But he is not liable for the act of each person, unless it was done in the furtherance of the common design of all. As Sir B. Peacock, CJ. said in a recent case. (1 R. C. & C. Cr. R. 43.)

"If the object and design of those who seized Amoordee was merely to take him to the Tannah on a charge of theft, and it was no part of the common design to beat him, they would not all be liable for the consequence of the beating, merely because they were present. It is laid down that when several persons are in company together, engaged in one common purpose, lawful or unlawful, and one of them, without the knowledge or consent of the others, commits any offence, the others will not be involved in the guilt, unless the act done was in some manner in furtherance of the common intention."

"It is also said that although a man is present when a felony is committed, if he take no part in it, and do not act in concert with those who committed it, he will not be a felon, merely because he did not attempt to prevent it, or to apprehend the felon."

But if several persons go out together for the purpose of apprehending a man and taking him to the Tannah on a charge of theft, and some of the party in the presence of the others beat and ill-treat the man in a cruel and violent manner, and the others stand by and look on, without endeavouring to dissuade them from their cruel and violent conduct, it appears to me that those who have to deal with the facts might very properly infer that they were all assenting parties, and acting in concert, and that the beating was in furtherance of a common design."

"I do not know what the evidence was. All I wish to point out is, that all who are present do not necessarily assist by their presence every act that is done in their presence, nor are consequently liable to be punished as principals." (See also 3 B. L.R. P.C. 44. 11 B. L.R. 347.)

The law upon this subject is very neatly laid down by an American jurist (Bishop. § 439) who says:

"The true view is doubtless as follows: Every man is responsible criminally for what of wrong flows directly from his corrupt intentions; but no man, intending wrong, is responsible for an independent act of wrong committed by another. If one person sets in motion the physical power of another person, the former is criminally guilty for its results. If he contemplated the result, he is answerable, though it is produced in a manner he did not contemplate. If he did not contemplate the result in kind, yet if it was the ordinary effect of the cause, he is responsible. If he awoke into action an indiscriminate power he is responsible. If he gave directions vaguely and incautiously, and the person receiving them acted according to what might be presumed to have been his understanding of them, he is responsible. But, if the wrong done was a fresh and independent wrong springing wholly from the mind of the doer, the other is not criminal therein, merely, because, when it was done, he was intending to be a partaker with the doer in a different wrong. These propositions may not always be applied readily to cases arising, yet they seem to furnish the true rules."

When such an

act is criminal by reason of its being minal knowledge

done with a cri

35. Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention, is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.

or intention.

36. Wherever the causing a certain effect, or an

Effect

caused partly by act and partly by omis

sion.

attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect partly by an act and

partly by an omission is the same offence.

Illustration.

A intentionally causes Z's death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by beating Z. A has committed murder.

37. When an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally cooperates in the commission of that offence, by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any

Co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence.

other person, commits that offence.

Illustrations.

(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally, and at different times, giving him small doses of poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement, with intent to murder Z. Z dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B intentionally co-operate in the commission of murder, and as each of them does an act by which the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.

(b) A and B are joint Jailors, and as such have charge of Z, a prisoner, alternately for six hours at a time. A and B intending to cause Z's death, knowingly co-operate in causing that effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food supplied to them for that purpose. Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.

(c) A, a Jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z's death, illegally omits to supply Z with food, in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely thereby to cause Z's death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder; but as A did not co-operate with B, A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder.

38. Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that

Several persons engaged in the commission of a criminal act may be guilty of different offences.

act.

Illustration.

A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation, that his killing of Z would be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill will towards Z, and intending to kill him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here, though A and B are both engaged in causing Z's death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable homicide.

See note to s. 117. Post. Abetment.

39. A person is said to cause an effect "voluntarily," when he causes it by means "Voluntarily." whereby he intended to cause it, or by means, which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.

Illustration.

A sets fire, by night, to an inhabited house in a large town, for the purpose of facilitating a robbery, and thus causes the death of a person. Here, A may not have intended to cause death, and may even be sorry that death has been caused by his act; yet if he knew that he was likely to cause death, he has caused death voluntarily.

40.

"Offence."

Except in the chapter and sections mention

ed in clauses two and three of this section, the word 'offence' denotes a thing made punishable by this Code. In Chapter IV and in the following sections, namely, sections 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 187, 194, 195, 203, 211, 213, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347, 348, 388, 389 and 445, the Word 'offence' denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or under any special or local law as hereinafter defined:

And in sections 141, 176, 177, 201, 202, 212, 216 and 441, the word offence' has the same meaning when the thing punishable under the special or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards, whether with or without fine. (Act XXVII of 1870. s. 2.)

The word "offence" does not extend to acts punishable by English law. See post, note to s. 224; and as to abetment of such offences, see note to s. 109.

41. A "special law" is a law applicable to "Special Law." a particular subject.

43. The

42. A "local law" is a law applicable only to "Local Law." a particular part of British India. word "illegal" is applicable to every thing which is an offence, or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action and a person is said to be "legally bound to do" whatever it is illegal in him to omit.

"Illegal."

"Legally bound

to do."

44. "Injury."

The word "injury" denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation, or property.

45. The word "life" denotes the life of a human being, unless the contrary appears from the context.

"Life."

46. The word "death" denotes the death of a human being, unless the contrary appear from the context.

"Death."

47. The word "animal" denotes any living creature, other than a human being.

"Animal."

48. The word "vessel" denotes any thing made for the conveyance by water of human beings, or of property.

"Vessel."

"Year."

49. Wherever the word "year" or the word "month" is used, it is to be under"Month." stood that the year or the month is to be reckoned according to the British Calendar.

50. The word "Section" denotes one of those portions of a Chapter of this Code which are distinguished by prefixed

"Section."

numeral figures.

"Oath."

51. The word "oath " includes a solemn affirmation substituted by law for an oath, and any declaration required or authorized by law to be made before a public servant, or to be used for the purpose of proof, whether in a Court of Justice or not.

52. Nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith, which is done or believed without due care and attention.

"Good faith."

CHAPTER III.

OF PUNISHMENTS.

53. The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code are

"Punishment."

First.-Death.

Secondly.-Transportation.
Thirdly.-Penal servitude.

Fourthly.-Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:

(1.) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour. (2.) Simple.

Fifthly. Forfeiture of property.

Sixthly.--Fine.

Whipping is now added as a punishment in certain cases under Act VI of 1864.

54. In every case in which sentence of death shall have been passed, the Government of India or the Government of the place within which the offender

Commutation of sentence of death.