SPEECH

DELIVERED IN THE CASTLE-CHAMBER

CONCERNING THE

OATH OF SUPREMACY.

WHAT the danger of the law is for refusing this oath, hath been sufficiently opened by my Lords the Judges; and the quality and quantity of that offence hath been aggravated to the full by those that have spoken after them. The part which is most proper for me to deal in is, the information of the conscience touching the truth and equity of the matters contained in the oath; which I also have made choice the rather to insist upon, because both the form of the oath itself requireth herein a full resolution of the conscience, as appeareth by those words in the very beginning thereof, "I do utterly testify and declare in my conscience," &c. and the persons that stand here to be censured for refusing the same have alleged nothing in their own defence but only the simple plea of ignorance.

That this point, therefore, may be cleared, and all needless scruples removed out of men's minds, two main branches there be of this oath which require special consideration: the one positive, acknowledging the supremacy of the government of these realms in all causes whatsoever to rest in the king's highness only; the other negative, renouncing all jurisdictions and authorities of any foreign prince or prelate within his Majesty's dominions.

SS2

For the better understanding of the former we are in the first place to call unto our remembrance that exhortation of St Peter, Submit yourselves unto every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be unto the king, as having the pre-eminence; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well. By this we are taught to respect the king, not as "the only governor" of his dominions simply, (for we see there be other governors placed under him,) but is vπeρéxovтa, as him that excelleth and hath the pre-eminence over the rest, that is to say, according to the tenor of the oath, as him that is "the only supreme governor" of his realms. Upon which ground we may safely build this conclusion, that whatsoever power is incident unto the king by virtue of his place, must be acknowledged to be in him supreme, there being nothing so contrary to the nature of sovereignty as to have another superior power to over-rule it.

Qui rex est, regem, maxime, non habeat.

In the second place, we are to consider that God, for the better settling of piety and honesty among men, and the repressing of profaneness and other vices, hath established two distinct powers upon earth; the one of the keys, committed to the church, the other of the sword, committed to the civil magistrate. That of the keys is ordained to work upon the inner man, having immediate relation to the 2 remitting or retaining of sins. That of the sword is appointed to work upon the outward man, yielding protection to the obedient, and inflicting external punishment upon the rebellious and disobedient. By the former, the spiritual officers of the Church of Christ are enabled to govern well, to speak and exhort and rebuke with all authority, to loose such as are penitent, to commit others unto the Lord's prison until their amendment, or to bind them over unto the judgment of the great day, if they shall persist in their wilfulness and obstinacy. By the other, princes have an imperious power assigned by God unto them for the defence of such as do well, and executing revenge and

11 Pet. ii. 13, 14. 31 Tim. v. 17.

6

3

wrath upon such as do evil, whether by death, or banishment, or confiscation of goods, or imprisonment, according to the quality of the offence.

When St Peter, that had the keys committed unto him, made bold to draw the sword, he was commanded to put it up, as a weapon that he had no authority to meddle withal. And on the other side, when Uzziah the king would venture upon the execution of the priest's office, it was said unto him, "It pertaineth not unto thee, Uzziah, to burn incense unto the Lord, but to the priests the sons of Aaron, that are consecrated to burn incense. Let this, therefore, be our second conclusion, that the power of the sword and of the keys are two distinct ordinances of God; and that the prince hath no more authority to enter upon the execution of any part of the priest's function, than the priest hath to intrude upon any part of the office of the prince.

In the third place, we are to observe, that the power of the civil sword, the supreme managing whereof belongeth to the king alone, is not to be restrained unto temporal causes only, but is by God's ordinance to be extended likewise unto "all spiritual or ecclesiastical things and causes;" that as the spiritual rulers of the Church do exercise their kind of government in bringing men unto obedience, not of the duties of the first table alone, which concerneth piety and the religious service which man is bound to perform unto his Creator, but also of the second, which respecteth moral honesty and the offices that man doth owe unto man; so the civil magistrate is to use his authority also in redressing the abuses committed against the first table, as well as against the second, that is to say, as well in punishing of an heretic, or an idolater, or a blasphemer, as of a thief, or a murderer, or a traitor; and in providing by all good means that such as live under his government 10may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all piety and honesty.

And howsoever by this means we make both prince and priest to be in their several places custodes utriusque tabulæ, "keepers of both God's tables," yet do we not hereby any

7 Ezra vii. 26.

8 Matt. xxvi. 52. 92 Chron. xxvi. 18.

10 1 Tim. ii. 2.

way confound both of their offices together; for though the matter wherein their government is exercised may be the same, yet is the form and manner of governing therein always different, the one reaching to the outward man only, the other to the inward; the one binding or loosing the soul, the other laying hold on the body and the things belonging thereunto; the one having special reference to the judgment of the world to come, the other respecting the present retaining or losing of some of the comforts of this life.

That there is such a ""civil government" as this in "causes spiritual or ecclesiastical," no man of judgment can deny. For must not heresy, for example, be acknowledged to be a cause merely spiritual or ecclesiastical? and yet by what power is an heretic put to death? The officers of the church have no authority to take away the life of any man: it must be done therefore per brachium seculare; and consequently it must be yielded without contradiction, that the temporal magistrate doth exercise therein a part of his civil government in punishing a crime that is of its own nature spiritual or ecclesiastical.

But here it will be said, the words of the oath being general, that the king is "the only supreme governor of this realm and of all other his highness' dominions and countries," how may it appear that the power of the civil sword only is meant by that government, and that the power of the keys is not comprehended therein? I answer, first, that where a civil magistrate is affirmed to be "the governor of his own dominions and countries," by common intendment this must needs be understood of a civil government, and may in no reason be extended to that which is merely of another kind. Secondly, I say, that where an ambiguity is conceived to be in any part of an oath, it ought to be taken according to the understanding of him for whose satisfaction the oath was ministered. Now, in

11 As on the other side, that a spiritual or ecclesiastical government is exercised in causes civil or temporal. For is not excommunication a main part of ecclesiastical government, and forest laws a special branch of causes temporal? yet

we see in Sententia lata super Chartas, anno 12 R. H. 111. that the bishops of England pronounce a solemn sentence of excommunication against the infringers of the liberties contained in Charta de Foresta.

this case it hath been sufficiently declared by public authority, that no other thing is meant by the government here mentioned but that of the civil sword only.

For in the book of Articles agreed upon by the archbishops and bishops and the whole clergy, in the Convocation holden at London anno 1562, thus we read: "Where we attribute to the queen's majesty the chief government, by which titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended, we give not to our princes the ministering either of God's word or of the Sacraments, (the which thing the injunctions also lately set forth by Elizabeth our Queen doth most plainly testify), but that only prerogative which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy Scriptures by God himself, that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be ecclesiastical or temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil-doers."

If it be here objected, that the authority of the Convocation is not a sufficient ground for the exposition of that which was enacted in Parliament, I answer, that these Articles stand confirmed not only by the royal assent of the prince, for the establishing of whose supremacy the oath was framed, but also by a special act of Parliament, which is to be found among the statutes in the thirteenth year of Queen Elizabeth, chap. 12. Seeing therefore the makers of the law have full authority to expound the law, and they have sufficiently manifested, that by the "supreme government" given to the prince they understand that kind of government only which is exercised with the civil sword, I conclude that nothing can be more plain than this, that without all scruple of conscience the king's majesty may be acknowledged in this sense to be the only supreme governor of all his highness' dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes temporal." And so have I cleared the first main branch of the oath.

as

I come now unto the second, which is propounded negatively, that "no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or potentate, hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spi