the carrier after storing them and giving notice of their arrival to the consignee, and after allowing a reasonable time for their removal he becomes a mere warehouseman; and if after that they are destroyed without his carelessness or negligence, the loss must be borne, as in equity it should be, by the owner. Sec. 142. (§ 110.) Same subject. This distinction has been expressly recognized and asserted by the supreme court of the United States in the case of The Railroad Company v. The Manufacturing Co.,49 in which it is said that "there is a clear distinction, in our opinion, between property in a situation to be delivered over to the consignee on demand and property on its way to a distant point to be taken thence by a connecting carrier. In the former case it may be said to be awaiting delivery; in the latter to be awaiting transportation." And the same principle may be said to be indirectly recognized in most of the cases in which the duty of delivery to the connecting carriers has been discussed.50 49. 16 Wall. 327. In 50. The case of Ouimit v. Hen. shaw, 35 Vt. 605, is an instructive case upon the subject of the duties of carriers in making delivery of goods to connecting carriers for further carriage; and though in relation to the baggage of a pas senger, the same reasons apply more forcibly to goods in the hands of the common carrier. this case it was known to the incoming road that the baggage was to be forwarded upon another, which did not immediately connect with it, however, either in time or place. The baggage was therefore stored by the agent of the first road until the next morning, the time for the starting of the connecting train, according to the custom of the road and at the request of the passenger, who was assured that it would be safe. In the morning the baggage could not be found and the road was held liable. It was said by the court that in such cases whenever the two roads connected in the same depot and the departure of the succeeding train was contemporaneous with the arrival of the incoming one, it was the duty of the latter to transfer the baggage to the outgoing train if so directed by the owner, or if it were known to its agent that the transportation was to be continued upon that train; and that if there was not a close connection between them, and a necessary detention for a short time, the custody of the first road must be held to continue, un less otherwise desired by the passenger, until the time for the departure of the second; nor would the relation of the carrier, it was said, be changed by the fact that the baggage was stored by it in its store-room while awaiting the de Sec. 143. (§ 111.) Of the carrier's duty to accept and carry the goods. It has been already stated in giving the definition of a common carrier that the obligation to accept the goods when they are tendered to him for carriage is an essential element of his character, and that if there be no such obligation he is not a common carrier although he may carry for hire. But this is only a general statement of the law. There are goods which he is not bound to carry at all, and there may be circumstances which will excuse him from carrying goods even of the kind which he is engaged generally in carrying and which generally he is bound to carry. He may therefore sometimes lawfully refuse to accept the goods; and as the delivery to him necessarily implies his acceptance, it involves the inquiry when such acceptance may be refused by him without subjecting himself to an action for so doing. Sec. 144. (§ 112.) Same subject-Not obliged to accept goods of a kind he does not profess to carry.-It has been already observed that no common carrier is a carrier of all kinds or classes of goods. This would be impossible. Therefore before he can be made liable to damages for a refusal to carry such as are offered to him for that purpose, it must be parture of another train. And it was stated as one of the reasons for this conclusion that what would constitute a delivery when the goods had arrived at destination would not necessarily do so when the baggage was still in transit, and that although the circumstances might have been held to amount to a delivery and to have changed the relation of the road to that of warehouseman, if it had not been known that the baggage was to be forwarded, it did not do so when this fact was known to the agent of the road. It should be observed in reference to this subject that the English cases throw no light upon it, inasmuch as there, what is known as the rule of Muschamp's Case, which makes the first or contracting carrier solely responsible for the goods to the end of the transit, and which will be hereafter explained, prevails. 1. See ante, §§ 59, 90. But a railroad company cannot refuse to transport coal on the ground that it is of an inferior quality, and its introduction into the market would injuriously af fect the reputation of the coal market from that section, and so injure and decrease the carrying business of the road. Olanta Coal Min. Co. v. Railroad Co., 144 Fed. 150. made to appear that they were of the kind which he usually carried, or which, by his public profession, he was bound to accept for that purpose. The law will only impose the obligation upon him in this respect co-extensive with the public expectations which he has created by his course of business or the invitations he has publicly held out to those who may solicit his services. But it being a matter of universal knowledge that certain classes of carriers engaged generally in the carriage of certain kinds of goods, when the kind of carrier and the nature of the goods are designated, notice will in most cases be judicially taken whether the particular goods are of the kind which those of the class to which the carrier belongs usually carry; and if they be, the presumption at once arises that he was under a legal obligation to accept and carry them. But still there may be many cases in which it cannot be known from common experience nor from the character of the business in which the carrier is engaged whether the particular goods are such that he, as a common carrier, is under a legal obligation to accept them for carriage, and in such cases it would devolve upon the party who insisted upon his liability for the refusal, to show from the nature of the employment, or from the usage of others similarly engaged, or from the previous practice or course of business of the particular carrier himself, that the duty to accept was incumbent upon him. And even when from public notoriety or from the evidence which may be adduced, the presumption arises that the carrier has unlawfully refused to accept or to carry the goods, it is still competent for him to show that although the goods are of the kind which carriers like himself are usually bound to carry, he has exonerated himself from the obligation to do so by public notice or by his previous conduct in his business. Sec. 145. ($113.) Reasons which will justify refusal to accept. So he may show other reasons for his refusal which will legally excuse him. He may, for instance, lawfully refuse to receive them if they are improperly packed, or if they are otherwise in an unfit condition for carriage.2 Or he may show that the goods offered were of a dangerous character, which might subject him or his vehicle, or strangers or his passengers, or his other freight, to the risk of injury.3 And he may even refuse packages offered to him without being made. acquainted with their contents, when there is good ground for believing that they are of a dangerous character. But he would have no right, unless from the appearance of the package or from other circumstances his suspicions are reasonably aroused as to its contents, to require the owner who offered it for carriage to disclose their nature. But when such is the case, it would not only be his right but his duty to ascertain the truth, and if they proved to be of such a dangerous character, to refuse them.5 Sec. 146. ($114.) Same subject-Press of business may justify refusal. He may also legally refuse to carry the goods or to accept them for carriage, if having provided himself with equipments and facilities for doing such an amount of business as, from previous experience, he might reasonably expect, he finds that, from unexpected temporary causes, its great accumulation, or the press of business as it is called, has made. it impossible for him to carry the goods; or if, as it is expressed in some of the old cases, his coach be full, he may refuse to receive them and thereby subject himself to the responsi 2. Union Ex. Co. v. Graham, 26 Ohio St. 595; Railway Co. v. A. B. Frank Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 48 S. W. Rep. 210, citing Hutchinson on Carr. 3. The carrier is not bound to accept for carriage goods which are likely to injure goods already received for carriage. The Nith, 36 Fed. Rep. 86; 2 Pars. Cont. 174. Nor is he bound to accept such articles as nitroglycerine, dynamite, gunpowder, oil of vitriol and the like. California Powder Works v. The Railroad, 113 Cal. 329, 45 Pac. Rep. 691, 36 L. R. A. 648, citing A railroad company is not liable in damages for refusing to transport a dead body where the tran sit permit is not in accordance with the rules and requirements of the state board of health. Railroad Co. v. James, 10 Ind. App. 550, 35 N. E. Rep. 395; s. c. 38 N. E. Rep. 192. 4. The Nitro-glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524. 5. The Nitro-glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524. bility of their safe custody, until he may be in a condition to transport them.6 Sec. 147. (§ 115.) Same subject-Other reasons.-So he may of course refuse to take the goods if he does not carry to the place to which the owner wishes to send them, unless, as has been held, such place is upon the line of a connecting carrier with whom he has an established method of doing business. Under such circumstances, he would be bound to accept the goods for carriage to the point of transfer and make delivery according to the usual course of business between them. But if the goods are brought to him at an unreasonable hour, or at a place other than that which he has appointed for their delivery to him, as if they be offered to the agent of a steamboat, railroad or express company upon the street or at any place other than the boat or office where it is advertised and known that such business is transacted, or if they are offered at a time unreasonably long before the accustomed or appointed time for his departure, he will be excused for refusing to receive them. So it will be a good excuse for refusing them if at the particular time when they are offered 6. Peet v. The Railway, 20 Wis. 594; Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Shower, 127; Riley v. Horne, 5 Bing. 217. Where a railroad company, by reason of a strike of the miners at the coal mines from which it had been accustomed to obtain a large part of the coal which it used in the operation of its road, was compelled to send to more distant fields for a supply, thus making it necessary for it to withdraw its coal engines and cars from that line of road and use them in freighting coal for its own consumption, such facts will constitute a sufficient excuse for its refusal to furnish the owners of a coal mine on that line of its road with engines and cars for the transportation of their coal. Rail road Co. v. Queen City Coal Co., 13 Ky. Law Rep. 832. 7. Pitlock v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 109 Mass. 452. 8. Inman v. Railroad Co., 14 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 37 S. W. Rep. 37; Seasongood v. Transportation Co., 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1142, 54 S. W. Rep. 193, 49 L. R. A. 270. 9. Pickford v. The Railway, 12 M. & W. 766; Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 652; Story on Bail. § 508; Cronkite v. Wells, 32 N. Y. 247. The carrier has the right to make reasonable regulations, applicable alike to all shippers, as to the manner in which a commodity such as coal will be received for transportation. This power to make reasonable regulations as to the manner and place where he |