operator, therefore, must exercise a high degree of care in allowing passengers a reasonable time to enter or leave the car before putting it in motion, and when a passenger is leaving it at any particular floor, to hold it there a reasonable time, not only for him, but for any other passenger in the act of alighting, to do so in safety.43

Sec. 102. Same subject-When negligence will be presumed. -As a general rule, the mere happening of an accident resulting in injury to the passenger while riding in a passenger elevator is not, of itself, prima facie evidence that the owner or his agent has been at fault, and the plaintiff must allege and prove the facts upon which he relies to establish negligence.44 But where the accident is caused by the breaking or giving way of the machinery or appliances by which the elevator is operated, the very nature of such an occurrence raises a presumption of negligence which can only be overcome by proof that the requisite care and caution was exercised.45 And although the operation of an automatic push-button, electrical passenger elevator may not be negligence in respect to persons of sufficient maturity and discretion to appreciate the danger and risk of contact with the door or side of the shaft when the car is moving, yet it may be actionable negligence towards a

43. Becker v. Lincoln Real Estate & Bld. Co., 174 Mo. 246, 73 S. W. Rep. 581; Luckel v. Century Bld. Co., 177 Mo. 608, 76 S. W. Rep. 1035; Becker v. Building Co., Mo. App. 93 S. W. Rep. 291. Starting an elevator while the door is open, and while a passenger is entering the car, is negligence. Blackwell v. O'Gorman Co., 22 R. I. 638, 49 Atl. Rep. 28.

If an elevator car be started at full speed before a passenger has had time to place himself securely on his feet, and he is thereby injured, the proprietor will be liable. Russo v. Morris, etc., Imp. Assn., 104 La. 426, 29 So. Rep. 46.

44. Spees v. Boggs, 198 Penn. St. 112, 47 Atl. Rep. 875, 82 Am. St. Rep. 792.

45. Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. Rep. 925, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630, 52 L. R. A. 922; Hartford Deposit Co v. Sollitt, 172 Ill. 222, 50 N. E. Rep. 178, 64 Am. St. Rep. 35; Franklin Printing & Publishing Co. v. Behrens, 181 Ill. 340, 54 N. E. Rep. 896; Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N. E. Rep. 953, 82 Am. St. Rep. 464, 52 L. R. A. 930; Springer v. Schultz, 205 Ill. 144, 68 N. E. Rep. 753; Winheim ". Field 107 Ill. App. 145; Edwards v. Bld. Co., R. I. - 61 Atl. Rep. 646.

child of tender years who cannot appreciate his danger, and the mere happening of an accident to such a child on an elevator of that description where no operator is employed constitutes rebuttable evidence of negligence.46

Sec. 103. (§ 81e.) Bridge, canal and turnpike companies. -Bridge, 47 canal, 48 and turnpike19 companies organized merely for the purpose of furnishing a thoroughfare over which others may transport goods, but not engaged in such transportation themselves, are not common carriers.

46. Shellaberger v. Fisher, C. C. A.-, 143 Fed. 937.

47. Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Railroad Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 616;

Grigsby v. Chappell, 5 Rich. 443.

48. Exchange Ins. Co. v. Canal Co., 10 Bosw. 180.

49. Lake Superior, etc., R. Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 444.

OF THE DELIVERY TO THE CARRIER, AND THE EVIDENCE THEREOF.

§ 139. First carrier as forwarding | § 158. Same subject-As receipts,

§ 177. Goods must be delivered [§ 189. Same subject-Possession of