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15. The question whether a convict shall be executed by the sheriff, as the
law stood at the time of his trial and conviction, or by the warden of
the penitentiary, as the law was subsequently amended, or whether he
shall escape punishment altogether, involves no question of due process
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.

16. A petitioner in an application for a writ of prohibition to the judges of
a. Court of Land Registration upon the ground that the contemplated
proceedings in said court denied to parties interested due process of
law, cannot maintain a writ of error from this court to the Supreme
Court of the State without showing that he is personally interested in
the litigation, and has been, or is likely to be, deprived of his property
without due precess of law. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration,
405.

17. The fact that other persons in whom he has no personal interest and who
do not appear in the case, may suffer in that particular is not suffi-
cient. Ib.

18. In a case brought here from a Circuit Court, the opinion regularly filed
below, and which has been annexed to and transmitted with the record,
may be examined in order to ascertain, in cases like this, whether either
party claimed that a state statute upon which the judgment necessarily
depended in whole or in part, was in contravention of the Constitution
of the United States; but this must not be understood as saying that the
opinion below may be examined in order to ascertain that which, under
proper practice, should be made to appear in a bill of exceptions, or by
an agreed statement of facts, or by the pleadings. Loeb v. Columbia
Township, 472.

19. As the bonds in suit in this case were executed by the defendant town-
ship, a corporation, and are payable to bearer, the present holder, be-
ing a citizen of a State different from that of which the township was
a corporation, was entitled to sue upon them, without reference to the
citizenship of any prior holder. Ib.

20. The Circuit Court erred in holding that the petition in this case made
a case that necessarily brought it within the decision in Norwood v.
Baker, 172 U. S. 269. Ib.

21. Even if the third section of the statute of Ohio in question here be
stricken out as invalid, the petition makes a case entitling the plaintiff
to a judgment against the township. Ib.

22. The contention that, independently of any question of Federal law, the
statute of Ohio under which the bonds were issued was in violation of
the constitution of that State in that, when requiring the defendant
township to widen and extend the avenue in question the legislature
exercised administrative, not legislative, powers, is not supported by
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio made prior to the issuing
of these bonds. Ib.

23. If a claim is made in a Circuit Court that a state law is invalid under
the Constitution of the United States, this court may review the judg-
ment at the instance of the unsuccessful party. Ib.

24. The authority of this court to review the action of the court below in

this case must be found in one of three classes of cases, in which, by
section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, an appeal or writ of
error may be taken from a District or Circuit Court direct to this
court. The classes of cases alluded to are as follows: 1. Cases in which
the jurisdiction of the court is in issue, in which class of cases the
question of jurisdiction alone is to be certified from the court below
for decision; 2. Cases involving the construction or application of the
Constitution of the United States; and 3. Cases in which the constitu-
tionality of any law of the United States, or the validity or construction
of any treaty made under its authority, is drawn in question. The
court is of opinion that the case at bar is not embraced within either
of those classes of cases. Arkansas v. Schlierholz, 598.

25. The final ruling of the state court at the trial of this case being based
upon a state of facts which put the state statute in question entirely
out of the case, no Federal question remained for the consideration of
this court. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Ferris, 602.
26. Final decrees of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in
respect of final settlements in the orphan's court, may be reviewed in
this court on appeal. Kenaday v. Sinnott, 606.

27. This court has jurisdiction to examine the proceedings in the Circuit
Court of Appeals, and to reverse its order if its ruling is found erro-
neous, or the reverse if its ruling was correct. Southern Railway Co.
v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 641.

See MILITARY TRIBUNALS.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

1. A Circuit Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review upon writ of
error the trial, judgment and sentence of an Indian to imprisonment
for life, founded upon a verdict rendered on a trial of an indictment of
the Indian for murder, by which verdict the jury find the defendant
"guilty as charged in the indictment, without capital punishment."
Good Shot v. United States, 87.

2. The receiver in this case, having voluntarily brought the case into the
Circuit Court, by whose appointment he held his office, cannot, after
that court has passed upon the matter in controversy, be heard to ob-
ject to the power of that court to render judgment therein. Baggs v.
Martin, 206.

3. Luxton v. North River Bridge Company, 147 U. S. 337, is decisive of the
question raised in this case whether a final judgment or order has been
entered by the Circuit Court which could be taken by writ of error to
the Circuit Court of Appeals. Southern Railway Co. v. Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co., 641.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.

C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.

D. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

1. Where, in a controversy between an executrix and next of kin, a decree
of the orphans' court approving the final account of the executrix has
been reversed by the Court of Appeals on the appeal of the next of kin,
and the cause remanded that the account might be restated in accord-
ance with the principles set forth in the opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals, involving a recasting of the entire account, the decree of the
Court of Appeals is not final. Kenaday v. Sinnott, 606.

2. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, sitting as an orphans'
court, has jurisdiction over the settlement of estates, and controversies
in relation thereto between the next of kin and the executrix, and re-
sort to the chancery court is unnecessary. Ib.

LACHES.

See CASES AFFIRMED AND FOLLOWED, 2;

TRADE MARK.

LEASE.

See ESTOPPEL.

LIS PENDENS.

The conclusions in this case of the Supreme Court of Louisiana depended
alone upon an interpretation of the local law of the State governing the
sale, the record of title to real estate, and the nature, under the local
law, of the rights of a mortgage creditor; and, accepting the rule of
property under the law of that State to be as so announced, the proceed-
ings in the equity cause were not res judicata, and the lis pendens created
by that suit did not prevent the exercise by Maxwell of his right to
foreclose his mortgage, and the title which he acquired in the foreclos-
ure proceedings was not impaired by the pendency of that suit. Abra-
ham v. Casey, 210.

MILITARY TRIBUNALS.

1. Section 716, Rev. Stat., does not empower this court to review the pro-
ceedings of military tribunals by certiorari. In re Vidal, 126.

2. The act of April 12, 1900, c. 191, having discontinued the tribunal estab-
lished under that act, and created a successor, authorized to take pos-
session of its records and to take jurisdiction of all cases and proceed-
ings pending therein, this court has no jurisdiction to review its
proceedings. Ib.

3. Such tribunals are not courts with jurisdiction in law or equity, within
the meaning of those terms as used in Article Three of the Constitu-
tion. Ib.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. The Supreme Court of the State of Missouri having decided that the
provision of the state constitution respecting the enactment of registra-
tion laws does not limit the power of the General Assembly to create
VOL. CLXXIX-45

more than one class composed of cities having a population in excess
of one hundred thousand inhabitants, this conclusion must be accepted
by this court. Mason v. Missouri, 328.

2. The general right to vote in the State of Missouri is primarily derived
from the State; and the elective franchise, if one of the fundamental
privileges and immunities of the citizens of St. Louis, as citizens of
Missouri and of the United States, is clearly such franchise, as is regu-
lated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which
it is to be exercised. Ib.

3. The power to classify cities with reference to their population having
been exercised, in this case, in conformity with the constitution of the
State, the circumstance that the registration law in force in the city of
St. Louis was made to differ in essential particulars from that which
regulated the conduct of elections in other cities in the State of Mis-
souri, does not, in itself, deny to the citizens of St. Louis the equal pro-
tection of the laws; nor did the exercise by the General Assembly of
Missouri of the discretion vested in it by law, give rise to a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Ib.

NEW ORLEANS DRAINAGE.

1. Without implying that the reasoning of the state court by which the
conclusion was reached that under the statute of Louisiana both the
Board of Liquidation and the Drainage Commission occupied such a
fiduciary relation as to empower them to assert that the enforcement
of the provisions of the constitution of the State would impair the
obligations of the contracts entered into on the faith of the collection
and application of the one per cent tax, and of the surplus arising there-
from, this court adopts and follows it, as the construction put by the
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana on the statutes of that State,
in a matter of local and non-Federal concern. Board of Liquidation of
New Orleans v. Louisiana, 622.

2. The proposition that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of
Louisiana rests upon an independent non-Federal ground, finds no sem-
blance of support in the record. Ib.

3. Considering the many, and in some respects ambiguous statutes of the
State of Louisiana, this court concludes, as a matter of independent
judgment, that the contract rights of the parties were correctly defined
by the Supreme Court of that State. Ib.

4. This court's affirmance of the judgment below is without prejudice to
the right of the Board of Liquidation and the Drainage Commission to
hereafter assert the impairment of the contract right which would arise
from construing the judgment contrary to its natural and necessary
import, so as to deprive the Board of Liquidation of the power, in
countersigning the bonds, to state thereon the authority in virtue of
which they are issued. Ib.

ORIGINAL PACKAGE.

See CIGARETTES,

PATENT FOR INVENTION.

1. An examination of the history of the appellant's claim shows that in
order to get his patent he was compelled to accept one with a narrower
claim than that contained in his original application; and it is well
settled that the claim as allowed must be read and interpreted with
reference to the rejected claim and to the prior state of the art, and
cannot be so construed as to cover either what was rejected by the Patent
Office, or disclosed by prior devices. Hubbell v. United States, 77.
2. This court concurs with the court below in holding that the cartridges
made and used by the United States were not within the description
contained in the appellant's claim.

Ib.

PLEADING.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.

PRACTICE.

1. The petition for a rehearing in this case is denied. Hubbell v. Hubbell
(No. 198, October Term, 1897), 86.

2. The defendant in the court below moved to dismiss this case on the
ground that the contract in relation to the property in question was
with Griffith alone, and, that motion being denied, proceeded to offer
evidence. Held that he could not assign the refusal to dismiss as error.
Sigafus v. Porter, 116.

3. The briefs filed in this case are in plain violation of the amendment to
Rule 31, adopted at the last term, and printed in a note to this case.
Wisconsin, Minnesota &c. Railroad v. Jacobson, 287.

4. Where both courts below have concurred in a finding of fact, it will, iu
this court, be accepted as conclusive, unless it affirmatively appears
that the lower courts obviously erred. Workman v. New York City,
&c., 552.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. The fourth subdivision of section 13 of the act establishing the Court of
Private Land Claims, which provides that "no claim shall be allowed
for any land the right to which has hitherto been lawfully acted upon
and decided by Congress or under its authority," applies to this case,
and the claimant has no right to ask that court to pass upon its claim.
Las Animas Land Grant Co. v. United States, 201.

RECEIVER.

1. An action against a receiver of a state corporation is not a case arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States simply by reason
of the fact that such receiver was appointed by a court of the United
States. Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Co., 335.
2. A receiver appointed by a Federal court may be sued in that court as well
as in the state court, but if in the state court, he is not entitled to re-
move the cause on the sole ground of his appointment by the Federal
court.

Ib.

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