as there was no proof of actual damage. Weller v. Eames (Minn.), 150.

CARRIERS.

1. Liability for baggage received for transportation. — The plaintiff was a passenger on defendants' road, but had lost her trunk while traveling over a connecting road. A few days after a conductor on the connecting road found the trunk, and left it in charge of the defendants' baggage master, stating the facts, and requesting him to forward it to plaintiff, which he agreed to do. Nothing was said about freight, nor whether the trunk should go by the freight or passenger train. The trunk being lost, held, that the defendants were liable for its value. Wilson v. Grand Trunk Railway (Me.), 23.

2. Duty to carry all freight without preference. - The defendants contracted with the Eastern Express Company to give the latter a certain share in the baggage and mail car attached to passenger trains for the carriage of their goods, and agreed not to let any similar space in any car attached to passenger trains to any other persons or express carriers during the continuance of the contract. Plaintiffs, another express company, offered packages to be transported on defendants' passenger trains, which the defendants refused to receive or transport. Held, that defendants were liable to plaintiffs for such refusal. New England Express Co. v. Maine Central R. R. Co. (Me.), 31.

2. Liability of, for willful misconduct of servants: measure of damage.-The plaintiff, a passenger in defendants' railway car, gave up his ticket to a brakeman, who was authorized to demand and receive it. Shortly after the latter approached plaintiff, denied that he had received his ticket, and assaulted and grossly insulted him. In an action against the railway company to recover damages, held, that the defendants were liable, and that plaintiff could recover exemplary damages. (Tapley, J., dissented on the question of damages.) Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. (Me.), 39.

3. The defendants having retained the brakeman in their employ after notice of his conduct, the court refused to set aside as excessive a verdict for $4,850. Ib. 4. Express companies: liability of.-The defendants were an express company, engaged in transmitting from place to place goods for hire, having at different points local agents whose duty it was to receive goods transmitted and deliver the same to the consignee, as well as to receive goods for transmission, having no vehicles or other means of transportation except at their local offices for local purposes, but transmitting goods, in charge of their messengers, by steamboats, railroads, coaches, etc., owned and controlled by other parties. Plaintiff's agent delivered to them goods for transportation, taking a receipt, in which it was stipulated that the defendants were not to be held liable for any loss or damage except as forwarders only, nor for perils of navigation and transportation. The steamboat on which the goods were being transported, in consequence of the negligence of those in charge, ran upon a snag and was sunk, thereby injuring the goods. In an action to recover the damage, held, that the defendants were common carriers, not forwarders, and, as such, liable for the loss, notwithstanding the terms of the receipt, which could not cover losses arising from negligence. Christenson v. The American Express Co. (Minn.), 122.

5. Liability for non-delivery to connecting line. – While in the absence of a special agreement, a carrier

is only liable to the extent of his route, and for safe storage and delivery to the next carrier, yet if he store the goods in his own warehouse at the end of his line, without delivery or notice, or attempt to deliver to the next carrier, his liability as a carrier will continue. Lawrence v. The Winona and St. Peter's R. R. Co. (Minn.), 130.

6. The defendants-common carriers-received for transportation from a connecting carrier, goods marked for M., a point beyond their line. On the arrival of the goods at W., the terminus of defendants' line, they were stored in their warehouse, where they were destroyed by fire. Some time previously the defendants, for the purpose of increasing the business of their road by drawing off the freight for M., from another road to M., connecting with their road at an intermediate point, had agreed with P., another carrier, that they would deliver to him all freight consigned to M., provided he would convey it regularly and at certain rates from W. to M., and, in pursuance of this agreement, it was their custom to store all such freight in their warehouse until a load accumulated, when P. would send a team and take it. The plaintiffs' goods were so stored at the time of their destruction; but no notice thereof was given to P. nor to the consignee. In an action to recover the value of the goods, held, that the defendants were liable as common carriers. Ib.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Taxation: exemption from by statute, not in nature of contract. The legislature passed an act exempting from taxation all property used for the purpose of manufacturing salt, and offering a bounty of ten cents a bushel for salt manufactured in the State. Two years later the said act was amended by limiting the exemption from taxation to five years. The five years having elapsed, the complainant, a corporation for the manufacture of salt, organized after the passage of the original act, filed a bill to restrain the collection of a tax upon their property, on the ground that the exemption from taxation was in the nature of a contract between the State and the parties acting under it, and therefore protected by the United States constitution. Held, that the act was not in the nature of a contract, and could be amended or repealed at any time. East Saginaw Manufacturing Co. v. City of East Saginaw (Mich.), 82.

2. Act compensating owners of sheep killed by dogs. — A statute provided that any person suffering loss by reason of the maiming, killing or worrying of his sheep by dogs may present proof of the nature and extent of his damages to the selectmen of the town, who shall draw an order for the amount in his favor upon the treasurer of the town, and thereupon the town may recover of the owner of the dog the full amount of such order. Held, to be unconstitutional, in so far as it undertook to bind the owner of the dog by the decision of the selectmen fixing the amount of the damage without giving him an opportunity to be heard on the question. Held, further, that the town could nevertheless recover, under the statute, from the owner of the dog the actual damage which the jury who try the cause find the owner of the sheep to have suffered, not exceeding the amount of the order drawn by the selectmen. East Kingston v. Towle (N. H.), 174.

3. Evidence tending to prove that the dog had killed or worried sheep before is inadmissible in such action. Ib.

CONTRACT.

1. When void for mental unsoundness of party to. A. having a life estate in certain lands, and owning stock thereon, conveyed the same to defendant on condition that he should support her for life, which he did. After her death her executor brought action to recover for use and occupation of the lands and for value of the property, alleging that the conveyance was void, A. being mentally imbecile at the time it was made. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover in the absence of bad faith or fraud on the part of the defendant. Young v. Stevens (N. H.), 202.

2. Entirety: not to be performed within a year: statute of frauds. On the 1st of January plaintiff made a parol contract with defendant to sell him all the wood upon a certain lot, at five dollars a cord, and to deliver as much thereof as he could that winter, and the balance the winter and year following, the defendant to pay on demand for amount delivered at the close of each winter's delivery. Plaintiff delivered a portion of the wood that winter, which was accepted and paid for; the remainder he delivered the winter and spring following, but defendant refused to accept or pay for it. Held, that the contract was entire; that the delivery and acceptance of the first part took the case out of the statute of frauds; and that it was not a contract which was not to be performed within one year from the making of it, within the meaning of the statute. Gault v. Brown (N. H.), 210.

1. Certificate of, prima facie evidence: mandamus.· The relator received from the proper officer a certificate of his election to the office of district clerk of M. county; he subsequently took the oath, gave and filed the bond required by law, and then demanded of the respondent - the former clerk, whose term of office had expired, and who was in possession-the seal, records, books, papers, etc., belonging to said office. The respondent answered that the relator, being a nonresident of the State, was ineligible to the office, and therefore not legally elected. Held, that the relator was entitled to a mandamus. State v. Sherwood (Minn.), 116.

2. A certificate of election is prima facie evidence of title, and the court will not go behind it in proceedings for a mandamus. Ib.

EVIDENCE.

Evidence of parol contemporaneous agreement to revoke written instrument inadmissible.-In an action for goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff gave in evidence a written order for the goods, signed by the defendant, and proved that they were delivered according to the terms of such order. The defendant thereupon offered to prove that at the time said order was made, as an inducement thereto, plaintiff verbally agreed with defendant that the latter might revoke the order during the summer and not take the goods, and that during the summer, and before the delivery of the goods, he did revoke said order. Held, that such offer was properly rejected. Wemple v. Knopf (Minn.), 147.

FIRE INSURANCE.

Condition in policy: non-payment of premium note.A policy, the premium for which had been paid by note, contained a provision that, in case the note should not be paid at maturity, the full amount of the premium should be considered as earned, and the policy become void while said past due notes remained overdue and unpaid; a loss occurred after the maturity of the note and before it was paid. Held, that the company was not liable for any loss which occurred during the continuance of the default, but that, on the subsequent payment of the note, the policy revived and was in force from the date of such payment. Williams v. The Albany City Ins. Co. (Mich.), 95.

FOREIGN LAWS.

1. Contracts tending to violate laws of foreign country: proof of foreign laws. - Plaintiff and defendant, in pursuance of an agreement to that effect, went to Canada in 1864 for the purpose of procuring men to be enlisted in the United States army, and, before going, and also while there, plaintiff loaned to defendant money to pay his expenses. In an action to recover such money, held, that the contract, having for its object the violation of a law of Canada, was void, and that the plaintiff could not recover. Hall v. Costello (N. H.), 207.

2. In proof of the laws of a foreign country, the testimony of any person, whether a professed lawyer or not, who appears to the court to be well informed on this point, is competent. Ib.

3. Presumption as to.- In the absence of evidence the presumption is that the laws of another State conform in substance to the general principles of the common law. Ellis v. Maxson (Mich.), 81.

HIGHWAY.

Notice of defect in.- In an action against a town to recover for injuries caused by a defect in a highway, the question whether notice to the town of the existence of the defect can be inferred from the length of time it has continued is a question for the jury. Colley v. Inhabitants of Westbrook (Me.), 30.

(To be continued.)

DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. The following decisions of the court of appeals were handed down on the 5th inst:

Judgments affirmed with costs-Florence v. Hopkins and another; Higgins v. The Watervliet Turnpike Co.; Lowry and ano. v. Inman; The Ocean National Bank v. Olcott and ano.; Holden v. The Putnam Fire Insurance Co.; Duffy v. O'Donevan et al.; Hough et al. v. The American Baptist Mission Union; Richardson v. The N. Y. Central Railroad Co.; Ross v. Ackerman, impleaded, etc.; Hoffman v. Hoffman; Crocker v. Colwell, impleaded, etc.; People ex rel. Dunkirk and Fredonia Railroad Co. v. Cassity, etc., as assessors, etc. Judgments affirmed without costs-Lanel v. Van Wagener; Lanel v. Van Wagener.

Judgments reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Drew v. Swift; Hall v. Lauderdale; Grant, survivor, etc., v. Smith; Hart v. Messenger and o'rs; Hamilton and ano. v. Douglass; Madison Avenue Baptist Church v. The Baptist Church in Oliver street; Etna National Bank of New York v. The Fourth National Bank.

Judgment of general term reversed, and that of special term affirmed with costs The National Park

versies are quite at an end, for, by the statute 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 10, explained by 29 Car. II, c. 30, it is enacted that the surplusage of intestates estates (except of femes covert, which are left as at common law) shall," etc. I am unable to see what the statute of frauds had to do with the question.

Bacon, in his abridgement edition, 1793, vol. I, page 289, uses the following language: "But choses in action, as debt due to the wife by obligation, etc., which are to be demanded by action, though they are likewise so far vested in the husband that he may reduce them into possession; yet, if he dies before any alteration

Order of general term of superior court affirmed with costs-People ex rel. Perkins v. Hawkins, supervisor, etc.

Order granting new trial affirmed, and judgment absolute for the defendant, with costs pursuant to stipulation - Bank of Albion v. Burns and another.

Judgment affirmed with costs as to Leonard-Dixon v. Palmer, and judgment of superior court reversed and judgment on report of referee affirmed against Stephens with costs, deducting $130.08 from the original. Judgment to correct error of referee in computation.— Dabeny et al. v. Stephens and ano., impleaded, etc.

Judgment affirmed with costs to respondent, to be paid by the plaintiff from the estate of the testator. White and ano., ex'rs, etc., v. American Colonization Society, impleaded; White and ano., ex'rs, etc., v. Trustees of the Board of Domestic Missions; White and ano., ex'rs, v. American Tract Society, impleaded,

etc.

Judgment reversed, new trial granted, cost to abide event, unless the defendant within thirty days after notice of this judgment consents to the entry of a judgment against him for $6,453.67, with costs in the court below and in this court, and in that event the judgment thus modified, affirmed-Currie and ano. v White.

Judgment of general term reversed, and that on report of referee affirmed with costs-Childs v. Smith. Judgment reversed and judgment for the people, adjudging that the relator was not duly elected to the office, and that the act of the legislature extending the term of office of the defendant was unconstitutional and void, and that neither the relator nor defendant were entitled to the office, without costs to either party against the other - People ex. rel. Fowler and o'rs. v. Bull.

CORRESPONDENCE.

DISTRIBUTION OF A WIFE'S PERSONAL ESTATE.
ANGELICA, August 29, 1871.

Editor of Law Journal:
Dear Sir After I wrote to you on the 26th instant,
my attention was more particularly drawn to the last
clause of section 79, which reads: "As they are entitled
by the rules of the common law." It struck me the
revisers of 1830 had made a mistake in saying that the
husband's right was derived from the common law.

The only authority for this expression I was able to find was in Chitty's Blackstone, vol. I, page 435, in which this language is used: "And the right of the husband not only to administer, but also to enjoy exclusively, the effects of his deceased wife depends still on this doctrine of the common law, the statute of frauds declaring only that the statute of distributions does not extend to this case. But now these contro

without such alteration, survive to the husband upon the death of the wife, or he have any right to them, but as he is entitled as administrator to his wife." He then refers in a note to 1 Rob. Abr. 910, and the statute of Charles, etc.

The twenty-ninth section of the act referred to in my former letter, and which is unrepealed by the act of 1867, is: "A husband, as such, if otherwise competent according to law, shall be solely entitled to administration on the estate of his wife, and shall give bond as other persons, but shall be liable, as administrator, for the debts of his wife only to the extent of the assets received by him. If he shall not take out letters of administration on her estate, he shall be presumed to have assets in his hands sufficient to satisfy her debts, and shall be liable therefor; and if he shall die leaving any assets of his wife unadministered, they shall pass to his executors or administrators as part of his personal estate, but shall be liable for her debts to her creditors, in preference to the creditors of the husband."

In 1853 an act was passed exempting the husband from liability for his wife's debts, except so far as he had assets from her, but that does not affect the question. The decision of the general term reversing the decree of the surrogate in the case referred to involves the absurdity of giving the wife's property to the administrator of the husband, in case of his death; while it excludes him, if living, from any enjoyment thereof. Yours respectfully, J. G. COLLINS.

THE ALABAMA CLAIMS.

The following circular has been issued from the State department:

}

"DEPARTMENT OF STATE, "WASHINGTON, August, 1871. "Claimants who have not already filed in the department of State their claims against Great Britain, growing out of the acts committed by the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generally known as the Alabama claims, are requested to do so without delay, in order that they may be taken into account in presenting the aggregate claims of the United States to be brought before the tribunal of arbitration which is to meet in Geneva in the month of December next. It will not be necessary for claimants who have already filed their claims, sustained by proofs, to take any steps under this notice, unless they may have additional proof to file. No papers already filed can be withdrawn. Claimants must prepare for themselves the proof of their claims. This department will, on application, forward to claimants a copy of the treaty and a circular showing the form of proof that is advised by the department in the absence of all rules by the tribunal which will pass on the same. The early atten

tion of claimants who have not already filed their claims is invited to this notice.

"HAMILTON FISH, Secretary."

The following notice has also been given by the State department, namely:

"Notice is hereby given that by the terms of the

treaty concluded on the 8th day of May, 1871, between the United States and Great Britain, all claims on the part of corporations, companies or private individuals, citizens of the United States, upon the government of her Britannic majesty, arising out of acts committed against the persons or property of citizens of the United States during the period between the 13th of April, 1861, and the 9th of April, 1865, inclusive, not being claims growing out of the acts of the vessels referred to in Article 1 of said treaty, generally known as the Alabama claims and which yet remain unsettled, are referred to three commissioners to meet in Washington for the examination, investigation and decision of such claims, as well as like claims on the part of her Britannic majesty upon the government of the United States. By the terms of said treaty, all such claims, whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice of, made, referred, or laid before, said commission, shall, from and after the conclusion of the proceedings of said commission, be considered and treated as finally settled and barred, and thenceforth inadmissible.

"Robert S. Hall, Esq., of New York, has been appointed, under said treaty, agent of the United States, to present and support the claims on its behalf, and to answer the claims made upon it, and to represent it generally in all matters connected with the investigation and decision thereof before the said commission. "Corporations, companies or private individuals, citizens of the United States, having claims against the government of her Britannic majesty, and coming within the terms of the above-recited provisions of the treaty, are requested forthwith to send to the agent above named, at the department of state, Washington, D. C., a statement of their respective claims, showing the name and residence of the claimant, the nature and amount of the claim, with a brief general statement of the time, place and circumstances of the transaction out of which the claim arose. It will be understood that the statement so invited is preliminary merely, and does not preclude the necessity of a subsequent formal memorial or statement, to be presented in conformity with such rules or regulations as the commission, on its organization, may prescribe. It is provided by the treaty that the commissioners shall meet at the earliest convenient period after they shall have been respectively named. It is expected that they will meet during the ensuing month of September. "HAMILTON FISH, Secretary."

tion. There are not a dozen lawyers in the country who take, or have access to outside of State libraries -complete sets of the current American and English reports. The number of these reports is so large as to render it a very heavy burden, pecuniarily, to take

them, and life is too short to justify an examination

of all of their contents. With the aid of this digest a lawyer engaged in the examination of a question, or in the preparation of a case for argument, can very easily ascertain the current of adjudications on the subject outside of his own State, and avail himself of all the cases. The plan and execution of this volume are exceedingly good; indeed the arrangement — the rock on which so many digests founder-could hardly be better.

Is it not about time that these twenty-eight volumes were recast and consolidated into one work? It would

certainly be a great convenience to the profession; and

although the expense attending the consolidation would be large, we should suppose that its increased popularity and sale would justify the attempt.

A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union. By Thomas M. Cooley, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Michigan, and Jay Professor of Law in the University of Michigan. Second edition, with considerable additions, giving the results of the recent cases. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1871.

Illinois Reports, vol. LI, by Norman L. Freeman, Reporter. Springfield, 1871.

The most important decisions in this volume are the three or four growing out of the act to establish a park in the city of Chicago, and involving the question, whether the legislature has power to compel a municipal corporation to incur debts for local improvements without its consent. The act providing for the establishment of the park appointed a board of commissioners, and authorized this board to procure lands to be paid for by the bonds of the city, to be issued by the mayor, etc., on demand of the commissioners. The mayor, etc., refused to issue the bonds, and a mandamus was sought. The court refused the mandamus on the ground that the consent of the corporation was necessary to its incurring indebtedness of the kind.

Some of our readers may remember that a strenuouseffort was made last winter by certain interested parties to have Mr. Freeman ousted from the reportership, or else to render his office a profitless one. We are glad to believe-though without information on the subject that the attempt was a failure. He is a thoroughly good reporter, and the laborer in such a field is justly entitled to all the income that he is likely to reap from his labors.

BOOK NOTICES.

United States Digest. Vol. XXII. By P. F. Burnham, Counselor at law. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1871.

This volume-the twenty-eighth of the United States Digest proper, and the twenty-second of the annual series contains an abstract of the decisions rendered in the courts of common law, equity and admiralty in the United States and in England during the year 1868. The general merits of the series is, or ought to be, so well known as to render unnecessary any commenda

BOOKS RECEIVED.

We have received the following books, which will be noticed at length at an early day:

A Manual of the Laurs of Fixtures, by John Ward
Hill, LL. B. Second edition, revised and en-
larged. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1871.
A Treatise on the Common and Civil Law, as embraced
in the Jurisprudence of the United States, by W.
M. Archer Cocke, author of the Constitutional
History of the United States. New York: Baker,
Voorhis & Co., 1871.

Maryland Reports, Vol. XXXIII, by J. Schaaff Stockett, State reporter. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1871.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1871.

THE MINORITY REPORT OF THE REVISION COMMISSION.

The most important legislation of the last twenty years, so far as law reform is concerned, was the act of 1870, providing for a revision of the statute law of this State, and it is greatly to be regretted that the commissioners appointed under that act have been unable to harmonize their views as to the manner in which the work was to be performed. We have heretofore published in this journal the substance of the report of the majority of the commissionMessrs. Throop and Parker; and, also, the report of Mr. Waterbury, the dissenting member. Mr. Parker has retired from the commission since that report was made, and Mr. Stebbins has been appointed to fill the vacancy. As the retirement of Judge Parker left the commission equally divided, it is a matter of more than ordinary interest to know to which side Mr. Stebbins will adhere.

We purpose in this article to notice briefly some of the objections raised by Mr. Waterbury to the plan of the majority. We have no hope or desire to exhaust the subject, but shall return to it again here

after.

Two things are patent upon the face of Mr. Waterbury's report-first, that the breach in the commission is of a character altogether too serious to justify a very strong hope for reconciliation; and, second, that the report itself was not prepared with that care and regard to logic that we should have expected at the hands of its author; and the latter point is the more remarkable, from the fact that the minority report was made some three months subsequent to that of the majority, and after the latter had been debated by the entire commission long and anxiously.

But, by marshaling the arguments that Mr. Waterbury has presented, there appear to be three principal objections to the majority report, which may be stated thus, in the order of their apparent importance:

I. That the majority propose to amend existing statutes to such an extent as to exceed the powers granted to them by the act under which they were appointed.

II. That the amendments which they propose to make are of such a character as to assure the opposition of powerful interests, which, by applying the usual means of influencing the legislature, will defeat the proposed revision.

III. That the writer has an insurmountable object to the use of the word "code" as a designation of the principal or primary divisions of the revision, and incidentally to there being any primary divisions except the chapters.

Of these we will speak in the order stated. That there may be an honest difference of opinion as to the scope of the act providing for the revision, and of the powers of the commission under it, we can very well understand, but that the majority of the commission design deliberately to exceed their powers and thereby violate the law no one can for a moment believe; and yet this is the impression conveyed-no doubt unintentionally-by Mr. Waterbury's report. On page 3 of his printed report he says: "In my opinion such amendments should be restricted to those which are expressly authorized by the act under which we were appointed; while my associates think that they should be upon a more comprehensive basis." Again, on page 4, after denying that "a large portion of the legal profession and the general public' expect us to report a series of codes," he says: "I could not believe that reasonable men expect us to depart from the instructions of the legislature; but if any do, I deem it better to disappoint them than virtually to disobey the statute from which all our powers are derived." And again, on page 7, he says: "In dissenting from the report of my associates, I am not forgetful of the general rule that the majority should control, and that the office of the minority is to accept the result. This rule, however, loses its force when a principle is involved; and I hold the duty of obedience to the law under which we were appointed to be matter of principle."

Now, the obvious purport of all this language is, that Messrs. Throop and Parker, for certain reasons, had deliberately planned to disobey the statute. Of course, we do not say or suppose that Mr. Waterbury meant this, but the language chosen conveys the impression.

But, passing this by, let us examine Mr. Waterbury's first objection on its merits. The act of 1870, chapter 33, provides in substance as follows:

1. The commissioners are to "revise, simplify, arrange and consolidate all statutes," etc.

2. They are (1) to bring together all statutes and parts of statutes, etc.; (2) to omit redundant and obsolete enactments; (3) to make such alterations as may be necessary to reconcile contradictions, supply the omissions, and amend imperfections of the original text; (4) to arrange the revision under suitable divisions and subdivisions.

3. They are to suggest to the legislature (1) the contradictions, omissions and imperfections of the original text and the modes in which they have reconciled, supplied and amended the same; (2) "such statutes or parts of statutes as in their judgment ought to be repealed, with their reasons for such repeal;" and (3) they "may also recommend the passage of new acts as such repeal may in their judgment render necessary.”

It seems to us that this is about as broad a commission as could be given. It is in fact even broader than that given to the original revisers by the act of April 21, 1825 (5 Edmonds' Stat. at Large, 497), for