ant, and held that under the exemption clause of the bill of lading it was not liable. This ruling was affirmed in the court of civil appeals. But the supreme court, in reversing the ruling of the lower court, said: "In order to sustain the ruling of the court of civil appeals and of the trial court, it must be held that the cotton, while upon the platform of the compress company, was either in transit or in depot within the meaning of those terms as used in the bill of lading. . It is contended on the one side that the words in transit are the equivalent of the words in transitu, and that goods in the hands of a carrier are in transit from the moment of their delivery to him until they reach the hands of the consignee. In a sense, the meaning of the two phrases is the same. The one is a literal translation of the other. But as actually employed, they have a different meaning and application. In transit means literally in course of passing from point to point, and such is its common acceptation. Such also is the literal meaning of the phrase in transitu, but for the sake of convenience in defining the right of a creditor to stop goods which have been sold but not delivered to an insolvent purchaser, they have been given a broader significa. tion.. It would seem, therefore, that if the parties to the contract had desired to employ a single phrase which would cover the carrier's exemption from liability from the time the goods were received by it until it had delivered them to the consignee, they would have used the more comprehensive terms. But here the words in transit, the words actually used, according to their ordinary signification, apply only to the cotton from the time the transportation was to begin until it was to end under the contract. The cotton not having been set in motion towards its destination was not in fact in transit, and we cannot hold it constructively in transit while on the platform. . . It may be true that no satisfactory answer can be given to the question why the defendant should limit its liability from the very moment the transportation began until the delivery of the cotton to the consignee, and it should omit to limit it at its receiving depot. It may be that its intention was to make its exemption general and to contract that it should not be liable for the loss of

the property either while in transit or while at the place it was received. But we hold that the phrase while in transit did not exempt the company from the loss of the cotton before the transportation actually began; and in any event, there is such grave doubt as to the construction of the phrase as would require that the doubt should be resolved in favor of the shipper."

Sec. 467. Same subject. So in De Rothschild v. Steam. Packet Company,1 where it appeared that a number of boxes of gold dust were delivered to the defendant by the agent of the plaintiff, to be carried from South America to London, under a bill of lading containing exceptions to the carrier's liability for losses "by the act of God, the queen's enemies, pirates, robbers, fire, accidents from machinery, boilers and steam, the dangers of the seas, roads and rivers of what kind and nature," and the boxes were stolen from a railroad truck in which they had been put after their arrival at Southampton, for conveyance thence to London, it was held that, under the circumstances, and considering the value of the goods, it could never have been intended to relieve the company from responsibility for losses by larceny; and that robbers meant such as might take by force and not those who might take by stealth, and dangers of the roads, if they had reference at all to roads on land, meant only such dangers as the overturning of carriages at rough and precipitous places and could not include theft. And where the carrier limits his lia. bility in reference to specific articles, goods not falling clearly within the description specified will not be included.2

Sec. 468. Same subject-Ambiguous words construed against carrier.-In Taylor v. Steam Company, it appeared

1. 7 Exch. 734.

A limitation that the value of

2. Cream City R'y v. Railway each horse or mule shipped does Co., 63 Wis. 93.

An exemption from liability for the negligence of the carrier's servants, collision and other dangers, will not extend to the personal negligence of the carrier himself. The Guildhall, 64 Fed. 867, 26 U. S. App. 414, 12 C. C. A. 445.

not exceed $100, will not apply to a jack shipped under the contract. Richardson v. The Railway, 62 Mo. App. 1.

3. L. R. 9 Q. B. 546. See also, Steinman v. Angier Line (1891) 1 Q. B. 619, 60 L. J. Q. B. 425.

that five boxes of diamonds had been shipped on one of defendant's steamships under a bill of lading which provided that defendant should not be liable for losses from the act of God, the queen's enemies, pirates, robbers, thieves, barratry of master and mariners, and the like. One box of the diamonds was stolen from the ship, either on the voyage or on her arrival in port before the time for delivery arrived; but there was no evidence to show whether they were stolen by one of the crew or by a passenger, or, after her arrival, by some person from the shore.

"The first question," said Lush, J., "is, does 'thieves' include persons on board the ship, or is it to be limited, as has been held in cases as to policies of insurance, to persons outside the ship and not belonging to it. The word is ambiguous, and, being of doubtful meaning, it must receive such a construction as is most in favor of the shipper, and not such as is most in favor of the ship-owner, for whose benefit the exceptions are framed; for if it was intended to give to it the larger meaning which is now contended for, the intention to give the ship-owner that protection ought to have been expressed in clear and unambiguous language. It is not, I think, reasonable to suppose, when the language used is ambiguous, that it was intended that the shipowner should not be liable for thefts by one of the crew or persons on board. The ship-owner must protect himself, if he intends this, by the use of unambiguous language. I say nothing as to whether barratry can include theft by one of the crew, because there were passengers on board, and therefore the theft was not necessarily committed by one of the crew, but might have been committed by one of the passengers." The loss was therefore held not to be within the exception.

Sec. 469. Same subject.-But in Spinetti v. Steamship Company, two boxes of specie had been shipped under a bill of lading providing that the carrier should not be liable for losses from theft on land or afloat," "barratry of master or mariners," "any act, neglect or default of the pilot, master, mar4. 80 N. Y. 71, reversing s. c. 14 Hun. 100.

iners, engineers, servants or agents of the company," and others. On the voyage a large sum was abstracted from one of the boxes, and there was evidence tending to show that it had been taken by the purser, and the question was whether the loss was within the exceptions or either of them, and it was held that it was. The purser, the court held, was a mariner, and the loss was within the exception of losses by "barratry of master or mariners," as it is well established that the term 'barratry' includes theft and embezzlement by the crew." And even if the purser were not a mariner, it was held that the loss fell clearly within the exception of "theft on land or afloat."5

Sec. 470. (§ 271.) How the benefit of such contracts can be claimed by connecting carriers.-An important question, growing out of the contracts of carriers for limited liability, sometimes arises as to the extent to which they may be taken advantage of by those carriers with whom they are not directly made, but who, as connecting carriers in the line to destination, receive them, directly or indirectly, from the contracting carrier for further transportation. In Maghee v. Railroad," the goods were received by a railroad company at Louisville, to be transported thence to New York, "unavoidable accidents of railroad and fire in depot excepted." They were carried by this road to its terminus and thence by other companies to their destination, but after arrival there were burned in the depot of the defendant which had completed their transportation. It was held that the contract made with the first road at Louisville inured to the benefit of all the succeeding carriers. It was said to be reasonable to suppose that the compensation fixed for the carriage had

5. Citing American Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 1 Hill. 25; s. c. 26 Wend. 563; 1 Phill. on Ins. 1071; At lantic Ins. Co. v. Storrow, 5 Paige 285.

Upon the point that the purser was a "mariner," the court cited In re Hayes, 2 Curteis Ec. 338; McLachlan on Shipping, 146, 148; The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. 240,

247; The Jane and Matilda, 1 Hagg. Adm. 187, 190; Smith . Sloop Pekin, Gilpin, 203; Bouvier's Law Dict. tit. "Mariner"; Boehm t. Combe, 2 Maule & Sel. 172.

6. 45 N. Y. 514. See also, Railway Co. v. Sharp, 64 Ark. 115, 40 S W. Rep. 781, citing Hutchinson on Carr.

relation to the restricted liability assumed, and that the contracting company, having undertaken to carry the goods to their ultimate destination, had an interest in making the exception commensurate with the scope and duration of its contract, and that it must be held that all the connecting lines acted under its employment; from which it resulted that all contracts made by the first carrier would inure to their benefit.

Sec. 471. (§ 272.) Same subject. On the other hand, in Babcock v. Railroad' the goods were delivered to a company other than the defendant to carry to the terminus of its own route, to be there delivered to a succeeding carrier. After several transfers to successive carriers on their way to destination, the goods finally came into possession of the defendant for continued carriage, and while in its possession they were destroyed by fire, which was one of the excepted risks in the contract of the first company. The question being whether advantage could be taken of this contract by the defendant, it was determined that it could not. The contract, it was said, not being intended as a through contract, no rate of freight was agreed upon for any part of the route beyond the terminus of the first carrier's route, and there was therefore no consideration for an agreement by the plaintiff to relieve the carriers who should thereafter receive the property for transportation from their commonlaw liabilities, and no such agreement was made. It was adImitted that carriers who were not named in the contract for the carriage of goods, and who are not formal parties to it, may, under certain circumstances, have the benefit of it; as when it is made by one of several carriers upon connecting lines or routes, for the carriage of the property over the several routes for an agreed price, by an arrangement among the several lines; or when, in the absence of such an arrangement, one carrier contracts for the carriage of the goods over his own and other lines, which would be a through contract. In all such cases the contract has respect to and provides for the services of the carriers upon the connecting routes. But where there is no such con

7. 49 N. Y. 491.