Opinion of the Court. their original packages, was in conflict with that provision of the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying an impost or duty upon imports. Congress, too, has repeatedly acted upon the principle of the Louisiana statute. Thus, after having imposed by act of August 2, 1813, a license tax upon the retailers of wines and spirits, for the purpose of providing for the expense of the war with Great Britain, it was further enacted by an act of February 8, 1815, c. 40, 3 Stat. 205, that it should not be construed "to extend to vine dressers who sell at the place where the same is made, wine of their own growth, nor shall any vine dresser for vending solely where the same is made, wine of his own growth, be compelled to take out a license as a retailer of. wines." So, too, in the Internal Revenue Act of July 1, 1862, c. 119, 12 Stat. 432, a license tax was imposed (sec. 64) upon retail dealers in all goods, wares and merchandise, but with a proviso, in section 66, that the act should not be construed "to require a license for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise made or produced and sold by the manufacturer or producer at the manufactory or place where the same is made or produced; to vinters who sell, at the place where the same is made, wine of their own growth; nor to apothecaries, as to wines or spirituous liquors which they use exclusively in the preparation or making of medicines for lame, sick or diseased persons." Another paragraph of the same section (64) exempts distillers, who sell the products of their own stills, from a tax as wholesale dealers in liquors. While no question of the power of Congress is involved, these instances show that its general policy does not differ from that of the act in question, and that the discrimination is based upon reasonable grounds. So, too, this court has had repeated occasion to sustain discriminations founded upon reasons much more obscure than this. Thus in Railroad Company v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, a municipal ordinance was sustained declaring that no car or vehicle of any kind "belonging to or used by the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company shall be drawn or propelled by steam" upon a certain street, although no other company was named in the ordinance, the court held Opinion of the Court. that as no other corporation had the right to run locomotives in that street, no other corporation could be in a like situation, and that the ordinance, while apparently limited in its operation, was general in its effect, as it applied to all who could do what was prohibited. "All laws should be general in their operation, and all places within the same city do not necessarily require the same local regulation. While locomotives may with very great propriety be excluded from one street, or even from one part of a street, it would be unreasonable to exclude them from all." In Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, it was decided that the equal protection clause did not prohibit a State from requiring, for the admission within its limits of a corporation of another State, such conditions as it chooses, though in that case it exacted a license tax from such corporations, which it did not exact from corporations of its own creation. In Missouri Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, it was said that this clause did not forbid special legislation, "and when legislation applies to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities, it is not open to the objection that it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions." To the same effect is Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578. The power of taxation under this provision was fully considered in Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, in which it was said not to have been intended to prevent a State from changing its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property altogether; may impose different specific taxes upon different trades or professions; may vary the rates of excise upon various products; may tax real and personal estate in a different manner; may tax visible property only and not securities; may allow or not allow deductions for indebted"All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature or the people of the State in framing their constitution." See also Home ness. Opinion of the Court. Insurance Company v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; St. Louis &c. Railway v. St. Paul, 173 U. S. 404. In Pacific Express Company v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, a state statute defining an express company to be such as carried on the business of transportation on contracts for hire with railroad or steamboat companies, did not invidiously discriminate against the express companies defined by it, by exempting other companies carrying express matter in vehicles of their own. This case is specially pertinent to the one under consideration. See also Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 857; Columbus Railroad v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Indiana, 165 U. S. 304; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194. The constitution of Louisiana classifies the refiners of sugar for the purpose of taxation into those who refine the products of their own plantations, and those who engage in a general refining business, and refine sugars purchased by themselves or put in their hands by others for that purpose, imposing a tax only upon the latter class. To entitle a party to the exemption it must appear (1) that he is a farmer or a planter; (2) that he grinds the cane as well as refines the sugar and molasses; (3) that he refines his own sugar and molasses, meaning thereby the product of his own plantation. Whether he may also refine the sugar of others may be open to question; although by its express terms the act does not apply to planters who granulate syrup for other planters during the rolling season. The discrimination is obviously intended as an encouragement to agriculture, and does not deny to persons and corporations engaged in a general refining business the equal protection of the laws. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Louis iana is MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurred in the result. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE did not participate in the decision of this case. Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS. No. 423. Submitted October 15, 1900.-Decided November 5, 1900. By the treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Indians of August, 1868, the Indians agreed not to attack any persons at home or travelling, and not to molest any persons at home or travelling, or molest any wagon trains, coaches, mules or cattle belonging to the people of the United States, or persons friendly therewith; and the United States agreed that no persons except those authorized by the treaty to do so, and officers, etc., of the Government should be permitted to pass over the Indian Territory described in the treaty. In 1877 Andrews passed over the territory with a large number of cattle, travelling over the Chishom trail, the same being an established trail en route from Texas to a market in Kansas. He being convicted on trial for a violation of the treaty, appeal was taken to this court. Held: (1) That the finding of the court below was equivalent to a finding that the trail was a lawfully established trail permitted by the laws of the United States; (2) That as the plaintiff was lawfully within the territory, he was not a trespasser at the time his property was taken. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Thompson and Mr. Assistant Attorney Finn for the United States. Mr. Silas Hare for Andrews. MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court. The claimant, Thomas C. Andrews, filed his claim in the Court of Claims against the United States and the above-named Indians to recover the value of certain cattle destroyed by the latter in June, 1877, in the Indian Territory. The claim was filed pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress of March 3, 1891, entitled "An act to provide for the adjudication and payment of claims arising from Indian depredations." Opinion of the Court. 26 Stat. 851. The property was alleged to have been of the value of $9225. The only defence set up was that the claimant at the date of the alleged depredation was wrongfully and unlawfully within the Indian country and was a trespasser, and therefore could not recover. After a trial, judgment was given against the United States and the Indians for the sum of $8300, and the court made the following finding: "In June, 1877, while the claimant, with a large number of cattle, was travelling over the Chisom trail, the same being an established trail, en route from Texas to a market in Kansas, and while camped on the Washita River, on the Kiowa and Comanche Indian reservation, in the Indian Territory, Indians belonging to the Kiowa and Comanche tribe of Indians took and drove away property of the kind and character described in the petition, the property of the claimant, which was then and there reasonably worth the sum of $8300. "Said property was taken as aforesaid, without just cause or provocation on the part of the owner or the agent in charge, and has never been returned or paid for." The Government contends that the claimant was a trespasser by reason of the provisions of the treaty between the United States and these Indians, proclaimed August 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 581, and because by section 17 of the act of 1834, 4 Stat. 729, it is provided that the liability of the Government for property taken by Indians, in the Indian Territory, shall arise only when the owner of the property taken was lawfully within such territory. The second article of the treaty, after describing certain lands in the Indian Territory thereby set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the tribes named, provides as follows: "And the United States now solemnly agrees that no persons except those herein authorized so to do, and except such officers, agents, and employés of the Government as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, VOL. CLXXIX-7 |