salient was determined by the intersection, with the prolonged perpendicular, of an are described with the curtain angle as centre, and the distance from the curtain angle to the opposite shoulder as radius. 3. Various additional outworks, or advanced works, have been constructed, with the idea of adding to the defence, or of occupying ground which it has been judged undesirable to leave to the enemy. Hornworks and crownworks have been already defined. They are placed covering either a bastion or a ravelin, and were used profusely in the larger fortresses of the Low Countries. At Tournay, for instance, in the old plans, almost every alternate front is covered by a large hornwork. Sometimes these are doubled and tripled, one before another. The cut below shows some other varieties of out Cut 7. work which have been added to the ravelin, and which, as they exist in actual fortresses, it is desirable to mention, though their benefits are very questionable, requiring, as they do, large garrisons, affording little opposition to an enemy's lodgment before their salients, facilitating his breaching the bastion by the duplication of their ditches, and affording ample spaces, when captured, for his lodgment. On the right front d, d are tenaillons, with a retrenchment ik. The long branches are perpendicular to the faces of the bastions. On the left front, a, & are demi-tenaillons, sometimes called lunettes; c is called a bonnet. Vauban, though the inventor of tenaillons, himself bandoned their use. Counter-guards are narrow additional ramparts rising out of ch. parallel to the escarp of the bastion or ravelin, which they are intended to protect from breaching. Sometimes the counter-guards form a continuous envelope enclosing several fronts. At Floriana, the suburb which protects the landward approach to Valletta, (Malta,) we find two large bastioned fronts, with their ravelins, covered by such a continuous envelope, which also has its ravelins. Before this envelope is a hornwork covered by a crownwork, and that by a lunette and covered-way, with spacious places of arms. The force of outworks could no further go! Yet this whole system is itself only an advanced-work to Valetta, which has its own coveredway, ravelin, envelope, giant bastions and cavaliers rising in the rear. -Pendant senie science ont de force ians quenquestes quan on sgait No service can be more trying to soldiers, or requires troops of a higher quality, than the prolonged defence of a fortress, where they are girt in by their own walls and ditches, as well as by the investing enemy; where offensive movements, unless on a petty scale, can rarely be effected; where, day after day, the assailant's progress is visible; where, though the garrison may resolve that he shall pay dearly for success, they scarcely can hope to be able to wrest it from his grasp. And as no duty can require, on the part of a chief, a greater degree of energy, prudence, patient fortitude, and readiness of resource, so none is more deserving of honour, when worthily executed. It may usually be true that the absolute defeat of a besieger, who enters on the operation with sufficiency of means and complete mastery in the field, is beyond hope. Even against such resources an energetic defence may cause great damage and insure great objects; but, moreover, in many cases an attack may be undertaken where the besieger's mastery of the field is not undisputed, or his means not sufficient. Such cases were nearly all the sieges undertaken in the Peninsula by the British army-twice unsuccessful at Badajos, and again at Burgos; and in such a case occurred the memorable defence of Tarifa against the French. The requirements of a good defence are suggested by the various steps of the siege-a parry for every thrust-but scarcely admit of such accurate description as the works of attack. The latter, in every regular siege, will have a substantial resemblance, and admit of dimensions, &c., being prescribed with more or less amplitude of margin. The former consist rather in the general exercise of the military virtues, and tactical skill to use rightly all the arms and resources of the service. This little work would, however, be incomplete without some sketch of the usual measures of defence. When a siege is probable, it will be the duty of the governor personally to verify the condition and amount of his stores, and to see that they embrace not only food, ammunition, and medical necessaries, but gabions, fascines, timber, iron, cordage, nails, tools, and the like. He must be supposed already to have made himself thoroughly acquainted with his fortress and its environs, its weaknesses and capabilities, in great detail, taking account especially of the amount of bomb-proof cover which can be obtained, the facilities of creating inundation, the nature of communications with outworks and within the ramparts, the remstances which, by any possibility, may assist surprise, uch as the existence of open drains, &c. Where the works are surrounded by wet ditches or intersected by rivers, he will provide rafts for communication, and see that the channels of the latter be barred by booms and stockades, and, in frost, the Tee kent broken. In foggy weather, close chains of sentries nnst be posted in, or beyond, the covered-way, and a rigid Inspection made of all persons and waggons entering the place. If the front of attack be determined, as in many cases it will be, by the nature of the ground. then traverses, blindages, and retrenchnents will be constructed. and materials assembled in convenient tenots. The fortress should be divided into distinct charges, each placed under the superintendence of an officer, who will study its peculiarities, and take every precaution against surprise. When a siege is actually determined on, the first measure of he besieger has been stated to be investment, for the purpose of arring communication, and the conveyance of supplies to the iace. The counter-movement on the part of the governor vill, of course, be to retard this investment, and prevent its being completed by surprise, so that he shall have time to recruit iericiencies in his garrison and stores, and defer the commencement of the siege as long as possible. To this end he will destroy the fords, bridges, and communications generaily, by which the enemy must advance; he will clear the country of supplies to as great a distance as his means admit, occupying, in favourable circumstances, with field-works and light artillery, positions on the routes of access, from which he can annoy the enemy's advance without compromising the retreat of his own parties; and he will keep patrols constantly on the alert in every direction. Entering by an open drain through the house of a friendly priest, Eugene surprised Cremona in 1702, and all but captured it. The enterprise failed from want of support, which was cut off by the destruction of the bridge over the Po. The allies, however, carried off Marshal Villeroi, the incompetent commander-in-chief of the French. His soldiers celebrated the double event in a "Français, rendons grâce à Bellone, Et perdu notre général ! ** |