CHAPTER VII.

IT IS NOT DESTRUCTIVE.

An intelligent and acute observer in writing on the subject of government, ten years ago,1 called needed attention to the extent to which the well-being of the people may be made to depend upon " improvement," in the matters alluded to, more" than even in what are called great reforms."

There is much truth and sound sense in this observation, and one which lies at the foundation of the most intelligent support which the present movement has. Destructive legislation, while it may have a glamour for unthinking minds, has never commended itself to the intelligence of English-speaking people, either in this country or Great Britain. It is for this reason that a plain, moderate, businesslike measure, like the one now urged, has to meet the criticism not only of those to whom such measures are not at all welcome, but also of those who demand some more striking, perhaps revolutionary step. It is, however, fortunate that only a small minority is represented by "the impatient reformer who troubles himself with nothing short of some grand enactment sweeping the whole field at once, and passing into history under some great name, as celebrated English statutes do, all-comprehensive and all-powerful for regeneration and reformation." (Letter of Senator Dawes, to the Springfield Republican, dated July 27, 1881.) There are several reasons why the movement is to be regarded as constructive rather than destructive, and as comprehending the various elements which go to make a stable and well-balanced enactment. And, first, it does not leave out of consideration the historical experience; for a plan of constructing systems of government which should leave out of account the teachings of history would be short-sighted indeed. The suggestive writer just quoted, remarks in another place, "History is the chart and compass for national endeavor. Our early voyagers are dead;" were it not for the history of these voyages contained in "hoarded lore of all kinds, each voyager, though he were to start with all the aids of advanced civilization (if you could imagine such a thing without history), would need the boldness of the first voyager."1

Other nations have had similar abuses to remove, have grappled with them, and have risen above them. The present German empire owes its efficient administration to the fact that in the early part of the century Baron Stein "secured the gratitude, and, in large measure, the greatness of his country, by three great measures of administrative reform," - among them, that of the "constitution of the supreme administrative departments." 2 Competitive examinations are in force in most of the leading European government services. The French system of consular service, for example, has been so admirably efficient that it has remained unchanged for nearly fifty years. It is, of course, the efforts made in England which appeal most strongly to our interest and attention, and it is a fact of no little significance, as showing the careful account which those who most clearly see the need of the reform in this country have taken of the experience which other countries furnish, that out of the work of the United States Civil Service Commission during the past ten years has grown the most comprehensive addition to the literature of the British experience. No extended reference is necessary here to a subject which has been so comprehensively treated

1 in Mr. Eaton's admirable volume. In brief, it may be said that "it must be apparent how wide and varied, in Great Britain and India, is the field of official life, political activity, and personal ambition and jealousy, which is now dominated by the reform methods. They extend to all but a very few of the highest places for the exercise of the appointing power of the crown. They are supreme through almost the whole vast range of what was, for generations, the patronage of the treasury and of members of parliament, a patronage which was as much greater than that of our heads of departments and members of congress, as their authority would be greater if the entire legislative and executive power of the states was made a part of the federal jurisdiction. The merit system, therefore, with its tests of character and capacity, and its claims of justice and principle against favoritism and partisanship, has achieved a victory over patronage as seductive and universal; has suppressed opportunities of intrigue and corruption as varied and numerous; has overthrown a tyranny of partisan and official influence as pervading and powerful, as would be involved in this country in a struggle which should draw to itself every selfish and partisan element; all the offices and gains; all the intrigue and influence; all the hopes and fears of a presidential campaign, of senatorial contests, and of elections for governors, united into one grand issue, dependent upon a single national vote at the polls."1

In the next place, it is constructive because it does not shut its eyes to the peculiar and individual circumstances of our own nation. The historical experience of other countries is to be studied and availed of, but not necessarily to be transferred bodily. It is for the very reason (as was shown at the beginning of this discussion) that the reform is essentially democratic in its nature, that, at certain points, its better adaptedness to American than to English institutions will call for a replacing of some of the features of the English plan by improved methods. Sir Arthur Helps, also, whom we have already quoted, enlarged upon the inadequacy of competitive examinations alone to bring the "fittest men" into the service of the government.1 But the plea which he so earnestly makes is answered by the supplementary principle of probationary appointments, an essential and most vital principle in the bill now proposed in this country,2 but not, at the time Sir Arthur was writing (1871), fully established in the enactments of the British system. An examination of the American legislation, and especially of the bill now proposed, will show an intelligent and. statesman-like aim to construct it on the basis of the underlying principles of the American political system.

3

Again, it is constructive for the reason that the proposed enactment disturbs existing legislation to the least degree possible, and, in fact, may be described as essentially complementary to these enactments. As has already been indicated, the legislation of 1871 "will remain in force so far as consistent with this" bill now proposed. Nor is it simply an attempt to avoid destructive legislation by thus conforming to the obvious methods of supplementing the former acts; but the closing section (Sect. 7) shows a painstaking research, on the part of its framers, to avoid any unwitting and unforeseen clashing with existing laws. Nor does it avoid destructive methods alone in its general theory and scope; but, descending to each individual sub-office in which its provisions may be put in force, its method is not to sweep aside at one blow the whole organization; but, after a certain specified date, beginning at the lowest grade, the new element is introduced, which is gradually to per

meate the mass. (Pendleton bill, Sect. 6.) The framers of the bill thus recognize the value of time and patience as elements in any permanent and substantial construction; and not less in the fact already indicated,1 that the measure, as a whole, is moderate rather than sweeping; and, as regards the scope of its operations, begins with those government offices only to which the provisions can at first be most practically applied.

But if the reform may not with truth be described as destructive, what shall be said of the partisan system which it aims to replace? Can any possible theory of civil-service reform be so utterly destructive as this principle, avowed by a former government-officer? "I believe that when the people vote to change a party administration they vote to change every person of the opposite party who holds a place, from the president of the United States to the messenger at my door." (Quoted in Mr. Curtis' Saratoga address.) Mr. Schurz, in an address made in 1876, presented it in very forcible language:

"Imagine that, in this year of the great centennial anniversary, some of the wise men of this republic - Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton - could rise from their graves in order to ascertain by tour of inspection what had become of their work in these hundred years. Of course we would have to show them our civil service; and would it not make them stare? We would have to explain to them how, nowadays, things are managed; how, on the accession of a new president, the whole machinery of government is taken to pieces, all at once, to be rebuilt again out of green materials, in a hurry; how 60,000 or 70,000 or 80,000 officers are dismissed, without the least regard to their official merits or usefulness, simply because they do not belong to the party, to make room for a 'new deal."

Or, to quote another authority: "At the end of each four years the entire federal patronage (amounting to one hundred and ten thousand offices) is collected in one lot," which the President, when elected, is "compelled to distribute to his party." "No nation can withstand a strife among its own people, so general, so intense, and so demoralizing. No contrivance so effectual to embarrass government, to disturb the public peace, to destroy political honesty, and to endanger the common security, was ever before invented."2