tion of the goods throughout to destination, all connecting lines of carriers employed in furthering and completing such transportation become his agents, for whose defaults he becomes responsible to the owner of the goods.1

Sec. 227. (§ 145a.) What circumstances necessary to show contract by carrier to assume liability beyond his own line.— The liability of the carrier beyond the terminus of his own line being thus based upon contract, it is evident that a contract to that effect, either express or implied, must be shown to exist." But what shall be considered sufficient to constitute a contract on the part of the carrier to carry the goods to the destination to

which they may be directed beyond his own route is a question which has been differently determined by different courts upon two distinct theories as to the obligation of the carrier in this regard.

Sec. 228. (§ 146.) The rule of Muschamp's Case. It has ong been the established law of England that when the carrier accepts for carriage goods directed to a destination beyond his own route, he assumes, by the very act of acceptance, in the absence of any express contract upon the subject, the obligation to transport them to the place to which they may be directed. This was first decided there in the noted case of Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway. A box was delivered to the carrier and booked by his agent for a point not on his line and which could only be reached by another connecting company, which fact was known to the shipper. The freight was not paid in advance, the agent saying that it would better be left to be paid by the consignee on its arrival at its destination. There was no further contract and no proof of any partnership between the connecting companies. The box having been lost after it had been forwarded by the defendant upon the connecting line, the question was whether the defendant was liable. The case was tried by a jury, and Baron Rolfe, in summing up, stated that where a common carrier takes into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and does not by positive agreement limit his responsibility to a part only of the distance, that is prima facie evidence of an undertaking on his part to carry the parcel to the place to which it is directed; and that the same rule applied although that place were beyond the limits within which he in general professed to carry on his trade of a carrier. The jury found for the plaintiff. A motion was made for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, and the motion was denied. The whole matter, said the court, was a question for the jury, to determine what the contract was on the evidence before them;

6. 8. M. & W. 421.

7. See the learned exposition of Doe, J., upon the meaning of this phrase when used by English

judges, in Gray v. Jackson, 51 N. H. 9, 14, where all the English and American cases to 1871 are cited and collated.

and it was held that there had been no misdirection, as the facts shown constituted evidence from which the jury might infer that the carrier had undertaken to carry the goods safely to their destination. In connection with this case it is to be noted that there was no written contract to be construed by the court; that the contract was to be gathered from the circumstances, and that it was a question for the jury to determine from these circumstances what the contract was. The court went no further than to affirm that from such circumstances as those there existing a contract for through carriage might be inferred, or, as the learned judge expressed it, that these facts constituted prima facie evidence of such a contract.

Sec. 229. (§ 147.) This rule well settled in England.—This rule that such a contract is to be inferred from these circumstances has been ever since adhered to without question or dispute by the English courts, and no principle is better settled in that country than that which obliges the carrier, who so accepts goods for transportation the destination of which is one to which he himself does not carry because off or beyond his own route, to nevertheless take upon himself the responsibility for both the carriage and the safety of the goods to destination; and if they be lost upon the route, no matter by whom, he becomes liable to the owner for the loss, unless he has protected himself against such liability by contract.8 And not only does the first or contracting carrier become liable, no matter by whom the goods may be lost, but it becomes exclusively responsible and can alone be sued by the aggrieved party; and any attempt to hold the subsequent or connecting carrier liable for the loss, although it may have occured from its negligence or fault, must fail for the want of privity of contract between such carrier and the injured party.9

8. Scothorn v. The Railway, 8 Exch. 341; Crouch v. The Railway, 2 Hurl. & N. 491; 3 id. 383; Wilby r. The Railway, 2 id. 703; Watson r. Railway, 15 Jur. 448; Webber v. Railway, 3 H. & C. 771.

9. Collins v. The Railway, 11 Exch. 790; Coxon v. The Railway, 5 Hurl. & N. 274; Mytton v. The Railway, 4 id. 615.

Sec. 230. (§ 148.) English rule prevails in many states.Upon the question of the justice and policy of this rule the American courts are divided. A number of them have emphatically approved and adopted it, and hold that the acceptance of the goods, in the absence of express contract, implies an undertaking on the part of the carrier to transport them as consigned or directed, although it may be to a place to which the carrier himself does not carry, and puts upon him the responsibility to the end of the transit, no matter how many subsidiary lines it may be necessary to employ to complete it.10

Georgia:

Ark.

Falvey v. Railroad Co., 76 Ga. 597; Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Texas Grate Co., 81 Ga. 602; Mosher v. The So. Ex. Co., 38 Ga. 37; Southern Ex. Co. v. Shea, 38 Ga. 519.

Illinois: Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Emrich, 24 Ill. App. 245; Wabash, etc. R'y Co. v. Jaggerman, 115 Ill. 407; Ill. Cen. R. R. v. Copeland, 24 III. 332; Ill. Cen. R. R. v. John son, 34 id. 389; Ill. Cen. R. R. v. Frankenberg, 54 id. 88; U. S. Express Co. v. Haines, 67 id. 137; Chicago, etc. R. R. v. The People, 56 id. 365; Erie R. R. v. Wilcox, Ill. Sup. Ct., Chicago L. News, 9, 178; Adams Ex. Co. v. Wilson, 81 Ill. 339; Wabash R. Co. v. Harris, 55 Ill. App. 159; Transportation Co. v. Flour Mills Co., 92 Ill. App. 628; Railroad Co. v. Simon, 160 Ill. 648, 43 N. E. Rep. 596, af

firming 57 Ill. App. 502; Railroad Co. v. Carter, 165 Ill. 570, 46 N. E. Rep. 374, 36 L. R. A. 527, reversing 62 Ill. App. 618; Railway Co. v. Elgin Condensed Milk Co., 175 Ill. 557, 51 N. E. Rep. 911, 67 Am. St. Rep. 238, affirming 74 Ill. App. 619; Elgin, etc. Ry. Co. v. Bates Machine Co., 200 Ill. 636, 66 N. E. Rep. 326, 93 Am. St. Rep. 218, affirming 98 Ill. App. 311.

Missouri: Halliday v. Railway Co., 74 Mo. 159; Marshall v. Railway Co., 74 Mo. App. 81. See also Crouch v. Railroad Co., 42 Mo. App. 248.

New York: Weed v. The Railroad, 19 Wend. 534.

Ohio: Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio, 647.

S. Carolina: Bradford v. The Railroad, 7 Rich. 201; Kyle v. The Railroad, 10 id. 382.

Tennessee: Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed, 203; Western & At. R. R. v. McElwee, 6 Heisk. 208; E. Tenn. & Va. R. R. v. Rogers, 6 id. 143; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 7 id. 253.

Washington: Allen v. Railway 84 Pac. Rep.

Co.,
620.

Wash.

Wisconsin: Hansen v. Railroad Co., 73 Wis. 346. In many of

Sec. 231. ($149.) English rule denied in majority of states. -On the other hand, the majority of our courts have pronounced with equal emphasis against the rule as unjust to the carrier, and