showing it rests upon him; and when the terms of the exception are general and can be reasonably satisfied by a limited construction, their meaning will not be extended beyond such reasonable limits. Hence where the agreement between the common carrier and the owner of the goods provided in general terms that they were to be transported at the owner's risk, it was held that the owner assumed the risks arising from the ordinary dangers of transportation by the means employed which the reasonable and ordinary care of the carrier might be insufficient to prevent; but that the carrier was still liable for losses arising from dangers which ordinary care and prudence might have avoided.30 So the exception in the carrier's receipt of liability for all loss or damage "arising from the dangers of railroad, ocean, steam or river navigation, leakage, fire, or from any cause whatever," was held not to exempt him from liability for losses or damage occurring from his own negligence or that of his servants, the court remarking that "the terms of these contracts are very much under the control of the carriers, and they may justly be required to express in plain terms the entire exemption for which they stipulate. The language of this clause is very broad; but if it be desired that a clause shall cover losses by negligence, it is not too much to say that the purpose must be clearly expressed.''31 It has also been decided that where such contract relieves the carrier from responsibility for losses by fire, he is still liable for such losses, if it appear that they have resulted from his negligence.32 And where the exemption was from damage or loss from any act, neglect or default of the pilot, master or mariners, it was held that the gross carelessness of the mate in delivering property in port ought not to be deemed within the exception.33 30. French v. Railroad Co., 4 Y., 168; Westcott v. Fargo, 6 Lans. Keyes (N. Y.) 108; Nashville, etc. 319. R. R. v. Jackson, 6 Heisk. 271; Baltimore, etc. R. R. v. Rathbone, 1 W. Va. 87; Mobile, etc. R. R. v. Jarboe, 41 Ala. 644; Canfield v. Railroad Co., 93 N. Y. 532. 32. Steinweg v. Railroad, 43 N. Y. 123; Lamb v. Railroad, 46 id. 271; Bostwick v. Railroad, 45 id. 712. 33. Guillaume v. Hamburgh, etc. 31. Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. P. Co., 42 N. Y. 212. Sec. 464. ($275.) Contracts limiting liability must be construed strictly against the carrier.-When such contracts between the carrier and his employer depend upon the notices of the carrier or upon terms and conditions which he has put into his receipts, if there be doubt or ambiguity in such notices or in the language of the receipts, it will be solved in favor of the employer and against the carrier.34 The law is said to be jealous. of the duty and obligation of the carrier, and will not allow him to divest himself of them without plain language indicative of an agreement to that effect. The imposition of his duties is not a light thing to be shuffled off at his pleasure. It has been 34. Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Holland, 68 Miss. 351, 8 So. Rep. 516; Black v. Transportation Co., 55 Wis. 319; Little Rock, etc. Ry. Co. v. Talbot, 39 Ark. 524; Norman v. Binnington, 25 Q. B. Div. 475; Taylor v. Steam Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. at p. 549; Burton v. English, 12 Q. B. Div. at p. 224; The Cale donia, 157 U. S. 124, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 537, 39 L. Ed. 644; Compania De Navigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12, 42 L. Ed. 398; Railway Co. v. Reiss, 183 U. S. 621, 22 Sup. Ct. R. 53, affirming 99 Fed. 1006, 39 C. C. A. 679 and 98 Fed. 533, 39 C. C. A. 149; Fairbank & Co. v. Railway Co., 81 Fed. 289, 26 C. C. A. 402, 47 U. S. App. 744, 38 L. R. A. 271, reversing 66 Fed. 471; Railroad Co. v. Nichols, 85 Fed. 945, 29 C. C. A. 500; Smith v. Booth, 122 Fed. 626, 58 C. C. A. 479, affirming 110 Fed. 680; Pierce v. The Railroad, 120 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. Rep. 874, 52 Pac. Rep. 302, 40 L. R. A. 350, 354; Parker v. The Railroad, 133 N. Car. 335, 45 S. E. Rep. 658, 63 L. R. A. 827; Amory Mfg. Co. v. The Railway, 89 Tex. 419, 37 S. W. Rep. 856, 59 Am. St. 396; Railway Co. v. Nicholai, 4 Ind. App. 119, 30 N. E. Rep. 424, 51 Am. St. Rep. 206; Steamship Co. v. Pilkington, (Canada) 28 S. C. R. 146. A provision in a bill of lading that the railroad company, in case of loss, should have the benefit of any insurance that may have been obtained upon the goods was construed to cover loss or damage to the goods themselves, and not damage sustained by reason of a mere failure to carry and deliver the goods at a reasonable time. Klass Commission Co. v. The Railroad, 80 Mo. App. 164. So a condition in the contract that the shipper, in case of loss or injury, should give the carrier notice of his claim within a certain time was held not to apply to a claim for damages arising on account of a delay in transportation. Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Bell, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 393; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 814; Leonard v. The Railway, 54 Mo. App. 293; s. c. 57 Mo. App. 366. sanctioned by the accumulated wisdom of many years, and can only be laid aside under circumstances which import a clear agreement upon the part of the other party to the contract. Thus, where the carrier had given two notices, he was held to be bound by the one least beneficial to himself.35 And where he had put up on a board in his office a notice which limited his liability, and had also circulated handbills, proposing to carry on terms of less restricted liability, he was held bound by the latter.36 So where a bill of lading provided that the carrier would not be liable for loss or damage arising from causes incident to railroad transportation, nor from fire or the elements "while at depots," and the goods were destroyed by fire while in the depot at destination, it was held that since doubtful expressions were to be taken most strongly against the carrier, the words, "while in depots," referred only to the depots at which the cars containing the goods might be stopped and not to the depot at destination.37 And where a carrier effected an arrangement with a compress company to act as its agent and receive cotton intended for transportation over its route, and it accepted a delivery of cotton at such place instead of at its own depot and issued its ordinary bill of lading therefor which stipulated for exemption from liability for loss by fire while the cotton was in its depots, stations, or places of transshipment, it was held that the exemption was not to be construed as relating to fire in the cotton press.38 So a clause in a ship's bill of lading which stated that the ship would not be answerable for loss occasioned by latent defects in the machinery or hull of the vessel not resulting from a want of due diligence was held not to cover a condition of unseaworthiness existing at the commencement of 35. Munn v. Baker, 2 Starkie, 255. 36. St. Louis, etc. R. R. บ. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302; Atwood v. Trans. Co., 9 Watts, 87; Aiery v. Merrill, 2 Curtis, 8; Edsall v. Rail road, 50 N. Y. 661. 37. E. O. Standard Milling Co. v. Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258, 26 S. W. Rep. 704. 38. Deming v. Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co., 90 Tenn. (6 Pickle) 306, 17 S. W. Rep. 89, 13 L. R. A. 518. the voyage, but to apply only to a state of unseaworthiness arising during the voyage.39 Sec. 465. (§ 276.) Same subject-Particular exemptions not enlarged by general language.-When the particular dangers or risks against which the carrier has specifically guarded himself in his receipt are followed by more general and comprehensive words of exemption, the latter are to be construed to embrace only occurrences ejusdem generis with those previously enumerated, unless there be a clear intent to the contrary. As where the owner of horses who was about to send them by railroad entered into a contract with the company that he would "take all risks of loss, injury, damage or other contingencies in loading, conveyance, unloading and otherwise, whether arising from negligence, default or misconduct, gross or culpable or otherwise, on the part of the railway company's servants, agents or officers," and upon the journey the horses were injured by the bottom of the car in which they were placed giving way, it was held that this defect in the car had no relation to any of the risks assumed by the owner and was not therefore included in them. The contract, it was said, had reference to such risks only as were likely to arise from the nature of the freight, from delays, and 39. The Aggi, 107 Fed. 300, 46 C. C. A. 276, affirming 93 Fed. 484. A stipulation in a contract of affreightment exempting the vessel from liability for loss or damage occasioned by "latent defects in the hull of the vessel" will not extend to such defects as were in existence at the time of the commencement of the voyage. The Sandfield, 92 Fed. 663, 34 C. C. A. 612, affirming 79 Fed. 371. Clauses exempting the owner of the vessel from the general obligation of furnishing a seaworthy vessel must be confined within strict limits, and are not to be extended by latitudinarian construction or forced implication so as to comprehend a state of unseaworthiness, whether patent or latent, existing at the commencement of the voyage. The Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655, 18 Sup. Ct. R. 753, 42 L. C. A. 1181, reversing 68 Fed. 254 and 63 Fed. 266. But the breaking of a junk ring on a steamship engine cylinder was held to be "an accident of the sea and of the machinery" within the meaning of an exemption from liability for losses from such dangers. The Curlew, 55 Fed. 1003, 5 C. C. A. 386, 8 U. S. App. 405. See also, The Maori King v. Hughes, 2 Q. B. (1895) 550, 65 L. J. Q. B. 168. from casualties and defaults occurring during the loading, transportation, unloading and delivery of the horses, but not to risks not incident to the ordinary transaction of business and arising from negligence in no way likely to be incurred by a company using ordinary care in the management of its business.40 And where the contract was that the shipper of the goods released the carrier "from any and all damages that may occur to the said goods arising from leakage or decay, chafing or breakage, or from any other cause not the result of collision of trains or of cars being thrown from the track while in transit," it was held not to release him from total loss or destruction of the goods by fire.41 Sec. 466. Same subject-Construction of specific terms not altered to release carrier.-In the case of Amory Manufacturing Co. v. The Railway,42 it appeared that a quantity of cotton was placed upon the platform of a compress company at the point of shipment for the purpose of being compressed. While the cotton was still on the platform of the compress company, the defendant issued to the shipper its bill of lading by which it agreed to transport the cotton. The bill of lading provided that neither the company issuing the bill of lading nor any connecting carrier would be liable in case of loss by fire while the cotton was in transit, or in depot or place of transshipment, or on landing at the place of delivery. The cotton was destroyed by fire while still upon the platform of the compress company. In an action to recover the value of the cotton, the trial court found that the fire was due to no negligence on the part of the defend 40. Hawkins v. Great W. R'y fining Co. v. The G. R. Booth, 64 Co., 17 Mich. 57. 41. Menzell v. The Railroad, 1 Dillon 531. See also, Railway Co. v. Callender, 183 U. S. 632, 22 Sup. Ct. R. 257, affirming 98 Fed. 538, 39 C. C. A. 154; The G. R. Booth. 171 U. S. 450, 19 Sup. Ct. R. 9, 43 L. Ed. 234; s. c. 91 Fed. 164, 33 C. C. A. 430, reversing on other grounds American Sugar Re Fed. 878; The Waikato v. New 42. 89 Tex. 419, 37 S. W. Rep. 856, 59 Am. St. Rep. 65. See also, Gulf, etc. R'y Co. v. Pepperell Mfg. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. Rep. 965. |