tion. The localities through which the road will pass in crossing the State of Minnesota and the Territories of Dakota, Idaho, Oregon and Washington, are also left for future determination after accurate surveys. Whether the route of Stevens or Mullan, or perhaps a more southerly one, will be adopted, remains to be decided.

The only limitation fixed in this bill is that the road shall not run farther south than the forty-fourth and a half degree of latitude; and I may here say that this limitation was mentioned in order to meet the fears entertained by some of the committee that if this road should run farther south it might conflict with the interests of the Central (Union Pacific) road. Such a fear is entirely unfounded. It is not possible that the Northern can injuriously interfere with the Central. The large extent of territory necessarily between them, averaging five or six hundred miles, would forever preclude this possibility. One might as well contend upon a similar reason that there should be but one road leading northeasterly between St. Louis and New York. And in addition to this, I am able to say, from conversation with those most largely interested in the Central road, that so far from considering this road prejudicial to theirs, it would be an aid, and they expressed their earnest wishes for its success.

A

You will perceive on examining the bill that it is drawn care, fully with reference to insuring the early commencement of the road. The fact that no money is asked by its friends of the Government may raise doubts in the minds of some, who comprehend the magnitude of the undertaking, whether it will not prove a mere idle and useless experiment. It is not so considered by those who are moving in it. They believe that there are advantages for building this road, and inducements for investing money in it by subscribing for its stock, which no other route to the Pacific can possibly command. While they ask not a dollar of Government bonds or money, and by the bill are precluded from taking any of the mineral lands crossed by the road, and are also prevented from ever issuing any mortgage or construction bonds without the consent of Congress, they are content with the grant of lands provided by this act, and believe that with this as a foundation, and with the provision that no incumbrance can be placed on it by the company, stock will be subscribed for and the work assured.

In relation to section thirteen of the bill, which provides that the act shall be void unless bona fide subscriptions to the stock to the amount of $2,000,000 shall be procured with ten per cent. paid within two years after the passage and approval of this act, I will here say, that from assurances made to me by gentlemen interested in it, and whom I know to be possessed of large means, that the amount required can be raised in one week after the passage of this bill. They say, give us twenty alternate sections of

land on each side of the railroad through the Territories, and ten sections per mile through the States, and we are ready to risk our money. This land is now virtually useless to the Government, and so far as surveyed is open to occupation and settlement at mere nominal prices. The land which will be left after this appropriation to the road will be increased a hundred-fold in value after the road is built; and to meet any possible suspicion that this is to be used as a mere speculative scheme for the purpose of getting hold of the public lands, I beg you to bear in mind that by the language of the bill, expressly prepared for the purpose, not one single acre of land can ever vest in this corporation except upon the terms of actually constructing and having ready for service the road, in sections of at least twenty-five miles each.

MAINE CHARTER.

But it is said, "Why grant this bill in aid of a company chartered by the Legislature of Maine?" The question was asked a few moments since by the gentleman from Wisconsin, [Mr. SLOAN.] To those conversant with the history of "railroad communications with the Pacific" I need not say that very serious question has in past times been made as to the power of Congress to authorize the immediate agents of the Government to engage in such undertaking. As recently as 1858 President Buchanan, in his annual message, used the following language:

"It is freely admitted that it would be inexpedient for this Government to exercise the power of constructing the Pacific railroad by its own immediate agents. Such a policy would increase the patronage of the Executive to a dangerous extent, and introduce a system of jobbing and corruption which no vigilance on the part of Federal officers could either prevent or detect. This can only be done by the keen eye and active and careful supervision of individual and private interest. The construction of this road ought, therefore, to be committed to companies incorporated by the States, or other agencies, whose pecuniary interests would be directly involved, Congress might then assist them in the work by grants of land or of money, or both, under such conditions and restrictions as would secure the transportation of troops and munitions of war free from any charge, and that of the United States mail at a fair and reasonable price."

It was in deference to such opinions as these, and after an unsuccessful attempt to get a charter directly from Congress, that application was made to the Legislature of Maine in March, 1860, for a charter. The Legislature of that State was the only one, I think, in session so late as March of that year, and hence the application there. The Speaker of the House at that time was my colleague from the fifth district, [Mr. PIKE,] and one of the distinguished Senators from that State [Mr. MORRILL] was the Governor. I am not aware that the power has been questioned of one State granting a charter for building railroads outside side of its territories, subject, of course, to the consent of any other State whose territory was to be crossed. In the exercise of this power the Legislature of New York granted a charter to a company for the construction of a road across the Isthmus of Panama, and another time, I believe, for a road in Texas. The objection

to Congress granting power for such purposes to Federal agents, which existed years ago, seems not to have prevailed in 1862, when the act chartering the Central Pacific road was passed, and I am not disposed to urge now that there is any soundness in such an objection; but I do not perceive any good reason why Congress may not legislate in aid of a company chartered by a State which would not apply with at least equal force to giving power directly to Government agents for the same purposes.

The only other interest which Maine has in this project is that which an enlightened public sentiment on this subject will create everywhere; an interest created by her bold but successful experiment in the Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, making Portland the terminus of the longest continuous railway in the world; an interest founded on the growth and increased commerce of Portland and other parts of the State, occasioned undoubtedly by that road. In illustration of this I may be pardoned for stating that in 1849, previous to the opening of this road, the exports from that place were only $643,529; and in 1863, with the road completed to Canada and thence to Detroit, they amounted to $5,018,365. The imports in 1849 were $498,346, and in 1863 they had increased to $9,034,526, including that which passed through under bond to the Canadas.

Again I say, as an additional reason why Maine is interested, more of her sons and daughters, in proportion to her population, than from any other State, have emigrated to the Northwest, and are now calling to us, in the voice of affection and by our love of kindred, as well as in behalf of the great demands of commerce and of developing this portion of the country, the value of which they have learned from personal experience and observation, to lend them our aid in carrying on this national work.

PRACTICABILITY AND IMPORTANCE.

Is this road practicable? is it important? are questions which we are called upon first to answer. The one already chartered is claimed to be both practicable and important, and in this I most fully concur; but while I admit this and would grant all reasonable aid to insure its completion, there are advantages pertaining to the Northern road which, in my judgment, no other route possesses. The distance is less, expense of building less, and greater public interests will be subserved by this than by any other communication with the Pacific. These points I propose to establish.

DISTANCES.

Accurate estimates prove that the distance from Seattle, a village situated on Elliott's bay, southerly side of Puget sound, to all our cities on the seaboard is shorter by this Northern than by the Central route.

The lineal distances from Seattle via Northern route, via Superior City and St. Paul's, and from Benecia via South Pass, via Council Bluffs, via St. Louis, to these several Ports of the Atlantic and Gulf coast, will be as follows:

Thus," as Mr. Stevens says, every seat of commerce on the coast is nearer to Puget Sound by the Northern route than to the waters of San Francisco by the Central route."

In relation to obstructions from the snow and severity of the climate, it is too well settled to require discussion that nothing need be feared from either of these causes; but as I have recently heard some question made upon this point by a gentleman on this floor, who said he had not had an opportunity to examine the subject, I will quote from the reports of Stevens and Mullan, and trust it will be sufficient to remove any further doubt. Mr. Stevens says:

"In an examination of that country, which I made in the years 1853-54-55, I deemed it a fundamental and essential fact to be determined, and it was determined in a manner that will enable me to speak positively. The passes of the Rocky mountains, Hell Gate, Northern Little Blackfoot, and Cadot's pass were crossed by my parties in the months of December, January, February, and March, in the years 1853-54, and in no one of these passes did they find more than fifteen inches of snow."

I could quote at length from all those who have surveyed this route and show conclusively that there can be no difficulty from snow, but there is not time for this. I have the authorities before 'me and will show them to any gentleman who desires it.

Again, he says:

"I will now consider the question of the cold. It is alleged that the weather is so

cold on the route of the forty-seventh parallel that it will be impracticable to work men in the construction of the road for a large portion of the year, and that it will be impracticable to run cars for many days in the winter.

"Unfortunately for these opinions, we happen to have observations on these points, and to have great lines of railroad in operation over tracts of country as cold and even colder than the route from Fort Benton to the shores of the Pacific. The mean winter temperature at Fort Benton in 1853-54 was 25° 38′ above zero. The average at Montreal, on the Grand Trunk railroad, for the same year was 13° 22′, and for a mean of ten years, 17° 80 above zero. At Quebec it was in 1853-54 11° 03′ above zero, and for a mean of ten years 13° 30′ above zero. On the great Russian railroad from St. Petersburg to Moscow the comparison is very similar. The mean winter temperature for a series of 21 years at Moscow is 15° 20' and at St. Petersburg for a mean of 25 years, 18° 10' above zero. "At Fort Snelling, on the great lines through Minnesota from St. Paul to Pembina, and from St. Paul to Breckinridge, now actually in process of construction, the mean winter temperature of 1853-54 was 11° 64', and the mean of thirty-five winters 16° 10′, above zero. Thus in the winter of 1853-54, an unusually cold winter, Fort Benton was 12° warmer than Montreal, 14° warmer than Quebec, 14° warmer than Fort Snelling, 10° warmer than Moscow, and 7° warmer than St. Petersburg. Looking to the Bitter Root valley, we find its average temperature in the winter of 1853-54 to be 24° 90′, and in 1854-55 30° 30′ above zero, making it for the two winters respectively 10° and 15° warmer than at Moscow, and 7° and 12° warmer than at St. Petersburg. In 1853-54 it was 12° warmer than at Montreal, and 14° warmer than at Quebec. But I will not content myself with giving you the average winter temperatures; let us consider the greatest cold observed. The greatest cold in the winter of 1853-54 was 29° below zero at Cantonment Stevens. At Fort Snelling it was 36°, at Montreal 34°, and at Quebec 29° below zero, from which you will see that on this route the greatest cold is not equal to the greatest cold on the route of the Grand Trunk railroad of Canada. The same fact is unquestionably true of the great artery of Russia from Moscow to St. Petersburg, but I have not been able to obtain the daily observations for purposes of comparison. We will look at it in another point of view. Take the number of cold days when the average temperature was below zero. The average temperature was below zero twelve days at Fort Benton, ten days at Cantonment Stevens, eighteen days at Fort Snelling, eighteen days at Montreal, and twenty-three days at Quebec. Thus you will see that there were more cold days on the line of the Grand Trunk railroad, and on the roads in Minnesota, than on this Northern route. Having compared the average winter temperatures, and the number of cold days, let us look at the climate in another point of view. Take the number of warm days when the average temperature was above the freezing point, and I find that at Fort Benton the thermometer was forty-three out of ninety days, and at Cantonment Stevens thirty-two out of ninety days above the freezing point, against only six days out of ninety at Fort Snelling, five days out of ninety at Quebec, eight days out of ninety at Montreal, and eighteen days out of ninety at Albany-all in the winter of 1853-54."

These facts, all drawn by Mr. Stevens from official records, ought to be enough to remove any fear of obstruction by snow or the severity of the cold.

The testimony of Mr. Mullan is the same; but I can only refer you to his very able report for the details.

Upon examination of the report of Mr. Collins, our consul at the Amoor, in 1857-58, you will find this supposed practical difficulty of snow and cold fully answered in his detailed statement of the postal service, or system of "posting" in Russia. Surrounded constantly by these difficulties, they have met them boldly and found that their existence even was only in theory. Difficulties, like dangers, ordinarily lessen in proportion as they are approached, and there is no better illustration of this, in a material point, than is found in the practicability of traversing that vast extent of territory between Moscow and Irkoutsk in eastern Siberia, of three thousand four hundred and twenty-six miles, where the cold and snow are much more troublesome than

1