Opinion of the Court.

laws of Louisiana forbidding a transfer of property pendente lite did not operate to prevent Maxwell from foreclosing his mortgage pending the equity suit, because, although the foreclosure proceedings were filed after such cause was commenced, the right in virtue of which they were initiated arose long anterior to the beginning of the equity suit, and was paramount to and independent of all the controversies which were therein presented for decision.

These conclusions of the state court depended alone upon an interpretation of the local law of the State, governing the sale, the record of title to real estate, and the nature under the local law of the rights of a mortgagee creditor. 48 La. Ann. 1160; 51 La. Ann. 840. It is the duty of this court to follow the rule announced on such subjects by the highest court of a State. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186-190, and authorities there cited.

Accepting the rule of property under the Louisiana law to be as announced by the Supreme Court of that State, it is manifest that the proceedings in the equity cause were not res adjudicata, and that the lis pendens created by that suit did not prevent the exercise by Maxwell of his right to foreclose his mortgage, and therefore the title which he acquired in the foreclosure proceedings was not impaired by the pendency of the suit. But it is argued although this be undoubted, it is not applicable because of the decree of this court in the case of Lacassagne v. Chapuis. In that cause, however, the decree below which dismissed the bill was so modified as to cause it to be "without prejudice to an action at law." And the court below has expressly decided that the proceeding taken by Laccassagne in the state court, and which is now under review, was the proper method by which he could, according to the Louisiana law, test his legal rights asserted to arise from the Maxwell foreclosure proceedings, and the purchase made thereunder. It is, however, argued that in the opinion in Lacassagne v. Chapuis this court upheld a construction of the Louisiana law which is in conflict with that law as construed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in its opinions in this case, and therefore, it is asserted, this court should apply its previous conclusions as to the law of Louisiana instead of now conforming to the view of the Louisi

Opinion of the Court.

ana law subsequently laid down by the Supreme Court of the State. This court, it is said, by virtue of the appeal in the Lacassagne case, was first vested with jurisdiction to consider the Louisiana statute as to lis pendens, and therefore, at least, as to the parties to this record, should hold the Louisiana law to be in accord with its previous decision, although by doing so the interpretation of the state law by the Supreme Court of the State be wholly disregarded. But we need not pause to point out the unsoundness of this argument as applied to the question now here, since the premise which the proposition assumes is without foundation. The case of Lacassagne v. Chapuis came to this court on two demurrers, the one predicated on a want of jurisdiction because both parties were aliens, and the other on an asserted want of equity in the bill. The jurisdictional question as to alienage was disposed of on the ground that the bill was ancillary to the original suit. Whether the other matters alleged were within the cognizance of a court of equity was fully considered, and it was held that the claim of title in Laccassagne furnished no ground for equity jurisdiction. The court observed: "As the plaintiff was evicted and the plantation was put into the possession of the widow Cave, a court of equity cannot give the plaintiff any relief until he has established his title by an action at law." True it is that subsequently, in considering whether the mortgage right of Laccassagne created a cause cognizable in equity, the opinion intimated views of the Louisiana law not in accord with the law of that State, as announced by the Supreme Court of Louisiana as hitherto stated. But the passages referred to were merely reasoning conducive to the demonstration that the rights asserted, in the bill, were cognizable at law only, and therefore not the subject of equitable jurisdiction. That the court did not intend to and did not decide what were the legal rights of Laccassagne is at once demonstrated by the fact that the decree below, which dismissed the bill, was amended so as to cause it to be without prejudice to an action at law, and as thus modified was affirmed. To treat the passages in the opinion, which are relied on as having the conclusive import now in argument attributed to them, would of necessity give rise to the following deduction: The opinion

Statement of the Case.

on the one hand dismissed the question of legal title from consideration because it was not within the province of a court of equity to decide who held the legal title, nevertheless the question of such title was finally disposed of in the cause.

But the premise contended for pushes to a more flagrant contradiction, since it cannot be accepted without admitting that, although the decree was "without prejudice to an action at law," the right to such action was in substance foreclosed. Affirmed.

BALDWIN v. MARYLAND.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND.

No. 113. Argued November 16, 1900.-Decided December 3, 1900.

The controversy between the State of Maryland and the estate of the ward having been finally settled in favor of the State, and the only Federal question presented in this case having been determined in favor of the State, this court declines to consider the purely local question whether a judgment binding the estate binds also the sureties on the guardian's bond.

THE facts are these: Prior to 1880 certain residents of Maryland died, leaving property to Columbus C. Baldwin, a minor. After the settlement of the estates of the decedents a guardian of the estate of said minor was appointed by the Orphans' Court of Washington County, Maryland. In consequence of the death of the guardian succeeding guardians were appointed, and in August, 1891, William Woodward Baldwin was duly appointed a guardian of the estate of such minor, and gave bond to perform his duty according to law. The present plaintiffs in error were sureties on that bond. During the years of the guardianship the Register of Wills of Washington County made annual returns to the county commissioners of the property of estates unsettled, and among those that of the estate of this minor, and taxes were levied thereon in accordance with law, and were

Opinion of the Court.

duly paid up to the year 1893. The taxes for 1893 and 1894 being unpaid, the guardian filed a bill in the Circuit Court for Washington County to restrain their collection. The basis of his contention was that both he and the ward were non-residents of Maryland, and that the estate of the ward had been taken by him outside of the State. The Circuit Court decided against him, and denied the injunction. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the State. 85 Maryland, 145. An attempt was made to review that judgment in this court, but the writ of error was dismissed (168 U. S. 705) on the ground that no Federal question had been distinctly preserved, or, if preserved, that there was a non-Federal question which was decisive of the case. Thereafter, the taxes being still unpaid, and the estate still unsettled, and the same statement presented by the Register of Wills to the county commissioners in respect to the taxes of 1895, this action was commenced to recover from the bondsmen the amount of the taxes for the years 1893, 1894 and 1895. Judgment was rendered against them in the trial court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the State, (89 Maryland, 587,) to reverse which judgment this writ of error has been sued out.

Mr. Charles A. Boston for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Henry Kyd Douglas for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The controversy in the case reported in 85 Maryland, 145, was one between the estate of the ward and the State of Maryland. In that case the right of the State to compel a payment by the estate of the ward of taxes levied thereon for the years 1893 and 1894 was settled. The personality of the litigants, the form of the action, do not disturb the substantial fact that the controversy was between the estate of the ward and the State of Maryland, and that that controversy was determined in favor of the State. This court declining to disturb the final judg

Opinion of the Court.

ment of the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland, that controversy is settled and beyond further litigation. The matter has become res judicata between the estate and the State. There is no pretence that the taxes of 1895 stand in any other condition as to matter of fact than the taxes of 1893 and 1894, which were in terms included within the litigation settled by the decision referred to. The ruling therefore, as to the taxes for 1895 comes within the force of that decision, and is determined by the conclusion in respect to the taxes of 1893 and 1894. Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252; Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U. S. 683; New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371.

The controversy, therefore, between the State of Maryland and the estate of the ward having been finally settled in favor of the State, and the only Federal question presented in this case being that already determined as to the right of the State to enforce a tax upon the property of the ward, it is unneces sary to consider the purely local question as to whether a judg ment binding the estate binds also the sureties on the guardian's bond. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Myrick v. Thomp son, 99 U. S. 291, 297; Swope v. Leffingwell, 105 U. S. 3.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.