ty, have become subjects of controversy in the United States. In England, the force of opinions, less substantial, produced a frightful civil war. In the United States, opinions, better founded, have already produced awful ideas of dissolving the union. In England, the religious controversies terminated in an act of uniformity, by which a majority of the people are cruelly oppressed; there are more meeting-houses than churches, and more dissenters than conformists; yet by bribery with publick money, so as exorbitantly to increase taxation, the majority are both excluded from civil offices, and subjected to the payment of tithes for the suppression of their own opinions and interests. In the United States, the majority of the people of each state, are subjected to the payment of more than tithes, to deprive themselves of free will as to their own interest, and to foster exclusive privileges. Our division into state governments of great extent, and embracing a great variety of local circumstances, will render a compulsory uniformity of temporal interests, habits and opinions infinitely more difficult, than a religious uniformity in England; and require means, more coercive and severe to effect it. A very powerful standing army, so necessary in England for one purpose, would be more indispensable here for the other. Whole states will more sensibly feel, and be more able to resist burdens, inflicted to enrich privileged civil sects, bearing heavily on their local interests and habits, than individuals only combined by the slight threads of ceremonials and speculative prejudices. Had the freedom of religion been established in England at the Reformation, a mass of civil war, national inquietude and oppression would have been avoided. A greater mass of these evils was foreseen by the framers of the Union, and attempted to be avoided, by restricting the powers given to Congress, and by retaining to the states those powers united with the local interests, habits and opinions of each state; in fact, by securing the freedom of property.

This wise precaution was suggested by the character of human nature, sound reason, substantial justice, and unequivocal experience drawn from the consequences of the different policy. pursued by England in her religious revolution. Why ought not industry to enjoy a freedom of will, similar to that demonstrated in the United States, to be so wholesome and happy in

the case of religion? How can an expensive, compulsory uniformity in one case, generate blessings, when it has generated curses in the other? It was not intended by our revolution to destroy the freedom of will, in relation either to speculation, actual habits or personal interests. It designed to draw a plain line between the foreign relations of the United States, and the internal concerns of each state; and the vitality of the union, as well as the vitality of religion, lies in a strict adherence to the same principle. Each state, however different in its habits and interests, like each sect however different in its tenets and ceremonials, has its liberty and happiness embarked and hazarded upon its preservation; and if any are tempted by the bribe of delusive advantages to abandon it, they will, like the religious sects which yielded to the temptations of pride, enthusiasm and avarice, when possessed of the majority, produce civil war, forge chains for themselves, and obtain a toleration of property instead of its freedom. A combination of corporations, exclusive privileges and pecuniary speculations, assails republican puritanism, as protestant puritanism was assailed by a combination of Roman Catholick princes, and for the same reason. It obstructs frauds.

The maxim of James the first, "no bishop no king," was a political truth; not limited to the idea of hierarchical orders, but an exemplification of the necessity of intermediate orders between an individual and a nation, for the support of a despotick government. It applies to all intermediate orders or exclusive privileges between a nation and a government, whether pecuniary, civil, religious, or military; whether they be called lords, mandarins, bashaws, generals, bishops, bankers, exclusive privileges, corporations, or companies. Adhering to the maxim in its amplified sense, the English government, for its own security, has extended it gradually from bishops and a nobility, to an army and to a vast pecuniary order; which, though compounded of various corporations, companies and exclusive privileges, as the noble order is compounded of a variety of titles, is united in the support and defence of the government, whatever it may do, as being dependant upon it for all the privileges, however denominated, enjoyed by its favour. These dependant orders are even better props of an oppressive government than a hereditary nobility. Accordingly,

they are more ardent in defence of political severities, and more rapidly create the evil of excessive taxation, than the orders of ancient coinage. Hereditary titles were more honorable than lucrative, embraced, and corrupted fewer individuals, and extorted less from the savings of industry, than dependant privileges entirely mercenary, and only capable of being fostered by perpetual drafts from the majority of nations. And, therefore, the latter have accomplished in England a degree of oppression, which the former could never effect. Did our revolution meditate an intermediate order between the government and the people? Are not privileged mercenary combinations, dependant on the government, both such an order, and of the worst species? Have we then adopted the essence of James's maxim, and subscribed to the opinion, "no exclusive privileges, no republick?"

During the reigns of the Stuarts, there existed two kinds of puritanism; one for purifying religious, the other for purifying civil government. The natural affinity between the two objects, combined the individuals devoted to each; and although the imperfect state of political knowledge, and a spirit of fanaticism obstructed their efforts, and prevented their complete success, yet the English were indebted to this doubleimpulse for some accessions both of civil and religious liberty, which constituted a platform upon which we have raised a more perfect superstructure. The civil and religious patriots of that period were united by the conviction, that a despotick power over the mind will absorb a despotick power over property; and that a despotick power over property will absorb a despotick power over the mind. The English government, by retaining such a power over property, has been enabled to retain a similar power over the mind. Our revolutionary patriots evidently entertained the same opinion, and therefore endeavoured to destroy both kinds of despotism; and their complete success in the establishment of religious freedom, ought not to render the freedom of property hopeless, especially when it is considered, that if the latter is impracticable, the former, in time, will become abortive. The consideration of the principles of our revolution will be resumed in several of the succeeding sections.

SECTION 2.

CONSTRUCTION.

It is necessary, before I proceed, to appropriate a short section to this art or artifice. There are two kinds of construction; one calculated to maintain, the other to corrupt or destroy the principles upon which governments are established; one visible to common sense, the other consisting of filaments so slender, as not to be seen except through some magnifying glass; one which addresses the understanding, the other which addresses - prejudice or self-interest. When a man splits his mind, and glues one half to certain principles, and the other to a mode of construction, by which the same principles are subverted, it is no easy matter to find arguments which will please both halves. There was in old times a God, said by his worshippers to be blind and lame and foolish, but who seems to me to be more quick-sighted, active and acute in the arts of construction than Minerva herself. But his inspirations are unhappily partial; for, if this deity would but open the eyes of every one to his own interest, the mode of construction most conducive to the general interest would be elected by a republican majority.

Next to this influence over construction, is that of governments. In all, except our own, the people have nothing to do with it; but ours is modelled with an intention that they should have much to do with it; and what is better for current use, that the members of the government themselves shall be strongly induced, individually, to give it fair play. But as the pride of power, the temptations of self-interest, and even the consciousness of good intentions, might crook or sharpen this terrible weapon, those invested with most power, hold their offices for short periods; and are exposed to frequent returns to private life; that the people might straighten or blunt its edge occasionally. This dependance, and our affection for children and relations, whose fate we are dealing out, unite to

chasten and restrain the unlimited power of construction; and though the solicitations of pride, vanity, or avarice, may in a few cases prevail, yet, under our form of government, a great majority of legislative bodies must feel an honest loyalty to

correctness.

All other governments, as expositors of power, are influenced by motives exactly the reverse of these. With them, construction is not a science to preserve the rights of mankind, but an art for extending their own power. Its business is to forge wealth for individuals or combinations, and chains for majorities: To make payment for usurpations, in fulsome flatteries, and insidious projects: To substitute successive, vacillating, eccentrick meteors, for steady planets of fixed orbits: To promise future blessings for present innovations, with the prophetical truth of those prospective chronologists, who have so often foretold the arrival of the millenium: And to furnish parties, factions, combinations and individuals, with concealed dirks to stab liberty.

The framers of our constitutions exerted all their faculties, to exclude from our policy this pernicious species of construction, by specifications and restrictions. Its wonderful acuteness in misinterpretation, was understood, and sedulously guarded against. It had often perverted the Scripture, and converted patriotism into treason. Russel and Sidney fell under the edge of constructive treason. The day on which the former was beheaded, the wise and learned university of Oxford, convinced by its doctors in the art of construction, declared every principle by which a free constitution can be maintained, to be "impious and heretical," especially the doctrine, that "all civil authority is derived from the people." Sidney had maintained it. Thence it was inferred, that he meant to excite the people to enforce it; that this would cause insurrection; that insurrection was treason; and that Sydney was therefore guilty of treason. He had also asserted, that tyrants ought to be deposed and punished, as in the cases of Nero and Caligula. Thence it was inferred, that he was a traitor in imagining, that the king of England, if a tyrant, might be justly deposed and punished. Which can do most harm to mankind, constructive treasons or constructive powers? The first takes away the life of an individual, the second des