SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. See Investment

Company Act of 1940.

SELECTION OF JURIES. See Constitutional Law, II, 3.

SELF-DEFENSE AS DEFENSE TO MURDER. See Constitutional
Law, II, 2.

SENIORITY SYSTEMS. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1, 5.

SEX DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4; Inter-

vention.

"SITUS" TEST OF ELIGIBILITY FOR LONGSHOREMEN'S COM-
PENSATION. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 1.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. See also Abortions; Constitutional Law,
III, 5; VI.

1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Required disclosure of
illegitimate child's father-Intervening legislation.-District Court's hold-
ing that a Connecticut statute requiring that mothers of illegitimate chil-
dren, as a condition to receiving AFDC benefits, disclose to appellant
Commissioner of Social Services names of children's fathers, was valid
provided that state authorities first determine, in accordance with § 402
(a) of Social Security Act, that appellee mothers of illegitimate children
did not have "good cause" for refusing to disclose fathers' names, taking
into account "best interests of child," is vacated and case is remanded in
light of an intervening amendment to Connecticut statute so that Dis-
rict Court can clarify whether appellant is free to make his own "good
cause" and "best interests of the child" determinations in absence of
effective regulations of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Maher v. Doe, p. 526.

2. Aid to Families with Dependant Children-Unemployed Fathers-
Exclusion of fathers unemployed as result of misconduct, strike, or quit-
ting job.-Regulation promulgated by Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare pursuant to § 407 (a) of Act, and authorizing States par-
ticipating in AFDC-UF program, within their discretion, to exclude from
definition of an unemployed father entitling family to benefits under pro-
gram a father "whose unemployment results from participation in labor
dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances
which result or would result in disqualification for unemployment com-
pensation under the State's unemployment compensation law," is a proper
exercise of Secretary's statutory authority and is reasonable. Batterton
v. Francis, p. 416.

3. Medicaid-State funding of nontherapeutic abortions.-Title XIX
of Act, which establishes a Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid), does

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-Continued.

not require States to fund nontherapeutic abortions as a condition of par-
ticipation in program. Beal v. Doe, p. 438.

SOUTH CAROLINA. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 2.

STANDING TO SUE.

State agency performing trade association functions.-Appellee, a stat-
utory agency for promotion and protection of Washington State apple
industry and composed of 13 state growers and dealers chosen from
electoral districts by their fellow growers and dealers, all of whom by
mandatory assessments finance appellee's operations, has standing, in a
representational capacity, to bring action challenging constitutionality of
North Carolina statute requiring that all apples sold or shipped into
North Carolina in closed containers be identified by no grade on con-
tainers other than applicable federal grade or a designation that apples
are not graded. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, p. 333.
STATE AGENCY'S STANDING TO SUE IN REPRESENTATIONAL
CAPACITY. See Standing to Sue.

STATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION.
See Constitutional Law, III, 1.

STATE FUNDING OF ABORTIONS. See Abortions; Constitutional
Law, III, 5; VI; Social Security Act, 3.

STATE REAPPORTIONMENT PLANS. See Voting Rights Act of
1965, 2.

"STATUS" TEST OF ELIGIBILITY FOR LONGSHOREMEN'S
COMPENSATION. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'

Compensation Act, 2.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3, 4.
STAYS. See also Jurisdiction, 2.

Necessity of stay in absence of procedural safeguards.-State must allow
a stay where procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate re-
view, are not provided, and Illinois Supreme Court's order denying a stay
of trial court's injunction against petitioners denied this right. National
Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, p. 43.

STEWARDESSES. See Intervention.

STUDENT LOANS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.

SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.

Law, II, 1.

SUPREME COURT. See also Jurisdiction, 2.

See Constitutional

Notation of the death of Mr. Justice Clark (retired), p. v.

SWASTIKA DISPLAY. See Jurisdiction, 2.

TEXAS. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1.

THEFT OF AN AUTOMOBILE. See Constitutional Law, V, 1.

TIME LIMITATIONS ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS. See Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 3, 4.

TIMELINESS OF MOTIONS TO INTERVENE. See Intervention.
TUITION ASSISTANCE. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.

UNDUE HARDSHIP IN ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYEES' RE-
LIGIOUS NEEDS. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1.

UNEMPLOYED FATHERS. See Social Security Act, 2.

UNIVERSITIES. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.

UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES. See Civil Rights Act of
1964; Intervention.

VALUATION OF SECURITIES. See Investment Company Act of
1940.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION. See Constitutional Law, II, 3.
VOTING DISCRIMINATION. See Voting Rights Act of 1965.
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965.

1. Determination of Act's coverage of State-Preclusion of judicial
review. Provision of § 4 (b) of Act that a determination of Attorney
General or Director of Census that a State is covered by Act "shall not be
reviewable in any court," absolutely precludes judicial review of such a
determination. Hence District Court and Court of Appeals erred in hold-
ing that they had jurisdiction to review petitioners' claims that Attorney
General and Director of Census (respondents) had erroneously applied
§ 4 (b) in determining that Texas is covered by 1975 amendments to Act
extending its protections to language minorities, such as Mexican-Ameri-
cans. A "bailout" suit under § 4 (a) to terminate coverage is Texas' sole
remedy. Briscoe v. Bell, p. 404.

2. Reapportionment plan-Attorney General's objection nunc pro tunc.—
Where Attorney General initially failed to interpose timely objection
under § 5 of Act to new plan reapportioning South Carolina Senate found
constitutional by District Court for District of South Carolina, his ob-
jection to plan, nunc pro tunc, after District Court for District of Co-
lumbia in subsequent action challenging his failure to object directed him
to consider plan without regard to other District Court's decision, is
invalid, and therefore South Carolina is free to implement such plan.
Morris v. Gressette, p. 491.

WASHINGTON STATE. See Constitutional Law, I; Jurisdiction, 1;
Standing to Sue.

WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. "Adjoining terminal . . . customarily used . . . for loading [and]
unloading." 33 U. S. C. § 902 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. V) (Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, p. 249.

2. "Engaged in maritime employment." 33 U. S. C. § 902 (3) (1970 ed.,
Supp. V) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, p. 249.

WRONGFUL DEATH. See Certiorari.

WRONGFUL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES. See Banks.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1979 O

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