CHAPTER III.

ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES.

As many as are the Judgments which admit of being formed from a simple analysis of the concepts that represent Being and its attributes, or again, that represent the primary and more general determinations of Being with their respective attributes; so many analytical Principles may there obviously be. Furthermore; any Judgments that admit of being formed from a simple analysis of the formal object of any particular science, (however inferior this latter may be in the hierarchy of sciences), will serve as an analytical Principle for that science.

Instances of such Principles are not far to find. Two shall be borrowed from the Metaphysical Science; and these have been purposely chosen, because they will form the subject of our immediate consideration. An analysis of the idea of contingent Being (one of the primary determinations of Being), supplies us with the Principle of causality. An analysis, and subsequent comparison of the idea of Being in the universality of its extension (which is real), with that of Not-Being (which is conceptual), gives the Principle of contradiction. These two will now severally occupy our attention in the order just adopted. Wherefore,

I. Concerning the evidence and certitude of the Principle of causality.

II. Concerning the value of the Principle of contradiction, as the ultimate in order of reduction. Under this section of the subject, it will occur to examine into the value of other Principles which, in more recent times, have been proposed, in place of that of contradiction, with the professed intention of deposing this latter from its ancient supremacy over the field of philosophic thought.

PROPOSITION CXIX.

The Principle of causality, (which may be thus enunciated : Inceptive or contingent Being necessarily supposes its

efficient cause) is analytical. Hence the concept of an efficient cause is essentially contained in the idea of change, or of the possible.

PROLEGOMENON I

By inceptive Being is understood Being that either has, or is capable of having, a beginning. It is not intended that the term should be contracted to substances alone; but that it should likewise include accidental transformations, as well as substantial or accidental modifications. In short: Everything real which once was not and now is, or is not but might be, is represented here by this phrase. It is sufficiently obvious that, being inceptive after the manner explained, it must be contingent, not necessary, Being.

PROLEGOMENON II.

The notion of cause is not essentially included in that of Being; though that of activity may perhaps claim such inclusion. The reason is, that cause is properly a relative idea, since it connotes an effect really distinct from itself,-actual, if the cause be actual; possible, if the cause be only possible. Hence, activity and causation are by no means identical terms. For activity may be immanent and, therefore, absolute; while causation is necessarily transitive and terminative extrinsically, or (as it may be put in Saxon phrase) outgoing. To illustrate by example: Thought in a man's mind is an immanent action, because it begins and ends with the thinker. Therefore, the thought is formal cause to the mental faculty; rather than the mental faculty efficient cause of the thought. But the question at present occupying us concerns efficient causation. On the other hand, the action of a sculptor upon a block of marble is transitive, because it passes out of himself (so to say) on to the stone; and it is terminative extrinsically, because the object which terminates his energy is external to himself. His action, therefore, as causal, connotes the effect produced upon the marble.

PROLEGOMENON III.

It will conduce towards a satisfactory prosecution of the proposed analysis, if we anticipate certain conclusions concerning the nature of time, which will be treated ex professo in a later Book. Time,

in the abstract, is a purely logical concept, which is, nevertheless, founded in reality. Apart from the existence of contingent Being, it neither is, nor could be, anything. So far as it can boast of reality, it is nothing more or less than successive change, or the succession of change, in finite and contingent entities. Hence, if there existed nothing but necessary and, consequently, immutable Being, there would be no time, but an ever-present now. If, therefore, we abstract from the notion of time all in it that is purely ideal, the residuary reality will be simply and only the mutations and sequences of finite Being. Let it be observed, however, that it is not now a question as to the approved measure of time, wherein there is naturally a greater show of reality. Notwithstanding, even here, if the matter is thoroughly sifted, it will be found that the divisions of days and months and years are purely based on the orderly succession of changes in celestial bodies.

1. IN THE FIRST MEMBER of this Thesis, it is declared that the Principle of causality (which may be thus enunciated: Inceptive Being necessarily supposes,-better perhaps, postulates,-its own efficient cause), is analytical. If such is really the case, a careful analysis of the concept of inceptive Being must evince, that within such concept is essentially contained the idea of some efficient cause, by virtue of which that said entity is, or at least may be. Let us see whether it be so, or not. It will facilitate the investigation, if we take actual inceptive Being as the subject of analysis. No one will care to deny that possible inceptive Being must be of the same nature as the former; while it is more difficult to realize, save for those who have made it a professed object of study. Actual inceptive Being, then, is Being, now existing, that once had a beginning. In consequence, previously to that beginning, it was nothing. Hence, representing the inceptive Being as A, we have two terms, respectively represented as A and not-A; i.e. the inceptive Being existent, the same Being not existent. Furthermore, objectively in order of succession not-A preceded A. Thus, then, we are initially confronted with not-A; and not-A as, in some way or other, a real term of thought. But how is this possible? For not-A is in itself a pure negation. Nor can it be said to have a real foundation in A; because, in that preceding time, there is as yet no A to be denied or removed. Again, if it were founded in A, A would be necessary Being; because, in such case, not-A

would postulate A as the necessary condition of its own conceivableness and (what is more to the point) of its objective reality, so far as it has any reality. In other words, A would be necessary to the beginning of itself, and would, therefore, exist prior to its existence. Yet, it is plain that there is a reality of some sort in the idea, for instance, that the Duke of Wellington was not in existence during the reign of William III. What can be plainer, then, (to proceed in the analysis), than that not-A postulates, even for its conceivableness, some existing entity which shall be the measure of its real priority to A? For, if you are to begin absolutely and solely with not-A, so that no existent Being whatsoever shall be presupposed, not-A is an empty nothing. The thought (if, indeed, the thought were possible) would not be representative; because it would be a negation of Nothing, and could have no object either direct or indirect. You might say, perhaps, that its precedency to A is measured by time. But this is no solution at all; for it must be remembered that time, as has been declared in the last Prolegomenon, is in itself destitute of reality, and that, as real, it is identified with the successive changes of existing contingent Being. Consequently, it cannot verify that by which alone itself is verified. Hence, it is plain that we are justified in eliminating from our present analysis the abstract idea of time, and substituting in its place the succession, or successive changes, of contingent and inceptive Being. But that brings us back to the original point of discussion. For the first change (as it may be called) of inceptive Being is from Not-A to A, i.e. from non-existence to existence. But this transition postulates, as has been already said, a real something which shall be the real measure of this transition; for, otherwise, the idea is inconceivable. It is a metaphysical impossibility that there should be such transition and, consequently, a beginning to be, without such measure.

Again: the real existing Being, which is absolutely required in order that any priority of not-A may become a possible term of thought, cannot, as we have seen, be A; because, in that priority or precedence of not-A, A was nothing, and a priority to nothing is no priority at all. It follows, therefore, that the required entity must be other than A.

Furthermore; that Being, which is thus presupposed, is necessary to the existence of A. For, without it, there could be no priority of not-A and, consequently, A could never begin to exist; whereas,

once you posit the supposed entity, the existence of A becomes ipso facto possible without further condition. But, if one Being of itself solely is a sufficient reason for the existence of another, and is also necessary, so that, without it, the existence of that other is metaphysically impossible; we are in presence of all that is required in order that the former should be truly and justly conceived as the efficient cause of the latter. Let an illustration serve to facilitate this somewhat abstruse process of thought. Chronologists tell us that Sir Walter Scott was born in the year of Grace 1771. Accordingly, in 1770 there was no Sir Walter Scott. Now, let us, for the sake of illustration, make an absurd hypothesis, and suppose that there had been no existing entity of any kind. before the birth of the great novelist. If such had been the case, could you possibly talk of his beginning to be, or of his previous non-existence? The idea perishes in its own inconceivableness. Where could you find any, even imaginary, basis for a before and after? There could have been no time; because, on the hypothesis, there was no contingent Being and, as a consequence, no successive change. Let us now proceed to introduce Sir Walter Scott's parents, and again make a fresh absurd supposition, that they were the only entities existing previous to the son's birth. Confining our inquiry to secondary causes, would they form a sufficient basis for truly conceiving that Sir Walter Scott had begun to exist? Let us examine and see. They were existing in 1770, when the son was not as yet born and was, consequently, Not-A. Relatively to them, he was Not-A; and, relatively to them, on his birth in 1771, he was A. They were, therefore, competent measure of his transition from not-being to being. Furthermore, they of themselves were sufficient (so far as proximate causation is concerned) for his existence; and, supposing the established order unaltered, they were conditionately necessary to his existence. What more is required to justify us in declaring, that they were the co-efficient causes of Sir Walter Scott? The illustration has been taken of set purpose from secondary causes; though they give rise to a difficulty, which will be brought before the notice of the reader later on. Thus, then, an analysis of the idea of inceptive Being convinces us that it essentially contains within itself the notion of an efficient cause.

To reduce the above analysis to a summary expression: Inceptive Being first was not, and afterwards was. Therefore, (i) it supposes