that the defendant was not liable for the fifty dollars in money, having fulfilled the requirements of statute by posting notice that he would not be liable for money, jewels or ornaments, unless deposited with him for safe-keeping. Held, further, that the defendant was liable for the value of watch and chain. Rameley v. Leland. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. Any property which is useful or necessary to the comfort and conveniences of the guest, that which is usually carried and worn as a part of the ordinary apparel or outfit, or is ordinarily used and is convenient for use to travelers, as well in as out of their rooms, is left, as before the statute, at the risk of the innkeeper. Ib.

3. A watch is neither a jewel nor ornament, as these words are used and understood, either in common parlance or by lexicographers. It is not used and carried as a jewel or ornament, but as a time piece or chronometer. It is as useful and necessary to the guest in his room as out of it- in the night as in the day time – and is, therefore, not covered by the statute. Ib.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Consideration. - A. entered into an agreement with B., which, in substance, was as follows: A. had leased unto B. a certain building in New York city from the 1st day of October, 1867, to May 1, 1868, and the entire lofts of said building from May 1, 1868, for the term of three years thereafter, unless sooner terminated as hereinafter specified, it being stipulated and agreed between the parties hereto as a consideration in part of the letting of the premises herein, that in case at any time prior to the expiration of the said term the common council of said city, or any of its authorities, should order the removal of any part of said building, for the improvement or extension of the street, then the said party of the second part (B.) will not hold the party of the first part (A.) liable for any damage he may sustain by reason of such removal; he (B.) to receive the award, if any, from the authorities for damage sustained for such unforeseen termination, and also pay the rent up to the time of such removal, when this lease shall cease and come to an end. title of said premises passed to the city at the date of the confirmation of the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment, December 30, 1867. Under this arrangement B. continued to occupy the premises until January, 1869, when he voluntarily removed therefrom. The city did not interfere with the premises until April, 1869. A. brought an action to recover the quarter's rent due February 1, 1869. Held, that B. was liable for the rent of the buildings up to the time of the removal of them by the city. Phyfe v. Elmer. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

LARCENY.

The

1. Of proceeds of draft by indorser.-A. was the owner of a draft for $2,500, drawn upon a banking house in New York city, which he desired to procure the money upon. B. expressed his willingness and ability to procure the money for him. He took A. to a broker with whom he (B.) was acquainted, and an arrangement was made by which B. was to indorse the draft, and the broker was to procure the money and have it at his office on the same day at three o'clock, where the parties were to come, and A. was to receive the money. B. indorsed the draft and delivered it to the broker, with the consent and in the presence of A. Afterward, and before three o'clock, B. came to the broker's office and procured the money and carried it

away. Held, that B. was guilty of a larceny. People v. McDonald. Opinion by Church, J.

2. It was urged upon the trial that the indictment should have been for stealing the draft instead of the money. Held, that an indictment for stealing the draft could not be sustained, as A. delivered the draft to the broker himself, and in contemplation of law he intended to part with the possession and control of it, and never expected its return, and it was not in fact appropriated. Ib.

3. Stress was laid upon the fact that B. indorsed the draft, and it was argued that this gave him a right to receive the money, and also gave him some interest in it. Held, that the evidence showed that B. had a felonious intent when he indorsed the draft, and that the indorsement was a contrivance to get possession of the money. Ib.

4. If money or property is delivered to a person for mere custody or charge, or for some specific purpose, the legal possession remains in the owner, and a criminal conversion of it by the custodian is larceny. Ib.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Authority of copartner to bind firm.-Partners are not liable for the contract of one of their firm when such contract is not within the common enterprise for which they were associated. Cobb v. Shepard. Opinion by Allen, J. (Grover, J., dissenting.)

2. The defendants entered into an agreement whereby they were to be jointly interested in the purchase of certain lands, and in the cutting and marketing of the wood on the lands, which was to be done under the direction of one of their number. While carrying on the cutting of the wood, an agent of the directing partner caused the erection of a saw-mill upon a part of the land, which part had been purchased by such agent. Held, that the building of a saw-mill was not, under the agreement to cut and market wood, within the limits of the agency of the directing partner, and that another partner would not be liable, as such, for machinery furnished for said mill. Ib.

3. The use of the note of such other partner, in payment for the lands, was no evidence that he was interested in the purchase. Ib.

PROMISSORY NOTES.

1. Agreement to extend time for payment. — A. purchased of B. a promissory note made by C. A. sued C. to recover on the same. C. gave evidence showing, that while the note was in B.'s hands an action was commenced thereon, and it was agreed between C., B. and plaintiff in the action, that the suit should be discontinued; that C. should pay the costs accrued thereon, and have during the ensuing month to pay the note. The costs were paid and suit discontinued. A. brought his action before the expiration of the time agreed upon by the parties to the former action. Held, that there was no valid agreement to extend the time of payment. Parmelee v. Thompson. Opinion by Allen, J. 2. It is competent for the parties, by a parol agreement, to enlarge the time of performance of a simple contract, and the time of payment of the note in suit might have been extended by such agreement made upon a sufficient consideration. But a promise to extend the time of payment, unless founded on a good consideration, is void. Ib.

3. A payment of a part of the debt, or the interest already accrued, or promise to pay interest for the future, is not a sufficient consideration. Ib.

4. If the only consideration for the promise of the creditor is the performance by the debtor, or the promise to perform some act which the latter is legally bound to perform, the promise is without consideration. Ib.

5. Waiver by indorser of demand and notice. The liability of an indorser of a note to pay it is in general upon the implied condition that payment thereof shall be demanded of the maker at maturity, and, in case of default, that notice of non-payment shall be given to the indorser. The right that demand should be made and notice given is personal to the indorser, and the waiver of it requires no new consideration to support it. Such waiver may be by express words, or it may arise by implication from the acts or conduct of the indorser. Sheldon v. Horton. Opinion by Andrews, J.

6. A. was the holder of a certain note a short time before its maturity. B., the maker, requested A. to hold it for another year. A. called upon C., the indorser, and stated to him the request of B., and asked him if he was willing to have it held for another year. C. consented. The holder of the note allowed it to mature without demand or notice, and deferred its collection for the term suggested. Held, that the liability of the indorser became absolute on the maturity of the note, and no subsequent demand or notice at any time was required. Ib.

RAILROADS.

1. Appointment of commissioners to locate road: failure to give notice.-It is the intention of the general railroad act, that the commissioners, upon the petition of one objecting to the proposed location of a railroad, should have jurisdiction of the entire subject of the location of the road through the county in which the land of the person applying for the appointment is situated. Matter of petition of Long Island R. R. Co. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. The appointment of such commissioners can only be made after all the notices required by law have been served, and the fifteen days have expired within which persons aggrieved may apply for such appointment. Ib. 3. And where proceedings are commenced before any notice - provided for by section twenty-two of the general railroad law - has been served upon one of the interested parties, and commissioners appointed under such proceedings, the application is premature and unauthorized, and the subsequent proceedings thereunder void, and such interested party is entitled to apply for the appointment of a commission, whose appointment will be valid. Ib.

4. Au order of the general term setting aside such appointment of commissioners is appealable. Ib.

SALE AND DELIVERY.

1. Duty of vendee to return, when articles defective. — A. manufactured upon B.'s order a large number of mattresses, amounting to $2,475.92. The mattresses were to be of the best quality of hair, and of a specified weight, and if they lacked in either element B. was not bound to receive them, or if, on receiving them, he discovered any defect, he had a right to return them. The mattresses were delivered to B., and he accepted them. B. alleged that they were deficient in weight, but neglected to return them, offering A. therefor the price agreed upon, less $500, which he claimed was all they were worth. A. offered to take back the mattresses, and refund B. what money he had advanced on them. B. declined the offer. In an action to

recover the price, held, that B., by neglecting to return the mattresses, assented to the performance of the contract by A., and that he waived his right to rescind the same. Pomroy v. Shaw. Opinion by Church, C. J. 2. A party purchasing goods, after having an opportunity to examine them, must then decide whether he will accept or reject them. He cannot say that the article is not what he agreed for, but that he will receive it, and pay only such price for it as he may be able to prove it worth. He cannot thus change the contract, and compel the seller to incur the hazard of losing the substantial benefit of it. Ib.

STATUTE OF LIMITATION.

1. As to attorney's services. The statute does not commence to run as against the account of an attorney until his connection with the proceeding in which he is employed is finally terminated. Mygatt v. Wilcox. Opinion by Grover, J.

2. A party who employs an attorney is personally liable to him for his services, though acting as a trustee or in a representative capacity in the business in which he employs him. Ib.

3. Where the defendants, who were administrators, employed the plaintiff in a matter connected with their estate, there being no pretense that the plaintiff undertook to look to the estate for payment for his services, they became personally liable therefor. Ib.

WILLS.

A. made his will, and, among other devisees, he bequeathed to C. and D., severally, a life estate in two certain parcels of real property, and after their death he gave the same in fee to their children; both of them died in the life-time of the testator, leaving no surviving issue. The question was, whether the heirs of A. took this land on the ground that it was not disposed of by the will, or whether the devisees took it under the residuary clause, which read as follows: "All the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate, real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever situate, and not herein and hereby specifically devised or bequeathed, I give, devise and bequeath" to certain persons named therein. Held, that there was a remainder in the lands given to C. and D. on the death of either of them, leaving no surviving issue, and that such remainder went to the devisees under the residuary clause, and not to the heirs. Young v. Young. Opinion by Grover, J.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.*
BIGAMY. See Criminal Law.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Evidence of an oral agreement between the parties to a note, at the time it was made, is admissible to show a partial or total failure of the consideration. Smith v. Carter.

COMMON CARRIERS.

A railroad company received goods at Pittsburg, Pa., destined for Hudson, Wis., stipulating against responsibility as a carrier beyond its own line, but guarantying that the cost of transportation to Hudson should not exceed a certain sum-less than the aggregate of the charges on the several lines between Pittsburg and *To appear in 25 Wisconsin Reports.

Hudson at the usual rates; the other connecting lines on the route having no knowledge or notice of the guaranty. Held, (1) That this was not a "through contract." (2) That even if there had been a “through contract," the other facts remaining, the rights of the successive carriers would be as hereinafter stated. (3) That each carrier after the first might charge and pay back charges, at the usual rates; and the last (or the warehouseman who received from it, paying back charges) has a lien on the goods for the total amount of such charges. (4) That the remedy of the shipper is against the first carrier, on the guaranty. (5) Whether the result in this case would be different if the other carriers had had notice of the guaranty, quære. Schneider v. Evans.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Declarations of a murdered person, made "when he was at the point of death, and every hope of this world gone," as to the time, place and manner in which, and the person by whom, the fatal wound was given, are admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the provision in the bill of rights as to the right of an accused person to "meet the witnesses face to face." Miller v. The State.

See Jurisdiction.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. To sustain an indictment for bigamy it must be shown that the first marriage was valid by the law of the place where it was contracted. Weinberg v. The State.

2. Where, by the law of the place of marriage, it was required to be entered into as a civil contract before a magistrate, and the celebration of a religious ceremony of marriage without such prior civil marriage was prohibited under severe penalties, proof of the religious ceremony, in a prosecution for bigamy, would not authorize a presumption that the civil ceremony had been performed. Ib.

3. If two persons conspire to commit a felony, and, while they are engaged in prosecuting that common design, one of them commits murder, the other is guilty of murder also. Miller v. The State.

4. The court, on the trial of the wife in such a case, instructed the jury "that if defendant, without any fear or compulsion of any kind from her husband, agreed with him to go to the store of the deceased and rob it, the husband telling her, and she believing, that he did not intend to kill the deceased, but would do him no greater bodily harm than to knock him down and stun him, so that the store could be robbed; and if she was present when her husband struck the fatal blow, but gave no intentional assistance to him-then, defendant and her husband being engaged in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery, the jury would be justified in finding her guilty of murder in the third degree." It seems that this instruction was too favorable to the accused, and that she was chargeable (if she acted voluntarily throughout) with the same crime as the husband. Ib.

DRAINAGE OF LAND.

The owner of land on which there is a pond or reservoir of surface water cannot lawfully discharge it through an artificial channel directly upon the land of another, greatly to his injury. Pettigrew v. Evansville. DYING DECLARATION. See Constitutional Law. EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law; Railroads, 3; Bills and Notes.

FRAUD.

The time for redemption of land from a tax sale having expired on Saturday, the clerk of supervisors promised the owner's agent on Sunday following that he would not open his office the next day until the regular hour (8 A. M.), and would then give him a fair opportunity to redeem; but, by collusion with the agent of the holder of the tax certificate, he opened the office at six o'clock Monday morning, and executed the tax deed and had it put upon record. Held, that on these facts the tax deed might not only be annulled in equity, but treated as void, for fraud, in ejectment. Mather v. Hutchinson.

HIGHWAY.

1. No action by town officers is necessary to constitute a valid acceptance by the public of land dedicated for a highway; but travel thereon, to such an extent and for such a length of time as to show that the public convenience requires the road, is sufficient; and this time may be less than ten years. Dixon, C. J., dissents. Buchanan v. Curtis.

2. Proof of the owner's declarations after the opening of the road, and during the use by the public relied on as evidence of a dedication, is admissible to show that there was no intention to dedicate. Ib.

3. Objects within the limits of a highway, naturally calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, may constitute such defects in the way as to render the town liable, even though so far removed from the traveled path as to avoid all danger of collision. Foshay v. Glen Haven.

4. An instruction “that an object existing within the limits of the highway, but leaving the traveled path unobstructed, so that the traveler is safe from collision with it, is not an insufficiency in the way, merely because it exposes the traveler's horse to become frightened at the sight of it, and the town in such case would not be liable"--held erroneous, because, in its most obvious sense, and as applied to the facts in the case, it conflicts with the law as above stated. Ib.

INSURANCE AGAINST FIRE.

1. A policy of insurance was issued upon a factory which was only run during a part of the year, and the answers of the company's printed interrogatories, stating the use of the building and the precautions against fire, were such as, from their nature, were appropriate only to the time during which the mill was run; and the agent who issued the policy was made fully aware of the facts, and himself filled up the application, and wrote down such portions of the applicant's statements as he considered important. Held, that the company, even if it had not expressly made itself responsible for the agent's accuracy, could not avoid liability for a loss incurred during the season when the factory was stopped, on the ground that the answers in the application were warranties that the same state of things should continue during the life of the policy. May v. Buckeye Mut. Ins. Co.

2. The policy in this case, after stating what the application must contain, and that any false description by the assured, or omission to make known any fact material to the risk, shall render said policy void, adds: "But the company will be responsible for the accuracy of surveys made by its agents." Held, that the word "survey" must here be construed to include the whole application, when made out by the agent, and the company is thus expressly precluded from taking advantage of his inaccuracy or omission in

JURISDICTION.

1. State and federal courts.-The fact that an insurance company, created by the laws of another state, does business in this state in conformity to its laws regulating the transaction of insurance business by foreign companies, and that its agents here are authorized to accept service of process from our state courts, does not deprive it of the right to transfer to the federal courts (under the 12th section of the judiciary act of 1789) a suit commenced against it in a court of this state and by a citizen thereof. Knorr v. Home Ins. Co. of N. Y.

2. (Paine, J., is of opinion that so much of the judiciary act as provides for the transfer of causes from the state courts to the federal courts is invalid. Cole, J., though of the same opinion, acquiesces in the application of the act to this cause, to save loss and embarrassment to the parties. Dixon, C. J., holds the act valid.) Ib.

3. Where one is restrained of his liberty within a state by a military or other ministerial officer of the United States, the state courts have jurisdiction to inquire, by habeas corpus, into the legality of his detention, and to discharge him if detained without authority of law. In re Tarble.

4. So much of the act of congress of March 2, 1867, constituting ch. 196, acts of the second session of the thirty-ninth congress (14 U. S. Statutes at Large, 558), as provides that a citizen of one state, who has commenced an action in a court of another state against a citizen thereof, may remove it to a federal court, is invalid. Whiton v. Ch. & N. W. R. W. Co.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Tenant for life, in possession, who takes a tax deed for taxes due before his tenancy commenced, if he can acquire title at all thereby, holds it for the benefit of the reversioners as well as for his own. Phelan v. Boylan.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Where a city was authorized to build a harbor, issue its bonds for the price, and raise money by taxation to pay the interest and principal thereof as they should become due, but, on its failure to issue the bonds, the contractor obtained a money judgment for the amount, and the city had no property on which execution could be levied,-Held, that the city council had the power, and would be compelled by mandamus, to levy and collect a tax to pay such judgment.

Cole, J., rests the decision mainly upon a provision in the charter subjecting all the property of the city to taxation for the support of the city government and the "payment of its debts and liabilities," and the acts which authorized the city to construct the harbor and thus create a liability therefor; holding that any limitation in the charter upon the power of the council as to the amount and objects of taxation could not affect a subsequent grant of authority to incur the liability, and that the grant of power to issue bonds, etc., was merely additional to the power already existing to raise money by taxation to meet such liability.

Dixon, C. J., holds that the power to levy a tax to pay for the harbor was conferred by the acts authorizing its construction; that no default of the city or subsequent act of the legislature could deprive the contractor of the benefit of such power; but that the city, by compelling the plaintiff, through its default, to

which the power must be fully exercised.

Paine, J., dissents. State ex rel. Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee.

NOTICE.

Of equitable title to land. Where P., being the equitable owner of sixty acres of land, of which three-fourths of an acre had been cleared and fenced, left it in charge of a person living on an adjoining tract, who chopped wood upon it and cultivated the clearing, the land being in a densely timbered and sparsely settled country, and the neighbors generally understanding that it belonged to P., Held, that this was such a possession as constituted notice of P.'s right to one who took a mortgage from the holder of the legal title. Wickes v. Lake.

RAILROADS.

1. The city of Watertown issued its bonds in aid of the Milwaukee and Watertown Railroad Co., which guarantied their payment. Afterward that company became consolidated, in pursuance of law, with the Milwaukee and La Crosse Railroad Co., which subsequently sold the Watertown division of its road (including what had previously been owned by the Milwaukee and Watertown Co.) to a third corporation, which sold it to the defendant. Held, that while the guaranty of said bonds became part of the general indebtedness of the Milwaukee and La Crosse Co., after the consolidation, defendant, as purchaser of the Watertown division of its road, is not liable for any part of such indebtedness. Wright v. M. & St. P. R. W. Co.

2. Where part of a tract of land has been taken for a railroad, if the market value of the residue has been reduced by reason of the road crossing it, the owner is entitled to damages for such depreciation. Snyder v. W. U. R. R. Co.

3. In such case witnesses, who are farmers owning land in the vicinity, may be asked how much, in their opinion, the land has been thus depreciated. Ib.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
ALLOWANCE TO COUNSEL.

Where a counsel for petitioning creditors obtains an adjudication, and performs other services incident to the bankruptcy proceedings, but it does not appear that he has in any way recovered property fraudulently conveyed to, or possessed of by, creditors, and the assets of the estate amount to about the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, an allowance of one thousand dollars made to the counsel for petitioning creditors, by the register before whom proceedings are pending, is too extravagant, and will not be confirmed unless assented

to by the assignee, the bankrupts and all the creditors who have proved their debts. In re Sanger & Scott. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. of N. Y., 5 N. B. R. 54.

APPEAL.

Motion to dismiss.-Where a decree is entered in the district court in favor of complainant, and respondent files notice of appeal giving requisite bond, and citation issues within ten days and in due time, but the transmiss upon appeal not having been filed in the circuit court until May, 1871, after two terms had gone over, on motion to dismiss appeal because transmiss had not been filed at next term after the appeal, held, motion denied because time to dismiss appeal had been enlarged by agreement of counsel, which is permissible, and therefore this case does not come within decision In re Alexander, 3 N. B. R. 6. Baldwin, assignee, v. Rapplee. U. S. Cir. Ct. N. Y., 5 N. B, R. 19.

COPARTNERSHIP.

Where nearly all the debts against a bankrupt copartnership, comprised of three copartners, have been purchased in the interest of two of the copartners, by two of their friends, to whom the money for such purchase was furnished by those partners, the third partner, not contributing, objects to the proof of the purchased claims as illegal, although it is not denied but that they were originally bona fide claims against the copartnership, held, that a decree will be entered providing for the payment in full, by the assignees, of the unpaid and unpurchased proved debts, with interest; for the payment into court of the amount of the unpaid unproved debts, with interest; for the payment of the commission of the assignees, and the charges, fees, disbursements and expenses of their attorney and counsel, and the fees of the register and clerk; for the payment to the two purchasers (friends of two of the bankrupts) of the amount paid out by them in the purchase of the copartnership debts, together with interest; for the transfer of the remainder of the estate by the assignee to the bankrupts, jointly, by proper instruments. In re Lathrop et al. U. S. Dist. Ct. S. D. of N. Y., 5 N. B. R. 43.

JURISDICTION.

Where a plea in abatement sets up that the writ, issued in an assumpsit by assignee to recover money paid by bankrupt by way of preference, does not show jurisdiction, and that in point of fact there is none, because proceedings in bankruptcy are pending in another district, writ does not allege that any bankruptcy proceedings are pending within this district, but it will be presumed that plaintiffs were appointed assignees in the other district, for otherwise they would have taken issue on the plea. Held, that jurisdiction is only vested in the courts of the district in which bankruptcy proceedings are pending for the adjustment and collecting of matters arising therefrom, and for such suits as this one. The United States district court of Rhode Island cannot entertain this case, because proceedings were begun in the state of Massachusetts. Sherman et al. v. Bingham et al. U. S. Dist. Ct. Mass., 5 N. B. R. 34.

PARTNERSHIP.

Where one member of a firm files his petition in one state and requests his copartners to join him in the proceedings, which they refuse to do, but subsequently appear by attorney and consent to an adjudication, whereupon all the members of the firm are adjudicated bankrupt, and upon the application for the discharge

of the bankrupts specifications are filed in opposition to their discharge, on the grounds of a want of jurisdiction, -Held, that section thirty-six, taken in connection with section eleven, supplemented by general order XVIII, should be construed together. Section thirty-six provides, that "if such copartners (that is, copartners in trade, who are sought to be adjudged bankrupts on the petition of themselves or any one of them of any creditor of theirs) reside in different districts, that court in which the petition is first filed shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over the case." The court which first obtains jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the petition, and over the person of the petitioner, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case; that is, over the subject-matter of the petition, and over all the copartners, if the non-petitioning copartners be brought in by appropriate process. Objections to jurisdiction overruled. In re J. R. Penn et al. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. of N. Y., 5 N. B. R. 30.

PRACTICE.

1. Where a bank went into liquidation in accordance with the provisions of a state law in 1868, pursuant to the decree forfeiting its charter, and commissioners were appointed to administer the affairs of the bank, and they accepted the trust, giving the necessary bonds, which trust they continued to fulfill for a year, when an involuntary petition for the adjudication of the bank and the commissioners bankrupt was filed in the United States district court of the district, alleging fraudulent preferences in payments by the commissioners, and also praying that a provisional warrant might issue to take possession of the assets of the bank then in the hands of the commissioners, a decree in bankruptcy was made, and injunctions granted against the commissioners. The commissioners, within ten days of the decree, filed a petition for the review by

the circuit court of the decree and order of the district court, and the circuit court affirmed the decree, etc., of the district court. Morgan et al. v. Thornhill et al. U. S. Sup. Ct., 5 N. B. R. 1.

2. Application for an, appeal to the United States supreme court being immediately made, was refused by the circuit judge; but more than ten days after the decree of the circuit court an appeal was allowed by an associate justice of the United States supreme court. Held, that decrees in equity, in order that they may be reëxamined in this court, must be final decrees, rendered in term time, as contradistinguished from mere interlocutory decrees or orders, which may be entered at chambers, or, if entered in court, are still subject to revision at the final hearing. If this rule were not followed in allowing appeals to the United States supreme court, every question arising in the courts may be indefinitely protracted, and the beneficent purposes of the bankrupt act be thereby defeated. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

PREFERENCE.

1. Where a creditor who has been carrying and renewing a note, enters up judgment by virtue of a warrant of attorney attached, and issues execution, the debtor having, three days before, absconded, leaving his property and creditors unprotected, the business community and newspapers being in speculation as to his departure and means, and the creditor having come to the conclusion that "there was something wrong," and that his interests as well as those of the surety on the note require that judgment should be entered, he obtains such a preference as is avoided by the thirty