plied, and it is to be presumed that such instances will not be of frequent occurrence.

Sec. 119. (94.) When the delivery becomes complete.The entire responsibility for the safety of the goods being shifted from the owner to the common carrier as soon as the delivery is made, it frequently becomes a question of the greatest importance and of great nicety to determine at what instant of time such delivery becomes complete; for, as we have seen, until the entire exclusive custody of them has been given to the carrier, no responsibility rests upon him in that character. The most that can be said generally upon this subject is, that a tender of the goods being made to the carrier, his liability for their safety as carrier arises co instanti with his acceptance of them. The difficulty lies in applying the law in such cases and not in its statement; that is, in determining in the particular instance exactly at what time the circumstances show the acceptance to have taken place. To effect a delivery to the carrier there must be, either actually or in legal effect, a complete surrender to him of possession and custody, and, as a consequence, all control over the goods must be abandoned by the owner until the purpose of the bailment has been accomplished; and until this has been done it cannot be said that the carrier has assumed any responsibility for them as carrier.

Sec. 120. (§ 95.) Same subject-Delivery to ships and vessels.-Delivery to a ship or vessel is complete as soon as the

1. The delivery is complete when the goods are accepted for carriage, and though the statute provides that transportation shall be deemed to have commenced when the bill of lading is signed, the carrier may become liable before if the goods have been actually delivered and accepted by him. East, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hall, 64 Tex. 615.

Where the shipper of goods has done all he intends to do to them

before they are shipped, and has notified the carrier's agent that they are upon the platform and ready for shipment, and the agent agrees to forward them, there is a sufficient delivery to make the company liable as a common carrier. Stapleton v. Railway Co., 133 Mich. 739, 10 Det. L. N. 133, 94 N. W. Rep. 739, citing Hutchinson on Carr. See also, Railway Co. v. Murphy, 60 Ark. 333, 30 S. W. Rep. 419, 46 Am. St. Rep. 202.

master, mate or any other agent of the owner receives the goods; and they may be received upon the ship, on the wharf, on the beach or at a warehouse, or at any other place at which an agent duly authorized may agree to receive them; and in all such cases the liability of the master and owners as carriers commences at the moment of such acceptance. It has been decided in a great number of cases that it is not necessary that the goods should be taken on board in order to fix the liability of common carriers upon the owners. Where a receipt had been given, and, before the goods had been put on board, a violent storm arose causing the tide to rise to an unusual height so as to flood the warehouse in which they had been placed, whereby they were damaged, and it was held that, "after the defendants had receipted for the merchandise, it was as much at their risk as if it had been on board the vessel."3 And taking them upon a barge or lighter by direction of the ship's agent to be conveyed to the ship constitutes a good delivery to the ship. Where a vessel drawing so much water that it could not come to the wharf to take on cotton which it had contracted to carry was obliged to employ a lighterman to convey the cotton to her, who gave his own receipt for it, it was held that the liability of the ship and owners attached as soon as the cotton was loaded upon the lighter. And where an ocean steamer could not reach the port to take passengers and freight on board, and her agent at the port employed a steamboat to take them down the river to the steamer, it was held that the freight was delivered to the steamer as soon as it was put on board the steamboat or delivered to its agents for the purpose of being conveyed to the steamer.5 And the ship and owners become responsible for the freight from the

2. Story on Bail. § 534; Abbott 477; Insurance Co. of North Ameron Shipping, ch. 3, § 3.

3. Greenwood v. Cooper, 10 La. Ann. 796.

4. Bulkley v. The Naunkeag, etc., Company, 24 How. 386; The Bark Edwin, 1 Sprague's Dec.

ica . North German Lloyd Co., 106 Fed. 973; affirmed in NordDeutscher Lloyd v. President, etc., of Insurance Co., 110 Fed. 420, 49 C C. A. 1.

5. The Oregon, Deady R. 179.

time of its delivery, although no receipt or bill of lading be made out or signed for it until after the loss has occurred."

But to constitute a delivery of goods which the owner places upon the carrier's wharf, it must appear, in the absence of any custom to the contrary, that a duly authorized agent received them for transportation; for if no acceptance be shown it cannot be said that the shipowner assumed the custody or control of them so as to impose upon him the responsibility of a common carrier. Thus, if the owner of baggage merely leaves it upon the carrier's pier with no directions as to its destination or the time of shipment, it is in no sense within the custody or control of the carrier so as to give the owner a maritime lien on the vessel for its loss; and the fact that he later purchases a ticket for passage on the vessel can make no difference.7

Sec. 121. (§ 96.) Same subject-Delivery to railroad and express companies.-Delivery of freight is usually made to railroads and express companies at offices, warehouses or stations which they have established for that purpose. And except in rare cases, resting upon peculiar and exceptional grounds as we have seen, notice must be given to the proper servant or agent of the company before the delivery will be complete. But if such agent become informed of the fact in any way, such knowledge will be as effectual to bind the company as express notice to him. Nor is it always essential, as has been shown, that the notice should be given to one who is an actual agent for the purpose of accepting the goods. For if the notice is given to one who is placed by the carrier in such a situation that those who come to deliver their goods for carriage have a right to presume that he is such an agent or has authority to accept them on behalf of the carrier, it is sufficient. Nor,

6. Snow v. Caruth, 1 Sprague's senger to show a delivery, and unDec. 324.

7. The Pricilla, 114 Fed. 836, 52 C. C. A. 470, reversing 106 Fed. 739.

til he does so the carrier cannot be made responsible for his baggage.

Lustig v. Navigation Co., 78 N.

The burden of proof is on a pas- Y. Supp. 885, 38 Misc. 802.

as we have also seen,8 is it always necessary that the delivery should be made at the office, warehouse, station or other place appointed or designed for the delivery of goods and generally used for that purpose; but it may be made wherever the proper agent may agree to accept it. The agent may, however, refuse to accept the goods at unusual places or away from the office or station appointed for the purpose; but if he do accept, no matter where, his company will become liable unless it be done. under such circumstances as would implicate the shipper in an attempt to defraud it. And such acceptance away from the usual place for receiving goods for carriage, or at any unusual place, must be by some agent whose business it is to receive the goods for that purpose, and not by one who is employed for an entirely different object;10 and must be consistent with. the general objects and business of the company.11

Sec. 122. (§ 97.) Carriers not required to stop for goods except at regular stations.-Nor can the owner of the goods. require such carriers to stop anywhere except at their regular offices or stations12 or other usual or designated place13 to

8. See ante, § 115 and note. 9. Cronkite v. Wells, 32 N. Y. 247.

10. Blanchard v. Isaacs, 3 Barb. 388; Fisher v. Geddes, 15 La. Ann. 14; Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 50.

A house and platform on the side of a track at which freight is occasionally received and discharged, but at which no agent's office or books are kept or bills of lading or receipts given, is not a "regular depot or station" within

11. Missouri, etc., Co. v. The the meaning of a statute imposing Railroad, 35 Mo. 84.

.

12. A carrier is not liable for not accepting goods unless they are offered at a regular depot or other usual or designated place for receiving freight; but when the goods are placed at a station upon the line of the road to be transported, the refusal of the carrier upon demand to furnish cars for the transportation of the property relieves the owner from making any further delivery or offer to deliver. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Flanagan, 113 Ind. 488.

a penalty for refusing to receive freight at such depots or stations. Kellogg . Railroad Co., 100 N. C. 158. See, also, Land v. Railroad Co., 104 N. C. 48.

A mere switch at which there is neither agent, station nor platform is not a depot at which delivery may be made to the carrier. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Lilly (Miss.), 8 S. Rep. 644.

13. As to what will constitute a stopping place by usage, see ante, § 115.

take on his goods. Nor can they be required to receive goods on or along a private switch. Their duties in this regard are confined and limited to their depots, or regular shipping or receiving points.14 Where the conductor of a freight train had promised to stop his train and take on the plaintiff's goods, relying on which promise he had deposited them upon the roadside and they were lost in consequence of the failure to stop the train as had been promised, it was held that the company was not liable;15 and it was said that if goods be put upon the platform at a regular station or depot, with the knowledge of the agent, it would be a good delivery and acceptance, and it would not be necessary that they should be entered on a way-bill or that any written memorandum should be made;16 for the liability commences whenever the owner relinquishes his control over the goods and they are received for the purpose of being carried, and exists to the same extent as when they are put upon the train; but that all "way-side deposits" made for the purpose of saving the trouble of hauling to the regular depot are at the risk of the owner until the goods are put upon the cars.17 So where the goods were stored in the warehouse or upon the platform of a railroad company with the permission of its agent, with the understanding that they should be shipped as soon as cars could be had to transport. them and the permission of the military authorities which then had control of the road could be obtained, it was held that this did not constitute such a delivery to the road as a carrier as to make the company responsible in that character for the loss of the goods, but that they had incurred liability only as warehousemen. It would have been different, how

14. Bedford-Bowling Green Stone Co. v. Oman, 134 Fed. 441; s. C., 115 Ky. 369, 73 S. W. Rep. 1038.

15. Wells ย. Railroad Co., 6 Jones' L. 47. See Meyer v. Vicksburg R. R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 639, cited in note to § 115.

16. The delivery is complete when the goods are actually ac

cepted for carriage, and the carrier may become liable then without giving a bill of lading, even though a statute provides that transportation shall be deemed to have commenced when the bill of lading is signed. East Line, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hall, 64 Tex. 615.

17. See ante, § 115 and note.