fore the English courts, which have likewise held that such a contract by an incorporated carrier was not ultra vires, but valid and obligatory upon it.33 The supreme court of Connecticut has, however, held in a number of cases, and it may be regarded as the settled law of that state, that such incorporated companies are not competent to bind themselves as carriers for the carriage of goods beyond the limits of their routes as fixed by their charters, and that all such contracts are void, and create no obligation on the part of the corporations.34 Sec. 243. (§ 154.) No liability for loss beyond his own line under contract to carry to end of line and there to deliver to next carrier. But where the place of destination is not upon the carrier's route, and he receives the goods under a contract to send or forward them by his own route to the point most convenient to their destination reached by him, and there to deliver them to an agent or to another carrier to complete the transportation, he cannot be made liable for the goods beyond the terminus of his own line, and if he deliver safely to such agent or carrier, he will have complied with his contract and will be discharged from all further liability.35 C. 262. And see Bissell v. The Michigan, etc. Railroad, 22 N. Y. 258, where this question is discussed at great length and with great ability on opposing sides by Comstock, C. J., and Selden, J. In Massachusetts it is said that when a corporation is established for the purpose, among others, of transporting goods over a certain route, goods delivered to such corporation directed to a more distant place are presumed to be received for the purpose of being carried by it over its own route only, and then forwarded by another carrier to their destination. Burroughs v. The Railway, 100 Mass. 26; Pendergrast v. Adams Ex. Co., 101 id. 123. But when there is no charter to indicate the limits of the carrier's business, and no written agreement between it and the other party, the question, what was in fact the extent of the undertaking, is a question for the jury. Lowell Wire Fence Co. v. Sargent, 8 Allen, 189. And in Perkins v. The Railroad, 47 Me. 573, it was held that a contract to bind such & corporation to transport beyond its line must be express. 33. Wilby v. The Railway, 2 Hurl. & N. 703. 34. Hood v. The Railroad, 22 Conn. 502; Naugatuck R. R. Co. 2. The Button Co., 24 id. 468; Converse v. The Transportation Co. 33 id. 166. 35. Pendergrast v. Adams Ex. Co., 101 Mass. 120; American Ex. Sec. 244. (§ 155.) Same subject-Meaning of the term "to forward" or "to be forwarded."-But if, notwithstanding the words used, the real contract be to carry the goods throughout the whole route, it will be immaterial that in his receipt for the goods the carrier has made use of any form of expression which would seem intended to impose upon him only the obligation to forward them by another carrier at the termination of his own route. The words "to forward" or "to be forwarded" are of frequent use in the receipt of carriers, and it sometimes becomes important to determine their meaning in the connection in which they are employed, as the whole question of the liability of the carrier may depend upon their interpretation. Sec. 245. (§ 156.) Same subject.-In Reed v. The United States Express Company36 a package was delivered to the defendant as an express carrier at Chicago, to be carried to Dalton, Georgia, which it undertook by the terms of its receipt "to forward to Dalton." This it could only have done, as was admitted, by transmitting the package from the terminus of its own route by other carriers, its own line not extending to the point of destination; and under these circumstances, it was held, by a divided court however, that the carrier, by the acceptance of the package and the contract "to forward," had bound itself as a forwarder only beyond the terminus of its own route, the words "to forward" in the receipt being construed as equivalent to the words "to send;" and it being shown that the defendant had safely delivered the package to a connecting carrier for further Co. v. Second Nat. Bank, 69 Penn. St. 394; U. S. Ex. Co. v. Rush, 24 Ind. 403; Inhabitants, etc. v. Hall, 61 Me. 517; Myrick v. Railroad, 107 U. S. 102; Rickerson, etc. Co. v. Railroad Co., 67 Mich. 110; Detroit, etc. R'y Co. v. McKenzie, 43 Mich. 609; McEacheran v. Railroad Co., 101 Mich. 264, 59 N. W. Rep. 612; Lake Erie, etc. Railroad Co. v. Condon, 10 Ind. App. 536, 38 N. E. Rep. 71; Railway v. Woodward, 164 Ind. 360, 72 N. E. Rep. 558; s. c. 73 N. E. Rep. 810; Eckles v. Railway, 112 Mo. App. 240, 87 S. W. Rep. 99; Palmer v. Railroad Co., 101 Cal. 187, 35 Pac. Rep. 629, citing Hutchinson on Carr.; Railroad Co. v. Waters, 50 Neb. 592, 70 N. W. Rep. 225; Dunbar v. Railway Co., 62 S. Car. 414, 40 S. E. Rep. 884; Hoffman v. Railroad Co., 85 Md. 391, 37 Atl. Rep. 214. 36. 48 N. Y. 462. transportation towards its destination, it was held that it had discharged its contract and was not liable for its subsequent loss.37 Sec. 246. (§ 157.) Same subject.-But where there are no circumstances which will control the conclusion as to the meaning of the parties in the use of these terms, the weight of authority is in favor of giving to them the signification which was contended for by the dissenting portion of the court in the foregoing case, and they will be construed as having been intended to mean to carry or transport and not merely to send as a forwarder. In other words, they will, except under special circumstances which will necessarily show that they were used in a different sense, bind the carrier for the entire carriage to destination, and make him responsible for the goods throughout the transit.38 37. From this decision Lott, Ch. C., and Hunt, C., dissented. The latter, in his dissenting opinion, called attention to the fact that no distinction was made in the contract between the duty assumed to carry to New York, the terminus of the carrier's line, and to Dalton, and that the language employed which bound the carrier to the two undertakings was the same. "It is conceded," said he, "by the defendant's counsel that its liability to New York is that of a carrier, and that it is sufficiently expressed by the engagement to 'forward' the package, and that it is not qualified by the expression that it is to be liable as forwarder only. There is no propriety in giving to this word two different meanings. It is the general rule that a word, when repeated in the same sentence or the same connection, is to bear the same signification. It would certainly be a violent assumption to impute different meanings at the same time to a word when used but once in a sentence. When the defendant undertakes to forward this package from Chicago to Dalton it is a single contract. This contract is denoted by a single word, and that is the same throughout the distance. Although it was in fact an extension of its liability beyond its own line, I am satisfied that the defendant, by the words made use of, undertook and assumed to carry and deliver this package to its destination in Georgia." 38. E. Tenn. & Va. R. R. v. Rogers, 6 Heisk. 143; Cutts v. Brainerd, 42 Vt. 566; St. Louis, etc. Railway v. Piper, 13 Kan. 505; Mercantile Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chase, 1 E. D. Smith, 115; Lock v. The Railroad, 48 N. H. 339; Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sand. 610; Schroeder v. The Railroad, 5 Duer. 55; Buckland v. Adams Ex. Co., 97 Mass. 124; Eckles v. Railway, 112 Mo. App. 240, 87 S. W. Rep. 99, citing Hutchinson on Carr.; Davis v. Sec. 247. Who is a connecting carrier-Transfer company. "A connecting carrier," it is said in the case of Nanson v. Jacob,39 "is one whose route, not being the first one, lies somewhere between the point of shipment and the point of destination. It becomes such by virtue of the agreement between the consignor or shipper and the first carrier, whereby the latter undertakes to deliver the shipment at its ultimate destination, and thus makes the carrier beyond its own route its agent for continuing the transportation, or else undertakes only to deliver the goods safely to the next carrier on the route, who thus becomes the agent of the shipper for carrying them further." Thus a railroad company which took loaded cars from a preceding road and transferred them by means of a switch engine over a portion of its own track to a spur track where they were to be unloaded was held to be a connecting carrier and liable as such for the safety of the goods transported by it.40 But a transfer company at the point of destination which undertakes merely to make delivery to consignees is not a connecting carrier, since, in so transporting the goods, it is not acting under and by virtue of the original contract of carriage.41 And where a bill of lading required delivery of the goods at the mills of the consignee, and the railroad company bringing the goods to destination procured another road to deliver them at the mills, which were two and one-half miles from the depot, it was held that the latter road was not a connecting carrier, delivery to which released the former, but, like the transfer company in the preceding case, was a mere instrument to effect delivery.42 So a local belt railway Jacksonville, etc. Line, 126 Mo. 69, 28 S. W. Rep. 965; Colfax Mt. Fruit Co. v. Railroad Co., 118 Cal. 648, 46 Pac. Rep. 668, 50 Pac. Rep. 775, 40 L. R. A. 78. 39. 12 Mo. App. 125. Wichita 40. Railway Co. v. Wholesale Grocery Co., 55 Kan. 525, 40 Pac. Rep. 899. 42. Western, etc. R. Co. v. Cotton Mills, 81 Ga. 522. Where the first carrier contracts to transport goods to destination and engages a terminal company to complete the transportation, the shipper will not be liable for the extra expense incurred by the former carrier. 41. Nanson v. Jacob, 12 Mo. Hendrix . The Railroad, 107 Mo. App. 125. App. 127, 80 S. W. Rep. 970. which is used by an initial carrier to make delivery of the goods to the next succeeding carrier is not a connecting carrier.43 Sec. 248. Authority of contracting carrier to bind connecting carrier by contract.--In the absence of any agreement, custom or course of dealing from which authority may be implied, the contracting carrier has no authority to make a contract with the shipper which will be binding on the connecting carrier. If the line of connecting carrier is so situated in relation to the line of the contracting carrier that the law would require the former carrier to receive and carry the goods tendered to it, it would be liable if it should refuse to receive them, or, if it should accept them for transportation, if they were lost or injured through a breach of its common law duty; but its liability in this regard would not be based upon the unauthorized contract made by the first carrier.44 If, however, the connecting carrier accepts the goods under the original contract with the first carrier, it will become a party to it by adoption and ratification and may be held responsible for any breach of its terms.4 45 Sec. 249. (§ 158.) Partnerships and associations between carriers.-Divided as opinions may be upon the question of the liability of the carrier who undertakes the transportation for losses by merely connecting or succeeding carriers when it becomes necessary to employ them to further or to complete the carriage, where there is no partnership or other arrangement creating a similar relation between them, it is universally agreed that if any connection of that character exists by which they become participants in common in the profits of the business, any one or all of them may be held liable at the option of the loser. A partnership may undoubtedly be formed as well in the business of carriers as in any other, and between corporations engaged in that business as well as between individuals, so as to 43. Texas, etc. R'y Co. v. Scoggin & Brown, Tex. Civ. App. 90 S. W. Rep. 521. 44. Houston, etc. R. Co. v. Everett, Tex. -, 89 S. W. Rep. 761, reversing (Tex. Civ. App.), etc. R. Co. v. |