First of all, external extension, by virtue of which bodies are located in space, is an accident which supervenes on the actuation of matter by its form. Then, secondly, a purely receptive faculty, or power (potentia), unactuated, as we conceive primordial matter to be, would have a difficulty in either occupying or filling space. But enough of this: It is forestalling a very abtruse question which must presently engage our undivided attention.

ii. The second Principle, which Kant adduces as another instance of a synthetical à priori Judgment within the domain of physics, is the third law in Newton's theory of motion, viz. In all communication of motion, action and re-action must always be equal.' But this law is purely empirical, i. e. the result of experiment and observation. Therefore, it is synthetical indeed but not à priori.

V. Kant gives one more instance of these supposed Judgments; and now it is taken from the metaphysical science. He pronounces that the following proposition,-"The world must have a beginning,'—is a synthetical à priori Judgment 1.

ANSWER. Touching this question of a temporal commencement of the world (if the phrase may be permitted), two different opinions have been maintained in the Schools; not as to the fact, but as to the possibility of a creation from everlasting. The first opinion is, that the existence of the world from everlasting is a metaphysical impossibility, because it involves a contradiction. And this accusation the fautors of that opinion endeavour to justify by what they consider demonstrative proof. According to them, then, the said proposition is not a Principle, but a demonstrated conclusion drawn from analytical premisses. The second opinion is, that the existence of the world from everlasting is not metaphysically impossible; and that, while we accept on Divine faith the fact of its temporal commencement, it still remains true that God might have created it from all eternity, had He so pleased. Such is the opinion of St. Thomas and Suarez. Aristotle holds to the possibility; for he seems to consider it not only possible, but actual. The writer of the present work ranges himself on the side of St. Thomas and Suarez; because the demonstrations hitherto offered by the advocates of the contrary opinion are, in his humble judgment, inconclusive, while the arguments in favour of the second opinion seem to him irrefragable.

1 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 12.

Whichever of these opinions, however, be true; in neither case would this so-called metaphysical Principle be a synthetical à priori Judgment. According to the former, it would be à priori, but not synthetical; according to the latter, it would not be à priori, though synthetical,-synthesized, however, not by the natural reason motived by experience, but by a supernatural act of faith.

BOOK V.

CAUSES OF BEING.

CHAPTER I.

CAUSES OF BEING IN GENERAL.

ARTICLE I.

Principiant and Principiate.

THERE are four cogent reasons why causation should claim a prominent place in any complete metaphysical treatise. The first is, that Cause is a certain determined grade or mode of Being, and can therefore scarcely be disregarded by that science which has Being for its subject-matter. The second is, that Cause is, as it were, a property of Being; since there is no real entity which is not somehow a Cause. The third is, that all science, properly so called, deals with Causes; seeing that, as practical logic teaches, these constitute the middle term of demonstration. But they fall in an especial manner under the cognizance of the supreme science; which not only uses them (as other sciences do) in her demonstrations, but professedly examines into their nature, divisions, differences, influx. Lastly, every being, save the Infinite, is caused; and though the Self-existent is not caused and can have no real Causes, yet there are certain Attributes in Him, which are truly though inadequately conceived as partaking of the nature of Causes, by the medium of which Natural Theology is enabled to deduce strictly scientific conclusions demonstrative of His Nature.

Is there, then, such a thing as a Cause? In other days than our own it would have been deemed superfluous, if not absurd, to moot the question. We should have been told, that one only requires a clear concept of what is understood by a Cause, to be irresistibly persuaded of its reality and real existence on all sides. Since, how