ever, it was said, had the agent given a shipping receipt or entered into an express contract to transport the goods unconditionally.18

Sec. 123. Same subject-Express companies.-In the absence of a custom of receiving goods at other places, express companies cannot be required to accept goods for carriage at other than their regular places of business or lines of travel. And where an express company, in the collection of express matter establishes limits in a city beyond which it will not go for the collection of such matter, it is not obliged to go beyond the limits so established, although they include points in one part of the city which are a greater distance from its place of business than points in another part not within such limits.19

Sec. 124. ($98.) When carrier deemed to have accepted goods. The long-established and familiar rule20 as to the warehouseman, that his liability commences as soon as the goods arrive at his warehouse and the crane of the warehouse has been applied to them to raise them into the warehouse, has been applied to the common carrier under similar circumstances, and the delivery to him and his acceptance of the goods held to commence from the moment he or his servants undertake to load them from the conveyance of another carrier upon his own and for that purpose have attached his tackle to them. And where an engine was sent by a truckman to the depot of a railroad company for shipment, the delivery to the road was held to be complete and its liability to have commenced as soon as the work of transferring the engine from the truck to the company's car had been commenced by means of a derrick, the agent of the company being present, superintending and directing the work, and the case was said to be the same in principle as that of the warehouseman. As soon, therefore, as the work of transferring the engine was commenced

18. Ill. Cen. R. R. v. Ashmead, 58 Ill. 487; Same v. McClellan, 54 id. 58; Same v. Hornberger, 77 id. 457.

19. Bullard v. Express Co., 107 Mich. 695, 65 N. W. Rep. 551, citing Hutchinson on Carr.

20. Thomas v. Day, 4 Esp. 262.

under the superintendence of the road, the liability of the truckman as carrier ceased and that of the company commenced.21

Sec. 125. (§ 99.) Same subject-How when goods are loaded by owner. When the owner of the goods has done all in his power and all that he is required to do by his understanding with the carrier or the usage of the business to further the shipment, and it becomes then the duty of the carrier to do whatever else is necessary to put them in transitu, the delivery and acceptance will be considered as complete from the time the carrier is informed that they are ready for him. The mere fact, therefore, that the owner of the goods has loaded them on a car, even though the carrier by the owner's directions has placed the car in a position convenient for such purpose, will not of itself be sufficient to constitute a delivery. Before the delivery will be deemed complete the owner must not only have relinquished his control over the car, but notice that it was ready for shipment must have been given the carrier. Thus where it was the course of business for a railroad company, when required to do so, to send its cars upon a side track at the place of shipment to receive cotton for transportation, and for the shipper there to load upon them the freight, make out a manifest and leave it with the agent of the company, who then had the bales counted, signed bills of lading, and sent locomotives to remove the cars thus loaded and place them in the train destined to the point to which the shipments were to be made, it was held that the delivery was complete as soon as the cotton was put upon the company's cars in this manner by the shipper and the company's agent informed of the fact.22 And where the owner of lumber ordered a car in which to load lumber for the purpose of shipment, and the carrier, in pursuance of such order, placed a car on one of its side tracks for such purpose, and after the car was loaded, but before the carrier had been notified that it was ready for ship

21. Merritt t. The Railroad, 11 Allen, 80.

22. Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Smyser, 38 Ill. 354.

ment, or had been apprised of the name of the consignee, it caught fire and the lumber was destroyed, it was held that as the carrier had not been notified that the car was ready for shipment, nor the name of the consignee given him, there was not such a delivery of the goods as to render him liable as a common carrier.23 And in another case, it appeared that on account of there being no station agent located at the place of shipment, it was the custom between the plaintiff, a shipper of cotton, and the defendant carrier, for the plaintiff when he wished to make a shipment to notify the conductor of a local freight train to leave a car on a track adjoining the main track. The plaintiff, when the car was thus placed, would load it, and when the same was ready for shipment, he would flag the train to which he desired the car to be attached and the conductor of the flagged train would give him a bill of lading. In accordance with this custom, a car was placed upon the adjoining track which the plaintiff loaded with cotton. Shortly after the car was loaded, but before the passing of the next train, the car and its contents were destroyed by fire. It was held that while the car and the track upon which it was standing belonged to the defendant, yet not having been notified that the car was loaded and ready for shipment, there was no delivery and acceptance shown such as to render him responsible as a common carrier for the loss.24 But where the owner of the goods has placed them in the car, and has given notice to the carrier that they are ready for shipment, or where, according to the course of dealing between himself and the carrier, he has done all that is required of him, of which fact the carrier has notice, so that whatever remains to be done is exclusively the work of the carrier, the delivery will be deemed

23. Basnight v. Railroad Co., 111 N. Car. 592, 16 S. E. Rep. 323. The mere loading of goods into a car standing on a side track does not constitute a delivery to the carrier, where the station agent, on being notified of the fact, de

clines to ship the goods. Yoakum v. Dryden (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. Rep. 312.

24. Tate v. Railroad Co., 78 Miss. 842, 29 So. Rep. 392, 84 Am. St. Rep. 649, citing Hutchinson on Carr.

complete, and the liability of the common carrier as such will at once commence.25

Sec. 126. (§ 99a.) Same subject-Implied acceptance.-So where the carrier has actually accepted the goods and undertaken their carriage, evidence of a formal or express acceptance is unnecessary. Thus where property was placed by the owner in a car for transportation without express authority from any authorized agent, but an agent having authority to receive the property for transportation knew that it was so placed there, and for what purpose, and did not object but permitted it to go forward, it was held that there was an implied undertaking on the part of the company to carry, and on the part of the owner to pay a reasonable compensation therefor.26

Sec. 127. (§ 100.) Checking, memorandum or entry on waybill not necessary to complete delivery.-It has been often determined that no checking, written memorandum or entry upon a way-bill is necessary to complete the delivery. All that is necessary is a deposit of the goods with the carrier for the purpose of transportation; and if they be accepted by him to be sent forward in the ordinary course of his business, whether they are to be accompanied by their owner or not, the full responsibility of the carrier at once begins. Thus where the plaintiff, who intended to leave upon an afternoon train, carried his trunk to the depot in the forenoon, but was told by the agent of the road that it did not check baggage until within a few minutes before the train was to start, whereupon. the plaintiff left his trunk in the care of the agent, and during the day, and after its delivery to the agent, it was broken open and rifled, it was held that the custom of checking could have no effect upon the character of the delivery, and that the company held the trunk from the first as a common carrier.27

25. Railway Co. v. Murphy, 60 Ark. 333, 30 S. W. Rep. 419, 46 Am. St. Rep. 202, citing Hutchinson on Carr. See ante, § 115 and cases cited.

26. Aiken v. Railway Co., 68 Iowa, 363.

27. Hickox v. The R. R., 31 Conn. 281.

And it may be stated generally that the baggage of a passenger deposited with the carrier or left with his agent at the usual place for delivering baggage, the passenger intending to proceed with it in the next train, boat or other conveyance, is in the custody of the carrier as carrier and not as warehouseman or ordinary bailee.28 And where the owner of a carpet-bag, who had engaged but had not paid for his passage upon a boat, left it on the boat and temporarily absented himself, during which time, it was stolen, in consequence of which he did not proceed upon his intended trip, it was held that he was entitled to recover for his loss.29 But where the owner of a trunk deposited it on the boat in the usual place for baggage and then left the boat without giving any notice. of his intention to become a passenger, it was held that he could not recover for its loss during his absence, upon the ground that not having engaged his passage or given any notice of his intention to do so, the boat was not bound to treat his trunk as the baggage of a passenger but merely as ordinary freight; and that as he had given no notice to any of the officers of the boat, there had been no valid delivery, though it had been deposited in the usual place for baggage.30 As has been seen, the carrier is not liable until there has been a complete delivery.31

Sec. 128. (§ 101.) Delivery to ferry-men, when complete.Ferry-men, it has been held, become responsible for the property which they transport as common carriers as soon as it has been brought upon the drop or slip of the boat,32 and even before it has been completely put upon the ferry-boat and before it is put actually into the charge of the ferry-man.33 But the better opinion would seem to be that the property should have been put into the custody of the ferry-man before

28. Camden T. Co. v. Belknap, 21 Wend. 354.

29. Woods v. Devin, 13 Ill. 746. 30. Wright v. Caldwell, 3 Mich. 51.

31. See ante, § 105.

32. Cohen v. Hume, 1 McCord, 439; Miles v. James, id. 157; Cook v. Gourdin, Nott & McCord, 19. 33. Blakely v. Le Duc, 19 Minn. 187.