illustrate the law of gravitation, if the action of the gravitating force upon them were prevented by the check of some intervening ring, or if the cords became entangled in a part of the frame. Here again, the releasing of weight or cord is cause of the free action of the weight, but not of its motion downwards. St. Thomas, following the teaching of Aristotle, calls this condition a cause by accident (causa per accidens)'. He explains this term in a passage which gives us a clear insight into its meaning. A primary agent,' he writes, 'is said to produce an effect both absolutely and by accident. It is said to effect a thing absolutely, which it effects by its own proper form; accidentally, that which it effects by removing an obstacle. Thus, the sun absolutely enlightens a house; but he who opens a shutter which was an obstacle to the light,' accidentally'2. Now, though it may be permitted to say colloquially, that a man who unfastens the shutters or draws back the curtains gives light to the room; it is certain that the agency of the man is limited to the act of unfastening or drawing back, and that the lighting up of the room is due to the action of the sun. Wherefore, an accidental cause is no cause at all of the effect of which it is said to be cause by accident; although it is cause of the removal of an impediment to the production of that same effect by another cause. An occasion, when not confounded with a condition, is neither sufficient nor necessary for the production of the effect; but merely contributes towards rendering the production more easy or more perfect. Thus, for instance, it is well to seize the occasion of a bright, sunny day for taking a photograph; though it could be taken when the sky is cloudy. A condition sine qua non is a condition in the absence of which the production of the effect is naturally impossible. Thus, light is a condition sine qua non of reading or writing. Conditions not of this class are such as are, morally speaking, necessary to the production of the effect; as, for instance, pen, ink, and paper, for writing. Absolutely, one could write with chalk on a wall.

1 1-280. lxxvi, 1, c.; lxxxv, 5, c.; lxxxviii, 3, c.

Agens autem principaliter dicitur agere aliquid et per se et per accidens; per se quidem quod agit secundum propriam formam, per accidens autem quod agit removendo prohibens; sicut per se quidem illuminat domum sol, per accidens vero qui aperit fenestram, quae erat obstaculum lumini.' Ma. Q. ii, a. 11, c.

PROPOSITION CXXXVI.

Causal influx, or causality, considered as something real in the effect, is a mode of imperfect existence or without intrinsic and absolute necessity, which is called dependence; by virtue of which an entity exists after such a manner, that it could not exist without the active influence of a Cause; but, that influx of the Cause once given, not only can, but does actually exist.

The truth, as well as meaning, of this Proposition are so manifestly contained in the enunciation and declaration of the preceding, that any exposition would be a waste of time. For its realization we must await the discussion on particular causes.

PROPOSITION CXXXVII.

Causality, as it is in the cause,-in other words, active causal influx,—is really distinct from the predicamental relation of the Cause to its effect; and, in like manner, passive causal influx,—that is to say, causality as it is in the effect,-is really distinct from the predicamental relation of the effect to its Cause.

The two Members of this Proposition may be considered as one in the declaration; because the same arguments, servatis servandis, equally establish both. Wherefore,

I. Between those entities, one of which can really exist without the existence of the other, there exists a real distinction. But the cause can exist as cause of the effect and the effect can remain as effect of the cause, so that the relation continues, without actual causal influx active or passive. Therefore, the relation of cause to effect and that of effect to cause are really distinct from the causality. The Major is axiomatic. The Minor is proved by experience. For in animal generation the parents remain parents of their offspring, when all actual causal influx has ceased; and, in like manner, the offspring remain offspring of the parents under the same circumstances. So, heat remains in the bed, long after the warming-pan has been taken away to the kitchen. Moreover, (but this confirmation holds good of active causality alone), causality may exist really, though potentially, in the cause, long before the production of the effect; nay, even though the effect should never be produced. Thus, a plate of glass has the power of generating electri

city; although, as long as it is in existence, it may never be put to such service. So, a grain of corn has the power, let us say, of producing wheat; although, because it has been ground down to flour, it is for ever prevented from producing its natural effect. Nor can it be justly urged that, in such cases, there is a potential effect as well as a potential Cause. For who does not perceive that the use of the word potential is here amphibological? As applied to Cause, the potentiality is subjective and real; as applied to the effect, it is objective and purely conceptual. With much greater show of reason might it be objected, that potential causality is not actual causality; and that it is manifestly with the latter that the present Thesis has to do. This, indeed must be granted; yet the concession does not impair the value of the confirmation. For the actual influx is but the act of the faculty or power; if, therefore, the potentiality is absolute and entitatively independent of all relation, there is every reason to conclude that its act is in its entity equally free.

II. That reality which is necessarily presupposed as foundation of a real relation, must be really distinct from that relation. But actual Causality is necessarily presupposed as foundation of the relation between cause and effect. Therefore, etc. Again: That reality from which a relation really results, is really distinct from the said relation. But Causality is the reality from which results the relation between cause and effect, as likewise that between effect and cause. Therefore, etc. To explain:-Two things are required for predicamental relation; to wit, a real foundation, and the actual position of the term or correlative. Where these exist, the relation at once arises. These two prerequisites, therefore, are naturally prior to the relation; and, if naturally prior to it, are really distinct from it. St. Thomas confirms and elucidates this argument in an Article where he is engaged in maintaining, that every finite entity must necessarily have been created by God. Against the truth of this proposition he supposes the following difficulty to be urged: There is nothing to hinder our discovering an entity destitute of that which forms no part of its essence; as, for instance, a man who is not white. But the relation of effect to cause does not seem to belong to the essence of entities; because some entities can be conceived without it. Therefore, they can exist without it.' To this objection the Angelic Doctor makes the following reply: Though relation to a cause does not enter into the definition of an entity that has been caused, nevertheless, it follows as a property upon what

belongs to its essence: because, from the fact that an entity is being by participation, it follows that it must have been caused by another. Hence, such an entity cannot exist without being caused; just as a man cannot exist without being capable of laughter. This, then, in sum is the argument of St. Thomas. Granted, that to have been caused does not enter into the definition of finite being; still it follows as a property from the essence of such being, just as visibility follows as a property from the essential nature and definition of man. For finite being is essentially being by participation. But if being is participated, it must be by communication from another. Thus the foundation being established and the term, (which is in this instance the Cause); the predicamental relation of cause and caused, (otherwise, effect), immediately arises as a property of all finite being.

SUMMARY.

Thus far we have seen, that between a Cause and its effect there exists a predicamental relation; that, consequently, there is a real distinction between the two; and that the relation in the Cause is really distinguished from the relation in the effect. We have further seen that the Cause is necessarily prior in nature, though not necessarily in order of time, to its effect; yet that Cause, in its second or perfected act, must be synchronous with its effect. Again; we have seen that causality, whether active or passive, is really distinct from the accompanying relation. Lastly, we have determined what causality is in the Cause, and what it is in the effect. It follows from all which has been said, that the word Cause is univocal; and that, in consequence, there is one corresponding formal as well as objective concept. Wherefore, the general properties that have been enucleated during the course of this Article, apply equally to all kinds of causes properly so called.

1 '[Videtur quod non sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum a Deo.] Nihil enim prohibet inveniri rem sine eo quod non est de ratione rei; sicut hominem sine albedine. Sed habitudo causati ad causam non videtur esse de ratione entium, quia sine hac possunt aliqua entia intelligi. Ergo sine hac possunt esse: ergo nihil prohibet esse aliqua entia non creata a Deo.'

'Ad primum dicendum, quod licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum, tamen consequitur ad ea quae sunt de ejus ratione: quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde hujusmodi ens non potest esse quin sit causatum, sicut nec homo quin sit risibilis.' 10 xliv, 1, 1m.

There is an animadversion which may possibly be made upon the doctrine here delivered; and it would be unwise to pass it over in silence. It may be said that, when we arrived at the crucial question touching the intimate nature of the causal influx, the problem was dismissed with a vague and insignificant declaration, that causality in the Cause is something necessary and sufficient for the existence of the effect; and that, in the effect, it is a mode of imperfect or dependent existence, by virtue of which the Cause is necessary and sufficient for the existence of the effect. But this tells one nothing; for it is already precontained in the primitive notions of Cause and effect. But that which one desiderates to know is, the precise nature of this same causal influx. What is the said necessity and sufficiency on the one side, and the dependence on the other? While denying that the declarations referred to are vague and insignificant, seeing that they serve to distinguish Cause from other cognate concepts; it must be owned that the exposition is markedly general. But how could this be avoided, when we are considering causes and causality in general, by way of introduction? The general idea of causal influx it is very difficult to describe, without incurring the danger of obscuring the simplicity of the concept, and of confounding general with particular causality. This latter, which is easier to realize, will be discussed in its place under each separate species of cause.

ARTICLE III.

Division of Causes.

PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.

The commonly received division of Causes into the Material, Formal, Efficient, Final, is true and adequate.

The present Thesis will be seen to contain two Propositions; viz. that the alleged division is true, then that it is adequate. The former Proposition resolves itself into two; viz. that the members of the division really exist, and that they exist as true causes. Adequacy of division postulates three things; viz. distinction and opposition between the several members;-that the members collectively should not exceed, or fall short of, the divided whole, i.e. that they should not be too many, or too few ;—and, thirdly,