APPENDIX

TO THE

MONTHLY REVIEW,

VOLUME the THIRTIETH.

De la Nature. Par J. B. Robinet.

A Philofophical Effay on the Syftem of Nature. 8vo. Vol. II. Printed at Amfterdam, for Harrevelt: imported by Becket and De Hondt.

T is now about two years fince the first volume of this extraordinary treatife made its appearance in public; in the mean time, the bold and daring fingularity of the Author's fentiments, have drawn upon him no little obloquy, from the profefied Advocates for eftablished opinions. This hath not deterred him, however, from proceeding in his intended career, and advancing propofitions ftill more exceptionable, more daring and fingular. In his former volume, he had only the Philofophers to contend with; in the prefent, he hath braved all the authority and zeal of the Theologifts, by much the more formidable Antagonists of the two. Equally zealous in the cause of fuppofed truth, as others may be in that of orthodoxy, he rushes boldly into the ftrongeft holds of his Opponents, regardless of all perfonal confequences. How far he hath, in this, acted the prudential part, either with regard to himself, or even to the propagation of what he apprehends to be truth, and which he appears to have fo much at heart, we prefume not to determine. Certain it is, that he hath difplayed a confiderable fhare of phylofophical ingenuity, as well as logical acumen throughout the greater part of his performance; and, tho' we conceive him to be fometimes egregiously mistaken, as to very effential points in his first principles, his mistakes are evidently thofe of a man of genius, by which fucceeding Writers, of greater attention, may profit. Indeed, the principal fault in this Writer feems to betoo much precipitancy, the common attendant on quick parts, and a lively imagination. He is alfo too diffufe, and too deßAPPEND. K k

cient

cient in the analytic method, to treat fuch abftracted fubjects with all the perfpicuity requifite to establish any propofitions concerning them, on a folid and unexceptionable bafis. Notwithstanding thefe obvious defects, however, this treatife abounds with fhrewd cbfervations and reflections on the most curious topics of theological and metaphyfical difquifition. In juftice to the ingenious Author, therefore, and for the fatisfac tion of our Readers, we fhall give as concise an abstract of it, as the multiplicity and variety of subjects treated of, will ad

mit.

Mr. Robinet hath divided his treatise into five parts; the first intended to prove the neceffary equality between phyfical good and evil; the fecond, relative to the uniform generation of phyfical Beings; the third, containing the doctrine of moral inftinct; the fourth, the natural hiftory of the human foul. Of thefe four parts, we have already given a fhort account; at prefent, therefore, we have only to confider the fifth and laft; containing an enquiry into the Being and Attributes of the Author of Nature, or God.

In the third chapter of the first part of this work, the Author had advanced the neceflity of the existence of a God, or of a fift Caufe, of which all the phenomena of Nature are the effects. But, as to the effence or attributes of that God, we are deftined, fays he, to remain for ever ignorant of them, and may fill, with the fame propriety as the Athenians once did, infcribe our temples to the UNKNOWN GOD. The intent and design of this fifth part of our Author's treatife, is, to explain and justify his fentiments on this head; which he hath here very elaborately attempted; dividing his feveral arguments and illuftrations into no less than eighty-nine chapters, befides an Appendix. Our Readers will hardly expect us to fpecify feverally the fubject of each, as we should have, in that cafe, barely room for a mere tranflation of the table of contents: but we fhall endeavour to give a general idea of the Author's principal arguments and manner of reafoning.

He fets out with obferving, there is fo great a difference between the perfections of an infinite Being, and the qualities of a finite Being, that the terms we make use of in fpeaking of the attributes of the Deity, have abfolutely no meaning, becaufe they do not convey any precife ideas to the minds of those who make use of them. It is impoffible, fays he, to comprehend

This would have prevented a number of tautologies and repetitions to be met with throughout, and have fhortened the treatife, at least one half.

See Review, vol. XXVI. p. 143-376.

any

any thing by the words used to exprefs things confeffedly incomprehenfible. He looks upon it, therefore, as only a more refined fpecies of Anthropomorphitifm to inveft the Deity with the attributes of goodnefs, wifdom, juftice,-different only in degree, from thofe qualities in men. On this head he shrewdly obferves, that the merit, or the degree, of thefe virtuous qua lities in man, confifts in, or, at least, is enhanced by, his being fubject to the contrary qualities, having it in his power or choice to do good or ill; whereas there is no fuch imperfection in the Deity, who is incapable of evil.

With regard to the notions commonly formed of the attributes of the Deity, he obferves, that they are only the fimple ideas of existence, power, knowlege, &c. elevated, or annexed, to our notion of infinity; or, to speak more precifely, that we conceive thofe qualities to be infinite and unlimited, tho' it is impoffible for us to form a conception of them as fuch, Under this head he examines and compares the fentiments of Mr. Locke, Dr. Clarke, Dr. Harris, and others, refpecting the application of the terms expreffive of human qualities and faculties, to the attributes of God. The term action, for inftance, is applied in common both to the Deity and to created Beings, whereas the difference between their action must be altogether effential. Man cannot act without means; but God acts in and of himfelf, in a manner totally incomprehenfible, Man acts by certain means, and his wifdom confifts in chufing and employing the moft proper means to effect the end defigned. This is all we can understand, and yet from hence it is that we form the pretended idea of infinite wisdom, as if any human quality could be fufceptible of infinity. Thus, continues Mr. Robinet, every thing feems eafy to comprehend, if we reft fatisfied with a fuperficial obfervation; but every thing appears difficult and myfterious, if we penetrate farther; and hence Philofophers have in vain attempted to define the word at, fo as to be equally applicable to God and to created Beings.

It is, indeed, impoffible, according to this Writer, for man, in the present state of things, to acquire an idea adequate to any of the divine attributes; fo that it is equally impoffible that his words fhould express what is incomprehenfible. It is in Nature alone, fays he, that the types of every thing exit, of which we can have any pofitive, clear, and diftinét conception; all our experience being confined to natural objects. We can form no notion whatever, that is not founded on the fimple ideas acquired by our fenfes, or by the reflection of the mind, contemplating its own operations. When, therefore, we impute intelligence, wifdom, goodnefs, or any other attribute whatever to any Being, our ideas of thofe qualities to whatever de

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gree we may carry them, have always their bafis on what we have obferved and experienced among ourfelves. It is, therefore, impoffible, under the prefent difpenfation of things, for man to entertain any other notion of the perfections of the Deity, than that which he entertains of human perfections: and this is the anthropomorphitifm, which the Author combats in this work.

Mr. Robinet proceeds next to enquire into the fources of this supposed error, or, as he terms it, spiritual Anthropomorphitism; not that he affects to have made the discovery of this fo very general a misapprehenfion. Archbishop King, the celebrated Author of the Origin of Evil, he fays, faw it in its true light, and had he thought proper to have expofed it in its proper colours, would have faved our Author that trouble. Dr. King, however, is not the only English Writer that hath been of our Author's opinion in this refpect; but he seems either to be but little acquainted with fome late philofophical productions of this country, or elfe he hath wilfully concealed his knowlege of them; left his Readers fhould difcover fo much affinity in his fentiments as to think him obliged to them for many of the most notable and ftriking arguments he hath made ufe of in his Effay*.

The firft caufe of the above-mentioned error, our Author imputes to the natural weaknefs of the human understanding, in fometimes forming falfe conclufions on as falfe principles. Thus because the human mind can form no idea of qualities fuperior to thofe of intelligence, wifdom, juftice, and goodness, they boldly impute them to the Author of Nature: but what an inference is that? Muft God neceffarily poffefs qualities of the fame kind with man, because men have no conceptions of any other to attribute to him? A fecond caufe of this error is imputed to the abufe of ideal abftraction; as if it were poffible for us fo to abftract our ideas, as by elevating thofe of a finite Being to an infinite, we fhould convert an human quality into a divine attribute. Under this head the Author examines whether finite, created Spirits are rendered analogous to the infinite and uncreated Spirit of God, in confequence of any common attribute of thinking? This he determines in the negative; alledging, that God is not a thinking Being, nor even a Spirit, if by Spirituality is underftood intelligence or intellect. A third

Particularly for feveral of thofe made ufe of to fupport his doctrine of the per eft equality of phyfical good and evil in the universe, in the firft part of this work: and again many of thofe in fupport of his ar guments in the part before us, again imputing moral attributes to the Deity. See Epiftles philofophical and moral.

fource

fource of the above error, fays Mr. Robinet, is the imperfect ftate of languages, and their influence on opinions. Being under a neceflity of making ufe of the fame terms to defcribe certain divine attributes as well as human faculties, we inadvertently accustom ourselves to annex the fame ideas to them in both circumftances, including under the fame apprehenfion the attributes of God, and the faculties of man. But we have no other than human ideas, and an human language adapted to objects within our comprehenfion, and, confequently, incapable to express any thing fupernatural. Hence it is, that the words fee and know, are fo greatly mifapplied when they relate to the Deity. In this place the Author obferves, how very ready we are to put ourselves in the place of God; exemplifying Dr. Grew's famous explication of the Trinity, afterwards refuted by Le Clerc. A fourth caufe of this error, is conceived to be the famous doctrine of the univerfality and eternity of the ideas of truth, juftice, order, &c. in other words, the fitness of things. This doctrine, as commonly received, is controverted by our Author, with a good deal of acuteness and force; after which he goes on to confider the mode of generalizing our ideas, as conceived by Locke, Malbranche, and others. A fifth caufe of the above error of fpiritual Anthropomorphitifm, our Author imputes to the misunderstanding and mifconftruction of the holy Scriptures; with the doctrines of which, he maintains, that his philofophy is perfectly confiftent.

Having fpecified the feveral fources of the general mistaken method of forming our conceptions of the Deity, Mr. Robinet proceeds to a metaphyfical inveftigation of infinitude, immenfity, and eternity; in confequence of which he determines, that the words infinite, immenfe, and eternal, are epithets which we cannot, with any philofophical propriety, annex to intelligence, goodness, wifdom, juftice, &c. according to the fimple ideas we have of thofe qualities, or have annexed to those terms.

Had our Author ftopt here, and put an end to his treatife, we apprehend it would have been much lefs exceptionable, than it may be generally conceived at prefent: but the misfortune of the fanguine and precipitate, is, that, elated with a fmall advantage, they tempt fuccefs, till they mifcarry. The greatest defect of a Logician, next to proving nothing at all, is proving too much; and the next to that, the proving what is not immediately to the purpose, or bringing a weak argument to support

In his Cofmologia Sacra, where he fuprofes that God the Father, in reflecting on himself, formed fubftantial ideas; and that the Son and Izoly Ghost were only fich fubftantial images of the Father.

Bibliotheque Choifie. Tom. i. 238.