of the sum agreed upon.43 It has been contended by some courts44 that contracts fixing an amount beyond which the carrier will not be liable, while conclusive on the owner of the goods where the carrier has been guilty of no misconduct contributing to the loss, are, in effect, limitations upon the carrier's legal liability and, as such, inoperative where the loss has

By executing this contract the plaintiff stipulated, and in effect represented to the defendant that, his horses were not worth to exceed $100 each, and that the charges for transportation should be based on that valuation. Assuming, as we must, that the contract was fairly made for the purposes expressed in it, we think it ought to be upheld as just and reasonable. It is not in any sense a contract for exemption from the consequences of negligence."

sued to recover the real value of ent kinds of domestic animals are the horses. In denying the plain- approximately those of average, tiff's right to recover more than ordinary animals in the country the amounts stated in the con- through which defendant does tract, Mitchell, J., in speaking for business. the court, said: "If the purpose of this stipulation was merely to place a limit on the amount for which the defendant should be liable, then clearly, as to losses resulting from negligence, it is not just or reasonable, and is not binding on the plaintiff. On the other hand, if it was a stipulation as to the value of the property, fairly and honestly made as the basis of the carrier's charges and responsibility, then we think it ought to be upheld as a just and reasonable mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protecting him against extravagant and fanciful valuations. And at this point we may suggest that so far as the question now under consideration is concerned, we see no difference between a case like the present, where the stipulation is that the value of the property does not exceed a specified sum, and one where the value is stipulated to be a specified sum.

We think that we are justified in taking judicial notice of the fact that the maximum value placed by this contract on differ

43. Coupland v. The Railroad, 61 Conn. 531, 23 Atl. Rep. 870, 15 L R. A. 534.

44. Grogan V. Adams Express Co., 114 Pa. St. 523, 60 Am. Rep. 360; Weiller v. Railroad Co., 134 Pa. St. 310, 19 Atl. Rep. 702, 19 Am. St. Rep. 700; Ruppel v. Railroad Co., 167 Pa. St. 166, 31 Atl. Rep. 478, 46 Am. St. Rep. 666; Hughes v. Railroad Co., 202 Pa. St. 222, 51 Atl. Rep. 990, 97 Am. St. Rep. 713, 63 L. R. A. 513; Railroad Co. v. Owens, 93 Ky. 201, 19 S. W. Rep. 590; Railroad Co. v. Radford, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 886, 64 S. W. Rep. 511; Railroad Co. r. Taber, 98 Ky. 503, 32 S. W. Rep. 168; Railway Co. v. Graves, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 684, 52 S. W. Rep. 961.

been occasioned by his negligence. But it cannot fairly be said. that such contracts tend to relieve the carrier from the consequences of his negligence. For the purpose of the contract the goods have no greater value than that agreed upon by the parties, and to that value the carrier must respond where his negligence has been instrumental in causing the loss. And it may be stated as now the well settled rule that where the contract fixes a sum beyond which it is stipulated the carrier will not be liable, and such contract has been fairly entered into with a view to placing a bona fide value on the goods, it will be upheld, although the carrier's negligence has occasioned the loss, as a just and lawful mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be liable and the charges he receives, and as a lawful agreement to dispense with the necessity of offering testimony to prove the value of the goods; and the owner, after a loss has occurred, will be estopped by his admission from asserting that their value was more. As was said by Blatchford, J., in Hart v. The Railroad,45 which is the leading case on the subject, "where a contract of the kind signed by the shipper, is fairly made, agreeing on the valuation of the property carried, with the rate of freight based on the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier the contract will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protecting himself against extravagant and fanciful valuation.''46

Sec. 427. Same subject-Valuation agreement must be bona fide-Valuation must be reasonable.-But while the owner of

45. 112 U. S. 331, 28 L. Ed. 177, at a low rate of freight, on the 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151.

46. The learned justice further said: "There is no justice in allowing the shipper to be paid a large value for an article which he has induced the carrier to take

assertion and agreement that its value is a less sum than that claimed after a loss. It is just to hold the shipper to his agreement, fairly made, as to value, even where the loss or injury has oc

the goods and the carrier may fix a value on the goods beyond which the carrier in the event of loss will not be liable, the agreement fixing value, in order to be conclusive on the owner, must be bona fide and the value reasonable. If, for instance, the value agreed upon should be so far below the real value of the goods that from their appearance the carrier must have known of the discrepancy, the agreement fixing value would not be bona fide and, depending on no value at all, would amount to an arbitrary limitation upon the carrier's legal liability which, in the event of loss occasioned by negligence, would not deprive the owner of the right to recover the real value of the goods. While it is true that the owner of goods of great value which are concealed in packages or otherwise hidden from view, and

curred through the negligence of the carrier. The effect of the agreement is to cheapen the freight and secure the carriage, if there is no loss, and the effect of disregarding the agreement, after a loss, is to expose the carrier to a greater risk than the parties intended he should assume. The agreement as to value, in this case, stands as if the carrier had asked the value of the horses, and had been told by the plaintiff the sum inserted in the contract.

for negligence up to that value. It is just and reasonable that such a contract, fairly entered into, and where there is no deceit practiced on the shipper, should be upheld. There is no violation of public policy. On the contrary, it would be unjust and unreasonable, and would be repugnant to the soundest principles of fair dealing and of the freedom of contracting, and thus in conflict with public policy, if a shipper should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss, and to repudiate it in case of loss."

Where the contract exempts the carrier from all loss except for collision, and provides that the liability for a given article of freight shall not exceed a certain price, and the freight is injured from another cause, the shipper cannot, upon the ground that such a sweeping provision is invalid, recover more than the stipulated Hill v. Railroad Co., 144

"The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from liability for negligence. It does not induce want of care. It exacts from the carrier the measure of care due to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond in that value for negligence. The compensation for carriage is based on that value. The shipper is estopped from saying that the value is greater. The articles have no greater value, for the purposes of the contract of transportation, Mass. 284; Graves v. Railway Co., between the parties to that con- 137 Mass. 33. tract. The carrier must respond

sum.

upon which a very inconsiderable value has been placed by him, will be precluded, in case of loss, from the right to recover a greater sum than the value which he has placed upon them, the reason for this exception is, that to charge the carrier with their real value, when by the owner's misrepresentation he has been induced to undertake the employment at a reduced compensation and to lessen the degree of care and vigilance which he otherwise would have exercised, would be to sanction. fraud and to enable the owner to gain an unfair advantage over the carrier through his own misrepresentation. The knowledge. which the carrier has of the real value of the goods tendered to him for shipment would, therefore, seem to be material in determining the effect of the valuation agreement upon his liability, although a contrary conclusion has been reached by some courts. And it may be stated as the better rule that, where the value agreed upon is so out of harmony with the ordinary values of similar kinds of goods as to indicate that the question of value did not in fact enter into the agreement, and the carrier, under the circumstances, must have known of the discrepancy, the agreement placing a value on the goods will be considered as a mere attempt by the carrier to secure a partial exemption from liability, and of no effect in relieving him from the obligation of responding for their real value where his misconduct has occasioned their loss. So in the absence of fraud

1. Railway Co. v. Jones, 132 Ala. 437, 31 So. Rep. 501; Railway Co. v. Stone & Haslett, 112 Tenn. 348, 79 S. W. Rep. 1031; Railway Co. v. McIntyre, (Tex. Civ. App.) 82 S. W. Rep. 346; Everett v. Railroad Co., 138 N. Car. 68, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 985; Central, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hall, Ga. 52 S. E. Rep. 679. In Railway Co. v. Jones, supra, McClellan, C. J., said: "While under our adjudications the carrier, in consideration of reduced freight charges, may agree with the shipper that in case of

loss or injury the recovery shall be limited to a valuation of the property expressed in the bill of lading, and such an agreement will be enforced by the courts when such valuation is not greatly below the real worth of the property, such agreements will not be countenanced or given effect if they are unreasonable,-if they limit damages for loss or injury to an amount greatly less than the damages in fact sustained. It is plain that this doctrine must be rested upon the same ground that

or concealment on the part of the owner of the goods whereby the carrier has been misled, the valuation agreed upon, it is said, must be reasonable, regard being had to the real value of the goods; and if such value be unreasonable, the owner will not be estopped from claiming damages on the basis of their real value.2

Sec. 428. Same subject-Execution of contracts limiting recovery to agreed value of goods-Construction.-If the owner, at the request of the carrier, deliberately places a value on the goods when he tenders them for transportation, he will, of course, where the carrier's request was made in good faith, be estopped from afterwards asserting that their value was more. So if the owner voluntarily accepts a receipt in which there is inserted a clause fixing a value upon the goods, he will be presumed, in the absence of proof of any unfair advantage having been taken of him, to have assented to the value stated.3 Thus

or not. It is against the public good in respect of a matter of gov ernmental concern that he should be allowed to make such stipulation under any circumstances; and to allow it to stand in any instance or upon any consideration would be to emasculate the principle of public policy obtaining in the premises, and to leave the public exposed to uncertainties incident to injurics, into what carriers intended, or knew or had been informed as to the real value of the property transported by them."

underlies the original proposition property carried, whether he knew forbidding agreements against lia- or was informed of its real value bility for the results of negligence, -public policy. And in determining whether a stipulation is void as being against public policy, there is no room for inquiry into the knowledge, information or intention of the parties. The ques tion is not what the parties knew, or intended, but what was the effect of the stipulation; not whether the parties intended evil or knew that their act was hurtful to the public, but whether to allow and uphold such contracts would be fraught with wrong and injury to the people of a character from which it is the province and duty of government to protect them. So it is immaterial, when a carrier has stipulated for a limitation of damages resulting from his negligence to a greatly disproportionately small valuation of the 638; Michalitschke v. Wells, Far

2. Railway Co. v. Stone & Haslett, 112 Tenn. 348, 79 S. W. Rep. 1031.

3. Graves v. Express Co., 176 Mass. 280, 57 N. E. Rep. 462; John Hood Co. v. American, etc., Co., Mass. -, 77 N. E. Ren.