Sec. 262. Same subject-Effect of establishing joint or through rates.-Where several connecting carriers establish and publish joint or through rates, that fact alone will be insufficient to impose upon them a joint liability or render one of them responsible for the acts or omissions of the others. The first carrier under such an arrangement is, at most, the agent of each of the other carriers for the purpose of contracting for carriage over its route, and it will be the duty of each succeeding carrier to receive the goods at the point where the preceding carrier's line ends and carry them to its own terminus. But neither the first nor any succeeding carrier will be considered as thereby assuming responsibility for the goods after a delivery has been made to the next carrier in the route.16

Sec. 263. (§ 169.) Same subject-The rule stated.-From these cases it may be deduced: First. That where carriers over different routes have associated themselves under a contract for a division of the profits of the carriage in certain proportions, or of the receipts from it after deducting any expenses of the business, they become jointly liable as partners to third persons; but that, where the agreement is that each shall bear the expenses of his own route and of the transportation upon it, and that the gross receipts shall be divided in proportion to distance or otherwise, they are partners neither inter se nor as to third persons, and incur no joint liability.17 Secondly. That, where they jointly employ a common agent in the prosecution of a joint enterprise as carriers, they become jointly

fact that the first carrier sells a ticket to a point on the other carier's line will not make the second carrier liable for the loss of a passenger's trunk before the same has been delivered to it. Romero v. McKernan, 88 N. Y. Supp. 365.

16. Wehmann v. Railway Co., 58 Minn. 22, 59 N. W. Rep. 546. 17. This statement of the rule is approved in Peterson v. Rail

way Co., 80 Iowa, 92, 45 N. W. Rep. 573. An advertisement by a railroad company that it runs trains or connects with trains of other companies so as to form through lines without breaking bulk or transferring passengers tends to show no contract or agreement between the companies to share profits and losses. Railroad Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 15 Sup. Ct. R. 136.

liable for his defaults,18 but do not become responsible for each other's acts merely by reason of the employment of such common agent. Nor will a contract for through transportation over their several lines made by him, although authorized by an arrangement between them, create a joint liability or a liability for the defaults of each other, it not being shown that such companies were jointly interested in the expenses of the transportation. Thirdly. That, in order to hold one carrier responsible for the defaults of another, a partnership between them must be shown, either express or implied, from the circumstances; or it must appear that the one was acting in the transportation as the agent of the other against whom the recovery is sought; and that the mere employment of a common or joint agent with authority to contract for through transportation over connecting routes, under an arrangement for the division of the receipts for such transportation in proportion to distance or other service, will generally constitute neither such a partnership nor agency, each for the other, as will make them jointly liable or liable for each other's acts in the transportation.19

W Rep. 15.
19. In Gulf, etc. R'y Co. v.
Baird, 75 Tex. 256, it is said: "If
the Louisville & Nashville Railway
Company (the first carrier) had
not authority, by virtue of the
existence of a partnership be
tween itself and the other lines
over which the cattle were to
pass, or by virtue of an agency
conferred on it by the other com-
panies empowering it to make a
contract which would bind them
jointly, then the contract was
simply the contract of the com-
pany that made it, by which it
was bound to transport the cat-
tle on its own line as far as that
extended, and beyond that to fur

nish transportation through other lines.

"In the absence of proof of express authority, facts may be shown which will be sufficient to authorize a jury to find that the power actually existed.

"A railway company cannot be held to have ratified a contract from the fact that it performed some of the services contemplated by it, when it is not at liberty, contract or no contract, to refuse to render the service. At the time the cars in which appellee's cattle were received by appellant, the law provided that 'every such company shall for a reasonable compensation draw over their railroad without delay the passengers, merchandise and cars of

Fourthly. That carriers, like other persons, may become liable for each other's acts as partners to third persons who may have sustained injuries through their defaults or misfeasances, when as between themselves there is no partnership nor mutual responsibility.20

Sec. 264. ($170.) Partnerships between corporations as carriers. The same rules in regard to partnerships and other contracts and associations between carriers will govern, when the connecting lines are railroad companies or other incorporated bodies, whenever the rights of third parties who have contracted with them require that such partnerships or associations shall be upheld, however it may be when the question is between the corporations themselves. It is true that it has been held that two distinct and separate railroad corporations have no right to consolidate and conduct their business under the same management as a partnership;21 but this was a case between the assignee of certain promissory notes, given in the name assumed by the two companies after the consolidation and the two original contracting companies, and it is probable that if the contracting companies had confined themselves in their association strictly to the purposes for which they had been incorporated, the decision would have been different, upon that general

every other railroad which may enter and connect with their railroad.'

"In the face of such legislation, the evidence should show something more than that a through shipment was made, that a price was fixed for the entire transportation and collected by the last carrier, before it ought to be held that this was a joint contract for transportation that would render each carrier liable for failure of duty on the part of other carriers in the connected lines." This case was followed in Fort Worth, etc. R'y Co. v. Williams, 77 Tex. 121.

The fact that each road sells

through tickets and takes its own share of the price according to its mileage does not constitute them partners. Railroad Co. v. Mulford, 162 Ill. 522, 44 N. E. Rep. 861, 35 L. R. A. 599.

A mere traffic arrangement between connecting carriers for a division of receipts on the profits of transportation will not create a joint contract or partnership between them. Wilson v. Railroad Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 1091.

20. Champion v. Bostwick, 11 Wend. 571, 18 id. 175; Pattison v. Blanchard, 1 Seld. 186.

21. Pearce v. Railroad Co., 21 How. 441.

principle in reference to corporations, that where their charters are silent as to what contracts they may make, they have power to make all such as are necessary or usual in the course of their business as means to enable them to attain the objects for which they are created. And in those cases heretofore referred to in which it has been held that a railroad or any other incorporated carrier may contract to carry beyond the limits of its line as fixed by its act of incorporation, such contracts have been mainly upheld upon the argument that, whether such contracts were strictly ultra vires or not, as to third persons so contracting with the carrier they were valid.22 Reasoning by analogy, it would be equally plain that wherever the rights of parties employing the carrier require the enforcement of a joint liability arising from such associations, they will be held to have been validly formed; and as to the public, however it may be between the companies themselves, all duties and obligations growing out of them will be enforced. Such has been, tacitly at least, eonceded to be the law in the great number of cases which have come before the courts involving such arrangement between connecting and associated lines of carriers.23

22. See cases cited ante, § 242. 23. In a New York case it is said that the power of corporations to become joint carriers has never been denied but has frequently been recognized. Swift r. Steamship Co., 106 N. Y. 206, citing Aigen v. Railroad Co., 132 Mass. 423; Block v. Railroad Co., 139 Mass. 308; Gass v. Railroad Co., 99 Mass. 220; Hot Springs R. R. v. Trippe, 42 Ark. 465; Insurance Co. v. Railroad Co., 104 U. S. 146; Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9; Wylde v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 156.

If two railroad corporations cooperate in the management of a railway without authority of law,

they will be none the less liable for injuries resulting through their negligence in the management of the road. Railroad Co. v. Meyers, 62 Fed. 367, 10 C. C. A. 485, 18 U. S. App. 569.

If a corporation permits another company to use its corporate name and hold itself out to the general public as transacting the business of a common carrier, it will be liable as a common carrier to those who in good faith deal with it as such. Reed v. Steamboat Co., 1 Marr. (Del.), 193, 40 Atl. Rep. 955.

Although a railroad company may be a legal entity separate and distinct from a second rail