of the State to tax was unlimited. The Constitution of 1875 made no limit or restriction on local taxation. Prior to 1875 in Missouri, the legislative power was subject to one limitation on the tax power, and one alone property must be taxed according to value," but the tax might have been one hundred per cent of the value. Now the legislative power may authorize the construction of roads and streets, and may authorize them to be paved, graded and improved, and the cost thereof to be assessed to abutting land, even if the work done be a damage prohibited by the Constitution.

The legislative power in the State may tax occupations to the etxent of one hundred per cent of the amount received by the employee. Taxation must be uniform throughout the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, but this does not apply to local taxes. But if a lot is taxed according to frontage, then "each front foot thereof is assessed alike" (80 Mo. 391). A local tax that takes every thing owned by the taxpayer is certainly not lacking in uniformity. And if every person having an occupation were taxed one hundred per cent of his receipts, then every dollar he receives is taxed just like every other dollar he receives, and just like every dollar any other employee may receive.

The tax takes one hundred cents of each and every dollar he has. The local tax ought to be less than one hundred per cent. The legislative power ought not to be authorized to take the whole value of the property in the way of a local tax. A limitation to that effect should be put on that power.

It is now the constitutional law of the United States that local taxes may be levied on abutting property to pay for improving roads and streets to the extent of one hundred per cent of the value of the abutting land, although the abutting land may be damaged by the im

provement for which the tax may be levied. The courts

can afford no remedy.

What are the reasons which prevent judicial interference will now be inquired into.

CHAPTER 14.

REASONS WHICH PREVENT JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE.

By the Constitution of the United States, article 1, section 10, no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Nearly every state constitution contains the same or like provision. In the sense of the prohibition used in the Constitution of the United States it includes all laws. The ordinances of city councils, statutes enacted by the legislative power and state constitutions are all included. The prohibition is absolute and complete as to the whole State, and all the agencies through which the State may act.

The highest judicial tribunal of each state construes the Constitution and statutes of the State and the interpretation so placed on the Constitution and statutes becomes a part thereof the same as if copied into the statutes and Constitution.

In Christie v. Pridgen, 4 Wall. 196 (A. D. 1866), a statute of Mexico was involved. The statute was enacted before Texas was admitted as a State and the Supreme Court of Texas had construed this statute of Mexico. Say the court, page 203:

"The law of 1824, though general to the Republic of Mexico, was, so far as it affected lands within the limits of Texas, after the independence of that country, a local law of the new State-so much so as if it had originated in her legislation. It had at the time no operation in any portion of what then constituted the United States. The interpretation, therefore, placed upon it by the highest court of that State must, accord

( 315 )

ing to the established principles of this court, be accepted as the true interpretation so far as it applies to titles to lands in that State, whatever may be our opinion of is original soundness. Nor does it matter that in the courts of other States, carved out of territory since acquired from Mexico, a different interpretation may have been adopted. If such be the case, the courts of the United States will, in conformity with the same principles, follow the different rulings so far as it affects titles in those States. The interpretation within the jurisdiction of one State becomes a part of the law of that State as much so as if incorporated into the body of it by the Legislature. If, therefore, different interpretations are given in different states to a similar local law, that law in effect becomes by the interpretations, so far as it is a rule for our action, a different law in one State from what it is in the other. That the statute laws of the states' says Mr. Justice Johnson, in delivering the opinion of this court in Shelby v. Guy, (11 Wheaton 367), 'must furnish the rules of decision of this court, so far as they comport with the Constitution of the United States, in all cases arising within the respective states,' is a position that no one doubts. Nor is it questionable that a fixed and received construction of their respective statute laws, in their own courts, makes, in fact a part of the statute law of the country, however we may doubt the propriety of that construction. It is obvious that this admission may at times involve us in seeming inconsistencies-as where states have adopted the same statute, and their courts differ in the construction. Yet that course is necessarily indicated by the duty imposed upon us, to administer, as between certain individuals, the laws of the respective states according to the best lights we possess of what those laws are."

Illinois and Missouri have a voluntary assignment

law couched in almost the same language. The Supreme Court of Missouri put a certain construction on her assignment law. Illinois put a different construction on her law. The Missouri statute is a different statute from the Illinois statute solely from the different interpretations put by the Supreme Court of each State on its own statute. [Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, at 235; White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U. S. 329.]

The same principle will apply to constitutions. The interpretation put on the Constitution of a State by its highest judicial tribunal becomes a part of that Constitution the same as if copied into it.

The principle is well illustrated in Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666 (decided in the Supreme Court of the United States in October, 1873, under act of the Legislature of Michigan, approved March 22, 1869, under the Constitution of the State adopted in 1850). The Supreme Court of Michigan put a construction on her Constitution adopted in 1850. The Supreme Court of the United States in this case overruled that construction, holding that the Supreme Court of Michigan had erred in construing her state Constitution. The Constitution of the State of Michigan, adopted in 1850, contained this provision (art. 14, sec. 6): "The credit of the State shall not be granted to or in aid of any person, association or corporation."

The act of the Legislature of Michigan provided: "That it shall be lawful for any township or city to pledge its aid to any railroad company now chartered, organized, under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Michigan, in the construction of its road by loan or donation with or without conditions," etc. The aid was not to exceed ten per cent of the assessed valuation of the city or township and was to be authorized by popular vote. The Supreme Court of Michigan say: