frequently urged that the fact that the auxiliary carrier acts in the transportation as the agent of the contracting carrier, and that there is no privity of contract between him and the owner of the goods, should relieve him from answering to the owner for any loss or injury to the goods while in his custody, the courts have consistently held that the public character of his employment is such as to impose upon him the duty of safely transporting all goods of the kind he professes to carry, whether received from the owner himself or from another carrier with whom the owner has contracted, and that for any loss which may arise either from his negligence or misfeasance he can be held responsible. Sec. 237. (§ 151.) Carrier may contract for the entire transportation.-And as the carrier may thus exempt himself from liability by express contract, so it is universally conceded that he may bind himself by an express contract to carry to any distance or to any destination, whether the carriage can be accomplished by his own means of conveyance upon his own route or will require the employment of agents or subsidiary carriers beyond it. In this respect he may bind himself to the same extent as other contracting parties, even to the performance of impossibilities if he will. The contract, however, according to the prevailing opinion, must be express. It will not be inferred from doubtful expressions or loose language, but only from clear and satisfactory evidence.9 R'y. Co. v. Radbourne, 52 Ill. App. 203; Railway Co. v. Twiss, 35 Neb. 267, 53 N. W. Rep. 76, 37 Am. St. Rep. 437; Railway Co. v. Henderson, 57 Ark. 402, 21 S. W. Rep. 878, citing Hutchinson on Carr.; Cavalarro v. Railway Co., 110 Cal. 348, 42 Pac. Rep. 918, 52 Am. St. Rep. 94, citing Hutchinson on Carr.; United States Mail Line Co. v. Mfg. Co., 101 Ky. 658, 42 S. W. Rep. 342, citing Hutchinson Carr.; Johnson v. Railway Co., 90 Ga. 810, 17 S. E. Rep. 121; Rail on way Co. v. Viers, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 356, 68 S. W. Rep. 469, citing Hutchinson on Carr. 8. See ante, § 225. 9. Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102; Taylor v. The Railroad, 87 Me. 299, 32 Atl. Rep. 905; Hoffman v. Railroad Co., 85 Md. 391, 37 Atl. Rep. 214; Hoffman v. Railway Co., 8 Kan. App. 379, 56 Pac. Rep. 331; Railway Co. v. Swenson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 25 S. W. Rep. 47. Where a drayman, engaged in the business of carrying goods Sec. 238. (§ 152.) What constitutes such a contract.-But while it is thus true that the carrier may contract for through carriage, the important and difficult question is, what constitutes such a contract. Where the undertaking is express, there can, of course, be no difficulty, but where it is to be implied from the surrounding circumstances, difficulties present themselves. Much depends, also, upon the general view which prevails in the state in which the question arises respecting the rule of Muschamp's Case, for it is obvious that in the states in which that rule obtains, much less evidence will establish a contract for through carriage than in those states in which it does not prevail. Thus in the former states the mere aceptance of the goods for carriage. when consigned to a point beyond the carrier's terminus is sufficient to imply a contract for through carriage,10 while in the latter states, this alone,11 or the payment of a through rate,12 is not conclusive. Where the contract is express, no resort need, of course, be had to circumstantial evidence; but where it is not express and within certain territorial imits, enters into a contract to carry to a point beyond the limits of such territory, his liability, on the same principle that a carrier by railroad would be liable under a contract to carry beyond his own line, will continue until the contract is performed. Farley v. Lavary, 107 Ky. 523, 54 S. W. Rep. 840, 47 L. R. A. 383. But where the carrier contracts to carry live stock to a point on the line of a connecting carrier, he will not be liable for injury to stock which is loaded on the cars at a point on the line of the connecting carrier. Hartley v. Railroad Co., 115 Iowa, 612, 89 N. W. Rep. 88. 10. See ante, $230. 11. See ante, § 231. 49 N. Y. 616; Camden R. R. v. The payment and receipt of one entire compensation is not sufficient in itself to establish a through contract to carry beyond the initial carrier's own line, but is a fact to be considered in connection with other circumstances as going to show the intent and understanding of the parties with respect to such a contract. Page v. Railway Co., 7 S. Dak. 297, 64 12. Etna Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, N. W. Rep. 137. the contract becomes a question of fact for the jury, then all the surrounding circumstances become important. In such a case the fact that the goods were marked for through transportation, that a through rate was paid, that the goods were to be carried through in a designated car, that there was an usage for through carriage, that the caption of the bill of lading or receipt purports a through contract, and any other fact throwing light upon the intention, may properly be considered.13 And while the existence of any single fact of this kind may not be in all cases sufficient to establish conclusively that such was the contract, it may always be shown to the jury as conducive to that end.14 And such a contract when proven will be valid, though it may re 13. International, etc., R. Co. v. Tisdale, 74 Tex. 8; Berg v. Steam ship Co., 5 Daly, 394; Candee v. Railroad Co., 21 Wis. 582; Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wall. 594; Robinson v. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co., 45 Iowa, 470; Isham v. Erie R. Co., 98 N. Y. Supp. 609. The fact that the agent gives a through rate and collects the entire charge are circumstances strongly tending to show a contract for through carriage. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bryant, Ind. App. 75 N. E. Rep. 829. 14. Root v. The Pailroad, 45 N. Y. 532; Hill Man. Co. v. The Railroad, 104 Mass. 122; Gray v. Jackgon, 51 N. H. 9; Woodward v. The Railroad, 1 Biss. 403. Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, is a lead ing case and one very often referred to when the question is, what is necessary to constitute a contract for through transportation by the carrier? The defendant was the owner of a line of steamships plying between New York and the Isthmus of Nicaragua. He was also part owner in several of the steamships constituting another line running between the Isthmus and San Francisco. He advertised "Vanderbilt's New Line" as the only through line via Nicaragua to San Francisco. The Transit Company which carried across the Isthmus was independent of both these ocean lines, but furnished tickets to the defendant for which he accounted to it as he sold them with the tickets of the ocean lines. The defendant and the company running its line upon the Pacific had a common agent in New York from whom the plaintiff purchased three of these tickets, one from New York to the Isthmus, another across the Isthmus, and another thence to San Francisco in a designated vessel in which the defendant, however, had no interest, the tickets together entitling the plaintiff to a passage by these various lines from New York to San Francisco. He paid for them the round sum of $250 to the common agent. The plaintiff was carried to the Isthmus but could find no vessel there to take him to San Francisco, and becom ing sick from the effects of the climate, he returned to New York and sued the defendant for the damage sustained by him in the failure to transport him to San Francisco according to the contract. It was insisted on behalf of the defendant that there was no through contract on his part and that he could not be held liable for the failure of the Pacific line to carry the plaintiff according to the agreement imported by its ticket; but the defense did not avail, and the defendant was held liable upon the ground that his contract was for the through transportation of the plaintiff to San Francisco. "But the defendant's counsel contends," said Denio, J., "that the tickets which the plaintiff received for the passage over the several routes are in themselves written evidence of the bargains by which he engaged his passage, and that he is precluded from contradicting them by parol testimony of an entire contract with the defendant. We do not think this a sound position. The tickets do not purport to be contracts. They are rather in the nature of receipts for the separate portions of the passage money; and their office is to serve as tokens to enable the persons having charge of the vessels and carriages of the companies to recog nize the bearers as parties who were entitled to be received on board. They are quite consistent with a more special bargain. ing the usual permits which were issued for the guidance of the masters of the vessels and the conductors of the carriages, they would necessarily be given to the passenger to facilitate the transac Be tion of the business, whatever the nature of his arrangement for pas sage may have been. Their character as mere tokens is shown by the fact that the defendant received them in large numbers of the Transit Company, not as an agent of that company for the purpose of making bargains in its behalf with others, but to furnish them to persons with whom he expected to deal on his own account. In Hart v. The Renssalaer & Saratoga Railroad Company, just referred to, the plaintiff had separate tickets for each of the roads over which she traveled, but she was permitted to recover against one of the companies, though unable to show that her baggage was lost on the route of that company. We do not say that the receiving of separate tickets for the different lines is not evidence of some weight upon the question whether the contract was entire, but we hold it does not come within the rule which excludes parol testimony respecting a contract which has been reduced to writing." See, also, Williams v. Vanderbilt, supra; Van Buskirk v. Roberts, supra, in which the facts were similar, and were held to prove a contract for the entire transportation from New York to San Francisco. There is no doubt, however, that if in these cases it had only been proven that the tickets for the different lines had been sold by the defendants the conclusion would have been different. It is now well settled that one passenger carrier may sell his own and at the same time the tickets of connecting lines, entitling the purchaser to through transportation to his des re tination over all the lines, and may receive the fare for the whole distance without becoming sponsible for the passenger's carriage beyond his own line; and in fact, where nothing else appears in the transaction, this will be the legal construction put upon it. The tickets for the several lines are, in such cases, known as coupon tickets, and each ticket is considered as the separate contract of the carrier over whose route it entitles the holder to be carried. The carrier who sells them is supposed to do so as the agent of the several lines, and the tickets are regarded and treated as the contracts of the respective carriers precisely as if they had been sold by the carriers themselves instead of the common agent. Knight v. The Railroad, 56 Me. 234; Milnor v. The Railroad, 53 N. Y. 363; Nashville, etc., R. R. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. 852; Brooke v. The Railway, 15 Mich. 232; Hartan v. The Railroad, 114 Mass. 44; Stimson v. The Rail road, 98 id. 83; Ellsworth v. Tart, 26 Ala. 733; Kessler v. The Railroad, 7 Lans. 62; Hood v. The Railroad, 22 Conn. 1; Elmore . The Railroad, 23 id. 457; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421. But see Furstenheim V. The Railroad, 9 Heisk. 238, in which a different view of the subject was taken. This, however, is clearly wrong according to the authorities. But see to same effect, Candee v. The Railroad, 21 Wis. 582, and Ill. Cen. R. R. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332. In this respect a distinction is made between carriers of freight and carriers of passengers and their baggage, the receipt or bill of lading for freight to its destination and the payment of the price for the entire transportation being generally held to be a through contract of the receiving company. One reason for this distinction undoubtedly is that the passenger who accom. panies his baggage can always know where and by whose fault he sustained the injury or the loss, and by whom the responsibility for it should be borne; whereas in the case of goods sent over a number of connecting lines it may be difficult and often impossible to obtain such information. If, however, circumstances can be shown, as in the foregoing case of Quimby v. Vanderbilt, from which it would appear that the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract for the entire transportation, or if a partnership existed between the carriers, or if the succeeding carriers were acting in the carriage of the passenger as agents of the first under its contract with him for through transportation, the passenger, if injured, might maintain his action against either the first carrier upon the contract or against any of the succeeding carriers to whose negligence or fault the injury was imputable. And when the contract in such a case imposes upon the first carrier the liability for the entire transportation, the coupon tickets will be regarded merely as so many tokens or vouchers entitling the holder to be carried by the succeeding carriers as agents of the first. Whether the carrier under the circumstances of the acceptance of freight will be held to be bound to carry and be responsible for it throughout its transit to destina |