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gery; that depending upon the intention with which the alteration was made. A fraudulent or felonious intention is not to be presumed, but it is to be proved. Ib.

3. Although an alteration in a promissory note be material, so that the makers might, if they should so elect, avoid payment upon the ground of the unauthorized alteration, yet, as they might, upon inquiring into the facts and circumstances, ratify the alteration, and thus render the note valid, or consent to pay it without regard to such alteration, and as it would be just that they should do so, the law will infer that they would. Ib.

4. But this is a question which concerns the makers alone. A third person, who is not a party to the note, nor in privity with any one who is a party, has no interest in the question, nor right to assume that the makers will refuse to pay on account of the alteration. Ib.

5. A person, to whom a promissory note made by another has been turned out by the holders as collateral security for the payment of a loan, and who, on demand of the note, after payment of the loan, refuses to redeliver it, cannot, in an action by such holders to recover for the wrongful conversion of the note, set up the defense that a material alteration has been made in it since it was executed, either as a bar to the action or to mitigate the damages. Ib.

6. The whole matter and subject of the alteration of the note is, as between the parties to such action, wholly irrelevant and immaterial for any purpose. Ib.

REFEREE.

A referee should pass upon objections to evidence as they arise. It is error for him to reserve his rulings upon the questions arising, and objections made, until the final submission of the case, and there decide the case as though there had been no objections to any portion of the evidence. Smith v. Kobbe.

NOTES OF DECISIONS IN UNITED STATES COURTS.*

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

1. What property exempt under. - A family sewing machine is properly exempt under the fourteenth section of the bankrupt act. In re Graham, bankrupt. Opinion by Hopkins, J.

2. A watch, not being exempt by the statute of the State, does not properly come within the discretionary articles contemplated by that section. Ib.

3. Exemption defeated by fraud. - In property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors prior to the filing of the petition against him, and afterward recovered to the estate, he cannot claim any exemptions. The sale is good as against him; in attempting to place this property beyond the reach of his creditors he has placed his exemptions beyond his own reach. Ib. 4. In the list of exemptions the value of the articles set apart should be stated, so that it may be seen whether they come within the limitations of the act. Ib.

5. Involuntary bankruptcy: removing property.Under section 29 of the bankrupt act it is not necessary that the debtor should be an actor in promoting

* From Josiah H. Bissell, reporter of seventh judicial circuit.

the taking of his property; the suffering it to be taken is a violation of the act. In re Heller, bankrupt. Opinion by Hopkins, J.

6. Duty of insolvent when sued. It is the duty of an insolvent, when sued, to take measures to secure the equal disposition of his property among his creditors. Ib.

7. And if he makes no defense to the actions, does not notify his other creditors of such suits, nor do any thing to prevent the obtaining a preference, he suffers his property to be taken within the meaning of that section. Ib.

8. When debtor suffers an act which he might prevent, and the necessary consequence of which is to give a preference to certain creditors, the law presumes that he intended such result. Ib.

9. An insolvent who, when sued, does not apply for the benefit of the bankrupt act, nor notify his other creditors of such suit, "suffers his property to be taken," etc., within the meaning of the 39th section of the act. Ib.

JURISDICTION.

1. Foreclosure of railroad mortgage. Where a bill had been filed in this court to foreclose a mortgage given by a railroad company, various interlocutory orders entered, a trustee appointed who had taken possession of the road, and on the faith of these orders certain bonds had been surrendered, stocks taken and debts and liabilities incurred, this is the proper tribunal to decide the rights and equities of the parties in interest. Bill v. The New Albany and Salem Railroad Company. Opinion by Drummond, J.

2. The trustee should report here, and any of the parties have the right to insist upon such report. He has no right to turn over to another jurisdiction matters which had been partially adjudicated here, and this is the only court whose decisions upon the rights involved are binding upon parties. Ib.

3. When a party in interest in such case asks for relief, it is no answer to say that another jurisdiction has attempted to seize the property, and thus place it beyond the power of this court to give relief. Ib.

4. When, during the pendency of the suit, in this court, the trustee, acting with certain bondholders, but without notice to or permission from this court, filed a bill in the State court to foreclose the same mortgages which are the subject of this bill, and making no reference to the case in this court, upon which a receiver was appointed, foreclosure ordered, and sale made by the sheriff, who, under order of the court, delivered the road to the purchasers, such an interference on the part of the State court with property at the time within the jurisdiction of this court was unauthorized, and it is, nevertheless, within the control of this court to adjudiate upon the equitable rights of all who have ever been before it. Ib.

5. In such a case a bondholder and stockholder is entitled to the equitable interposition of this court to protect his rights under its decrees, and to demand an account from the trustee or his representative. Ib.

6. The purchasers and their counsel having had notice of what had occurred in this court cannot claim to be bona fide purchasers. Ib.

7. The company being insolvent, the original trustees having died without rendering a proper account to this court, and the road being in the actual possession of parties in hostility to its decrees, a receiver should be appointed. Ib.

NEGLIGENCE.

A tug is in fault which, in a crowded thoroughfare like the Chicago river, proceeds at the rate of over five miles an hour. McNamara et al. v. The Tug Little Giant et al. Opinion by Davis, J.

THE LATE PROFESSOR VON VANGEROW. The students of Roman jurisprudence in Great Britain and the United States of America will learn with deep and unfeigned regret of the demise of Professor Adolph Carl von Vangerow, of the University of Heidelberg. Within the last few years the old Ruprecht university has suffered irreparable losses in the removal by death of Mittermaier, Rothe, and Von Vangerow. Not only were these professors great scholars, but they were preeminently gentle and good men. As a criminal lawyer, upon whom Professor Feuerbach, of Bavaria, cast his mantle, no man has, perhaps, ever obtained to so high a position as Mittermaier. His countenance was stamped with benignity, and his life furnishes an example of what a man should aim at who is desirous of being a true patriot and a friend of the human race. Rothe was a model theologian. His quiet caimness, his unaffected piety, and his beaming countenance, transfused almost with celestial ardor, when delivering certain parts of his lectures on the "Leben Jesu," can never be forgotten by those who have been his pupils, and enjoyed his friendship. But Von Vangerow was a strong man; strong in frame and muscle, and one can scarcely believe that he has passed away years before attaining the allotted span of human life. As one looks at the accumulated memoranda obtained at his lectures, and remembers that his allotted two hours daily for lectures on the pandects were sometimes extended to upward of three, one cannot but feel that the life of the great man has been shortened through the waste occasioned by the enormous physical energy consumed in his inimitable addresses.

The successful German professor is a despot, but his despotism is of the divine type, for he sways his scepter in the domain of intellect by the force of his inflexible purpose and his superior mental power. As one has often quietly walked by the side of Von Vangerow, in the old Plockstrasse in Heidelberg, and received his friendly, kindly greeting, one easily realized that he was a strong man in every sense, but no one would have guessed from his appearance that such hidden fires of eloquence lay smouldering beneath that quiet and repose. But it was so, for Von Vangerow was a man of a lion-like nature, and all his movements were like the tramp of a Titan. Mittermaier was, in his lectures, colloquial, fragmentary, suggestive, lacking system and completion; Rothe was chaste, finished and exquisite; but Von Vangerow had a power of utterance and of eloquence, with a voice like the tone of a trummpet and the melody of a harp, that no other professor we have ever heard possessed. This is no exaggeration, as those who have known the lamented German will admit. There is a marked distinction between a German professor, of the first rank, and many public teachers in our own country. The German, impressed by his theme and dominated by his subjects, gives you the result of his craft in a finished and carefully planned piece of workmanship. The very "chips from the workshop" of such a man are valuable. The Englishman too often forgets that he is an investigator; he speaks as if he knew every thing, and as though it were

an act of condescension to treat upon the subject he has in hand. Such men could never occupy the first rank in a German university. The genius loci requires something different, and the professor can only hope to obtain success when he is natural in his manner, and when he is himself so interested in his subject as to command the lively interest of others.

On

But to return to Von Vangerow. He was born in the south of Germany, at Shiffelbach, a village in Kurhessen, not far from Marburg. In the beautiful country where Luther met and contended with Zuinglius, he spent his youthful days. The current conviction with his Heidelberg students used to be, that he was not particularly industrious in his early life; and it was even hinted that he was once plucked. However this may have been, it is certain that from his sixteenth year, now nearly half a century, he has devoted his noble energies to the study of jurisprudence. January 23, 1830, he was advanced to the degree of Doctor of the Civil and the Canon Law, and the following Easter he commenced his professional career as Privatdocent in the University of Marburg. It is not a little remarkable that Savigny, Puchta and Von Vangerow were at different times associated with the Hessian university of Marburg. Savigny commenced his student life there in 1795, and took his doctor's degree in the same legal school on October 31, 1800. Puchta was a professor at Marburg in 1837, and Von Vangerow was for ten years identified with this seat of learning, as student, tutor and professor. He was appointed professor extra-ordinarius at Marburg in the year 1833; in 1837 he was appointed, in the same university, ordinary professor, that is, one of the principal professors of the law. Upon the death of the distinguished professor Thibaut, in the autumn of 1810, just thirty years ago, Von Vangerow was invited to the University of Heidelberg, where he remained till his lamented death, the most popular professor of the Roman law in Germany.

In Germany it is usual to mark distinguished literary and scientific ability by court favor. Thus, two years after Von Vangerow's settlement at Heidelberg, he was appointed a court councilor in the Grand Duchy of Baden; in 1846 he was made a privy court councilor; and in 1849 he became a "geheimrath" or privy councilor in the same state. He was a knight of both German and Russian orders.

No man's writings could possibly give less idea of his flowing and rich eloquence in his class than those of Von Vangerow. In this country a man writes a lecture, polishes it and touches it up, not for the benefit of his class, for they may doze or scribble while he is delivering it, but because he has the publication of a book in view. It is quite different in Germany. There is no compulsion to attend lectures, no register of attendance is kept, and hence the student's life is the freest period of a young man's course. The student may wander about with his dogs, or he may spend his time by bawling songs from his "Commerz Buch" in his club, or fighting duels on the far side of the Neckar. If he is to be won and riveted to his class it must be by the power and eloquence of the professor. It is a remarkable fact that with all this freedom men sometimes "hospitiren" to learn what is going on in other classes, but they rarely forsake their own favorite professors. The secret of a German professor's popularity is not merely to be traced to his great stores of learning, but to the unfettered use he learns to make of his voice.

Göethe himself, a prince among writers, has said: "To write is to abuse speech, and perusal is but a sad substitute for the living energy of language." But Von Vangerow himself shall be heard upon this point, as it will explain his own marvelous success. He has said:

"I hold it to be an essential requirement of lectures on the modern Roman law that the verbal discussions of the lecturer should not only comprehend in a fragmentary manner the general distinct parts of the law, but should present for the contemplation of the auditors the entire system as an organic whole. Of course, I here presume a free and characteristic delivery, one in which the professor is, at the time of his lecture, really self-active. Lectures that are dictated or read ought, in common justice, never to be given, for they are only destructive to the intellect of the professor, tending to convert his avocation into actual misery, while they lack the penetrative vitality which give to a spoken lecture its real value."

Such men as Savigny, Puchta and Von Vangerow would never have obtained their world-wide reputation if they had confined themselves to the ipsissima verba of their MSS. The ready utterance, the keen, quick eye, kindly glancing at the student and ascertaining at once whether the statement was understood; the courteous demeanor and sympathy of these great men, all brought to a focus, powerfully ministered to the advancement of their students, and to their own welldeserved European fame. Powerful and fascinating as were the addresses of Von Vangerow, he was a true and faithful disciple of the school of Savigny. Not only did he talk of the original sources of the law, but he constantly led his students to refresh and stimulate their research at the fountain head. The great revival in the study of jurisprudence that the present century has witnessed in Germany has been the result of the careful and loyal study of the sources of the law, contained in the "Corpis Juris Civilis" and the other writings of the jurists and scholars of antiquity.

Von Vangerow's inaugural address, delivered at Marburg in 1830, consisted of a commentary on I. 22 Cod. "De jure deliberandi” (6.30). This address was succeeded by the following works: A treatise upon the "Latini Juniani," Marburg, 1833; "De Furto Concepto ex Lege XII. Tabularum," Heidelberg, 1815; his great work entitled "Leitfaden für Pandektenvorlesungen," -elementary work for lectures on the modern civil law-was first published at Marburg in three volumes, 1837, and the following years. This work has passed through several editions; the seventh was published only last year. Almost his last work was a monogram on the difficult questions connected with the Senatus Consultum Neronianum. Von Vangerow has also written in Richter's "Jahrbuch" several critical works, and in the " Archives for Civil Practice," of which he has been co-editor since 1841, a great number of articles have appeared from his pen.

In contrasting the three great civilians of Germany of modern times, it may be observed that Puchta was a compact and philosophical writer, who, if he had lived at the time of the early Roman jurists, when the luminaries of legal science were grouped in two constellations of surpassing brightness, would have been found marshaled with the Proculians, the sect or school that treated the law with philosophical freedom, deriving its arguments from the appropriateness and the utility of the law itself. Arndts, formerly of Vienna, is preeminently a plain, able, and practical writer.

But Von Vangerow possessed a critical acumen that amounted to genius. His arguments are so striking and cogent, he is so fair to his opponents, combining the clear common sense of the best English controversialists with the learning and acuteness of a German.

The Pandekten of our great master is a work upon the modern Roman law altogether unique. To the general student it would be regarded as lacking the completeness and finish of Puchta. To the advanced student, Von Vangerow presents, in his extracts from the authorities and his discussions on the controverted points of the law, a mine of wealth and treasure, not to be found in any modern treatise on the Roman law. In this three volumes, containing almost as many thousand pages, we possess the most acute discussions on the controversies of the Roman law, found either in ancient or modern writers. These volumes, however, give no adequate conception, to a mere reader, of his well-rounded and perfectly spoken lectures. His works resemble a vast workshop stored with materials, and containing things in various stages of completeness. Their great value can be only appreciated by those who have used them as text-books for his spoken lectures. During the winter-session of the University of Heidelberg, for five months of the year, hundreds of students flocked to his class. They came from all parts of Germany, from France, Holland, Belgium, England, Italy, Spain, Greece, Russia and the United States of America. Full and systematic, microscopically correct and accurate in his authorities and his definitions, his students never wearied of listening to him, and even grew enthusiastic in their devotedness to the professor, and to the branch of the law of which he was so great a master. In his lectures there seemed to be revived the fluency, the beauty and promptness of the great Roman jurist, Ulpianus.

One of the best informed of our daily journals recently printed the following able, truthful and pertinent remarks on the great jurist.

"While French journalists have been circulating fictitious stories about the mysterious death of an illustrious German officer, one of the most noteworthy among German professors has suddenly passed away. By the death, in his sixty-s 'cond year, of Professor Vangerow, at Heidelberg, Germany loses one of her greatest jurists, and the students of Roman law one of their most accomplished teachers. Since Savigny died, Professor Vangerow has had no superior in the world as an authority upon Roman law. For the last twenty years his lectures have attracted students to Heidelberg from all parts of the globe. In his class room, students from every State in Germany, from England, Scotland and America, attentively listened to the exposition of the principles of Roman law, and to an explanation of the points which had been the subjects of controversy and doubt. There was not a pamphlet relating to the law which the professor had not read, and to which, in his work entitled 'Pandekten,' he did not make some reference. He had the gift, possessed by few of his countrymen, of being exhaustive without being exhausting. His lucidity of exposition was as great as his learning. This contributed to make him renowned as a teacher. Indeed, his fame as a writer is out of proportion to his capacity. Had he devoted himself, like Savigny, to the production of some comprehensive work on Roman law, he would, doubtless, have made a greater mark in the voluminous literature of which Roman jurisprudence is the theme. He might have done this, however, without rendering a

more important service to the students of jurisprudence. Those who profited by his teaching will be able to accomplish that which he had not the time to undertake."

We hope and believe that the closing words of this writer may be verified in the future.

Many years ago, Mr. Chittenden, of the American bar, was sitting by the side of the writer of this sketch, at the close of Von Vangerow's course of lectures on the Pandects. All the class were in a state of exhaustion; but it was felt to be exhaustion after a mighty victory. Never will the plaudits with which those lectures were concluded be forgotten. Mr. Chittenden retired with the writer, to the building now known as the "Hotel de Russe," and while the present writer was penning an article on Lord Palmerston for the American Press, Mr. Chittenden wrote on a piece of paper, still preserved, the following account of that closing lecture: "Dr. Von Vangerow was deeply affected, for his students had faithfully clung to him till his last utterance. His face was flushed and his glorious voice trembled with feeling. When he closed, thunders of applause testified the admiration of his students, and many a tear was brushed away from manly cheeks. 'Gentlemen,' said Von Vangerow, 'we have attained our object, and I have now only a pleasant duty to perform. Though, during the long months that have fled, I have given your patience a severe trial, I still hope that the recollection of the labor my instructions have cost you will not cast too deep a shade upon the lectures themselves. You will, I know, remember that the labor has been mutual. I am confident that the investigations of the past session have demonstrated to you that the study of the pandects is, and will be, the only sure basis of a scientific knowledge of the law. I am quite sure that your further researches in jurisprudence will be facilitated by the attention you have paid to this subject. One who knew well has said, and said correctly, "bonus pandectista, bonus jurista," and the experience of every age confirms the assertion. I trust you will regard the notes of my lectures, which you will carry away with you, as a friendly souvenir of the past session. But my time fails; I thank you heartily for your kind and studious attention. It is a guarantee to me that you have acquired a correct idea of the full significance of the principles and doctrines advanced. I shall not, however, blame you,' he pleasantly observed, if you rejoice somewhat at the thought, that—instead of listening to the voice that has so long resounded in this lecture hall-you are about to enjoy a pleasant ferien in the homes of your friends. Farewell.'" Several have been the communications since that "Farewell," which have come from the kind-hearted and noble professor on the banks of the Neckar to the old student on the banks of the Thames. On the 18th of October last a letter came with the Baden impress. It told his former pupil and friend that the excellent professor, Dr. Von Vangerow, was dead, and that on the previous Friday he had been laid in his last resting-place-his "quiet bed," as the Germans call it not far from Umbreit, and Mittermaier, and Rothe, and that a distinguished professor from Munich had been already invited to occupy his chair.-Law Magazine and Review.

There are 347 rules already in force for regulating the practice under the English bankruptcy act.

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Editor Law Journal: Your correspondent, “Quidam" answers the question of "Lex" in regard to the effect of an execution against the husband on the wife's dower, "correctly,” as Bishop would say, “according to the light of reason and principle." Mr. Parker's answer certainly shows two very conclusive cases in favor of the affirmative of the original question, so far, at least, as New York is concerned. But, before the matter passes as universally settled, as these correspondents seem to think it, please permit me to call attention to the following note, by Sharswood, to 2 Bl. Com. 137, n. 27: "In some States dower is barred by a sale on execution for the debts of the husband. Davidson v. Frew, 3 Deo. 3; Gardiner v. Miles, 5 Gill, 94; Reed v. Morrison, 12 8. & R. 18: Loudon v. Loudon, 1 Humph. 1." Also, "a sale of lands under a testamentary power for the payment of debts discharges the land from the dower of the testator's widow. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8 Barr, 126.” Perhaps this will induce some one who cares to investigate the matter to give further light on the subject. STUDENT.

LEGAL NEWS.

Of the twenty-three law schools in this country, Harvard, founded in 1817, is the oldest.

A bill has passed the Connecticut legislature creating the office of attorney-general.

Humphrey William Woolrych, sergeant at law and author of a number of legal works, died in England on the 2d of July.

An exchange says that General Phil. Sheridan was made a doctor of laws because of his knowledge of cannon law.

Jules Favre, the great French leader, has resumed the active practice of the law. He re-appeared in his barrister's robes at the palace of justice on the third instant.

The number of assistant assessors of the internal revenue service in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, July 1, 1870, was 154. The number now employed is 93.

The commissioner of internal revenue has decided that officers of a Territorial government are not entitled to the exemptions from income tax, as are officers of State governments under the decision of the supreme court, in the case of Buffington v. Day.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, AUGUST 19, 1871.

SUICIDE AND LIFE INSURANCE. Considering the limited knowledge which the courts have on the subject of insanity, it is not wonderful that they have been unable to agree as to the effect of suicide on life insurance.

Most policies contain provisions rendering them void in case the assured shall die by his own hand, or shall commit suicide, or shall die by suicide. That these are synonymous terms is not disputed, but whether they include self-destruction under the influence of insanity, as ordinarily understood, is not agreed.

That suicide is not necessarily the effect of mental derangement, but may be the act of a sound, rational mind, is admitted by the most eminent writers on insanity; but that it frequently is the result of insanity, in one form or another, is settled beyond dispute. Ray divides suicides into two classes, founded upon the different causes or circumstances by which they are actuated. The first includes those who have deliberately committed the act from the force of moral motives alone; the second, those who have been affected with some pathological condition of the brain, excited or not by moral motives. Ray on Insanity, 487. Under the first division may be classed those cases where the suicide has been committed to escape infamy, or on account of a sudden and serious reverse of fortune, etc. Under the second head he classes suicides resulting from a melancholy disposition, or from an impulse or propensity to self-destruction, etc.

The authorities concur with considerable unanimity that suicide resulting from some forms of insanity is not covered by the terms of the policy above quoted; but what shall be the criterion is far from settled. The one sustained by some of the authorities, and by the dictates of common sense, is the same as if the act were that of homicide-did the person know right from wrong, etc.? And, to sustain this view, the maxim of nosciter a sociis has been brought to bear, The terms suicide, or death by his own hand, are generally placed in the policy in connection with the other exceptions - "death in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the known violation of any law." And it is contended that this coupling of the words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense, and that, inasmuch as the last three exceptions designate criminal acts, the first must be taken to designate a similar act - that is, felonious self-killing. There is another well-known rule of construction that has been applied by the courts, holding that "suicide," as used, means felo de se, viz.: that the words of the proviso being the words of the insurers and not the assured, are to be taken, if doubtful, most strongly against the former.

more liberal to the insurer. In Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gran. (1843), the policy contained a proviso that, in case the assured should die by his own hands, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, the policy should be void. The assured threw himself into the Thames, and was drowned. The court instructed the jury that "if the assured by his own act intentionally destroyed his own life, and that he was not only conscious of the probable consequences of the act, but did it for the express purpose of destroying himself voluntarily, having at the time sufficient mind to will to destroy his life, the case would be brought within the condition of the policy; but if he was not in a state of mind to know the consequences of the act, then it would not come within the condition." The jury found that the assured "voluntarily threw himself into the water, knowing at the time that he should thereby destroy his life, and intending thereby to do so, but at the time of committing the act, he was not capable of judging between right and wrong." By the first part of the verdict it was made a case of felo de se, and by the last part a case of insanity. Judgment was entered for the office, and was subsequently affirmed by three of the judges of the common pleas, Tindal, C. J., dissenting. Much stress was laid by the majority, upon the fact that the jury found the act of self-destruction to have been voluntary. Erskine, J., said: "Looking simply at that branch of the proviso upon which the issue was raised, it seems to me that the only qualification that a liberal interpretation of the words with reference to the nature of the contract requires is, that the act of self-destruction should be the voluntary and willful act of a man having at the time sufficient powers of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to cause his own death by that act; and that the question whether at the time he was capable of understanding and appreciating the moral nature and quality of his purpose is not relevant to the inquiry, further than as it might help to illustrate the extent of his capacity to understand the physical character of the act itself. It appears indeed to me that, excluding for the present the consideration of the immediate context of the words in question, the fair inference to be drawn from the nature of the contract would be, that the parties intended to include all willful acts of self-destruction, whatever might be the moral responsibility of the assured at the time."

The next English case was that of Schwabe v. Clift (1846), which was tried at nisi prius, before Cresswell, J. It was upon a policy containing the provision that if the assured should "commit suicide," etc., the policy should be void. The assured died from the effects of sulphuric acid taken by himself, but evidence was given tending to show that at the time he took the acid he was, in fact, of unsound mind. In his The English courts have adopted an interpretation charge to the jury, the learned judge said, that to

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