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quire transportation and delivery in another state or country beyond the line of the carrier.15

Sec. 239. Same subject-Illustrations.-Where a bill of lading issued for the shipment of fruit over several connecting lines provided that the fruit was received subject to the carrier's liability under the common law and statutes in force in the different states through which the shipment was to pass, and, further, that the car was to be re-iced as often as necessary, it was held that the bill of lading constituted a contract for through transportation.16 A similar conclusion was reached where the bill of lading stated that the goods were to be transported by the receiving carrier to his own terminus and from such point by connect

tion over auxiliary lines as well as its own will depend in a great measure upon the law of the place of the making of the contract or of the acceptance of the goods, or of the performance of the service. In those states in which the applicatory law would be that of the English courts, which would bind the carrier, without an agreement restricting his responsibility to his own line, to carry throughout to destination, the mere acceptance of the goods consigned to a par ticular destination would import a contract for through carriage and make the carrier responsible for their loss anywhere upon the route. But where the English rule has been rejected, a through contract must be either express or must arise from some of the circumstances mentioned in the text. In some of the cases it has been held that a receipt or bill of lading for the goods to be carried to a particular destination, and the payment of the entire freight, will be sufficient, in the absence of any

special agreement upon the subject, to constitute such a contract; while in others this has been denied. See cases infra in text and note. Where the subject is not controlled by any rule of law or by the express agreement of the parties, the question will be one of intention, depending upon the usage of the carrier and the facts of the case, which sometimes makes it difficult to decide whether a through contract was meant or not; and it is an argument in favor of the English rule that, when it prevails, such questions cannot easily arise. Knapp v. U. S. Ex. Co., 55 N. H. 348; Grindle V. The Eastern Express, 67 Me. 317.

15. Burtis v. The Railroad, 24 N. Y. 272; Bennett v. The Peninsular Steamboat Co., 6 Com. B. 775; Phillips v. The Railroad, 78 N. C. 294.

16. Johnson v. Railway Co., 133 Mich. 596, 10 Det. Leg. N. 324, 95 N. W. Rep. 724, 103 Am. St. Rep. 464.

ing lines to destination.17 So where the contracting carrier had the right under the bill of lading to select the connecting lines over which the shipment was to pass, and a through freight charge was collected and receipted for, and it further appeared that the first and all succeeding carriers had a traffic arrangement whereby a through rate was agreed upon which was shared in common by all of them, it was decided that the contract imposed a through liability.18 So where the carrier accepted goods marked for delivery at a point beyond his terminus, and a through rate was quoted and accepted by the shipper, it was held that the carrier thereby assumed responsibility for the safe delivery of the goods at destination.19 So a bill of lading which provided that the goods were to be forwarded to the end of the first carrier's line and there delivered to a connecting carrier, and further on the back thereof that the goods were to be forwarded to destination, was held to constitute a through contract.20 But the fact that a car containing live stock was waybilled to a particular place on a connecting carrier's line was held insufficient to show a contract for through liability.21 the words, "ice when needed," inserted in the bill of lading which further provided that the receiving carrier would not be liable for loss or damage not occurring on its line of road, were held to impose on the carrier no obligation to ice the shipment while on a connecting road.22 And where the charge collected, although for the entire route, was made up of distinct sums proportioned to the line of each connecting carrier, it was held

17. Ireland v. Railroad Co., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1586, 49 S. W. Rep. 188; but see dissenting opinion, 49 S. W. Rep. 453.

So

line is not sufficient to show a through contract. Weis v. Railroad Co., 97 N. Y. Supp. 993.

20. Colfax Mt. Fruit Co. v. Rail

18. Eckles v. Railway, 112 Mo. road Co., 118 Cal. 648, 46 Pac. Rep. App. 240, 87 S. W. Rep. 99. 668, 50 Pac. Rep. 775, 40 L. R. A. 78.

19. Jennings v. Railway Co., 127 N. Y. 438, 28 N. E. Rep. 394; affirming, s. c. 52 Hun, 227, 5 N. Y. Supp. 140. But the mere statement by the agent that the goods will be sent to a point on another

21. Herring v. Railroad Co., 101 Va. 778, 45 S. E. Rep. 322.

22. Farnsworth v. Railroad Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 658, 88 App. Div. 320.

that the contract was separable and imposed no liability on the contracting carrier beyond the terminus of his own route.23

Sec. 240. Extent to which carrier may limit his liability under contract for through carriage.-While the carrier, as has been seen, may, by an express contract that he will assume no liability for the goods after he has safely delivered them to a connecting carrier, prevent all question as to his liability for a loss or injury occurring on the connecting route, it remains to be seen to what extent he may thus exonerate himself from liability where by his contract he has undertaken to carry the goods through to destination. If the contract clearly provides for through carriage, or the facts and circumstances disclose an undertaking to transport the goods to their ultimate destination, all subsidiary carriers employed in the transportation will become the agents of the contracting carrier to effect the performance of the contract, and he can no more stipulate for exemption from liability for the negligent acts or omissions of such agents than he can stipulate for exemption from liability for his own. He may, however, by a contract to that effect, relieve himself from liability as an insurer of the goods not only while they are being transported over his own line but over the lines of the connecting carriers, but he will still remain liable until the goods have been delivered at destination for any loss or injury arising from negligence.24

23. Hughes v. Railroad Co., 202 Penn. St. 222, 51 Atl. Rep. 990, 97 Am. St. Rep. 713, 63 L. R. A. 513.

24. Galveston, etc. R. Co. v. Allison, 59 Tex. 193; Ireland v. Railroad Co., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1586, 49 S. W. Rep. 188; Halliday v. Railroad Co., 74 Mo. 159, 41 Am. Rep. 309; Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Pontius, 19 Ohio St. 221, 2 Am. Rep. 391; Condict v. Railroad Co., 54 N. Y. 500; Railroad Co. v. Vaughn, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 16 S. W. Rep. 775; Eckles v. Railway Co., 112 Mo. App. 240, 87 S. W.

Rep. 99; Railway Co. v. Western Hay & Grain Co., 2 Neb. (unofficial) 784; 90 N. W. Rep. 205. But see, Fremont, etc. Railroad Co. v. N. Y. etc. Railroad, 66 Neb. 159, 92 N. W. Rep. 131, 59 L. R. A. 939.

Where a copartnership or association exists between several lines of carriers, the initial carrier cannot limit his liability to his own line for injuries to through freight. Gulf, etc. R'y Co. v. Wilbanks, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 489, 27 S. W. Rep. 302. See post, § 450.

Sec. 241. (§ 152a.) Implied power of agents to make contracts for through carriage. The question whether a local freight agent of a carrier has implied authority to make a contract for through carriage is involved in the same conflict as the question whether the mere acceptance of the goods destined to a point beyond the carrier's route constitutes a contract to assume responsibility for their safe delivery at such point, and is determined by much the same reasons.25

Under the English rule26 and the cases adopting it, it is held that the agent authorized to receive the goods for carriage has implied authority to bind his principal by a contract for through carriage;27 but under the American rule, it is held that, while the general freight agent of a railroad may have such authority,28 it will not be implied in the case of local freight agents from their general authority to receive and receipt for goods offered for transportation over the carrier's road;29 and the mere fact

25. See post, § 460 et seq.

26. See Watson v. Railway Co., 15 Jurist, 448; Scothorn v. Railway Co., 8 Exch. 341; Bristol, etc. R'y Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cases, 194.

27. It was so held in Hansen v. Railway Co., 73 Wis. 346; Nichols v Railroad Co., 24 Utah 83, 66 Pac. Rep. 768, 91 Am. St. Rep. 778.

The freight clerk of an express company has implied authority to give the rates at which property is to be delivered at a point on the line of another company. Express Co. v. Boullement, 100 Ala. 275, 13 So. Rep. 941.

28. Grover, etc. M. Co. v. Railway Co., 70 Mo. 672; White v. Railroad Co., 19 Mo. App. 400.

An agent employed to solicit freight traffic has implied author ity to bind his principal for the safe delivery of goods at a point beyond his own line and to contract over what road beyond such

line the property shall be transported. Fremont, etc. R. Co. v. New York, etc. R. Co., 66 Neb. 159, 92 N. W. Rep. 131, 59 L. R. A. 939.

29. Burroughs v. Railroad Co., 100 Mass. 26; Grover, etc. M. Co. v. Railway Co., supra; Turner v. Railroad Co., 20 Mo. App. 632; Faulkner v. Railway Co., 99 Mo. App. 421, 73 S. W. Rep. 927; McLagan v. Railway Co., 116 Iowa, 183, 89 N. W. Rep. 233; Hoffman v. Railroad Co., 85 Md. 391, 37 Atl. Rep. 214; Page v. Railway Co., 7 S. Dak. 297, 64 N. W. Rep. 137; Gulf, etc. R'y Co. v. Jackson & Edwards, Tex. 89 S. W. Rep. 968, reversing (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. Rep. 47.

Strictly speaking, the business of the carrier is confined to his own line and the general scope of the authority of a subordinate must be limited to the carrier's business. Pittsburgh, etc. Ry.

that a through rate of freight is collected or that the goods are billed for through shipment will be insufficient to support an inference that he has such authority.30 But although implied authority is denied a local freight agent to make a contract for through carriage, a usage or custom may be shown for such agent to receive goods under a contract for through carriage, and when such usage or custom is established, the principal will be bound by the act of the agent.31

Sec. 242. (§ 153.) No distinction between corporations and other carriers in respect to power to enter into contracts for through carriage. A distinction has, however, been made in some of the cases between chartered or incorporated carriers, such as railway companies, which derive all their power or authority to engage in the business and to assume its obligations and liabilities from their charters, and which by the very terms of their incorporation are limited to routes between certain designated points, and other carriers not so incorporated; and it has been said that such companies or corporations in their business as carriers could not, even by express contract, bind themselves to carry beyond these designated lines, so as to impose upon themselves the obligations of common carriers, and that, a fortiori, no such contract could be implied. But this idea has been in the later and best considered cases denied, and may be now considered as abandoned.32 The question has also been discussed be

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30. Coates v. Railway Co., 8 S. Dak. 173, 65 N. W. Rep. 1068; Sutton v. Railway Co., 14 S. Dak. 111, 84 N. W. Rep. 396.

75 168; Root v. The Railroad, 45 id. 524; Burtis v. The Railroad, 24 id. 269; Hill Manuf'g Co. v. The Railroad, 104 Mass. 122; Feital v. The Railroad, 109 id. 398; Noyes v. The Railroad, 27 Vt. 110; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Steamboat Co. v. Brown, 54 Penn. St. 77; Schroeder v. The Railroad, 5 Duer, 55; West v. The Railroad, 4 Seld. 57; Railroad Co. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 840, 64 C. C. A. 478; Railway Co. v. Howard, 178 U. S. 153, 20 Sup. Ct. R. 880, 44 L. Ed. 1015, affirming 14 App. D.

31. Faulkner v. Railway Co., 99 Mo. App. 421, 73 S. W. Rep. 927; Railway Co. v. Cole, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 635, 28 S. W. Rep. 391.

32. Swift v. Steamship Co., 106 N. Y. 206; Perkins v. The Railroad, 47 Me. 573; Western, etc. R. R. v. McElwee, 6 Heisk. 219; Buffet v. The Railroad, 40 N. Y.

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