*472] the following answer in the said report to the said question:"Mr. Stirling has for sixteen years past resided principally in Belize, Honduras: his health has not in any way suffered: he intends returning there for a few years, in about a month."

In a letter addressed by the said John Notman to the defendants on the 20th of the same month of June, and received by them on the 21st, he makes the following statement with respect to the said Mr. Stirling: -"Mr. Stirling proceeds to Belize about the end of this month." The said Michael Finlayson Stirling did not proceed to Belize until on or about the 9th of June, 1856, where he arrived about the middle or latter end of August, 1856; and continued there from that time until his death.

In the month of May, 1857, he caught a cold, which brought on an attack of jaundice and diseased liver, of which he died on the 13th of August, 1857, within the space of a year from his arrival at Belize: and he was buried at Belize aforesaid on the same day.

The fact of the death of the said Michael Finlayson Stirling was published in the obituary of a Glasgow newspaper in the course of the month of September last, from which source the plaintiffs and the said Archibald Livingston, the assignee of the said policy, first learnt that the said Michael Finlayson Stirling had left this country, and first learnt that he was dead.

Upon becoming acquainted with the fact of the decease of the said Michael Finlayson Stirling, the said Archibald Livingston communicated with the defendants; and the following correspondence took place :— "Policy No. 1845. 20007. "Michael Finlayson Stirling,

"Glasgow, 22d September, 1857. "We beg to intimate that this party died at Belize, *Hondu*473] ras, on the 13th ult., and will thank you to forward to us the necessary forms for proving the death, &c. Of course you are aware that our Mr. Livingston is in right of this policy under a regular deed of assignment duly intimated to your office.

(Signed) "LIVINGSTON & GARDINER." The following is a copy of the letter of the managing director of the Anchor Assurance Company, in reply:

"Anchor Assurance Company, "67, Cheapside, London. 23d Sept. 1857. "Gentlemen,-In reply to your letter of the 22d instant, intimating the death of Michael Finlayson Stirling, assured with this company under policy 1845, and which death took place at Belize, Honduras, I beg to refer you to the conditions of the policy, and to intimate to you, that, inasmuch as the assured had gone abroad without due notice thereof and payment to this company of the extra premiums, as in such case is always done, the policy, as a necessary consequence, has become forfeited, and the company is not liable for any payment in respect "THOMAS CAVE, Managing Director." To this reply Archibald Livingston made the following answer :

of it.

"Glasgow, 25th Sept. 1857.

"Re Stirling's policy, 1845.

"Your letter of the 23d inst. to Messrs. Livingston & Gardiner is to

hand; and, before placing myself in anything like a hostile attitude with the Anchor Assurance Company, I wish to state two things by way of explanation regarding the claim which has emerged under this policy,-1. The assured left this country unknown to me, and therefore I could not intimate to the office what I did not know myself. The first and only notice of the change of residence received by me was *that contained in the newspaper obituary of last week announc

ing the death,-2. By an endorsation on the policy, under date [*474

the 23d of June, 1853, liberty is granted to the assured to proceed to and reside at Belize, Honduras, upon payment of an extra premium of 20 guineas for one year's residence there, and for so long thereafter as the like extra premium shall from time to time be paid. Now, as I have just learned, the assured did not then go to Belize, and only proceeded thither last year, and died within a twelvemonth of his landing there, the company have been paid the extra premium fixed by themselves for the whole period of foreign residence exigible under the policy and endorsation thereon.

"Having made you aware of these facts, I now wish to know whether the claim is to be admitted on production of the usual certificates, which I shall at once procure on being furnished with the office forms. (Signed) "ARCHIBALD LIVINGSTON." Subsequently to this, the following letters passed between the said Archibald Livingston and the defendants:

"Archibald Livingston, Esq.

"London, 26th September, 1857.

"Sir,-In the absence of Mr. Cave, I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of yesterday's date. The contingency of Mr. Stirling's leaving the country without your knowledge is one that you took upon yourself when you purchased the policy. The license given in June, 1853, expired in June, 1854, in consequence of the extra premium not having been paid from time to time, as required by the license. "Per pro. THOMAS CAVE, Managing Director. "J. H. WOOD."

[*475

"Sir,-Your letter of the 26th instant has just been *received. As I wish to have the decision of your board on the claim which has arisen under the policy, I will thank you to lay the correspondence which has passed on the subject before the directors at their first meeting, and let me know the result. "ARCHIBALD LIVINGSTON."

"Policy 1845.

"London, Oct. 1st, 1857.

Sir, I brought your letters, re this death, before the board at their meeting this day, when I was instructed to inform you that they cannot admit the claim. THOMAS CAVE, Managing Director. "J. H. WOOD."

"Per pro.

The question for the opinion of the court, is, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the sum assured by the said policy of assurance, or any and what sum for the return of extra premium or other premiums, under the above circumstances.

If the court shall be of opinion in the affirmative, then judgment is to be entered up for the plaintiffs for 2000l. and costs, or such other sum as the court may direct: but, if the court shall be of opinion in the negative, then judgment of nolle prosequi, with costs of defence, shall be entered up for the defendants.

James Wilde, Q. C. (with whom was John Thompson), for the plaintiffs. (a) The question is, whether by *the terms of the memo

*476] randum, the party whose life was insured was bound to avail himself of the permission thereby given him at once, or whether, having paid a premium for a year's residence, he was at liberty to go at any period, and reside at the place indicated for one year, in consideration of the 20 guineas extra premium. [COCKBURN, Č. J.-The amount of the premium is calculated with reference to the man's age and state of health at the time of the bargain.] The language of the memorandum is general. The liberty is granted for "a year's residence at Belize,"to commence, of course, from the time the party first lands there. It nowhere appears that the sum charged for the extra risk is fixed with reference to the then age of the party. He is to be at liberty to reside at Belize, for one year, go when he may, and for so long thereafter,after the expiration of that one year, as the extra premium shall from time to time be paid. The language of the policy and of the memorandum is that of the company, and therefore is to be construed, if there be any ambiguity in it, most strongly against them: "Verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contrà proferentem." In Broom's Legal Maxims, 3d edit. 529, it is said: "It is a general rule, that the words in a deed are to be construed most strongly contrà proferentem,-regard being had, however, to the apparent intention of the parties, as collected from the whole context of the instrument; for, as observed by Sir W. Blackstone, the principle of self-preservation will make men sufficiently careful not to prejudice their own interest by the too extensive meaning of their *477] words, and hereby all manner of deceit in *any grant is avoided; for, men would always affect ambiguous and intricate expressions, provided they were afterwards at liberty to put their own construction upon them. Moreover, the adoption of this rule puts an end to many questions and doubts which would otherwise arise as to the meaning and intention of the parties, which, in the absence of it, might be differently construed by different judges; and it tends to quiet possession, by taking acts and conveyances executed beneficially for the grantees and possessors." The same rule of construction is applied in the case of guarantees. Thus, in Hargrave v. Smee, 6 Bing. 244 (E. C. L. R. vol. 19), 3 M. & P. 573, Tindal, C. J., says: "The question is, what is the fair meaning to be collected from the language used in this guarantee. The words employed are the words of the defendant in this cause, and there is no reason for putting on a guarantee a construction different from

(a) The points marked for argument on the part of the plaintiffs, were,

"1. That the license of the board of directors to the life assured, to reside at Belize, endorsed upon the policy, is for one year's residence at Belize unconditionally, and that the extra premium for such risk having been paid, and the life assured having died at Belize within one year of his arrival and residence there, the plaintiff's are entitled to recover the sum assured.

"2. In the event of the court deciding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the sum assured, that they are entitled to recover the extra premium and such ordinary premiums as may have been paid after the time from which it may be said that the policy became forfeited, and ceased to exist."

that which the court puts on any other instrument. With regard to other instruments, the rule is, that, if the party executing them leaves anything ambiguous in his expressions, such ambiguity must be taken most strongly against himself." And in Mayer v. Isaac, 6 M. & W. 605,612,† Alderson, B., says: "Undoubtedly, the generally received principle of law is, that the party who makes any instrument, should take care so to express the amount of his own liability as that he may not be bound beyond what it was his intention that he should be; and, on the other hand, that the party who receives the instrument, and parts with his goods on the faith of it, should rather have a construction put upon it in his favour, because the words of the instrument are not his, but those of the other party." The subject underwent discussion recently in the House of Lords, in Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 House of Lords Cases 484, where Lord St. Leonard's says: "It [the policy] is of course prepared by the *company, and if therefore there should be any [*478 ambiguity in it, must be taken, according to law, more strongly against the person who prepared it." Assuming, therefore, though it is not admitted, that there is any ambiguity here, the same principle of construction must be applied to this instrument. Then, if the policy be void, the plaintiff will be entitled at all events to recover back the 20 guineas extra premium, and the three half-years' premium paid since the time when the policy so became void.

Bovill, Q. C. (with whom was R. E. Turner), for the defendants.(a)The obvious intention of the parties was that the residence at Belize should commence immediately, or within a reasonable time. This is plain from the circumstance of the extra premium being declared to be payable at the same time as the other *premiums; and these are payable half-yearly, The application is for permission to "pro[*479 ceed to, and reside at," Belize. The words "for one year" have reference to the payment of the premium. The amount of premium for the foreign residence would necessarily vary according to the age of the party at the time of its commencement. In Jenk. Cent. 301, it is said, "A lease is made for twenty-one years, without mentioning the time. of its commencement: it shall begin immediately." [COCKBURN, C. J.— Every deed dates from the time of its delivery.] No one can fairly doubt the meaning of the parties here: the season of arrival would be an important ingredient in the consideration of the premium: and here the parties were evidently dealing with a view to an insurance of a person upon the eve of starting. [COCKBURN, C. J.-The company

(a) The points marked for argument on the part of the defendants, were as follows:"1. That the permission given by the defendants to the said Michael Finlayson Stirling to proceed to and reside at Belize, as stated in the memorandum, had expired before the said Michael Finlayson Stirling had left England, and that therefore the policy became forfeited by his departure for Belize in June, 1856.

"2. That the permission given by the memorandum was, a permission to proceed to Belize within a short time after the 23d day of June, 1853,-at all events, before the 9th day of June, 1856.

"3. That the language of the memorandum itself, and of the policy, and also the other documents which form part of the case, show that such is the construction to be put upon the memorandum; and that the said Michael Finlayson Stirling was not at liberty, under such permission, to proceed to and reside at Belize at any time after the 23d of June, 1853.

"4. That, the policy having become forfeited by the departure of the said Michael Finlayson Stirling to Belize in 1856, all sums paid to the office by way of premium, extra premium, or otherwise, are, under the terms of the policy, also forfeited."

might have placed the matter beyond doubt, by inserting the date fron which the year's residence was to commence.] If the argument on the other side be tenable, the party might have gone to Belize for a year's residence twenty years after the date of the memorandum. [COCKBURN, C. J.-Perhaps that would not have been very unreasonable, seeing that the company would have had the benefit of the ordinary premiums for all the intervening space.] The whole bargain was based on the assumption that Stirling was "about to proceed" to Belize at once. [WILLIAMS, J.-No doubt he intended and the company expected that his departure would take place at once: but neither party stipulated for it.] He was bound to go within a reasonable time. [WILLES, J.What is to be the test of reasonable time,--his convenience or his pleasure?] That would be a question for a jury. Then, as to the return of premiums. [COCKBURN, C. J.-You need not go into that.] J. Wilde was not called upon to reply.

*COCKBURN, C. J.-I am of opinion that the plaintiffs are en

*480] titled to judgment. In all probability, at the time the agreement was entered into whereby permission was given to Mr. Stirling to go to and reside at Belize on payment of the additional premium for the extra risk, both he and the company supposed that he was about to proceed thither at once, and consequently that his period of residence at that place would commence within a short period, viz., as soon as he should arrive there but there is no stipulation that he shall proceed to Belize and commence his residence there immediately. By the terms of the agreement, permission is given to Mr. Stirling "to proceed to and reside at Belize aforesaid, and for the time aforesaid, and for so long thereafter as the extra premium shall from time to time be paid along with the premium payable on this policy." It is true that that language is somewhat ambiguous; and it is doubtful whether the words "for the time aforesaid" have reference to the proceeding to as well as the residing at Belize, or only to the last part of the sentence. I am inclined to think, taking this expression in conjunction with the subsequent words, "and for so long thereafter as the extra premium shall from time to time be paid," that it has reference to the residence only, and not to the time consumed by the voyage. But, admitting that there may be some doubt as to this, I think we are entitled to look at the recital to ascertain the meaning. That recital is as follows:-"The life assured under this policy being about to proceed to and reside at Belize, in the state of Honduras, and an extra premium of twenty guineas having been paid for the extra risk for such residence for one year," &c. Now, that in terms excludes the time to be occupied in the voyage out. I think the terms of the permission must be construed by that recital: and the effect *481] of the whole is, that *the person insured was to have twelve months' residence at Belize, independently of the time occupied by the voyage. It is said that that period is to date from the 23d of June, 1853: but there is nothing to be found in the contract to define the period from which the twelve months' residence is to date. Bovill has pointed out reasons of considerable cogency why the company should find it to their interest to give such permission for foreign residence commencing at or within a reasonable time after the application. Nothing could be more easy than to express that in plain terms in the instrument itself: the permission might be granted for a residence

Mr.