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peremptorily, then they are necessarily the jury to try the case. Now in this instance, the defendants have no more peremptory challenges, and the challenge which they have made for cause is overruled; therefore so far as the defendants are concerned, he is a juror to try the case. This was accepted by both parties as a true statement of the then condition of the case; and after some further examination of the juror, which elicited nothing of importance in connection with the present inquiry, no peremptory challenge having been interposed by the State, Sanford was sworn as a juror, and the panel was then complete. This so far as we have been advised, presents all there is in the record which this court can consider touching the challenges of these two jurors by the defendants for cause.

In Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 156, we said, "that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by "a challenge to a juror, in a criminal case, on the ground that he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the issues to be tried, "the court will practically be called upon to determine whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried, so far as the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character, upon the evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.

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*It must be made clearly to appear, that upon the evidence, the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed impartial. The case must be one in which it is manifest the law left nothing to the conscience or discretion' of the court.' If such is the degree of strictness which is required in the ordinary cases of writs of error from one court to another in the same general jurisdiction, it certainly ought not to be relaxed in a case where as in this the ground relied on for the reversal by this court of a judgment of the highest court of the State is that the error complained of is so gross as to amount in law to a denial by the State of a trial by an impartial jury to one who is accused of crime. We are unhesitatingly of opinion that no such case is disclosed by this record.

dence ou that account. And upon this point the Supreme Court of the State, in that part of its opinion which has been printed with the motion papers, remarks as follows: "The objection that the letter was obtained from the defendant by an unlawful seizure is made for the first time in this court. It was not made on the trial in the court below. Such an objection as this, which is not suggested by the nature of the offered evidence, but depends upon the proof of an outside fact, should have been made on the trial. The defense should have proved that the Most letter was one of the letters illegally seized by the police, and should then have moved to exclude or oppose its admission on the ground that it was obtained by such illegal seizure. This was not done, and therefore we cannot consider the constitutional question supposed to be involved."

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Even if the court was wrong in saying that it did not appear that the Most letter was one of the papers illegally seized, it still remains uncontradicted that objection was not made in the trial court to its admission on that account. To give us jurisdiction under section 709, Rev. Stat., because of the denial by a State court of any title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of the United States, it must appear on the record that such title, right, privilege, or immunity was specially set up or claimed " at the proper time, and in the proper way. To be reviewable here, the decision must be against the right so set up or claimed. As the Supreme Court of the State was reviewing the decision of the trial court, it must appear that the claim was made in that court, because the Supreme Court was only authorized to review the judgment for errors committed there, aud we can do no more. This is not, as seems to be supposed by one of the counsel for the petitioners, a question of the waiver of a right under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, but a question of claim. If the right was not set up or claimed in the proper court below, the judgment of the highest court of the State in the action is conclusive, so far as the right of review here is concerned. The question whether the letter, if obtained in the manner alleged, would have been competent evidence, is not before us, and therefore no foundation is laid under this objection for the exercise of our jurisdiction.

As to the suggestion by counsel for the petitioners Spies and Fielden-Spies having been born in Germany, and Fielden in Great Britain that they have been denied by the decision of the court below rights guaranteed to them by treaties between the United States and their respective countries, it is sufficient to say that no such questions were made and decided in either of the courts below, and they cannot be raised in this court for the first time. Besides, we have not been referred to any treaty, neither are we aware of any, under which such a question could be raised.

We come now to consider the objection that the defendant Spies was compelled by the court to be a witness against himself. He voluntarily offered himself as a witness in his own behalf, and by so doing he became bound to submit to a proper cross-examination under the law and practice in the jurisdiction where he was being tried. The complaint is that he was required on cross-examination to state whether he had received a certain letter, which was shown, purporting to have been written by Johann Most, and addressed to him, and upon his saying that he had, the court allowed the letter to be read in evidence against him. This it is claimed was not proper cross-examination. It is not contended that the subject to which the cross-examination related was not pertinent to the issue to be tried; and whether a cross-examination must be confined to matters pertinent to the testimony-record as it now stands, because on its face it shows in-chief, or may be extended to the matters in issue, is certainly a question of State law, as administered in the courts of the State, and not of Federal law. Something was said in argument about an alleged unreasonable search and seizure of the papers and property of some of the defendants, and their use in evidence on the trial of the case. Special reference is made in this connection to the letter of Most about which Spies was cross-examined; but we have not been referred to any part of the record in which it appears that objection was made to the use of this evi

The objection that the defendants were not actually present in the Supreme Court of the State at the time sentence was pronounced, cannot be made on the

that they were present. If this is not in accordance with the fact, the record must be corrected below, not here. It will be time enough to consider whether the objection presents a Federal question when the correction has been made.

Being of opinion therefore that the Federal questions presented by the counsel for the petitioners, and which they say they desire to argue, are not involved in the determination of the case as it appears on the face of the record, we deny the writ. Petition for writ of error is dismissed.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

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CARRIERS-WRONGFUL DELIVERY- - LIABILITY-NOTICE.-Plaintiff's assignors delivered freight to a carrier in Norfolk, Va., for shipment to Denver, Col., receiving a receipt therefor describing the goods as "marked 'Y'-order notify Zucca Bros.," Denver, Col. The goods were delivered by an intermediate carrier to defendant company with a "transfer sheet, Consignee Y,' order Hup. Zucca Bros., Denver, Col.," and were delivered by defendant to Zucca Bros. without demanding the production of the bill of lading. The bill of lading had been attached to a draft drawn on Zucca Bros. for the price of the goods, which was dishonored and the bill of lading returned, and indorsed. If there were no bill of lading, inquiry would develop that fact, and in all probability would also show who was the proper party to whom to make delivery, Until this was done the goods could be properly placed in store, as was stated to be the true course in Bank v. Bissell, 72 N. Y. 615. Our Factors' Act makes it the duty of a carrier, etc., not to deliver goods except upon production and cancellation of the bills of lading; and for a delivery to a consignor without the production of the bill of lading which provided for a delivery to him, but which he had in the meantime indorsed and negotiated, the carrier was held liable to the holder of the bill. Colgate v. Pennsylvania Co., 102 N. Y. 120. If this delivery had been made in this State therefore there would have been no doubt of the propriety of the recovery in this action, assuming that Zucca Bros. were not the consignees. We think that the common law makes it the duty of the carrier to deliver in accordance with the bill of lading, and if delivered without it, the carrier runs the risk of showing a delivery in accordance with its directions. It is argued here that even by the terms of the original bill of lading, Zucca Bros. were the consignees, and that being such, they were presumptively the proper parties to whom to make delivery, and that there was no written or any notification to the contrary, and hence defendants were justified in such delivery. We do not agree to the correctness of this construction of the bill of lading. It acknowledges the receipt of the goods, their weight, and states the amount of freight to their destination, Denver, Col., and says the goods are marked "Y-order notify Zucca Bros." Here is no statement that Zucca Bros. are the consignees. The very presence of the word "notify" in its relation to them shows that they are not intended as the consignees. If they were, the word is wholly unnecessary. It is the duty of the carrier to notify the consignee of the arrival of the goods. Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322. To place in the bill of lading a direction to notify certain persons to whom, if consignees, it was the carrier's duty to deliver, or at least to notify of the arrival of the goods, is a plain notice that (in the absence of further directions) they are not the consignees. In this bill no one is named as consignee, and that makes it obvious that no delivery should be made to any one who does not produce it. The words, "Y-order notify Zucca Bros.," in the order in which they are written, show that the goods are not to be delivered to the order of Zucca Bros., because after the word "order," in relation to Zucca Bros., is the word "notify," which notification is all the duty the defendant had to perform under the bill. The word "order" therefore must relate to what preceded, and it must have meant that the delivery was to be made to the order of the consignors, or else to the order of "Y," which being altogether fictitious, does not mean to the order of Zucca Bros., unless they produce the bill of lading. Zucca Bros., not being the consignees, therefore all the cases showing that prima facie the consignee is the

owner, and a delivery to him protects the carrier, unless he has been notified to the contrary, do not apply here. The opinion of the learned judge at the General Term proceeds, it seems to us, upon the erroneous theory that the defendant was only bound to know what was imparted to it by the directions on the goods and the papers it received from its immediate predecessor, and that from such papers it discharged its obligations by delivering to Zucca Bros. Even on the papers received from the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad we do not think the defendant was justified, without inquiry, in making the delivery, and we do not think that a carrier situated like defendant can safely rely upon the papers received from its immediate predecessor, when it delivers without a bill of lading (where one is made out), and to the wrong person, although justified in its delivery by the papers received from its predecessor, which differed as to the consignee from the person named in the bill. These papers are made out for the convenience of the carriers as between themselves. The owner or consignor of the goods has nothing to do with them, and probably never sees them. If he has placed a direction upon the property showing where it is to be transported, and obtained a bill of lading for it, he has the right to assume that delivery will only be made in accordance with the terms of the bill, and the duty of carrier is only thereby discharged. In this case Zucca Bros. were not consignees, and the whole loss was sustained by the negligence of the defendant in not demanding the bill of lading before delivering the property, which bill Zucca Bros. could not have produced unless they had paid the draft which accompanied it. By neglecting this plain duty the defendant caused the loss, and by failing to deliver on plaintiff's demand it has converted the goods, and it should therefore be responsible for their value. Oct. 4, 1887. Furman v. Union Puc. Ry. Co. Opinion by Peckham, J.

CONTRACT-PERFORMANCE- PLEADING PRESUMPTION-WAIVER OF OBJECTION.—(1) A complaint which does not allege when the contract sued on was to be performed, nor performance, or tender of performance by complainant within the time, is defective. (2) Where no time for performance is mentioned in a contract the legal presumption is that the engagement is to be performed within a reasonable time. (3) A complaint did not allege when the contract sued on was to be performed, nor performance, or tender of performance, by complainant within the time. Held, that such defect was not waived because the objection was not taken by demurrer or auswer, under the Code of New York, § 499, which provides that if objections to grounds of demurrer, appearing on the face of the complaint, are not taken, either by demurrer or answer, the defendant is deemed to have waived such objections, "except the objection to the jurisdiction of the court, or the objection that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." Oct. 4, 1887. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Manuf'g Co. Opinion by Andrews, J.

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EXTRA ALLOWANCE

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COSTS PERCENTAGE OF AMOUNT INVOLVED—APPEAL.-(1) Under the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, providing that in difficult or extraordinary cases, where a defense is made, the court may, in its discretion, allow extra costs to either party, not to exceed five per cent "upon the sum recovered or claimed, or the value of the subjectmatter involved," in a suit for a partnership accounting, where the summons gave notice that on default judgment would by taken for $65,000, and the complaint specified sums as received or invested by de. fendant's intestate, amounting to not less than $200,000, profits of the firm business, on dismissal of the case for

court, defendant caused to be published, in a newspaper published in the city where the court was sitting, a telegraph dispatch falsely stating that persons

failure to prove the fact of partnership, held, that onehalf of the $200,000 constituted the subject-matter involved, and that it was in the court's discretion to allow defendant extra costs accordingly. (2) The allow-named had made a wager that owing to the influence

ance of costs in difficult or extraordinary cases where a defense is made, under the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, § 3253, is reviewable on appeal to the General Term. Oct. 4, 1887. Adams v. Arkenburgh. Opinion by Danforth, J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

ACTION -CONTRACT-JOINT LIABILITY.- A contract executed and delivered the same day as the lease on the back of which it was written, was as follows: "In consideration of the letting of the premises in the foregoing instrument described, and for the sum of one dollar to me paid, I do hereby become surety for the punctual payment of the rent and performance of the covenants in said instrument mentioned, to be paid and performed by the second parties therein named; and if any default shall at any time be made therein, I do hereby promise and agree to pay unto Wallace A. Preston, one of the parties of the first part named in said instrument, the said rent and arrears thereof that may be due, and fully satisfy the condition of said instrument, and all dangers that may occur by reason of the non-fulfillment thereof, without requiring notice or proof of the demand being made. Witness my hand and seal this 5th day of January, 1885. Geo. W. Platt, Jr. [L. S.]" Held, the two instruments formed a joint obligation, and on default by the lessees, a joint action thereon could be maintained. It is plain that the contract of George W. Platt, Jr., is not one of guaranty. He binds himself in terms as a surety, and his undertaking is to pay the rent upon default. If the rent is not paid, he is at once liable. There is no possible contingency where the other defendants become liable to pay rent or damages, but he is also liable, and to the same full extent that they are. If they pay the rent the day it becomes due, and fully perform the covenants of the lease, there can exist no right of action against them on the part of the lessors. Only upon their default can suit be brought against them, and immediately upon such default George W. Platt's promise is the same as theirs, and his liability to the lessors is the same, and co-extensive with theirs. I can see no good reason why he cannot be sued jointly with the other two defendants for the rent due upon the lease and upon his contract. And his contract must be considered a part of the lease. It was executed the same day, under seal, and upon the same paper, as the lease, and delivered at the same time. It was in law executed at the same time as the lease. The whole contract - the lease, and his undertaking upon the back of the same

- took effect from a single delivery. The same consideration governed the undertaking of the three defendants, and their promise was in legal effect the same, a joint obligation. See Stage v. Olds, 12 Ohio 160; Leonard v. Sweetzer, 16 id. 1; Scott v. Swain, (Penn.) 8 Atl. Rep. 24; McLott v. Savery, 11 Iowa, 323; Watson v. Beabout, 18 Ind. 281; Smith v. Sheldon, 35 Mich. 42; Dye v. Mann, 10 id. 295. Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 6, 1887. Preston v. Huntingdon. Opinion by Morse, J.

CONTEMPT- INSINUATING THAT COURT WOULD BE CORRUPTLY INFLUENCED.- Defendant was a party to certain actions in the Supreme Court, known as the Smoke-House cases, all of which were of a similar character, aud part of which had been decided in his lavor. While a part of them were pending before the

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of adverse claimants, the Supreme Court would reverse its former decision in the Smoke-House cases. Held, a contempt at common law. The defendant disclaims in his affidavit any intention to treat the court with the slightest contempt in publishing said telegram; but the court is not bound by such disclaimer, but may inquire into the truth of the matter. "The meaning and intent of the defendant in publishing the dispatch must be determined by a fair interpretation of the language used." "The construction and tendency of the publication, as bearing upon its character as a contempt, are matters of law for the court." Henry v. Ellis, 49 Iowa, 205; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, and also numerous authorities cited in the latter case. The defendant says in his affidavit that in making the publication in the "Independent" he “intended no disrespect or improper conduct toward the court; but on the contrary, was prompted solely to so publish the same as an item of news, and apprise the court of what had transpired, that it might act in the premises as it saw proper." He further says that Murphy and Cannon were copartners in the real-estate business, and on that account interested in having the surface claimants succeed in said cases; that Murphy stated to him in substance and effect the facts published in the "Independent," and he was thus informed of the wager at the time he sent the dispatch. On the hearing of this case, the defendant voluntarily put himself upon the witness stand, and among other things swore that his object in sending that telegram was to have the thing generally discussed to have a chance to make wagers, as he was satisfied the decision would not be reversed." He further discloses the fact that Cannon and Murphy had made no wager at all, but that he had procured a simulated one to be made. It is seldom we find as many contradictions and as much falsehood in so short a record as the case before us contains. The dispatch itself is false. Cannon and Murphy had made no wager. Murphy had not informed him of the wager; he knew all about it himself. He says his sole purpose was to publish it as an item of news, and apprise the court of what had transpired, that it might act in the premises as it saw proper. Then again he says his purpose was to have the matter generally discussed, that he might have a chance to make wagers on the decision. We do not believe that any of the reasons given is the true one; but we will consider what the motive was. In the conversation he had with Murphy, the latter told him that the counsel for the claimants in the Smoke-House cases had developed some new points that he believed would cause the court to decide his suits then pending before it against him. In this is to be found the real motive that moved the defendant to send the telegram. In the words "that owing to the influence of some surface claimants on the Smoke-House lode the Supreme Court would reverse its former decision" lurks the insinuation that undue influence was being brought to bear upon the court by his adversaries in said suits. He expected in this way to make the public believe that Cannon & Murphy, a firm of real-estate dealers in the city of Butte, would not make a wager of $500 that some of the "surface claimants" would so influence the court that it would reverse its former decision, without having strong grounds for believing it was true. He intended, by sending the telegram to the "Independent,” and publishing it in the city where the court was then sitting, to reach the court. He says himself in his affidavit, that his purpose was to apprise the court of what had transpired, that it might act in the premises as it saw proper. He fabricated a false

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hood, attributed it to other parties, and published it, to apprise the court of what had transpired,— to influence its decision in the suits then pending before it in which he was a party. He hoped by informing the judges that it was believed that the defendants to the suits in which he was plaintiff were bringing influence to bear upon them so that they would reverse their former decision, to make them feel that they could not afford to do so, lest it would be said of them by the public that they had been induced by corruption to make such decision. His purpose to reach one of the judges, and to influence him to stand firm in his former holding, is as obvious as if he had sent the dispatch to each of them personally, instead of publishing it in a newspaper, where he knew they were bound to read it. If the telegram had been true, he might have been execused upon the ground of an honest motive. But what could have induced him to manufacture a falsehood, and send it, but a corrupt motive to influence the court? Must a court that sits to try causes be insulted by the very parties to the [suits which they are trying, by a covert and cowardly insinuation of official corruption, and have no power to punish such parties for contempt? To deprive them of such power is to take away from them the right of judicial self-defense. There can be no doubt but that his conduct is a contempt of court at common law. Mr. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Law, vol. 2, § 245, says: "And according to the general doctrine, any publication, whether by parties or strangers, relating to a cause in court, if it has a tendency to prejudice the public respecting its merits, and to corrupt the administration of justice * * may be visited as a contempt." In 2 Hawk. P. C. 220, contempts are classified as contempts in the face of the court, and contemptuous words or writings concerning the court. Blackstone says contempts may be committed " speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges acting in their judicial capacity, * * and by any thing, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority is entirely lost among the people." 4 Cooley, Bl. Com. 285. The Supreme Court of Illinois has defined contempts to be "direct," such as are offered in the presence of the court while sitting jndicially, or "constructive," such, though not in its presence, as tend by their operation to obstruct and embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice." Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. 395. And in this case the court held that such acts would be considered as done in its presence. Courts are organized for the administration of justice, and the whole doctrine of contempt grows out of the necessity of removing every obstruction in its way, by visiting summary punishment upon those who undertake to defeat it. The right to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of justice. It is a part of their very life, and a necessary incident to the exercise of judicial power. U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodb. & M. 407; State v. Johnson, 1 Brev. 155; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 416; Casat v. State, 40 Ark. 514; U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; State v. Doty, 90 Am. Dec. 674. In the case of Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. 395, the Supreme Court of Illinois say that "in the class of constructive contempts would necessarily be included all acts calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice." Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court. Contempts committed out of the court's presence are often held to have been constructively committed in its presence. It makes no difference whether the defendant was in Butte or Helena, in the courthouse in the presence of the court, or out of it; when he published the obnoxious dispatch, the authority to punish for it is equa!! clear at common law. Upon

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the right to punish for constructive contempt in England and America, see Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates, 441; Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319; Masters v. Edwards, 1 Caines, Term R. 515; Tenney's case, 3 Fost. 162. In the case of Neel v. State, 50 Am. Dec. 209, the court say: "This power extends at common law, not only to acts which directly and openly insult or resist the power of the court, or the purposes of the judges, but to consequential, indirect, and constructive contempts, which obstruct the process, degrade the authority, or contaminate the purity of the court." Mont. Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1887. Territory v. Murray. Opinion by McConnell, C. J.

CONTRACT- -COVENANT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE SALE OF LIQUOR ON PREMISES. A deed contained the clause, "No intoxicating liquors are to be sold ou said premises in less quantities than five gallons." Held, that the restriction was not such a restraint of trade as to make it invalid. It was one of the most ancient rules of the common law that all contracts in restraint of trade were void. We learn from the Year Books that this was considered as settled law in England as early as the year 1415; and its courts would not then tolerate the least infraction of this rule. It was enforced with much judicial severity, and doubtless grew out of the law of apprenticeship, under which no one in that country could earn a livelihood at any trade until after long service, and then he must continue in the one adopted by him, or have none. For 200 years the rule existed, without exception, that all contracts in restraint of trade were void. It was qualified however as the law of apprentices hip broadened; and a distinction was then drawn by the cases of Broad v. Jollyfe, 3 Cro. Jac. 596 and Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, between a general and a limited restraint of trade. Other decisions followed, until it became the settled English rule that while a contract not to do business anywhere is void, yet one stipulating not to do so in a particular place, or within certain limits, is valid. This has always been the rule in this country. The wisdom of the rule as qualified cannot be doubted. It is eminently suited to the genius of our institutions. It prevents the building up of monopolies, and the creation of exclusive privileges. Contracts in general restraint of trade produce them; they tend to destroy industry and competition in a country, thus enhancing prices, and diminishing the products of skill and energy; they impair the means of livelihood, and injure the public, by depriving it of the services of men in useful employments. The law therefore guards against these evils by declaring such contracts void. Pyke v. Thomas, 4 Bibb, 486. This reasoning however does not apply to such as impose but a special restraint; as not to carry on trade at a particular place, or with certain persons, or for a limited reasonable time. The party contracting is then left free to exercise his trade or transact business at other places, other times, and with other persous. Indeed, a particular trade may be promoted by being limited for a short period to a few persons, and the public benefited by preventing too many from engaging in the same calling at the same place. If therefore the limitation be a reasonable one, it will be upheld. Grundy v. Edwards, 7 J. J. Marsh. 368; Turner v. Johnson, 7 Dana, 435. The one now under consideration is so. It related to the use and occupation of the property. It was a covenant running with the land, and therefore effective against a tenant or assignee of the vendee; and the appellants were when enjoined, engaged in the willful violation of it. Steph. N. P. 1113. Ky. Ct. App., Oct. 13, 1887. Sutton v. Head. Opinion by Holt, J.

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the county board of supervisors to sell intoxicating liquors for mechanical, medicinal, culinary and sacramental purposes, sells beer by the keg, to be used in the manufacture of of a beverage known as "I. M. SodaWater," it is a violation of the permit. The statute is not designed merely to prevent intoxication, but the use to any extent of intoxicating liquor as a beverage. It is only in exceptional cases that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage results in intoxication. It is not usually drunk in sufficient quantity to intoxicate. But the sale of liquor to be used as a beverage is a violation of the law, regardless of the quantity in which it is to be used at one time, or the extent to which it is to be diluted. A large part of the evil attendant upon the use may be done, though the particular use may not result in intoxication. The habit and appetite may be formed. Evils are sometimes dangerous in proportion to their insidiousness. The name ** Soda-Water" has a very inoffensive sound, and might easily commend the drink to the inexperienced and unwary. We do not think the statute is designed to sanction the use of it as a beverage if it contains an intoxicating ingredient. The sale of the beer, in the case at bar, was a sale of it to be used as a beverage, and we are not able to see that the precise way in which it was to be used detracted much from ite objectionableness. The beer contained an intoxicating ingredient, and was capable of doing the injury of intoxicating liquor, in part at least, though so diluted that the use would not result directly in intoxication. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 6, 1887. State v. Yager. Opinion by Adams, C. J.

EVIDENCE-NEGLIGENCE-SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS.--In an action against a horse railroad company to recover damages for injuries sustained in a collision between one of its cars, on which the plaintiff was a passenger, and a hook and ladder truck of the fire department, it is not competent to show that directly after the accident brakes were put on this and other city trucks. The object of the evidence was to show that there was a defect in the truck, so that it could not be readily stopped. The materiality of this testimony is not obvious. The court held, in effect, that whether the truck was driven with care or not was only significant as bearing upon the question whether the accident was unavoidable; that it was no excuse for negligence on the part of the driver of the street car that those in charge of the truck were also negligent, or driving at a rapid rate. The principle is familiar that all persons who act together in committing a tort are jointly and severally liable therefor. So even if the collision was caused by the joint negligence of the driver of the street car and those in charge of the truck, still the defendant is responsible for the injury. Wis. Sup. Ct., Oct. 11, 1887. Heucke v. Milwaukee City Ry. Co. Opinion by Cole, C. J.

the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL at a later day. A copy of the programme will also be transmitted to each member of the association by mail.

A communication from Governor D. B. Hill was received, inviting the members of the association to a reception to be given them by him at the Executive Mansion on the evening of Jan. 17, 1888.

A resolution accepting Governor Hill's invitation was unanimously adopted. The secretary of the association was appointed a committee to wait on his excellency and present him a copy of the said resolution.

In view of the governor's reception, a resolution was adopted dispensing with the usual annual association dinner.

The members of the committee expressed themselves highly gratified with the exceedingly prosperous condition of the association, and in the very large addition to its membership during the past year.

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Conviction and sentence reversed and new trial granted-People v. Jacob Sharp-Opinion by Danforth, J., all concurring and a supplemental opinion was written by Peckham, J.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Ellen Urquhart, respondent, v. City of Ogdensburgh, appellant.-Judgment affirmed without costs -John J. Serviss, appellant-respondent, v. Lucy McDonnell, respondent-appellant, and others.—Order of General Term and Surrogate's Court reversed and letters revoked with costs, as expressed in the opinion In re Estate of ex-Gov. John B. Page, deceased.Order of General Term dismissing appeal reversed, and appeal ordered to be heard on the merits by that court-Ithaca Agricultural Works, appellant, v. Judah Eggleston, respondent, and Allen B. Eggleston, contestant.- -Judgment affirmed with costs-Charles L. Picket, appellant, v. Edward C. Bartlett and another, respondent,-Judgment of General Term modifying judgment entered in report of referee reversed, and that of referee affirmed with costs-Wm. B. Cooper, appellant, v. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, respondents. Judgments of courts below reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event -Jacob Miller, appellaut, v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, respondent.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide eveut-Agnes L. Reid, respondent, v. Samuel L. Mulford, appellant, and others.Judgments of General Term and Circuit Court reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-The Yew York Rubber Company, v. John Rotheroy and another, respondents.--Judgment affirmed with costs-Florence McPherson, respondent, v. Patrick Rollins and another, impleaded, etc., ap-

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE STATE BAR pellants. Judgment affirmed with costs-John W.

ASSOCIATION.

The committee charged with the duty of making arrangements for the next annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association, to be held in the Senate Chamber, Capitol, Albany, January 17 and 18, 1888, met in the rooms of the association, Capitol, on Mouday, Nov. 28.

The following members of the committee were present: Henry G. Danforth, Rochester; Matthew Hale, Albany: Wm. H. Arnoux, New York; A. T. Clearwater, Kingston; Hamilton Harris, Albany: Arthur L. Andrews, Albany; Charles R. Hall, Norwich.

Au interesting programme of the proceedings of the annual meeting was adopted, which will appear in

Gilbert, v. Henry S. Deshon, appellant, and another. -Judgment affirmed with costs-Sally M. Jeffers and another, appellants, v. Robert N. Jeffers, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Martha Albert, respondent, v. Delaware and Hudson Railroad Company, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs -John Greso, respondent, v. Benjamin J. Hall, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-The Discount and Deposit Bank of Clarence, respondent, v. Samuel F. Osterhoudt, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-George A. Manchester and another, respondents, v. Philip Braeudin, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Isabella Smith, appellant, v. City of Brooklyn, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Wm. W. Ensign and others, v.

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