what he has already maintained by a stronger. This latter, we conceive to be the cate with our Author, during the remainder of his treatife. He hath endeavoured to demonftrate with great fhrewdne's and ability, that there is an effential diftinction between human qualities and divine attributes; in other words, that moral attributes cannot (without a latitude of which he is ignorant) e attributed to the Deity. His arguments, hitherto, have been founded on the firm basis of phyfical knowlege; which, as Lord Bacon obfe ves, is the foundation of all the sciences; in the farther puriuit of his fubject, however, he lets go this firm hold of the rod of experience, to catch at the metaphyfical reed of imaginary terms. In short, Mr. Robinet would re prove, or prove over again metaphyfically, what he exultingly thinks he hath fufficiently done by phyfical reasoning already. To this purpofe he founds a new argument on the Perfection of the Divine Reing: to which term, however, we conceive as many objections may be made, as he hath before done to wisdom, goodrefs, juftice, intelligence, && Our Author mistakes in thinking Perfection a metaphyfical and not a moral attribute *. He may fay, indeed, that he doth not think it fo. But then what hath he made it? Be this, however, as it will, on the fimple attribution of indefinite perfection to the Deity, he proceeds to determine, that God is not inteligent, good, nor holy; that he is neither juft nor unjust, free nor neceffitated; that he neither acts at random nor by defign; that he is ignorant of nothing, yet knows nothing. Our Readers will readily credit us when we affure them, there is more ingenuity than folid reafoning ufed in the fupport of these propofi tions. There is interfperfed, however, through the whole, as we before intimated, a confiderable fhare of metaphyfical knowlege, as well as great ftrength and acuteness of artificial reafoning.

Our Author afcribes metaphyfical attributes to the Deity; but thefe are all either incomprehenfible or negative. It is impoffible, however, to convey his meaning precify in any other terms thin his own. Les attributs metaphyfiques de Dieu, l'aficté, l'immenfité, la fimplicité, l'eternité, l'abiolue perfection, et toutes fortes d'infinité font des nega tions precjes des perfections reconnues dans la Creature. Ils ne difent rien de ce que Dieu eft, mais ils font je mont appliqués à cet etre ineffable, comme des titres par lequels nous reconnoiffons que fon effense, infiui. ment au-deffus des chofes naturelles, n'eft limitée en aucune matiere.' This Author muft have a notable hand, indeed, at the equivoque, to be able to have effected all that is here pretended.

It is to he obferved, however, that tho' our Author does not admit the Deity to be intelligent, good, nor holy, he maintains that he is wifer than intelligent, better than good, and more facred than holy.

2.

Among

Among many other curious propofitions difcuffed in this part of the work, is the fubject of Being, a fubject undoubtedly the moft curious and refined of all others, for it is in vain for Philofophers to write or talk, till they know what they are writing and talking about. Our Author hath wafted feveral pages in his enquiry into the nature of Spirit, the mode of existence of thinking Beings; the poffibility of endowing matter with a capacity of thinking; the fpecific intelligence of the foul; and other curious topics: we think, however, that in all thefe he hath begun at the wrong end of his enquiry. At least, we are certain, if he had as much phyfical knowlege as metaphyfical fubtilty, he would have rather made our ideas and fenfations the criterion of the existence of Matter, and thence proceeded to the investigation of Spirit, than have taken the former for granted, and bewildered himfelf about the existence and qualities of the latter. We would, indeed, recommend this method to an Author of Mr. Robinet's turn and abilities for thefe enquiries; not doubting but he will foon find the advantage of it, and feel his arguments, if we may fo exprefs it, ftand on a firmer bafis than they do at prefent. Thus, before we should enquire whether there be any analogy between the existence of God and of man, we should enquire into the nature of existence in general; and, to this purpofe, into the nature of our ideas of existence, and which way they were obtained. To this end, we should begin with the principle of Des Cartes. No man, in the first place, doubts of his own exiftence. He hath only to take a furvey of the objects around him alfo, to be convinced, that there are a multiplicity and diverfity of diftinct Beings comprehended in the univerfe. In the knowlege of the modes, in which thefe Beings feparately exift, and by which they are feverally diftinguifhed from each other, confifts the whole fcience of Ontology: exiftence, in general, being a term expreffive of an abftract idea, impoffible to define. Hence, tho' we may define the effence of any individual Being, or clafs of Beings, we cannot pretend to define the eflence of Being itfelf, or to defcribe how Beings in general exift. Indeed, this would not be to explain the eflence of things, but abfurdly to perplex our limited faculties, in order to explain the effentiality of that effence. To examine how we came firft by our ideas of exiflence, and what that idea is, we must begin with enquiring into the nature of our own consciousness. We fnould reflect, that if we had never felt, or perceived, any thing of ourfelves, or the objects around us, we never fhould have had any confcioufnefs of our own, or any notion of their, exiftence. It is, indeed, greely to be quellioned, whether the fenfe or confcioufnefs of our own exiflence, does not immediately

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arife from the perception of fome external object. Till fome impreffion be made on the organs of fenfe, no fenfation can be formed, and without fenfation no Being can form ideas, or think, much lefs medi.ate or reflect; fuch confcioufnefs of our existence, therefore, could not arife from thought or reflection. Till fome of the organs of fenfe alfo be affected or impressed by fome perceptible object, they could have no fenfation: for we cannot feel, hear, or fee nothing. Such confciousness could not arife from mere fenfation. What kind of confciousness then can be attributed to a Being without either reflection or fenfation? Surely none! The lowest degree of fenfe that can be imputed to an animal Being, is the fenfation of mere refiftance. The groffeft nerves, however, do not feel any refistance, unless fome object ftrike, prefs, or be fomehow obtruded against them; in which cafe they not only refift fuch percuffion, preffure, or obtrufion, as all other bodies of equal tenacity do, but they are affected, in fo doing, in a manner peculiar to themfelves, with what we call a fenfation. From this fenfation, the moft fimple of all others, is derived our idea of force or power, the fource of action; the first and most indefinite of all perceptible Beings. Now, that this power is not any thing merely inherent in, or the quality of, the perceptive faculty or organ, is evident; because we never experience the exertion of force, unless the organ of fenfe be oppofed by fome refifting object; the exertion felt being always proportionable to fuch refiftance; so that we can no more doubt that force or power exifts in the object, than that we feel its exiftence in ourselves. Hence we may derive the knowlege of the exiftence of feveral diftinct powers or phyfical Beings; from which by analyfis we may arrive at the moft fimple or primary element of thofe Beings, and by fynthefis, come to fuch a knowlege of the efficient caufe of their exiftence, as is deducible from philofophical inveftigation.

But we must here take leave of this performance; recommending it, under caution however, to all thole whofe tafte or curiofity may induce them to apply to metaphyfical studies,

Les Elemens primitifs des Langues, decouverts, &c. The primitive Elements of Language difcovered, by comparing the Hebrew Roots with thofe of the Greek, the Latin and the French. Comprehending an Enquiry into the Manner in which Languages are formed, and what they have in common with each other. By Mr. Lorgier, Doctor of Theo. Jogy, and Curate in the Diocefe of Befançon. 12mo. Paris, 1764. Imported by Becket and De Hondt.

THE

HE ingenious Author of this performance, prefents it to

THE

the public as an introductory Effay; intending, if it meet with encouragement, to confider the fubject more at large in a future work: his reafons for engaging in which, as well as an idea of his plan, may be gathered from the first Differtation.

All thofe, fays he, who have made the ancient languages their ftudy, or have been defirous of facilitating the study of them to others, have been fenfible of the neceffity of recurring to their roots; that is to fay, to the primitive words, from which all others are derived. It was with great reason they expected by fuch means to diminish their labour, as by fixing in the memory a fmall number of original terms, they would imprefs on the mind the whole language of which thofe terms were the elements. The knowlege of a language, particularly a dead one, confifts only in knowing the fignification of all the words it contains; the Syntaxis, or conftruction of language being eafily attainable by cuftom.

The Learned, continues he, who have given us Dictiona ries of the Greek and of the Oriental languages, have carefully diftinguifhed thofe terms which appeared to them to be the roots, or elements of fuch language; deducing all other words from this fource. He conceives, however, that they have not fucceeded, because they have generally taken verbs for the radical terms, whereas they fhould rather have adopted nouns: the latter expreffing objects themselves, and the former only the relations fubfifting between them. Mankind, doubtlefs, gave names to objects before they expreffed their relations; nouns, therefore, certainly are rather primitive terms than verbs. The latter have at moft given ufe only to verbal nouns, fignificant of the action of the verb from which they are derived; whereas the former have frequently no relation to any verb whatever, nor can poffibly have their derivation from them.

The true roots, or radical terms, of all languages, Mr. Bergier conceives to be monofyllables. Now the greateft part of the verbs in all languages, he obferves, are compofed of two or more fyllables, while there are an infinitude of particles and nouns which have but one fyllable; but is it natural, fays he, to fuppofe, that the compound word fhould be the root of the fimple, rather than that the fimple fhould be the radical of the compound? This obfervation is in a manner demonftrative, if we reflect, that every one of the fyllables in compound words hath each a particular meaning: fuch fyllables or fignificative particles being, in fact, the materials of which thofe words are conftituted,

constituted, and therefore must be regarded as the only genuine radical terms.

In the Hebrew Dictionaries, where the greatest pains have been taken to diftinguish these roots, there are ftill a great number of compound terms, whofe roots the Grammarians have not yet been able to difcover: if we can discover them, therefore, by a new method, it is a corroborating proof that theirs is falfe or defective. Again, There are a multiplicity of nouns whofe fignification is very different from that of the verbs, from which it is pretended they are derived; hence this method of derivation cannot poffibly be right. There are other nouns which, at the fame time, as they bear a fenfe analogous to that of the verb from which they are fuppofed to be derived, have other meanings annexed to them abfolutely different; thefe must be derived from fome other fource; and fuch nouns be evidently conftituted of different roots. Add to all this, that the Grammarians, not to depart from their principles, are often obliged to form verbs which are not in ufe, in order to ferve as the roots to compound words. Would it not be better, therefore, to renounce this arbitrary method, to infert in our Dictionaries none but terms in use, and to feek for their roots in the monofyllaBles of which they are compofed?'

Such is Mr. Bergier's fcheme, the neceffity of which, he tells us, hath been often felt by the Learned, but either from the difficulty of the task, or their avocation to other studies, i ́ hath never been effected. He doth not even make it a queftion, whether the elements of language are to be fought for in the Hebrew rather than in any other tongue, as he takes this point for granted; it being allowed on all hands, that the Hebrew is the most ancient, and bears the greatest marks of a primitive language*. He admits, nevertheless, that the Hebrew will hardly furnish us with three hundred monofyllables, a fmall number to compofe near two thoufand principal words, which are generally fpecified by the Grammarians, together with thofe other compound modes of diction, the fource of which they have not yet difcovered. Our Author is fo far from being d.fheartened at this circumftance, that he goes on to aggravate it, by faying, that out of the above-mentioned three hundred Hebrew monofyllables, at least a third of them must be thrown afide, as differing only in the ftronger or weaker method of pronouncing them. He ventures, nevertheless, to declare, that

Some ingenious Writers, however, have conceived, and, indeel, have fupported their opinion with much plausibility, that the Celtic language is, in this refpect, to be preferred to the Hebrew.

the