shipper at some future time, he will not be bound by any limitations inserted in it if it appear that no mention was made of them to him and that he in good faith supposed it would be nothing more than an ordinary receipt.17 But after the bill of lading has been forwarded to the shipper, he may, either expressly or by conduct amounting to a ratification, adopt its limitations, and if they are such as the law considers reasonable, he will be bound by them.18 So if there has been an habitual course of dealing between the parties for one to deliver the goods and for the other afterwards to make out and deliver bills of lading containing uniform conditions as to liability, the former will be bound to accept them, and such conditions will become the terms of the contract between the parties.19 Sec. 417. ($247.) Same subject-Parol agreement acted upon cannot be limited by receipt, subsequently delivered.-If, however, there be no such course or habit of dealing between the parties, a receipt or bill of lading delivered after the loss will be of no avail, although the carrier may have intended at the time to give the receipt, but was prevented from so doing by accidental circumstances, there being, however, no consent on the part of the owner of the goods to receive it at some future time.20 And if the goods be delivered and the transportation commenced under a verbal agreement as to the time, manner or conditions, such verbal agreement is not merged in a bill of lading delivered afterwards to the shipper, when he has parted with all control over them; and the mere receipt of such a bill of lading, after the verbal agreement has been acted, does not estop him from showing what the actual agreement was.21 Thus, in Bostwick v. Railroad,22 plaintiff had 17. Railroad Co. v. Craig, 102 Tenn. 298, 52 S. W. Rep. 164. 18. Rubens v. Steamship Co., 65 Hun, 625, 20 N. Y. Supp. 481. 19. Shelton t. The Merchants' D. T. Co., 59 N. Y. 258. See also, Railroad Co. v. Richardson, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2234, 66 S. W. Rep. 1035. 20. Gott v. Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45. 21. Missouri Pac. R'y Co. v. Beeson, 30 Kans. 298; Swift v. Steamship Co., 106 N. Y. 206; Guillaume v Transportation Co., 100 N. Y. 491; Wheeler v. Railroad Co., 115 U. S. 29; Wilde v. Transportation Co., 47 Iowa, 247; Merchants, etc. made a verbal contract with the agent of the railroad company to transport his cotton by "all rail" from Cincinnati to New York. Under this agreement he delivered his cotton at the company's depot and its transportation was immediately commenced. One or two days afterwards the company's agent sent to the plaintiff a bill of lading which by its terms reserved to the company the right to forward in part by water. When the cotton reached Baltimore it was shipped on steamers for New York and a part of it was lost by the wrecking of the vessel in a storm. It was held that, after the verbal agreement had been consummated and rights had accrued under it, it could not be altered without the express assent of the shipper, and that, the cotton having been exposed to the danger by the fault of the company, it was liable, though the immediate cause of the loss might have been the act of God.23 Sec. 418. ($248.) Extent to which carrier may limit his liability. The extent to which the carrier may exonerate him Co. v. Furthmann, 149 Ill. 66, 36 N. E. Rep. 624, 41 Am. St. Rep. 265; Caldwell v. Railway Co., 21 Ky. Law Rep. 397, 51 S. W. Rep. 575; Railroad Co. v. Cooper, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1644, 56 S. W. Rep. 144; Railway Co. v. Clark, 48 Kan. 321, 329, 29 Pac. Rep. 312. See, ante, § 171. A passenger's rights and the carrier's liability as to baggage are fixed and determined when his ticket is bought. Subsequent notice of a limitation of liability will not alter the rights thus determined, unless the passenger assents thereto upon a sufficient consideration. Saunders v. Railway Co., 128 Fed. 15, 62 C. C. A. 523. 22. 45 N. Y. 712. 23. In Union Pac. R'y Co. v. Marston, 30 Neb. 241, 46 N. W. Rep. 485, it appeared that one M. applied to an agent of the Rock Island & Peoria Railroad Company, at one of its stations in the state of Illinois, to ship certain office furniture, including a stove; to Kearney, on the line of defendant's road in the state of Nebraska. The agent informed M. that the custom was for shippers to release stoves, but advised him not to do it for reasons given, but to pay the additional expense of sending it at carrier's risk. To this M. assented, and offered to pay the freight to said agent, who informed him that he could as well pay it at the end of the route. The agent placed the goods in a car of a freight train, which proceeded on its way. Four or five hours afterwards the agent handed M. a paper, saying that it was a receipt for the goods shipped. This paper M. put in his pocket without examining it, and self from responsibility by such express or special agreements, where permitted, is, subject to the exceptions to be hereafter considered, almost unlimited. He cannot, of course, exonerate himself from the consequences of the fraud or felony either of himself or of his servants, though, as we have seen,24 it was formerly otherwise in England as to the felony of his servants; and, as will be hereafter seen,25 according to the weight of authority in this country, based upon considerations of public policy, he cannot contract for exemption from liability for losses caused by his own or the negligence of his servants. But, with these exceptions, there is no danger or risk which can arise in the course of the transportation of the goods, or of his connection with them, for which he cannot avoid responsibility by a contract fairly and understandingly made with his employer, upon the theory that the owner of the goods, for the consideration which it is supposed he receives, either in the reduced compensation or in some equivalent advantage, may surrender, if it proved to be a bill of lading of the goods, containing, inter alia, the condition, "stoves at owner's risk of breakage." The goods were received at Council Bluffs from the Rock Island Railroad by defend ant, the Union Pacific Railway Company, and carried to Kearney. Upon arrival the stove was found to have been broken en route. In an action by M. against the Union Pacific Railway Company for damages for injury to the stove, it was held that, as between M. and the Rock Island & Peoria Railroad Company, the stove was carried at carrier's risk. The same rule was followed in American Exp. Co. v. Spellman, 90 Ill. 455, where the receipt or bill was given some time after the goods had been shipped, and the evidence negatived expressly any presumption that the shipper knew of it; and in Michigan Cent. 24. See ante, § 392. he will, the obligation of the carrier as an insurer, to any extent he may choose. Thus Sec. 419. (§ 248a.) Carrier may stipulate for exemption from liability for certain losses in carriage of live stock.-As has been already seen,26 the carrier of living animals as freight is, by the weight of authority, to be regarded as a common carrier as to such freight. It has also been seen27 that the carrier of animals is by law exempt from liability for those losses which are occasioned, not by his fault or neglect, but by the inherent nature, vice or propensity of the animals themselves. The carriage of animals evidently involves different requirements than those involved in the carriage of inanimate objects. They must be loaded and unloaded with more care; they must be fed, watered and protected; they must be secured from escape; they must be guarded against heating, crowding and suffocation; they must often require skilled attention and assistance. For these and like reasons the owner and the carrier may both desire that the owner, or some experienced person in his behalf, shall accompany the stock and assume its care, leaving to the carrier only the duty of transportation with its necessary incidents. In view of these facts, it is well settled that the owner and the carrier may, by contract, provide that the carrier shall be exempt from all liability for injuries occurring to the stock disconnected and apart from the conduct and running of the trains, such as injury from loading or unloading, from overloading, suffocation, heating, and the like, or from the weakness, escape or viciousness of the stock.28 Such a con 26. Ante, § 339. 27. Ante, § 336. 28. Georgia R. R. Co. v. Beatie, 66 Ga. 438; Georgia R. R. Co. v. Spears, 66 Ga. 485; Mitchell v. Railroad Co., 68 Ga. 644; East Tenn. R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596; St. Louis, etc. R'y Co. v. Lesser, 46 Ark. 236; Myers v. Railway Co., 90 Mo. 98; Atchison v. Railroad Co., 80 Mo. 213; Ball v. Railway Co., 83 Mo. 574; Sturgeon v. Railway Co., 65 Mo. 569; Oxley v. Railway Co., 65 Mo. 629; Clark v. Railway Co., 64 Mo. 440; Levering v. Transportation Co., 42 Mo. 88; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Raiordan, 119 Penn. St. 577; Central R. Co. v. Bryant, 73 Ga. 722; Betts r. Loan & Trust Co., 21 Wis. 80; Morrison v. Construction Co., 44 Wis. 405; Burns v. Railway Co., tract does not relieve the carrier from the due performance of his undertaking; nor can he, according to the weight of authority, by such a contract escape responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants.29 The consideration for such contracts is usually found in the reduced rates given and the free transportation of the shipper or his agent to and from the destination of the stock. Sec. 420. (§ 248b.) Carrier may stipulate for exemption in case of loss by fire.-So a carrier may stipulate for exemption from liability in case the goods are lost or injured by fire, and if he does so, the measure of his obligation is ordinary diligence;30 but if the fire is caused by his negligence, or if he negligently places or leaves the goods in a place of danger, he cannot, by such a stipulation, escape responsibility.31 Sec. 421. (§ 248c.) Carrier may stipulate for exemption in case of loss caused by strikes, mobs, etc.-So it is held that a 104 Wis. 646, 80 N. W. Rep. 927; Railway Co. v. Patterson, 69 Ill. App. 438; Railroad Co. v. Fox, 113 Ill. App. 180; Morse v. Railway Co., 97 Me. 77, 53 Atl. Rep. 874; Railroad Co. v. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129, 31 N. E. Rep. 781, 32 Am. St. Rep. 239, 17 L. R. A. 339; Railroad Co. v. Reid, 91 Ga. 377, 17 S. E. Rep. 934; Railroad Co. v. Schuldt, 66 Neb. 43, 92 N. W. Rep. 162. Co. v. Heath, 22 Ind. App. 47, 53 30. Little Rock, etc. R'y Co. v. Daniels, 49 Ark. 352; Rand v. Transportation Co., 59 N. H. 363; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Manchester Mills, 88 Tenn. 653, 14 S. W. Rep. 314; Reid v. The Railroad, 10 Ind. App. 385, 35 N. E. Rep. 703, 53 Am. St. Rep. 391; Indianapolis, etc. R'y Co. v. Forsythe, 4 Ind. App. 326, 29 N. E. Rep. 1138, citing Hutchinson on Carr.; Constable v. Steamship Co., 154 U. S. 51, 14 Sup. Ct. R. 1062, 38 L. Ed. 903; Walters v. Railway Co., 1 Terr. L. R. 88. 29. See post, § 450; Moulton v. Railway Co., 31 Minn. 85; Coupland v. The Railroad, 61 Conn. 531, 23 Atl. Rep. 870, 15 L. R. A. 534; Candee v. The Railroad, 73 Conn. 667, 49 Atl. Rep. 17; Minter v. The Railway, 82 Mo. App. 130; Botts v. The Railroad, 106 Mo. App. 397, 80 S. W. Rep. 976; Railway Co. v. Ragsdale, 14 Ind. App. 406, 42 N. E. Rep. 1106; Railway A. 173. See also, post, § 477. 31. McFadden v. Railway Co., 92 Mo. 343; Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 89 Fed. 131, 32 C. C. |