directed and empowered in such case to employ, at once, the army and navy in the enforcement of the demand. The resolutions had the merit of brevity, explicitness, and unquestioned validity. No exercise of any doubtful or indefinite authority or power was provided for. The beginning and ending of the whole matter was the immediate expulsion of the Spaniards from Cuba. The door was shut against all further propositions of mediation or intervention looking to autonomy, or the continued sovereignty of Spain in the Island on any terms. The resolutions meant the absolute and unqualified independence of the Cubans, with the right to establish their own government without let or hindrance from us or anybody else; and they saved us from the perils and responsibilities of establishing a government. That whole subject was left in the hands of the people to whom it belongs. Consistent with all this was the fourth resolution, disclaiming all intentions of acquisition, and the first resolution, declaring that the people are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

The first resolution was of the highest importance, and was accordingly made the subject of much earnest discussion. The chief insistence of those who opposed it was, however, simply that it declared what was not true. In this behalf they claimed, in all possible forms of speech, that war was still in progress in the Island; that the Spanish army still occupied the fortified cities and all the seaports; and that if the Cubans were already free and independent, it would not be necessary for us to intervene. To all this it was answered that a people could be free and independent, in the international sense, without having exclusive control of all their country; and that the presence of an enemy in the midst of them was not a test. At the close of the Franco-Prussian war the German army occupied Paris; but nobody ever thought of denying that the French people were internationally free and independent on that account. Similarly it was argued that though the people of Cuba had not driven the Spaniards out of the Island, yet they had resisted the Spanish arms successfully, that Spain was no longer attended with a reasonable hope or expectation of success in her effort to regain her lost sovereignty, and that our whole proceeding was based on the theory that Spain, by her misgovernment and bad conduct, had forfeited, not only her sovereignty, but also her right to regain it; for which reason we were proposing to drive her out. The effect of that would be to leave the Cubans free; for, if Spain had lost authority, there was none in the Island, except such as the Cubans might impose upon themselvesall of which was only another way of saying that they were free and independent. It was further insisted that if, according to the requirements of international law in ordinary cases, there was anything lacking to make the Cubans internationally free and independent it was supplied by the resolutions to be passed, because, by those resolutions, intervention was provided for; and that meant the unquestioned freedom and independence of Cuba to all who believed in our success. If Spain should retire on demand, the case was clear; if she remained to fight, the result was the same in practical effect, although for a time postponed; while the legal effect would occur immediately, so far as we were concerned, because we should be compelled to recognize the insurgents as our natural allies and co-operate with them, and we could not do

that, and at the same time continue to treat with them as Spanish subjects.

A further argument was based on the fact that the armed intervention proposed was regarded as of such nature that if Spain refused to abdicate, war would immediately follow, and a declaration to that effect would be necessary, as proved to be the case; but that a declaration of war against Spain would be a declaration of war against all her subjects everywhere. The people of Cuba, including the insurgents, were Spanish subjects in law, and would remain so in our view, as well as that of Spain and the rest of the world, until we recognized their independence. A declaration of war against Spain therefore would be a declaration of war against the Cubans as well as everybody else belonging to Spain; and consequently, as a war measure and as one of the necessities of the case, at least the people of Cuba should be recognized as independent. This view prevailed. It prevailed because it was justified by the facts, and was made necessary as a collateral proposition by the chief proposition of intervention. Independence must go hand in hand with intervention.

For the same reasons, as well as others, the Republic of Cuba should have been recognized as the true and lawful government of the Island. The progress of events will not only make this manifest, but will shortly compel such recognition, practically, if not formally. The chief objection was stated by the President, as follows:

"In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally."

A complete answer to this suggestion, in the minds of those who favored such recognition, was found in the fact that, according to all international-law writers, an intervening power never takes orders from anybody, and in the further fact that the whole situation was of such a character as emphatically to negative the idea that the Cuban Republic, or General Gomez, would embarrass us by the assertion of any such right. This is all that need be said upon that point now. In this way the question narrowed itself down to whether or not we were justified, under all the circumstances, in demanding that Spain retire from Cuba, and, upon her refusal, in proceeding to eject her by force of arms.

The general rule established by international law is non-intervention; but the exceptions to this rule have been so often repeated, and on such various grounds, that intervention has become a well recognized right, if not in some instances, an acknowledged obligation.

Prof. Lawrence, in his admirable work on "The Principles of International Law," after discussing the right of intervention on the ground of self-interest, says, with special reference to cruelties on account of religion:

"Should the cruelty be so long-continued and so revolting that the best instincts of human nature are outraged by it, and should an opportunity arise for bringing it to an end and removing its cause without adding fuel to the flame of the contest, there is nothing in the law of nations which will condemn, as a wrongdoer, the state which steps forward and undertakes the necessary intervention. Each case must be judged on its own merits. I have no right to enter my neigh

bor's garden without his consent; but, if I saw a child of his robbed and ill treated in it by a tramp, I should throw ceremony to the winds, and rush to the rescue without waiting to ask permission.” (P. 120.) In concluding his discussion of the subject, Lawrence says: "They (nations) should intervene very sparingly, and only on the clearest grounds of justice and necessity; but when they do intervene, they should make it clear to all concerned that their voice must be attended to and their wishes carried out.” (P. 185.)

All authorities are to the same general effect.

Applying these rules, the war in Cuba has been of long duration. It is more than three years now since it commenced; and the present is but a resumption and continuation of the ten years' war that ended by the treaty of Zanjon in 1878. The struggle has been attended by unusual cruelties from the beginning; and the one feature of international extermination by starvation of the unoffending non-combatants, to the number of hundreds of thousands, is so inhuman and shocking, and has been now so long continued that, without regard to the commercial and property interests involved, we have “the clearest grounds of justice and necessity" for intervention ever presented.

In the language of Historicus (Letters on Some Questions of International Law.-I), it is a case where intervention is "a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law"-which is the equivalent of saying that it has the most sacred sanction of law.

We were justified, therefore, in intervening; and it was our duty, when we did intervene, adopting the words above quoted, to make it clear to all concerned that our voice must be attended to and our wishes carried out. The resolutions authorizing our intervention meet all these requirements, and do not go beyond. We could not do less than they propose and do our duty. Under all the circumstances we delayed action longer than we should, and have been less harsh and exacting than we might have been.

Spain lost her sovereignty by her own misrule; and she lost all opportunity to retire with dignity and honor, by obstinately refusing the kindest and most generous offers of mediation and by failing to heed repeated and unmistakable warnings of the inevitable. She had a legal right to treat our intervention as an act of war; but she had no moral right to do so. She has been in the wrong and at fault from the beginning. The trouble commenced in her own house. She made it a general nuisance, and persisted in so maintaining it long after she had been notified that it had become insufferable. Now, when she has forfeited all the respect of others, and all her rights, and when ejection has become necessary, she resents it as an act of war, and appeals to the world for sympathy. So far she has not received any; and it is to be hoped she will not. But, however that may be, our only course was to meet war with war. It is a justly dreaded necessity, but not without some compensations. The spirit of patriotism that has been aroused will stir the life blood of the nation, quicken human activities, and efface sectional divisions. Whether the struggle be long or short, we shall emerge from it stronger, more united and more respected than ever

before.

J. B. FORAKER.

April 28, 1898.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SAMPSON-SCHLEY CONTROVERSY-A BIG GUN FOR CINCINNATI-CUBAN LEGISLATION.

IT

T IS not within the purpose of these notes to write a history of the Spanish-American War, or to deal with any of its incidents, or any of the questions arising therefrom, except in so far as I may have had a personal relation thereto. The struggle was short, sharp and decisive. Both the Army and the Navy did well according to their respective opportunities, but the brilliant victories at Manila and Santiago caused all to feel that the Navy had done especially well.

It was my good fortune to become well acquainted with Admiral Dewey. I found him such a charming and lovable, modest and unassuming man that it was always a pleasure to know that nobody disputed his right to the first honors that were accorded him.

The controversy between Sampson and Schley always seemed to me as unnecessary as it was unfortunate. It was one of the first quarrels of the war that found its way into the Senate.

There was enough honor and more than enough "to go around," allotting to each a wholesome measure. It was not the fault of Sampson that he was absent when Cervera's fleet came out of the harbor of Santiago.

He was on duty obeying orders, by which he was directed to have a conference with General Shafter at Siboney, eleven miles distant. It was his duty to be where his orders placed him, but nevertheless the fact was that he was there, and not in front of the mouth of Santiago harbor when the battle commenced.

He started to return as quickly as the roar of the guns gave him warning and traveled with all possible speed to the scene of the battle, but unfortunately for him, when the

Spanish fleet came out of the harbor they turned to the right instead of the left, and went at full speed toward the West, our ships engaging and pursuing; and thus the battle continued for forty-three miles, until the Colon, the last of the Spanish fleet, surrendered.

When the New York, Sampson's flagship, arrived the fighting was all over. Schley was in the midst of the battle from the beginning until the end; and Sampson was not in it at all, and no matter how good the excuses, and they were good, they were only excuses; they did not change the facts.

The testimony showed that each Spanish ship suffered more or less injury from shells fired from the Brooklyn, Schley's flagship, and the only American casualties were on that ship; one wounded and one killed.

It was doubtless a great disappointment to Sampson and his champions in the rivalries of navy circles for him to be absent at the critical moment, and this disappointment, chagrin and mortification were intensified by the fact that the honors Sampson doubtless would have been entitled to claim, had he been present, went of right to Schley, who was present and in command from the beginning until the ending of the battle. But this was no excuse for Sampson and his friends undertaking to make unjust claims; and particularly no excuse for denying to Schley and those who fought the battle the credit to which they were entitled.

The controversy was long, bitter and acrimonious, finally resulting in a refusal of the Senate to confirm the President's promotion of Sampson by eight points while giving only six to Schley; and further resulting, three years after the war, in a Court of Inquiry that was conducted more like a prosecution of Schley than an impartial investigation of great historical facts, and which resulted in a finding by two of the members of the Court that Schley was guilty of a number of charges that had been born of the controversy, some of which seemed absolutely malicious, and most of them without any just foundation in fact. Among these charges was one to the effect that at the beginning of the battle Schley had improperly maneuvered his ship and that he had