be presumed within the twenty years." Senator Maison in a long and elaborate opinion reviews all the cases, and concludes that possession for less than twenty years had never been held a bar, except in three cases, namely: Ogden, Van Corlear and Gardner. He lays down the rule "that where the boundaries in the deed are clear and unambiguous, and the land thereby described can be easily, and without doubt or conjecture, ascertained, no acquiescence or recognition, however unequivocal or often repeated, can have the effect of depriving the party of his possession of land, unless that acquiescence be continued in for at least twenty years." He continues: "When lands have been located, and such location acquiesced in for any time less than twenty years, either with or without agreement, and during the continuance of such acquiescence, with the knowledge and assent of the party, but without objection, buildings are erected and improvements made on the land thus possessed, the owner of the fee will, nevertheless, at law, be entitled to recover his land, but the party building or improving is not remediless; full and perfect relief and protection is afforded him in chancery," namely, by a perpetual injunction against the action at law. A new trial was granted with but one dissenting voice.

Intermediate 6th Wendell and 16th Wendell, the case of Mc Cormick v. Barnum, 10 Wend. 104, was decided in 1833. Here it was held that an owner of land was bound by a division line, recognized by his surveyor as correct, where the owner has given deeds in conformity to a map and field book made by the surveyor, and no efficient attempt is made for twentytwo years to correct the line. Also, Kipp v. Norton, 12 Wend. 127, in 1834, in which mere acquiescence for five years was held inconclusive. Also, Dibble v. Rogers, 13 Wend. 536, in 1835, in which the court held an acquiescence of twenty years conclusive.

We next run against Clark v. Wethey, 19 Wend. 320, A. D. 1838. This case decided that where, in a description in a deed, course, distance and monument are given, the premises must be located according to the deed, and all parol evidence of the intent, acts and declarations of the parties, going to establish a different location, is inadmissible as contradicting or varying the deed, unless a possession be shown under claim of title for such a length of time as will bar a recovery in an action of ejectment. If, however, doubt or uncertainty exist, owing to the vagueness or obscurity of the description, or the decay or destruction of the monument, such evidence is admissible in aid of the deed. An actual location by agreement different from the deed will be obligatory. Judge Cowen says the defense of title by acquiescence for less than the statutory period is in the face of the statute of frauds, and also contravenes the doctrine of parol evidence. It would seem at first sight that Judge Cowen does not exactly know what to do with Adams and Rockwell, nor fully understand on what

ground the reversal was there put, but inasmuch as the supreme court were reversed, he himself has no compunctions about "going back" on the doctrine overruled. On a closer examination we do not see that his doctrine differs from that of the court above.

The doctrine of "oral conveyance" seems to have been "laid," perhaps stunned, by Judge Cowen's tremendous and unanswerable onslaught, until 1853, when it "walked" again in Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183. This case decided, that, where a grantor at the time of the execution of the deed put the purchaser in possession, and pointed out the boundaries, but the boundaries so pointed out embraced land not included in the deed, occupation with the consent of the grantor for a less period than that required by statute to bar a right of entry gave the purchaser no title to the lands not covered by the deed. Judge Cowen's doctrine is expressly sustained.

Down to this time the conclusiveness of acquiescence had been based upon the notion that it was evidence of a parol agreement establishing the line. But this idea was exploded, in 1857, in Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N. Y. 359, which put the doctrine on the true ground, namely, that the acquiescence is conclusive evidence that the location is correct. It became material to decide this in answer to the argument that where the location was erroneous no bar could be inferred, because an agreement founded on a mutual mistake of facts is not obligatory. But the remark that "there may be cases in which an express agreement recognizing an erroneous boundary will conclude a party; as where the other party, acting upon the faith of such agreement, has made expensive improvements, the benefit of which will be lost to him if the line is disturbed," seems obiter. Acquiescence of more than forty years was shown in this case, and the court say: "The plaintiff is precluded, on principles of public policy, from setting up or insisting upon a line in opposition to one that has been steadily adhered to, upon both sides, for more than forty years." Judge Cowen's doctrine was also approved in Terry v. Chandler, 16 N. Y. 358, A. D. 1857.

In Reed v. Farr, 35 N. Y. 113, A. D. 1866, which was a case of practical location and acquiescence for more than twenty years, the case of Baldwin v. Brown was followed and approved, and its reasoning adopted.

In the same year the question was reviewed in a learned and exhaustive opinion, in Hubbell v. McCulloch, 47 Barb. 287. The plaintiff alone, more than twenty years before, ran an erroneous line through woods, on uncultivated and unimproved lands, having previously been told by the defendant that the defendant would abide by the line as he should find it, and having subsequently described it as run to the defendant, but the defendant not having assented to it, and it not being fixed or adopted. There being no adverse holding proved, this was held not to amount to a practical location, because there was no original agreement of minds, and no subsequent acquiescence

except silence. The court say: "There has been in the early cases a good deal of confounding of possessions that began adversely, with this new method of getting round the statute of frauds, now called 'practical location;' but it is time that possession begun adversely, and possessions claimed to have begun under practical location, if there is any difference, should be in some way distinguished." The court find the origin of "practical location" in an acquiescence between the parties in a line known and understood by them, of such a length of time as to be identical with "time immemorial," or "time out of memory." "Rather than disturb such an ancient line, it was the policy of the law to presume a grant." In Reed v. Mc Court, 41 N. Y. 441, A. D. 1869, it was held that a parol assent as to the location of a boundary fence, and the actual erection of the fence, followed by mutual occupation and acquiescence for a few months, is not sufficient to change the true line, and that "scarcely less than twenty years" would effect such change.

The substance of these authorities on the point of acquiescence seems to be this:

Where the description of the premises in a deed is definite, certain and unambiguous, no extrinsic evidence is admissible to show a different location, unless a possession be shown under claim of title for such a length of time as to bar a recovery in ejectment. If, however, the description is vague, obscure or ambiguous, or the monuments referred to have become decayed or destroyed, such evidence is admissible in aid of the deed.

(To be continued.)

AMERICAN REPORTS AND REPORTERS. No. IV.

NEW JERSEY.

The earliest decisions regularly reported in this state, were those from the April term, 1790, to the November term, 1795, inclusive, which were published in one volume by Richard S. Coxe, in 1816. The legislature had provided, in 1806, that a reporter should be annually appointed by joint ballot of the two houses, whose duty it should be to collect and prepare for publication the decisions of the supreme court, and deliver them to the printer of the state laws, who was directed to print the same with the state laws each year. The decisions so printed with the laws from 1806 to 1813, were afterward collected into two volumes by W. S. Pennington, one of the justices of the supreme court.

In February, 1818, Samuel L. Southard, one of the justices of the court, received the appointment of reporter, and reported the decisions from the February term, 1816, to the May term, 1820, in two volumes. In March, of the last named year, the term of office of the reporter was extended to five years, and his salary fixed at $200 or $250. In 1821, Wi liam Halstead, Jr., succeeded Mr. Southard, and held

the office until 1831. He reported the decisions during that period in seven volumes, including in the first volume the decisions from 1796 to 1799. He was succeeded by James S. Green, who reported in three volumes the cases from the November term, 1831, to the end of the November term, 1836.

With the February term, 1837, Josiah Harrison began the duties of law reporter, and reported the cases to the end of the September term, 1842, in four volumes the last being very thin, and containing an appendix of an alphabetical table of all cases reported in the twenty-two volumes of New Jersey reports then issued. Mr. Harrison was succeeded by Robert D. Spencer, who began with the November term, 1842, and ended with the July term, 1846, having issued one volume. He was followed by A. O. Zabriskie, who reported the cases till the end of the March term, 1855, in four volumes. Andrew Dutcher followed, and reported in five volumes the cases both in the supreme court and court of errors and appeals to 1862.

Peter D. Vroom, the present law reporter, began with the June term, 1862, and has thus far issued four volumes, bringing the cases in both supreme court and court of appeals down to the June term, 1869. The several foregoing reports make up the series cited as New Jersey Law Reports, now numbering thirty-three volumes.

By an act passed in 1832 the appointment of a chancery reporter was authorized, who was to hold office for five years. The chancery reports were published separately from the law reports. A volume of reports was not issued under this provision until 1838, although the cases had been printed annually by the state. In that year N. Saxton published one volume containing the decisions of Chancellor Vroom from 1830 to the July term, 1832. In 1842 Henry W. Green, having been appointed chancery reporter, issued the first volume of his reports, commencing with the January term, 1838, leaving an interval of about five years between Saxton's reports and his own. He, however, promised to collect and publish the cases during that interval, and did so in his second and third volumes. He published three volumes, ending with the January term, 1845. George B. Halstead reported in four volumes the cases from the April term, 1845, to the end of the June term, 1853. John P. Stockton continued the cases in three volumes down to 1858; Mercer Beasley thence down to 1861, in two volumes; Thomas N. McCarter to 1856, in two volumes; and C. E. Green down to the November term, 1870.

PENNSYLVANIA.

The first volume of reports published in this state, and the second published in the country, was the first volume of Alexander J. Dallas, issued in 1790, and containing cases in the supreme court, court of oyer and terminer, court of common plass en da hist

court of errors, between September, 1754, and December, 1789. The second volume includes cases decided in the federal court of appeals in 1781, 1783 and 1787; in the high court of error and appeals in 1792-1795; in the supreme court from 1789 to 1790, together with some prior detached cases; in the common pleas from August to December, 1790; in the supreme court of the United States from April, 1790, to August, 1793; and in the circuit courts of the United States from April, 1792, to 1798. The third and fourth volumes contain cases in the United States supreme court from 1794 to 1800, and the state, supreme and other courts decisions down to 1806. The series numbered four volumes.

In 1800 Alexander Addison, then president of the courts of common pleas of the fifth circuit, reported one volume of cases in these courts, and in the high court of errors and appeals, between 1791 and 1799, including in the volume a large number of his charges to grand juries.

Peter A. Browne published, in 1811 and 1815, two volumes of cases adjudicated in the court of common pleas of Philadelphia, between 1806 and 1814.

The reports cited as Yeates' reports were published in 1817-1819, in four volumes, by Charles Smith, from the manuscripts of Jasper Yeates, one of the supreme court justices, who had prepared them for the press. These volumes contain the decisions of the supreme court from 1791 to 1808, with a few nisi prius and circuit court cases.

In 1808, Horace Binney began a series of reports, which was concluded in six volumes in 1815, and contained the decisions of the supreme court from 1799 to 1814.

issued a series of nine volumes, closing with the December term, 1845. The last volume contains a valuable index to the whole nine volumes.

The reports heretofore noticed were all the results of private enterprise, the state not having appointed a reporter, but in 1845 provision was made for the appointment of a reporter by the governor, to hold his office for five years; to report not to exceed two volumes a year, of not less than five hundred and fifty pages, bound in law calf, and to sell them at a price not to exceed four dollars a volume. It was also prescribed that no minority opinion should be reported; and that the title of the reports published under the provisions of the act should be "Pennsylvania State Reports." Robert M. Barr received the appointment. He began with the cases of the May term, 1845, and ended his series with the May term, 1849. He issued ten volumes, known and cited as the first ten of the Pennsylvania State Reports. It may be well enough to mention here that when counsel wish to refer to this series, they should cite "Pennsylvania State Reports," as the reports of Watts and Penrose are known as the "Pennsylvania Reports."

Mr. Barr died about the time of the publication of his tenth volume — 1849 — leaving a large amount of materials intended for further numbers. This material was arranged by his friend J. Pringle Jones, and published with the consent of the governor, for the benefit of his family. This material filled two volumes, bringing the cases down to the December term, 1849.

George W. Harris was appointed successor to Mr. Barr, and reported the cases to 1855, in twelve volumes, numbered in the series 13-24.

James Hepburn was next appointed, but died after he had partly prepared a volume for the press. Joseph Casey succeeded him and finished his incom

(25-36 Pa. St.) the cases down to 1860. Robert E. Wright succeeded, and continued the cases to 1865, in fourteen volumes.

The cases in the middle, southern and western districts, from 1829 to 1832, were reported by William Rawle, Charles B. Penrose and Frederick Watts, in three volumes, cited as Pennsylvania Reports, or Penrose and Watts' Pennsylvania Reports. From 1832 to 1840 the decisions of the supreme court in these three districts were reported by Frederick Watts, in ten volumes.

In 1831 John W. Ashmead published a volume of cases decided in the Philadelphia common pleas, quarter sessions, etc.; and John Miles published, in 18361842, two volumes of the decisions of the district. court of Philadelphia, from 1835 to 1840.

Frederick Watts and Henry J. Sergeant began with the May term, 1841, of the supreme court, and

The present state reporter-Mr. P. Frazer Smith succeeded Mr. Wright, and has reported the decisions from the October term, 1865, to and including the January term, 1870, in fourteen volumes, the last being volume 64, of the state series.

Besides these supreme court reports, there are the following miscellaneous reports:

Frederick C. Brightly published, in 1851, decisions at nisi prius, in Philadelphia, from 1809 to 1851. Many of the cases were elaborately annotated.

Benjamin Grant published, in 1857-64, as an individual enterprise, three volumes of cases in the supreme court. These reports include cases between 1852 and 1863. Alden's condensed reports, in three volumes, contain cases between 1754 and 1814. In 1851 A. V. Parsons, one of the judges of the court of common pleas for Philadelphia, published one volume of select cases in equity, decided in his court between 1841 and 1850. The Philadelphi

.

common pleas reports, in four volumes, contain the decisions of that court from 1850 to 1861.

F. Carroll Brewster began, in 1869, reports of "equity, election, and other important cases," decided principally in the courts of Philadelphia. The cases began with October, 1856, and the third volume, recently published, contains cases as late as 1871.

and has continued the series to the thirty-second volume.

The reports of the cases decided in the high court of chancery were published by Theodoric Bland in three volumes, containing the cases from 1811 to 1832. The decisions of Chancellor Johnson, between the years 1846 and 1854, when the court was abolished, were reported in four volumes, cited as the Maryland Chancery Decisions.

The existing laws of Maryland provide for the ap

DELAWARE.

In February, 1837, it was made the duty of the judge of the superior court, residing in Kent county, to prepare reports of the decisions of the superior court, court of oyer and terminer, and court of errors and appeals. Samuel L. Harrington, associate justice, in pursuance of this act, published five volumes, commencing with the spring session of 1832, and ending in 1855. In 1866, a volume of reports was published by John W. Houston, associate judge, containing the cases between the spring of 1855 and the fall of 1858. Since that time there has been no volume issued in the state.

MARYLAND.

The four volumes of reports published by Thomas Harris and John M'Henry, between 1809 and 1818, were the earliest reports published in this state. They contain the cases decided in the provincial court and court of appeals, of the then province, from 1700 to the American Revolution, and in the general court and court of appeals of the state from 1780 to 1799. These reports were succeeded by the reports of Thomas Harris and Reverdy Johnson, numbering seven volumes. The first volume contains the decisions of the general court and court of appeals from 1800 to 1805, inclusive. The general court having been abolished, the remaining six volumes contain only the decisions of the court of appeals down to 1826. Following in regular succession these reports are the two volumes of Thomas Harris and Richard W. Gill, containing the decisions down to 1829. From 1829 to 1843 the cases in the court of appeals were reported in twelve volumes by Richard W. Gill and John Johnson. Mr. Gill continued the reports from that time to 1851.

In 1851 A. C. McGruder was appointed state reporter under a provision of the legislature, and began the series known as the Maryland reports with the December term, 1851. He published two volumes ending in the latter part of 1852. Volumes 3-18 of the Maryland reports were reported by Oliver Miller, and contain the cases between December, 1852, and June term, 1862, inclusive; from nineteen to twenty-six of the series Nicholas Brewster, Jr., held the office. Mr. J Schaaff Stockett succeeded him,

appeals for the term of four years, at a salary of one thousand dollars per year. He is to report all decisions of the court of appeals, designated by said court to be reported, within six months after their delivery. Each volume is to contain at least six hundred pages, and is to be sold at $5.00 a volume. The reporter owns the copyright and pays the expense of publishing. The state takes two hundred copies at $6.00 a volume.

MISTAKES OF LAW.

(Continued from Vol. III, p. 448.)

The question was much discussed by the supreme court of Alabama, in the case of Jones v. Watkins, 1 Stew. 181, and the court expressed themselves strongly against relieving from mistakes of law, but the point was neither necessarily nor properly before the court. There the plaintiffs, years before, had given their notes, stipulating therein to pay a large rate of interest, in the belief that under the statute they might lawfully stipulate for any rate of interest that the parties should agree upon. When the notes matured they paid some of them voluntarily, and suffered judgment to be taken by default on the others. Some years afterward the courts decided, that the statute in question limited the rate of interest in cases like this to a sum much smaller than plaintiffs had paid. Thereupon plaintiffs filed their bill to recover the overpayment. There were several reasons why they were not entitled to relief. One was, that their remedy, at least at law, was barred by the statute of limitation before their bill was filed. Another was, that they had a good legal defense at the time to the actions brought on the notes, but had failed to make it; again, there was no fraud shown, but the notes were paid in exact conformity to the original intention of the parties; or, in other words, they had paid what the law would not have compelled them to pay, but what, in equity and conscience, they ought. The case did not, therefore, call for the interference of the court.

In Pinkham v. Gear, 3 N. H. 163, Chief Justice Richardson regarded it as well settled that no man can avoid his contracts by an allegation that he made it under a mistake of law. This nobody will dispute, for it is clear that the mistake must be not only alleged, but proved. The case of Peterborough v.