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of time and the unproductiveness of the laws contemplating a regular force, and volunteers for an entire year & under federal commissions, compel us to moderate some of our expectations. It was much to have been desired that simultaneous invasions of Canada at several points, particularly in relation to Malden and Montreal, might have secured the great object of bringing all Upper Canada, and the channels communicating with the Indians, under our command; with ulterior prospects towards Quebec flattering to our arms. This systematic operation. having been frustrated, it only remains to pursue the course that will diminish the disappointment as much as possible. Hull,1 as you will have learnt, is preparing a force for the attack of Malden; and that he may descend towards Niagara, with greater effect and be the more secure agst Indian dangers, a reinforcement of 1,500 men is ordered which will be promptly supplied by the overflowing zeal of the detached militia of Ohio & Kentucky. We hope that your arrangements with Gov! Tomkins will have provided an effective co-operation for subduing the hostile force opposite ours at Niagara; and preparing the way for taking possession of the Country at the other extremity of Lake Ontario. In these events we shall have in our hand not only all the most valuable parts of the Upper province, but the important command of the Lakes. It appears that Hull was making an effort to overpower the British force on

William Hull, appointed to command the northwestern army, surrendered on August 16.

Lake Erie, his success in which will be critically useful in several respects.

In addition to these measures, it is essential, notwithstanding the advance of the season, and the difficulties thrown in our way, that the expedition agst Montreal should be forwarded by all the means in your power. The number of regulars that can be procured for it cannot even yet be ascertained; but it is sufficiently ascertained that an extensive auxiliary force will be wanted; and it is nearly as certain that this will not be furnished by the Volunteer Act of Feb' unless a sudden ardor overcoming the objections to it, should be inspired by the vicinity of the object and the previous conquests. The last resource therefore on which we are to depend, is that portion of the detached & other Militia which may be within reach, will comply with the call, and voluntarily unite with their officers in rejecting geographical limits to their patriotism. To this resource I hope you will turn your full attention, with a view to the immediate steps proper to be taken to enable it to supply the deficit of regulars & volunteers; with respect to the latter of which as far as they are within a practicable distance, the number known here to be in readiness is very inconsiderable. From the Vermont & New Hampshire Militia favorable expectations are indulged, the State authorities being well disposed to promote the service. As to Massts & Connecticut, even, notwithstanding the obstructions created by the Gov" it is not yet decided that the spirit of some of the detached & other corps may

not give effect to your requisitions. Should an adequate force be attainable from the whole or part of the sources referred to, you will be the best judge how far a demonstration towards Quebec will be proper in aid of the measures agst Montreal, which if we can take by means of any sort we shall find the means of holding. Sh it be found impracticable to take it this campaign, will it be possible to occupy any other post that will cut off the intercourse with the Indians thro' the Ottowas river?

You will have noticed the arrival of a Dispatch. vessel from the B. Govt. Nothing is disclosed from that quarter that ought in the slightest degree to slacken our military exertions.

The Secy of State is on a visit to his farm where he will leave his family. On his return, which will take place in a few days, I propose a like respite. I find myself much worn down, and in need of an antidote to the accumulating bile of which I am sensible; and which I have never escaped in August on tide

water.

TO JOEL BARLOW.

MAD. MSS.

WASHINGTON August 11, 1812

DEAR SIR,-As I write on short notice and in cypher, I must be very brief.

The conduct of the F. Govt, explained in yours of the -1 on the subject of the decree of April 1811, will be an everlasting reproach to it. It is the

1 May 12, which followed his of May 2. They are printed in part in State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii., 602.

more shameful, as, departing from the declaration to Gen! Armstrong, of which the enforcement of the non-importation was the affect, the revoking decree assumes this as the cause, and itself as the effect; and thus transfers to this Govt the inconsistency of its author.

The decree of April, may nevertheless be used by G. B. as a pretext for revoking her orders; notwithstanding the contrary language of Ld Castlereagh in Parl. An authentic, tho' informal communication has just arrived in a despatch vessel from G. B. importing that the orders were to be revoked on the 1st of Augst, subject to renewal if required by the conduct of F. & the U. S. particularly, if the nonimportation act should not be forthwith rescinded on the arrival of the act of revocation. As this pledge was given before the declaration of war was known, it may not be adhered to. It is not improbable however that it was hurried off, as a chance for preventing an apprehended war; and the same dislike to the war may possibly produce advances for terminating it, which if the terms be admissible, will be readily embraced.

In the event of a pacification with G. B. the full tide of indignation with which the public mind here is boiling will be directed agst France, if not obviated by a due reparation of her wrongs. War will be called for by the Nation almost una voce. Even without a peace with England, the further refusal or prevarications of F. on the subject of redress may be expected to produce measures of hostility agst

VOL. VIII.14.

her at the ensuing session of Congs. This result is the more probable, as the general exasperation will coincide with the calculations of not a few, that a double war, is the shortest road to peace.

I have been the more disposed to furnish you with these prospects, that you may turn them to account, if possible, in prosecuting your discussions with the F. Gov and be not unprepared to retire from them altogether, on a sudden notice so to do. Your return home, may possibly be directed even before the meeting of Congs if the intermediate information should continue to present the French conduct in the provoking light in which it has hitherto appeared.

The Secy of State is absent. But you will receive from Mr. Graham, the usual supply of current intelligence, to which I refer you. I have not time to write to Gen! Fayette. With my best regards to him, tell him that Congs rose with deciding as to the validity of the remaining locations near Pt Coupee.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

MAD. MSS.

WASHINGTON Aug. 17, 1812.

DEAR SIR,—I have recd yours of the 10th, and return as you request, the letter of Mr. Higginbotham. He will probably have understood from Col: Monroe that the Consulate of Lisbon is the object of numerous & respectable candidates.

The seditious opposition in Mass & Con with the intrigues elsewhere insidiously co-operating with it, have so clogged the wheels of the war that I fear

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