constituted the commune. If M. Thiers recognized, as he unquestionably did, the right of these men to overthrow a settled government of a fifth of a century, he certainly cannot claim that they are felons now for attempting to overthrow a government not a month old.

Rebellion being only a political offense, it follows prima facie that every insurgent engaged in rebellious warfare has committed no extradition crime, and every act done in the bona fide prosecution of that warfare, though shocking in itself, is but an offense against the state. Were the burning of the Tuilleries, the slaughter of the archbishop of Paris and the other hostages, the destruction of the public buildings and the firing of the city, acts done in the bona fide prosecution of this warfare? Horrible as these acts undoubtedly were, it is not impossible to suppose that they may have been resorted to for the same reasons that kindred measures have been frequently resorted to in international wars, viz.: for reprisal or for strategical purposes.

Again, the commune was for nearly three months the de facto government of Paris, and exercised the attributes of sovereignty. It waged war, levied armies, held elections, made laws, collected taxes and contracted loans. Now, suppose that the murder of the hostages, or any or all of the many horrible acts done, were done in obedience to or furtherance of the commands of this de facto government, would this remove them from the category of ordinary crimes and give them the character of political offense? If yes, then the perpetrators of them are clearly not liable to extradition. That there was no sufficient political motive for the acts does not affect the question. We have no right to investigate the motive, so soon as it is established that the commune was a de facto government, and that these crimes were committed in obedience to the orders of that government.

PRACTICAL LOCATION OF DIVISION LINES. For many years there have been but two ways in which the citizen could acquire title to lands; first, by grant; second, by such long possession that a grant should be conclusively presumed, or as it is commonly called, adverse possession. In most, probably all, communities, the length of time necessary to establish this presumption is fixed by statute. But within a comparatively recent period, attempts have been made in the courts, based upon strong and apparent equities, to evade the statutes of limitation in this respect, and give force to the agreements of parties in regard to boundary lines, and to their long continued occupation of premises in a particular manner, but for less than the statutory period. It may be useful to examine these cases. We will examine the question of location, fixed, first, by mere acquiescence; second, by specific agreement; and third, by equitable estoppel.

ACQUIESCENCE.

The earliest case in this state is Jackson v. Bowen, 1 Caines, 363, A. D. 1803. It was decided that an adverse possession of more than twenty years was a bar to a recovery in ejectment. The court remarked that if a man was mistaken in respect to his title, but, under circumstances showing no suspicion of imposition or ignorance, acquiesced in a possession by another in hostility to it, for the length of time shown in this case, he ought to be concluded. That length of time in this case was thirty-six years.

In Jackson v. Dysling, 2 Caines, 197, A. D. 1804, the plaintiff's lessor and the defendant's predecessor had forty years before employed two surveyors to run a line between them, and the defendant's predecessor by parol agreed to remove his fence to the line which the surveyors found, but there was evidence of a subsequent parol agreement, between the plaintiff's lessor and the defendant, in effect rescinding that agreement. This second agreement was, that if a suit between Klock, defendant's predecessor, and Wills, should be decided in favor of Klock, the defendant was to give up possession without suit; but if Wills prevailed, the plaintiff's lessor was to abandon his claim.

No evidence as to the event of that suit was given. Judge Spencer thought the first parol agreement binding, but held it rescinded by the second; that the plaintiff was bound to show the result of that suit; but he held the acquiescence of forty years to be conclusive in favor of the defendant. Judge Livingston held the first agreement invalid, because it was not acted on, but agreed with Spencer as to the acquiescence. Judge Thompson held the first agreement not affected by the statute; that the second agreement had nothing to do with the case as it stood, or that the defendant should have chosen the result of the suit; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Judgment of nonsuit.

In Jackson v. Vedder, 3 Johns. 8, A. D. 1808, it was held, that, where a partition had been made, with a survey and a map, and possession had been taken accordingly and held for forty years, the parties were concluded from contesting the correctness of the actual location.

In Jackson v. Diefendorf, 3 Johns. 269, A. D. 1808, it was held, that, where a location had been made under a deed and survey, and undisturbed possession held accordingly for thirty-eight years, it should prevail, although subsequently made to appear inac

curate.

In Jackson v. Ogden, 7 Johns. 238, A. D. 1810, the grant was uncertain and ambiguous as to location, but there had been an acquiescence of seventeen or eighteen years, during which the land had been cultivated and become valuable. The plaintiff also had purchased under defendant's title, taking a deed recognizing the lines thus located. A majority of the court held this to be conclusive. But Judge Van Ness dissented, holding that the grants conferred no

title on the defendant, and that such a length of possession was not sufficient to make title. He says, at page 245: "The extent which we have hitherto gone is, that when two persons already having a title have settled the line of division between them, or when one having title has made an actual location, according to what he supposed to be his true line, and his neighbors have acquiesced in such location for a considerable length of time, the boundary thus established shall remain undisturbed. But in this case my brethren go greatly beyond the principle of our former decisions."

In Jackson v. Douglass, 8 Johns. 367, A. D. 1811, where there was no uncertainty as to the true location of two adjoining lots of land, the single fact that one of the plaintiff's lessors, eight years before, had pointed out a mistaken line, which was fenced accordingly, was not sufficient to conclude the plaintiff.

In Jackson v. Gardner, 8 Johns. 394, A. D. 1811, it was held, that, where A. voluntarily surrendered a lease and took a new lease, and afterward claimed under the old lease, he could recover no more land than what he could prove with absolute certainty was covered by the old lease; especially after the premises claimed had been in possession of another for sixteen years, who had made valuable improvements. | In Stuyvesant v. Dunham, 9 Johns. 61, A. D. 1812, there was a crooked fence between the parties, which the plaintiff proposed to the defendant to straighten. Accordingly, the plaintiff employed a surveyor, who, to the knowledge of the defendant, and without objection on his part, ran a straight line. The plaintiff removed the fence to this line, and the defendant pulled it down. The plaintiff brought trespass. The defendant showed that he and his ancestors had been possessed of the locus in quo for more than twentyfive years, and that during all that time the crooked fence had been the boundary. Also, that before the plaintiff's removal of the fence he objected to it. The plaintiff was defeated.

In Jackson v. Smith, 9 Johns. 100, A. D. 1812, it was held that where a survey was made by the direction and under the observation of the grantee, he cannot, after the lapse of twenty-six years, vary the location. The grant in question was "for the use of the gospel," but the court do not seem to lay any stress on the peculiar sacredness of the purpose.

In Jackson v. McCall, 10 Johns. 377, A. D. 1813, it was proved that the immediate predecessor of the lessor of the plaintiff had repeatedly confessed that he was present when the line was run by the king's surveyors, and that the line set up by the defendant was the one he referred to. This line had been recognized on both sides for forty-one years. Held, conclusive against the plaintiff.

In Jackson v. Van Corlear, 11 Johns. 127, A. D. 1814, the parties had made a new survey, and agreed on the line run thereon as the true boundary. Positive acts of acquiescence were shown, and after

nineteen years the line thus established was held conclusive. But this was expressly placed on the ground of the agreement.

In Jackson v. Freer, 17 Johns. 29, A. D. 1819, the proprietors of the patent had partitioned the same by actual survey, and the lot in question had been improved more than twenty years, and the defendant had possessed it fourteen years. A verdict for defendant was sustained. The decision was placed on the ground of the original agreement.

In Rockwell v. Adams, 7 Cowen, 761, A. D. 1827, action of replevin, tried in 1825, it does not appear how long the acquiescence had been. The lands were wild, and no occupation was shown except cutting of timber, and there had been no agreement as to the line. But the court held that where the line has been acquiesced in for a great number of years, by all the parties interested, it is conclusive evidence of an agreement to that line; citing Jackson v. Bowen, Jackson v. Vedder and Jackson v. Diefendorf, and adding, "In each of these cases erroneous locations had been made, and they had been acquiesced in (not with a full knowledge that they were erroneous, but under a belief that they were correct), for from thirty to forty years." The court also hold that an actual practical location will control, although the party does not know that its effect will be to give him less land than he would otherwise be entitled to, and that there need be no express agreement to abide by the line. And the court then adopt and sanction Van Ness' dissenting opinion in Jackson v. Ogden as the true rule. The verdict for defendant was set aside. The action was tried again in 1828 (6 Wend. 467, A. D. 1821), eleven years acquiescence was shown. The plaintiff had a verdict. Chief Justice Savage said the question was the same as in 7 Cowen, adopted the law there laid down, and denied a new trial. From this decision error was brought, and the case came up again in 1836, before the court of errors (16 Wend. 285), and this is the starting point back to which all subsequent decisions go. Chancellor Walworth laid down this rule: "Where there can be no real doubt as to how the premises should be located, according to certain and known boundaries described in the deed, to establish a practical location different therefrom, which shall deprive the party claiming under the deed of his legal rights, there must be either a location which has been acquiesced in for a sufficient length of time to bar a right of entry under the statute of limitations in relation to real estate; or the erroneous line must have been agreed upon between the parties claiming the land on both sides thereof; or the party whose right is to be thus barred must have silently looked on and seen the other party doing acts, or subjecting himself to expenses, in relation to the land on the opposite side of the line, which would be an injury to him, and which he would not have done if the line had not been so located, in which case, perhaps, a grant might