some one president had succeeded in accomplishing the reform. So long as he remains in office, well and good; but the expiration of his term installs in his place a successor who may or may not share his own deep sense of its importance, and the reform is seen to be ephemeral.1 No. In order to guarantee its permanence, it must not merely represent the convictions of some one man, but must have its foundations laid deep in well-considered and far-reaching legislation. Says Mr. Curtis, in his Saratoga address: "In this country law is only formulated public opinion. Reform of the civil service does not contemplate an invasion of the constitutional prerogative of the president or the senate, nor does it propose to change the constitution by statute. The whole system of the civil service proceeds, as I said, from the president, and the object of the reform movement is to enable him to fulfil the intention of the constitution by revealing to him the desire of the country through the action of its authorized representatives. When the ground-swell of public opinion lifts congress from the rocks, the president will gladly float with it into the deep water of wise and patriotic action." But let us interrogate the other branch of the government, the legislative. 1 General Garfield, in his letter of acceptance, bore emphatic testimony to the fact that congress should "co-operate with the executive departments in placing the civil service on a better basis. Experience has proved that with our frequent changes of administration no system of reform can be made effective and permanent without the aid of legislation." - Macpherson's "Hand-book," ISSO, p. 193. 2 In the hearing before the Pendleton committee at Washington, last January, the question was asked: "If the executive branch of the government would take its own administration of public affairs into its own hands," and administer them with the courage of such convictions as you have, is there any need of legislation at all? - [Senate report, no. 872, 46th congress, 3d session, p. 42.] While the answer to this is obvious, bearing in mind the constitutional declaration, it remains that no president will in fact do this under existing circumstances. The pressure is too great. The same is true, not only of the fact that one president may be succeeded by another who will not carry out his work, but also of heads of departments. A notable instance is that of the Interior Department, which, under Secretary Cox and Secretary Schurz, had been attaining a high degree of efficiency. "Mr. Kirkwood" (to quote from the The Nation of May 5, 1SS1, p. 307-308), "when he came into office, found the new plan at work there, and thoroughly successful after four years' trial. But he was old; it was novel to him; he had never seen it or heard of it in politics; ' it seemed 'visionary' and 'literary;' so, without examining its operations for one week even, he abolished it and went back to the old, corrupt, demoralizing, dishonest, embezzling system of allowing congressmen to fill the places with their henchmen as a means of paying their political debts. He soon plunged the department into confusion, found himself overwhelmed with officeseckers, and is to-day a sadder and wiser man." It may be added that the levying of political assessments (which the Willis bill, already alluded to, seeks to abate) needs no less the specific legislation sought. The extent to which this abuse still flourishes even in the New York Custom Houseand Post Office is a striking confirmation of the fact. When a member of the House of Representatives, in 1872, Mr. Garfield said (Congressional Globe, Apr. 19, 1872, p. 2583), "Individual members of congress are no longer wholly responsible for this state of things, for they are also pressed by their political friends for help which, it is understood, they are able to render. It is hardly possible for any man in public life to escape this pressure." Senator Dawes, of Massachusetts, in a letter to the Springfield Republican, dated July 19, 1881, says: "No one can altogether escape responsibility for the existing state of things. The president has encouraged it, if not directly, certainly by recognizing and yielding to it." Congressman Robinson, of the same state, says (see Boston Advertiser, July 30, 1881): "I have no question at all that members of congress would welcome any change that would relieve them from participating in this matter." It appears, therefore, that neither of the two departments has felt equal to the responsibility of acting alone in this matter. But, it may be asked, have not matters improved since some of these declarations were written? Few will urge that the legislation of 1871 is sufficient and adequate, after examining the repeated appeals in the annual message of every president since that year, and of the other government officers friendly to reform, for farther legislation. In that act, particular methods, since seen to be wellnigh essential, were not specifically prescribed, and thus obstruction was made possible. But it may be supposed that since the competitive examinations, as conducted at New York and elsewhere, have proved themselves so abundantly effective, they may be extended to the other offices without legislation. On this point a recent statement of Mr. Eaton sheds important light, and shows that it is not to be expected: "The self-sacrificing labors of a few men of rare ability, patriotism, and experience, whose earnestness in the cause went beyond words, scorning alike the sarcasms of chieftains and high officials, alone made such results possible. It is too much to expect that their patriotic labors will be indefinitely continued. Such men are not likely to be found in every place where examinations will be needed. A great nation has no right to ask that private citizens as a charity, and the more self-sacrificing and devoted of its salaried subordinates working beyond office hours, -as have been the facts in the cases to which the learned senator has referred, shall carry on a great national reform unaided - unrecognized even - by the national congress, in order that its members may not have to perform a plain public duty at a time when, perchance, it might not be agreeable." [Letter in Springfield Republican, Oct. 7, 1881.] 1 See McPherson's "Hand-book of Politics." The fact that the president has an undoubted right to ask the opinion of a senator in the matter of an appointment, where he is certain that a candidate unknown to him is personally known to the senator, is not to be confused with an obligation to do so. In the early days of the republic, with the constitutional provision fresh in the public mind, the matter came before President Washington for action, and was promptly settled by him. "In 1794 it was rumored that President Washington contemplated appointing Alexander Hamilton to be minister to England. Mr. Monroe, who was the leader of his party in the senate, was opposed to this appointment, and wrote to the president, asking that he be granted a personal interview in regard to the matter. President Washington, with a wisdom and foresight that is wonderful, saw instantly the danger of establishing such a precedent." He refused to grant the interview, and, on the 9th of April, 1794, wrote as follows to Monroe: "If you are possessed of any facts or information which would disqualify Col. Hamilton for the mission to which you refer," I request "that you would be so obliging as to communicate them to me in writing. As I alone am responsible for a proper nomination, it certainly behoves me to name such a one as, in my judgment, combines the requisites for a mission so peculiarly interesting to the peace and happiness of this country." 3 For a time, as may well be imagined, the effect of this unmistakable deliverance from the executive, which must have cooled the air like a thunder-shower, was to put an end to any tendency towards the usurpation of executive powers by congress. Insidiously, however, it has gradually made itself 1 A legitimate and constitutional view of the matter is that which, according to the testimony of Congressman Stone, "Senator Edmunds of Vermont is said to per. mit to himself. His reputed rule of action is to take no notice of matters of executive appointment, unless the appointing power requests his advice in regard to a pending appointment." - Boston Advertiser, July 30, 1881. 2 For striking facts connected with this circumstance and others collected by Mr. John Jay, and furnished to the New York Tribune, see its issue of June 12, 1SSI. For a valuable study of the course the practice has taken, see the article by Senator G. F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, on "The appointing power," North American Review, Nov., ISSI, v. 133, p. 464-76. 3" Writings of George Washington," v. 10, р. 399-400. a recognized precedent under the name of the "courtesy of the senate;"1 and the advent of the civil-service reform discussion, fourteen years ago, found it not only securely intrenched, but a most formidable obstacle to any such reform. It is of no little interest now to notice that, in 1872, Gen. Garfield, then a member of congress, brought the force of his commanding intellect and profound knowledge of political history and development to bear upon this very matter in a characteristically able and convincing argument. In the light of this fact, it is not a matter of wonder that, on becoming president, he should, in the still unforgotten contest of last spring over the New York collectorship nomination, have given the "courtesy of the senate" its most telling blow. Whatever we may think as to the justifiable nature of this struggle, it was effective. It is in the light of this earlier position of his also that a passage in General Garfield's letter of acceptance, which has, we think, been somewhat misconstrued, should be understood: 1 It is somewhat remarkable that one of the most extreme statements of this perverted view should come from Gen. Grant. He said, June 12, 1881: "When the president makes an appointment in any state, and it fails to elicit the approval of the two senators from that state, the matter should end there, and the nomination be reected. If the Republican senators from any other state object to any nomination, the rest of the party is expected to support them in the matter without exception. The same is, of course, true of the Democrats." Providence Star, June 15, 1881. 2 Congressional Globe, April 19, 1872, p. 2583. See also his language in the magazine article elsewhere referred to :"The evil has been greatly aggravated by the passage of the tenure of office act of 1867, whose object was to restrain President Johnson from making removals for political cause. But it has virtually resulted in the usurpation by the senate of a large share of the appointing power. The president can remove no officer without the consent of the senate; and such consent is not often given, unless the appointment of the successor nominated to fill the proposed vacancy is agreeable to the senator in whose state the appointee resides. Thus, it has happened that a policy inaugurated by an early president has resulted in seriously crippling the just powers of the executive, and has placed in the hands of senators and representatives a power most corrupting and dangerous." "I affirm that this present custom is an apostasy from the original policy of the government, an apostasy alarming in its character, and that the chief reason why a reform in the civil service is required is that the three powers, or particularly the two powers of the government, the legislative and the executive, may be restored to their independence, may be left unawed and uninfluenced by the pressure of personal dictation and control." - Atlantic Monthly, July, 1877, v. 40, p. 61. 3 The theory as to his action in this matter, suggested by a recent correspondent of The Nation, deserves consideration; but it should be remembered that this can, at best, be only a matter of speculation. The correspondent says: "Thoroughness in the mastery of every situation in which he was placed was a leading trait." - "Are we not to believe that he made himself master of that situation in which be found himself placed with reference to the spoils system when he came to be president?""In his secret purpose, thinking his way along, with light dawning on him as he went, independent of popular criticism," "he cleared the way of the most forinidable obstacle to civil-service reform." - "In doing so, he took the risk of not being understood in case of failure; but he risked his reputation for the sake of the people." The Nation, Oct. 13, 1881, p. 293. "To select wisely from our vast population those who are best fitted for the many offices to be filled, requires an acquaintance far beyond the range of any one man. The executive should, therefore, seek and receive the information and assistance of those whose knowledge of the communities in which the duties are to be performed best qualifies them to aid in making the wisest choice."। He by no means recognized in this declaration the right of congress to invade his prerogative. Indeed, in another part of the letter, he expressly disclaims that very thing. Nevertheless, what was the case on his accession to office? His time was seized upon and monopolized by applicants for office and members of the government, engaged in pressing the claims of candidates. The Nation says: "It was not work imposed on him by the constitution or the laws. It contributed nothing to the improvement of the administration or of any other public interest. It did not tend to promote the public welfare in any manner whatever.” "Now, in what did this work consist? What was it? Simply the work of listening to arguments in favor of giving some hundreds of small offices, which were not vacant, to a few thousand insignificant and obscure persons who had discovered that they were unable to make a decent livelihood in any of the ordinary pursuits of active American life. It was to this class - one of the least important and least worthy of the community - that he made the tremendous sacrifice of health and strength to which all the newspapers called attention during his first four months of office." It is, then, one reason, and by no means an unimportant one, why the proposed reform is "not unnecessary;” that "congress," to use the recent language of a newspaper writer, " is part of the thing to be reformed;" and the measneed to receive, by this legislation, "that essential strength and stability which only the approval of congress can impart." 2 ures 1 McPherson's "Hand-book," 1880, p. 193. 2 "Report of Pendleton committee," p. 12. |