that her stem was constructed in a peculiar manner, forming a ram which protruded under the water. It was contended in the court below that there were other points of contributory negligence on the part of the Bellerophon, that the Bellerophon was a ship that drifted to leeward in some unusual way, and that notice of this tendency ought to have been given to the Flamsteed. It was also suggested that she had hoisted her jib and that her head paid off, and that the paying off to leeward partly induced the collision that took place, and brought the Flamsteed more immediately under the bows of the Bellerophon. However, those two points were ultimately abandoned upon the argument before their Lordships, and the only point for their consideration is whether the Bellerophon was guilty of contributory negligence, in omitting to give notice to the Flamsteed that her stem was so constructed that a vessel going close under her bowsprit might sustain damage by reason of this ram. On the part of the appellants, it was said the law requires that wherever persons control and are in possession of a dangerous instrument, which is latent, and which may produce damage to others, they are bound to give notice of the existence of that latent instrument of danger, and therefore that the circumstances in the present case imposed upon the Bellerophon the obligation to give notice of the existence of the ram in her bow. It appears to their Lordships important to consider exactly what the nature of this latent instrument of danger in the bow of the Bellerophon was. It was insisted by the learned counsel, and truly said, that it was intended for the purpose of causing damage to others, and no doubt the ram upon the Bellerophon was for the purpose of being used as an instrument of offence in naval warfare, and would be or might be efficacious for that purpose. But it was not an instrument in itself necessarily dangerous to persons navigating the high seas; on the contrary, except under certain extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, it could produce no danger whatever to any of Her Majesty's subjects or others so navigating. Still, if, being such as it was, and under the circumstances which took place, the captain of the Bellerophon (speaking of him for convenience sake as the person responsible), had under the circumstances reasonable ground for supposing that this ram would occasion danger to the Flamsteed, and had reasonable means and opportunity of warning the Flamsteed of that danger so as to enable her to avoid it, then, although the Flamsteed had in the first instance been guilty of negligence, and even although by her negligence she had occasioned the necessity for giving notice, still their Lordships are of opinion it would have been the duty of the captain of the Bellerophon, or of those in charge of her, to have given that notice to the captain of the Flamsteed. Their Lordships entirely concur in the view that if there be a latent instrument of danger, those who have the control and the possession of it are bound to take all reasonable precautions that it shall not cause damage to others. But they are of opinion that there was no obligation upon the captain of the Bellerophon to give notice of this ram unless there was a reasonable probability of danger to the Flamsteed from the want of notice; and further unless he had a reasonable opportunity of giving such a notice as might have enabled the Flamsteed to avoid the ram.

[PRIV. Co.

Many cases have been referred to in support of the proposition as stated by the appellants from which their Lordships do not in any way dissent; but they are unaware of any case which establishes a rule of law which would conflict with that to which reference has been made, namely, that the obligation to give a notice or a warning of danger must arise from the existence of some reasonable probability of danger to the party to whom that notice is to be given, and an opportunity of giving it so as to enable such party to avoid the danger; and applying that rule in the present case, their Lordships, upon the facts, think that there is no ground whatever for saying that at any period of this collision, the captain of the Bellerophon, or those in charge of the Bellerophon, had any reasonable ground to suppose that anyone navigating the Flamsteed would have placed that vessel in a position which would have rendered notice of the existence of the ram necessary to preserve them from danger. When the captain of the Flamsteed was asked in the court below what ought to have been done by the Bellerophon, and when ought the notice to have been given, it was said by the captain at first that it ought to have been given when he was approaching the ironclad, the Flamsteed being then directed amidships; but is it reasonable that their Lordships should suppose upon these facts that the captain of the Bellerophon was to assume that the Flamsteed had any such wild intention as that of almost scraping the starboard side of his ship, so as to become entangled, and thrown across his bows, under his bowsprit and close to his stem? The captain of the Flamsteed himself seems to have thought that at that time there was no danger of his getting so close. After he had said that the notice might have been given to him when he was off the quarter, because "he (the captain of Bellerophon) saw we were going to try to pass to leeward of him," it was observed to him, "He did not think you were coming close to him?" his answer was No, nor I did not think so either." Therefore it appears perfectly clear that at that period there could have been no obligation arising from any reasonable anticipation of any contact between the Flamsteed and the ram for any notice to be given to the Flamsteed of the existence of that ram.

66

But it is suggested that at some subsequent time that notice ought to have been given. With reference to that suggestion, it is to be observed that the whole of the transaction described occupied but a very short time. The learned counsel for the appellants observed that Capt. Wells, in putting the time at something over a minute, had understated it. That is possible. The captain of the Flamsteed himself states it at two or three minutes. People do not look at their watches on these occasions so as to estimate accurately the time, but their Lordships think it safe to assume upon the evidence that the whole of this took place in a very short space of time, that it was a continuous act occupying it may be a minute, it may be a minute and a half, or two, or even three minutes, and yet it is suggested that it was to be expected from the captain of the Bellerophon, and that he ought, in the midst of the confusion occasioned by the mismanagement of the Flamsteed, to have anticipated that the Flamsteed would go close across his bows, and that he could and ought then to have given notice.

Ех. Сн.]

This seems to their Lordships to be a proposition that cannot possibly be maintained. Admitting fully the obligation to give the notice, if there were reasonable ground for apprehending danger, and if a notice conld be given so as to be productive of the effect of averting that danger, yet on the facts of this case their Lordships come to the conclusion that there was no reasonable ground for anticipating any danger to the Flamsteed from the rain, and they are further advised that in a nautical point of view there was no period after the first collision when any notice to the Flamsteed would or could have averted the unfortunate accident, and therefore that there was no omission upon the part of the captain of the Bellerophon which would constitute the contributory negligence sought to be established in this

case.

In one of the cases cited of Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway Company (29 L. J. 247, Ex.), the late Mr. Justice Willes seems, to have laid it down very clearly, "Negligence is the absence of care more or less according to the circumstances." It is the circumstances that must regulate the obligation to give notice, or to do any other act which would have the effect of averting danger from those who might otherwise be exposed to it. Their Lordships, therefore, come to the conclusion that this collision in the first place was produced wholly and entirely by the fault of the Flamsteed, and that there was no negligence on the part of those in charge of the Bellerophon, at any period of that collision.

Under these circumstances their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty to affirm the judgment of the High Court of Admiralty, and also that this appeal be dismissed with costs to be paid by the appellant.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for the appellants, Pritchard and Sons.

Proctor for the respondent, H. G. Stokes, Admiralty Proctor.

EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by ETHERINGTON SMITH Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Saturday, June 19, 1875.

(Before BRAMWELL, B., BLACKBURN, LUSH, and QUAIN, JJ., POLLOCK, and AMPHLETT, BB.) THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL COMPANY v. SAUNDERS.

Marine insurance-Fire insurance-Double insurance- "Insured elsewhere"-Construction of policy.

The plaintiffs insured wool against fire with the defendants," in any shed, or store, or station, or in transit to S. by land only, or in any shed or store, or on any wharf in S., until placed on board ship." They afterwards entered into another policy with another insurance company in these terms: "Lost or not lost at and from the river H. to S. per ship or steamers, and thence per ship or steamers to L., including the risk of craft, from the time that the wools are first waterborne, and of transshipment and landing and reshipment at S." It was a condition in the defendants' policy that if the wool

was

[Ex. CH.

"insured elsewhere," notice of such insurance was to be given to them, otherwise the policy was to be void. No notice of this second policy was given to the defendants by the plaintiffs. The wool was burned while in warehouse at S. where it had been placed for the purpose of storage, and was waiting for reshipment. The plaintiffs sued on the first policy for the loss of the wool.

Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas), that they were entitled to recover. That the second policy did not apply to keeping goods on land, but only to marine risks, that these goods were not within the meaning of the words, “transshipment, landing, and reshipment at S." while stored in warehouses there, and that there was therefore no double insurance, and consequently the goods were not "insured elsewhere" so as to make notice of the second policy necessary. Held also, that by "insured elsewhere" was meant a specific insurance of the same risks, and that the words were not satisfied in the case of different policies upon different policies upon different risks, by the mere possibility of one overlapping the other under some possible circumstances. THIS was an appeal from the judgment of Willes and Keating, JJ., sitting as a division of the Court of Common Pleas in favour of the plaintiffs, in an action brought by them on a policy of insurance against the loss by fire of some wool, which was burned while in store at Sydney, in Feb. 1870.

The plaintiffs are large shippers of wool from Australia to London, and most of it is grown up the country and brought down to Sydney for shipment. The wool comes sometimes by land to Sydney, and is thence shipped to England. It sometimes comes down the river Hunter in steamers to Sydney, and is reshipped without being landed; or it is landed from the steamers and placed in warehouses for the purpose of being pressed, and it is frequently stored whilst waiting for shipment. Wool which is to be pressed is taken to the stores of the stevedores of the ship in which it is to be loaded, and is by them pressed and warehoused. Wool received by the stevedores is considered as between the ship and shippers as being in the custody of the ship, and the stevedores charge the pressing and warehousing against the ship. The stevedores give receipts for wool received by them, which are treated by ship and shippers as equal to mates' receipts, and in exchange for them bills of lading are given on demand whether the wool is in store or on board the ship. Wool brought by steamers to Sydney by the river Hunter for shipment to England is usually removed by drays from the wharves, where it is landed from the steamers, to the store of the stevedore appointed to store and press for the ship for which the cargo is intended. At these stores all descriptions of goods are kept for shipmeut and other purposes, but they are principally used for storing and pressing wool for shipment.

The wool in question came in several steamers by the river Hunter to Sydney, and on being landed was taken possession of by one Moore, as agent for the plaintiffs, and conveyed to his stores to be weighed. Moore engaged a ship to carry the wool to England, and afterwards sent the wool to the stores of the stevedores of the ship, who had received authority from the master to receive wool for shipment by that ship; they received the wool, and gave the usual stevedore's

Ex. CH.]

receipts on behalf of the ship. Whilst the wool was in the stevedores' stores waiting for shipment the plaintiffs effected a policy of fire insurance with the defendants in these terms: "On wool in fleeces or bales in any shed or store or station, or in transit to Sydney by land only, or in any shed or store, or on any wharf in Sydney, until placed on board ship." And there was also a provision in clause 5 of the policy that "No claim shall be recoverable if the property insured be previously or subsequently insured elsewhere, unless the particulars of such insurance be notified to the company in writing, provided that upon such notice being given after the issue of the policy, it shall be optional with the company to cancel the same, returning the rateable premium for the unexpired term thereof." In Jan. 1870, the plaintiffs effected a policy of marine insurance in the Indemnity Mutual Insurance Company, as follows: "Lost or not lost at and from the river Hunter to Sydney, per ship or steamers, and thence per ship or steamers to London, including the risk of craft, from the time that the wools are first waterborne, and of transshipment and landing and reshipment at Newcastle and Sydney." No notice of this insurance was given to the defendants' company. After both these insurances had been effected, and while both the policies were in force, viz., on Feb. 9th 1870, a fire took place at the stevedores' stores, and 182 of the plaintiffs' bales were burned. Other bales of the plaintiffs which had been at other stores were afterwards shipped on board the said ship, and bills of lading were given in respect thereof in return for the stevedores' receipts. The carriage of the wool in question down the river Hunter to Sydney was under a distinct contract from the contract for carriage from Sydney to London. The plaintiffs sued the defendants on their fire policy for the loss and obtained judgment in their favour, against which judgment this appeal was brought.

The question raised was whether the first or the second policy applied, and, if the latter, whether the defendants were not relieved from all liability by the operation of clause 5. The court below

held that the second policy did not insure the goods on land, but was a marine policy, simply covering, in addition to the perils of the seas, only such risks as arose upon the loading and discharge of the vessels and the necessary transshipment incidental to the voyage.

Manisty, Q.C. (Edwards, Q.C. with him) for the defendants. The question arises here from the plaintiffs having effected two policies, first, the fire policy with the defendants, and secondly, what may be called the marine policy with the Indemnity Mutual Insurance Company. There being a proviso against double insurance without notice, the first question is, whether the marine policy covered the same risk as the fire policy, because, if it did, then, notice not having been given to the defendants of the second insurance, they are not liable under the provisions of their own policy. It is therefore admitted that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the defendants on the Liverpool policy, unless the marine policy covered the same risk. Looking at the words of the latter policy, it is an insurance which attached when the goods were loaded on craft in the river Hunter, and continued while they were at Sydney, and during transshipment, and during the voyage to London (Pelly v. The Royal Exchange Assurance

[Ex. CH.

Company, 1 Burr. 341). [BLACKBURN, J.-The marine policy cannot attach until it is destined for a particular ship.] We contend that the policy attached when the goods were put on the ship in the river, and continued while they were being transshipped at Sydney; and that by the custom and practice, they were then to be considered just as if on board ship. The practice necessitated the temporary warehousing of the wool before loading it again on the ships for England, and the risk when so warehoused is covered by the words of the policy" transshipment, and landing, and reshipment."

Watkin Williams, Q.C. (J. C. Mathew with him) for the plaintiffs.-The Liverpool policy, it is admitted covers the loss, unless it is taken out of it by the operation of clause 5, which is that if the assured" insured elsewhere," the policy was not to hold good unless notice was given. The plaintiffs' contentions are: First, they were not insured elsewhere; that is, the loss was not covered by the marine policy; secondly, if it were possibly covered, that does not constitute an insurance elsewhere within the meaning of the policy:

Harrison v. Ellis, 7 E. & B., 465;

Pearson v. The Commercial Union Assurance Company, ante, vol. 2, p. 100; 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 279; L. Rep. 8 C. P. 548.

As to Pelly v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company (ubi sup.), if there had been an affreightment from the river to London, then, perhaps, transshipment being necessary, this warehousing might have been held to be incidental to the transshipment. But the case is different here. They were warehoused for the convenience of the owners, and if the goods were taken to a warehouse for any purpose, not being part of the actual transshipment, then it is contended the marine policy would not apply; secondly, the provision in clause 5 does not apply to cases where the goods are only possibly, but where they are specifically insured. Here even if possibly the policies might overlap, there is no specific insurance, and so the plaintiffs need not have given notice, and when could notice as a question of fact have been given ? The clause manifestly points to a similar description of policy to the fire policy, and does not mean a marine policy.

Manisty, Q.C. in reply.-The plaintiffs were bound to give notice, whatever the effect might be; they were, in the words of the clause, "insured elsewhere," and they must give it after the fire if they could not give it before. The real question is, did the marine policy, in fact, cover the risk, and if it did, it matters not whether it did so accidentally or not. Crompton, J., in his judgment in Harrison v. Ellis (ubi sup.), shows that the ground of the judgment is that there would have been in fact a double insurance. So in Pearson v. The Commercial Union Assurance Company (ubi sup.), the deviation was held not within the scope of the policy, because the jury had expressly found that the ship was moored in the river for an unreasonable time, and for a particular purpose unconnected with the transit.

Ex. CH.]

Sydney, per ship or steamers, and thence per ship or steamers to London, including the risk of craft, from the time that the wools are first waterborne and of transshipment and landing and reshipment at Sydney," that is, including the case where the wools are taken from one ship to another, and where it is necessary to land them for that purpose, and afterwards the risk of reshipping. This, it is quite clear to me, does not include a loss by fire of the goods when warehoused on land, which is no part of landing or transshipment, and it is so clear that one need only read the words themselves to perceive it to be so. But it is said nevertheless, that the wools were virtually on board the ship at the time of loss, and so within the policy. In point of fact, however, they were not on board ship, nor were they in course of the act of reshipment. I am therefore very clearly of opinion that this particular loss could not be recovered against the underwriters on the marine policy. But then, the assured was not to recover if any other insurance were effected and not notified to the Liverpool company. Now, as far as mere words go, there might here be said to be an isurance elsewhere, but was there in fact ? Mr. Manisty says that the words "insure elsewhere" must be an insurance as to the whole or a portion of the risks in the policy sued on. If so, in my opinion, this is not a case of such double insurance, because no action could have been maintained on the Marine Insurance policy in respect of this loss, but the action could be maintained on the policy in question. Then it was said here that there was a possibility of the goods being within the risk covered by both policies. For my part I doubt whether such a possibility would be sufficient; for to come within the provision, there must be such a double insurance as that the underwriters in the one case would have the benefit of the other. But in my opinion there is no evidence here that the risk in the two policies did overlap one another. It is suggested as the policy on wool to Sydney was in these terms, on wool in fleeces or bales, in any shed, or store, or station, or in transit to Sydney by land only, or in any shed or store, or on any wharf in Sydney until placed on board ship," that landing and reshipment might involve putting the goods on a wharf, so that while there if a fire occurred, there would be a loss within the scope of the policy. The answer is first, that there is no evidence that there could be such a mode of landing and reshipment as one process, going on as a continuous process in the manner supposed, nor do I believe that it exists; and that being so, the possible case which has been put is therefore a possible case as to which we have no evidence of its possibility in point of fact. Another answer is, that if it were so, the marine policy would cover the loss, and the fire policy would not. It seems, therefore, that the loss by fire is not within the marine policy for the reasons given; and next, although it is possible a case might occur in which the loss might be in both policies, yet first there was no evidence that such could take place at Sydney; and secondly, if it were possible there, it would show that the case was not in the fire policy at all, but in the marine policy, and so in neither case would there be a double insurance.

66

BLACKBURN, J.-I also think that the judgment below should be affirmed. The fire policy is on "wool in fleeces or bales, in any shed, or store, or VOL. III., N.S.

[Ex. CH.

station, or in transit to Sydney by land only, or in any shed, or store, or on any wharf in Sydney until placed on board ship." The wool was, in fact brought to Sydney and stored there, and before it was put on board ship was burnt, and so it is, I think, quite clearly a loss for which the insurers were liable unless they are saved by the 5th clause of the policy, which is to the effect that the policy was to be void if the wool were insured elsewhere without notice given to the insurance company. Now, I think, taking that and the average clause together, that it is clear what is meant and if the marine policy did insure the goods on shore then the plaintiffs ought to have given notice of the insurance to the defendants, but such a construction of the clause would be too mnch strained if we were to say this notice was equally necessary if the second insurance was of a different character to the first. It must I think, have been a second insurance against fire, and I do not think that if there were only an accidental and possible overflapping of the policies, this was contemplated in the words "insured elsewhere." Then arises the question does the marine policy, in fact, cover the goods in the warehouse at Sydney? The facts are that the goods came down the river Hunter to Sydney, and were put in Moore's warehouse there until it was convenient to secure a ship in which to forward them to England. Thence they were sent to the stevedore's warehouse, and there they were burned. They would not primaâ facie be covered by the marine policy when they were on land, but the words of the policy go on to say "including the risk of transshipment and landing and reshipment at Sydney,". Now I do not think that it was a deviation, landing the goods at Sydney, so as to vitiate the insurance on that account, but it is very difficult to say that the underwriters in a marine policy are liable for a fire on shore. It would require evidence of a very strong custom to induce me to think that the goods were just in the same position as if on board ship, and there is none here to establish this contention. I think, therefore, that "insured elsewhere means specifically insured, and against the same risks and under the same conditions, and at the same time, and not a mere possibility of a wholly different insurance overlapping. For this reason and upon the facts stated, I think that the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed.

LUSH, J.-I also think that the judgment of the court below ought to be affirmed upon the ground that the goods were not insured elsewhere in any other office against fire "in any shed, or store, or station, cr on any wharf in Sydney." I do not think any of those events were ever covered by the marine policy. It says: [The learned judge then read the principal clauses.] Now I think this means landing in the course of the voyage as incidental to it merely, and as a means of transshipment which would be necessary from the river craft to the ship. Here, as I understand the facts, the goods came down to Sydney in several instalments, and were stored in warehouses until it was convenient to send them on to London. If so, it was not a landing and reshipment within the meaning of the policy at all, and so this disposes of the contention that the goods were just in the same position as regards the policy as if on board ship. As to the second question it does not arise in my opinion, for the marine policy ceased to be in force from the moment of the

F

goods being landed as described. But I will go further than this, and say that I do not think that a policy which in certain events may possibly overlap the former one is such a one as that the assured would have under the provision in the defendants' policy to give notice of it to the underwriters.

In

QUAIN, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think the first question is what the risk undertaken by the Indemnity Company was, and I find it to be in the words of the policy of transshipment, landing, and reshipment. Now first, I think that the goods lost were not being transshipped, landed, or reshipped within the meaning of these words; nor secondly, do the facts found extend it in the present case by reason of any custom. There may perhaps be some customs so notorious as to qualify the plain meaning of words as simple and intelligible as these, but here there is no such notorious custom found to exist in the case. Lord Mansfield's words, I should define the risk as being that which the insurers knew would arise from the ordinary and known course of trade, and the custom must be one so notorious and universal that it always made it necessary for the particular course to be adopted, which was in fact adopted. Now so far from this being so here, I find in paragraph 7 of the case it is stated that sometimes this is done and sometimes that, and they are not therefore invariable and necessary practices, and consequently do not come within the words of the policy. On the second point I agree with the rest of the court, because I think that what was intended by the 5th clause is a certain definite policy, and not a mere contingent risk. not clear that the goods would be landed and warehoused at Sydney, and so this was not in my opinion an insurance elsewhere within the meaning of the condition so as to require notice of it to be given.

It was

POLLOCK, B.-I am of the same opinion. The first question is whether by the marine policy having been effected it can be said that the goods previously covered by the Liverpool policy were then insured elsewhere. I refer to the marine policy itself to see, and I quite agree with what was said by Willes, J., in the court below that it was meant to cover marine risks in a marine transit. It is reasonable to assume that when that was entered into the intention was that the goods should go to England. Then what did actually occur was not something incidental to the marine transit, but something which made a break in the course of the water transit, and put it into the power of the agent at Sydney to send the goods elsewhere. It is true that the goods when burned were in the hands of a stevedore, but then there had been a distinct break in the voyage when they came to be put into his warehouse. Having disposed of that, there is therefore one other point only.

If the second policy

did chance to overlap the former one, could it be said that the goods were thereby insured elsewhere so as to absolve the defendants altogether? On this point I agree with my brother Bramwell. These conditions had been of late inserted into fire policies with the object of enabling the insurers to know the character of the risk, and that the parties had the real value of the goods insured. But it would manifestly be quite immaterial to the underwriters of a fire policy whether they knew or not that the assured had a wide

[ADM.

On

marine policy also, even if the two policies might possibly in some event overlap. On both grounds I think the judgment ought to be affirmed. AMPHLETT, B.-I am of the same opinion. the main point I quite agree with the rest of the court, and will not repeat what they have said. On the second question, if we think that the marine policy did not attach, the second point of the defendants is no longer open because paragraph 21 of the case admitting that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover unless they are deprived of this remedy by means of having effected the marine policy excludes it. That clause could have no operation if they had not insured the risk under the marine policy. But I agree that the plaintiffs had no double remedy, and say further that, in my opinion, in no event could there be one under these policies, or could the policies overlap, because the only event within the marine policy would be a fire happening while the goods were on shore for the express purpose of being reshipped. But if so the words in the fire policy "on any wharf in Sydney" would not mean this, because the goods would be considered in law as on the ship while they were being shipped.

Judgment affirmed.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs: Waltons, Bubb, and Walton. Attorneys for the defendants: Chester, Urquhart, and Co.

COURT OF ADMIRALTY. Reported by J. P. ASPINALL, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

May 11 and June 1, 1875.

BANDA AND KIRWEE BOOTY. (a) Booty of war-Reference to Admiralty CourtNon-payment of part of booty-DistributionJurisdiction.

When the Crown grants to captors booty of war and

(a) This case cannot be called a "maritime law case,' but it deals with a subject which is intimately connected with prize law, and turns to some extent upon jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty as a prize court, and it was hence thought desirable to insert it here.

The origin of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty as a prize court is very doubtful. From the reign of Charles II. it has derived its jurisdiction as a prize court entirely from a commission from the Crown issued at the commencement of each war to the Lords of the Admiralty. Whether prior to that reign the court exercised jurisdiction as a right incident to the office of Lord High Admiral and his deputy, there appear to be no documents in existence to show. It seems, however, probable that prize jurisdiction was originally inherent in the office of the Admiral, and that special commissions calling forth the jurisdiction are of comparatively modern institution. Prior to the reign of Elizabeth England was seldom at peace with her neighbours, and, although the wars may not have been of any importance, it appears by the State papers that there were perpetual captures of ships by British vessels; in fact, before there was a regularly established fleet belonging to the Crown, the captains of ships do not seem to have waited for a declaration of war; they seized any foreign vessel where there was a pretext for quarrel. In this state of things the services of the Admiralty Court, or some other tribunal, were constantly called into requisition to decide the question of prize or no prize, The Admiralty Court was not the only tribunal which formerly investigated questions of prize, In A.D. 1343 a British ship having seized and brought in another ship as prize, an order was issued by Edward III. to his Chancellor and council to call the parties before them, inform themselves of the facts, and render complete and speedy justice to the