of said States, Territories, or districts of which such citizens or persons may be at the time bona fide residents, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe for the protection of the timber and of the undergrowth growing upon such lands, and for other purposes: Provided, The provisions of this act shall not extend to railroad corporations.

SEC. 2. That it shall be the duty of the register and the receiver of any local land office in whose district any mineral lands may be situated to ascertain from time to time whether any timber is being cut or used upon any such lands, except for the purposes authorized by this act, within their respective land districts; and if so, they shall immediately notify the Commissioner of the General Land Office of that fact; and all necessary expenses incurred in making such proper examinations shall be paid and allowed such register and receiver in making up their next quarterly accounts.

SEC. 3. Any person or persons who shall violate the provisions of this act, or any rules and regulations in pursuance thereof made by the Secretary of the Interior, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $500, and to which may be added imprisonment for any time not exceeding six months.

A. TIMBER ON MINERAL LAND.

1. CONSTRUCTION AND PURPOSE OF ACT.
2. STATES IN WHICH CUTTING IS PERMITTED.
3. MINING DISTRICTS-MEANING.

4. RESIDENTS AUTHORIZED TO CUT.

5. LANDS ON WHICH CUTTING IS PERMITTED.
a. MINERAL CHARACTER.

b. EXTENT OF MINERALS-PROOF.
c. COAL LANDS.

d. TIMBER LANDS-WHAT CONSTITUTES.

6. PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO CUT AND USE.
7. USES FOR WHICH CUTTING IS PERMITTED.
a. USES NAMED IN STATUTE.

b. REDUCTION, SMELTING, ROASTING, ETC.
c. DOMESTIC PURPOSES-MEANING.

d. EXPORTING PROHIBITED.

e. POWER TO SELL, BUY, OR EMPLOY OTHERS TO CUT. f. SAWMILL OWNERS-DISPOSAL OF LUMBER.

8. REGULATIONS AS TO CUTTING.

a. AUTHORITY AND EFFECT.

b. VALIDITY-RESTRICTING STATUTE.

d. REGULATION AS TO SAWMILL OWNERS.

9. DUTY OF REGISTERS AND RECEIVERS.

10. PLACER LOCATIONS- FRAUDULENT DESIGN FOR TIMBER CUT

11. ACTION FOR DAMAGES.

a. EVIDENCE AS TO MINERAL CHARACTER OF LAND.
b. DEFENSE EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH.

c. BURDEN OF PROOF.

d. WILLFUL TRESPASS- -PROOF AND PRESUMPTION.
e. WILLFUL TRESPASS-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

f. RIGHT OF UNITED STATES TO RECOVER.

g. LIABILITY OF RAILROAD COMPANY.

h. CRIMINAL LIABILTY-INTENT.

1. CONSTRUCTION AND PURPOSE OF ACT.

This statute is a part of the legislation showing the policy of Congress to develop the mineral resources of the country, providing practical legislation to that end, and placing only such restraint upon the settler and mineral explorer as will provide against waste and destruction, and this section must be construed with reference to the conditions prevailing in the mining regions requiring that the taking of timber for mining and domestic purposes shall not be restricted to lands known to contain minerals in paying quantities, but may include such adjacent lands as under all the conditions would not be deemed to be subject to entry except as mineral lands, and it is intended that this right or privilege of cutting timber shall be exercised under such regulations as will preserve the timber for the benefit of the inhabitants engaged in or connected with the mining industry.

United States v. Basic Co., 121 Fed. 504, p. 507.

See United States v. Edwards, 38 Fed. 812.

United States v. Richmond Min. Co., 40 Fed. 415.
Anderson v. United States, 152 Fed. 87, p. 91.

The purpose of this statute was to establish by positive enactment a right long claimed and exercised by lumbermen to appropriate the timber on Government land to manufacture it into lumber and furnish it to the millmen, miners, and farmers of the district who did not care to do the actual cutting and manufacturing for themselves, and its object ought not to be to compel payment for timber so cut, but to prevent unnecessary waste, and by this statute Congress enabled settlers in regions where timber is scarce to utilize it for domestic and mining purposes and to develop the mineral resources of the rough, mountainous districts where agricultural pursuits could not be profitably followed.

United States v. Rossi, 133 Fed. 380, p. 383.

The courts can not import into this act a limitation as to the location of the land from which timber may be taken where Congress has expressly conferrred authority to cut for the purposes stated on the public domain, mineral and not entered, in the State of which the citizen or person may be a resident.

United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed. 655, p. 660.

Congress having by this act designated the extent of the locality from which timber may be cut, it follows that no construction can limit the area and thus abridge or take away from the persons lawfully engaged in the industries designated by Congress the right to enjoy the license given.

United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed. 655, p. 660.

It seems to have been the intention of Congress to enlarge the uses which might be made of timber taken from public lands and for that purpose Congress modified the existing statute on this subject.

Morgan v. United States, 148 Fed. 189, p. 192.

56974°-Bull. 94, pt 2-15-33

This act was passed to establish by positive enactment a right claimed and exercised without interference on the part of the Government for a period of 30 years, and to prevent absolutely the cutting of timber would compel the abandonment practically of all the mineral regions of the States and Territories named in the act. Hardin, In re, 1 L. D. 597, p. 598.

The object of this act was to enable the inhabitants of the States and Territories named to fell and remove the timber from that class of the public lands withheld from the operations of the preemption and homestead laws, which by existing laws they were not permitted to do.

Instructions Timber Cutting, 1 L. D. 600.

By this and the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat. 89), the scope and operation of the offenses mentioned in the prior statute were extended from cutting, removing, or wanton destruction of timber growing on lands purchased or reserved by the United States for certain uses so as to embrace within their denunication the cutting, removing, or wanton destruction of timber growing on any of the public lands of the United States.

Morgan v. United States, 148 Fed. 189, p. 192.

This act is restricted in its operations to lands subject to entry under the mining laws, and it is the character of the entry by which they may be appropriated and not the character of the lands themselves, that determine the right to use timber for mining purposes.

Truan, In re, 2 L. D. 827.

It was the intention of Congress by this act to encourage and develop the industry of mining and to enable miners to make every use of the timber on mineral lands in the development of their mines and for all purposes properly classed under the head of mining, and miners are not restricted in such use in the employment of timber in the mine itself, but its application and use was intended to be granted in many ways requisite and necessary for the proper development of the industry.

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 8 Ariz. 186, p. 190; 71 Pac. 954.

2. STATES IN WHICH CUTTING IS PERMITTED.

This statute provides that bona fide residents of certain States and Territories and all mineral districts are permitted to cut and remove for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes any timber or trees growing on the public mineral lands and not subject to entry except for minerals.

English v. United States, 116 Fed. 625, p. 626.

This act, permitting residents of Colorado, Nevada, and the Territories and other mineral districts of the United States to cut timber for certain purposes upon the mineral lands, does not apply to California.

United States v. Benjamin, 21 Fed. 285, p. 286.

See Yosemite National Park, In re, 25 L. D. 48, p. 51.

This statute does not in terms apply to the State of Oregon, and the phrase "other mineral districts of the United States" is not intended to include the State of Oregon, as there is no such mineral districts therein.

United States v. Smith, 11 Fed. 487, p. 491.
United States v. Benjamin, 21 Fed. 285, p. 286.

United States v. English, 107 Fed. 867, p. 868.

English v. United States, 116 Fed. 625, p. 626.

3. MINING DISTRICTS-MEANING.

The land districts in mining States like Colorado and Nevada are sometimes spoken of as mineral districts and from this the phrase found its way into this act, and while there are some mineral lands and mining districts, it is not known that there are any considerable or contiguous sections of country to which the term "mineral district" could be properly applied, and there is none to which it is applied by law. United States v. Smith, 11 Fed. 487, p. 491.

If mineral districts are found outside of the States and Territories named in the act, such districts are included in the provisions of the act as fully as if the States containing such mineral districts had been specifically named.

Instructions-Timber Cutting, 1 L. D. 600.

The words "all other mineral districts of the United States" in this act include the mineral districts of California, and the rights and privileges granted to the citizens of Colorado, Nevada, and the Territories to fell and remove timber for mining, agricultural, and other domestic purposes from the public mineral lands are given to the citizens and residents of the mineral districts of California.

Timber cutting, In re, 1 L. D. 616, p. 617.

There is no section of the State of Oregon known and defined as a mineral district. United States v. Smith, 11 Fed. 487, p. 490.

4. RESIDENTS AUTHORIZED TO CUT.

Bona fide residents of Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Dakota, Idaho, and Montana are authorized to cut timber growing on mining lands for certain purposes.

United States v. Copper Queen Min. Co., 185 U. S. 495, p. 496.

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, p. 210.

United States v. Plowman, 216 U. S. 372.

See United States v. Budd, 43 Fed. 630, p. 631.

A person cutting timber on mineral lands and claiming the provisions of the statute must show he is a bona fide resident.

Powers v. United States, 119 Fed. 562, p. 565.

This act authorizes any citizen of the United States and any bona fide resident of the State of Colorado to cut and remove for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes any timber or trees growing upon the public lands where such lands are mineral and not subject to entry except for mineral.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 243.

The language used in this act includes aliens as well as citizens, if they are bona fide residents of the States and Territories and districts mentioned.

United States v. Copper Queen Min. Co., 7 Ariz. 80, p. 86, 60 Pac. 885.

See United States v. Copper Queen Min. Co., 185 U. S. 495.

A foreign corporation doing business solely within the State of Idaho is not a bona fide resident within the meaning of this act, and is not authorized or permitted to cut timber for certain purposes on the public mineral lands.

Centerville Mining, etc., Co., In re, 39 L. D. 80, p. 85.

This act authorizes a citizen to enter upon mineral public lands opened to mineral entry to cut timber therefrom for mining purposes.

Bunker Hill, etc., Min., etc., Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 548, p. 549,

5. LANDS ON WHICH CUTTING IS PERMITTED.

a. MINERAL CHARACTER.

This statute is not limited to land which is or may be actually occupied for mining purposes, and it is not altogether a matter of finding valuable ore or metal in the ground from which timber is taken where the lands described are in a mountain region in the vicinity of valuable mines, and some indications of valuable minerals in them, and are unfit for cultivation or pasturage.

United States v. Edwards, 38 Fed. 812, p. 813.
United States v. Budd, 43 Fed. 630, p. 631.

United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663, p. 666.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 245.

Lands that are mountainous or broken foothills, mineral in character, of little or no value except for mineral, within an organized mining district, itself mineral in character, is mineral land within this statute, permitting the cutting of timber for mining purposes.

United States v. Richmond Min. Co., 40 Fed. 415, p. 418.

The right of a person to cut and remove timber from the land in controversy is dependent upon the land being mineral and not subject to entry under existing laws of the United States except for mineral entry.

Lynch v. United States, 138 Fed. 535, p. 540.

The grant of permission to cut timber, when construed with reference to the conditions existing when the statute was enacted, extends to public mineral lands not subject to entry except for mineral without limitation as to any locality and subject to regulation by rules of the Secretary of the Interior.

United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed. 655, p. 660.

This statute does not contemplate or require that before a citizen can enter upon the land and cut and remove timber there must have been an actual discovery of mineral and development work showing the presence all over it of valuable mineral deposits.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 245.

This act, authorizing citizens of Colorado, Nevada, etc., to use timber for mining and domestic purposes, applies to such mineral lands as are not subject to entry under existing laws of the United States, except for mineral entry in either of such States. Truan, In re, 2 L. D. 827.

The mere fact that portions of land from which timber was cut in violation of this section contained particles of gold or other valuable deposits, or veins of gold bearing quartz, would not necessarily impress it with the character of mineral land as defined by the statute and within the meaning of this act, but it must be shown that such lands contain metals in quantities sufficient to render it available and valuable for mining purposes.

United States v. Copper Queen Min. Co., 7 Ariz. 80, p. 85.
See United States v. Copper Queen Min. Co., 185 U. S. 495.

Under this statute timber can be cut on lands surveyed and described as having "broken and rocky surface, cut up by ledges and ravines, and with every indication of being mineral ground," and shown in the plat of the Government surveyor as mineral land, though no mines have been actually found or located on the particular subdivisions from which the timber was cut.

United States v. Edwards, 38 Fed. 812.

United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663, p. 666.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 245.