higher type. The butterfly never, by any accidental or other change, relapses into the chrysalis or caterpillar; nor the chrysalis, in its turn, into the caterpillar. Take, for another illustration, the body of an animal,—first in its living state, then in death, and lastly in a state of decomposition. It was, in its original state, full of life and energy, digesting and assimilating its food, breathing, propelling its life-blood through its system, moving spontaneously hither and thither. In the state of death all these functional properties, that energy and life, are gone. Cold has succeeded to heat, stiffness to pliancy. Finally, decomposition for the most part sets in; and the corpse resolves into the elementary bodies of which it was originally composed. In vain would you attempt to bring back that mass of decomposition to the dead or living body of the animal. Thus, then, the phenomena of generation and corruption are experimentally distinct from, and in some respects opposed to, mere alterations, or accidental changes. There is a substantial identity permanent throughout the latter. The phosphorus is phosphorus, whether it be ordinary or amorphous. But, in the former, substantial identity is lost. No one would venture to say that a butterfly is substantially the same as a caterpillar, or that two gases are substantially the same as one liquid. Experience, therefore, teaches that the distinction and multiplication of material bodies are not due to mere accidental forms. No one of sane mind could conceive, that the difference between a diamond and a rose-tree or between a dog and a sea-anemone, or between a viper and an oak, was purely accidental,—that is to say, constituted by accidental form alone; or that the individual distinction between the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford is as accidental as the growth of each from infancy to manhood.

ii. In the hypothesis, then, that the Primordial Material Cause, (which has been shown to be one), is a complete substance; is it possible that the distinction and multiplication of bodies could be due to supervenient substantial forms? This is the second of the two alternatives. There is but one answer to the question: It cannot be. The following is the reason why. This complete substance (which, as is supposed, is the Primordial Matter of all bodies) must be either composite or simple. But it cannot be composite. Therefore, if anything, it must be simple. The Minor is thus proved. A composite substance essentially connotes an ulterior Subject; consequently, it could not be the primary

Subject. For a complete composite substance is composed of a receptive power and its substantial act; in which case, the former must be the ulterior Subject. It may be objected, that the above argument may hold good in the case of incorruptible and ingenerable bodies, if such there be; but that, in all those bodies which are objects of experience, the Primordial Material Cause must be a composite substance. For it is an acknowledged fact, that the Material Cause must be variously disposed for the reception of disparate substantial forms, and that the disposition must be more elaborate in proportion to the nobility of the form introduced by the action of the efficient cause. Therefore, there must always be some previous form in Matter, in order to prepare the way for the reception of each particular substantial form. In a word,-to put it roughly,you must begin with body. But such a supposition is inadmissible; and the sole argument on which it rests, valueless. For, first of all, this putative universal primary form has never given any visible signs of its existence. The properties, common to bodily substances, are all traceable to the several forms by which these substances are specifically constituted, and are sufficiently accounted for by their activity. For clearness' sake, let us consider this subject in the concrete, and take for granted that, as modern chemistry teaches, there are some sixty elements, or simple bodies. These bodies, as being elements, are primordial complete substances, incapable of ulterior physical resolution into yet simpler complete substance. If, therefore, any further resolution is possible, each component will be an incomplete substance. Let us call them, in unison with the teaching of the School, the determinating form of each element on the one hand, and undetermined Primordial Matter on the other. In the case of these elements, the actuation of the Matter by the primitive forms of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, calcium, and the rest, would not postulate any previous disposition of the Matter. But its first determination by any one of these forms would simultaneously give to it its proper quantity and certain qualities proper to each form. Subsequently, the combination of two or more elements in varying proportions would dispose the Matter in those combined elements for the introduction or eduction of higher forms with new properties accompanying them, or at least with modifications of the properties belonging to the component simples; and so onward, to yet more complex combinations and nobler forms. All, therefore, that the said supposititious form is

evoked to effect, is already amply provided for without its interference. It is consequently superfluous; for there is nothing for it to do.

If, then, the Primordial Material Cause cannot be a composite, it remains to be seen whether it can be a simple, complete substance; for this is the second alternative of our dilemma. But this is likewise inadmissible. For in such case there would be two specific substantial forms together actuating the same portion of Matter; which is impossible. For these two specific forms must either actuate the same Matter immediately and independently of each other, or the one must be the act of the other as already actuating the Matter. The first supposition may be forthwith dismissed; for in such case the one form would not necessarily be subject of the other; nor would the complete substance,-that is to say, the Matter as actuated by the precedent form,-be the Material Cause of the subsequent form. But this is destructive of the hypothesis. Neither can the second supposition stand. For it is a contradiction in terms, that one and the same substance should be essentially constituted in two specifically distinct natures. But each substantial form of itself essentially constitutes substance in its specific nature. Therefore, if there were two substantial forms in one and the same substance, that substance would be essentially constituted in two specifically distinct natures. It will be seen at once, that this last argument is equally fatal to both suppositions.

COROLLARY.

It follows from the truth demonstrated in this Proposition, that no physical element or elements can be the primordial Subject of material substances. They may be the ultimate or ultimates of chemical analysis; but they cannot satisfy for the ultimate which is the object of metaphysical research. It may be well to notice how independent the latter is of the former, while the former, however eventually determined by physical experiment and research, must necessarily submit to the determination of the latter.

REAL ENTITY OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.

Having demonstrated in preceding Propositions, contained under the previous Section, the existence of a Primordial Material Cause, -that it is numerically one only,-and that it cannot be a complete

substance; it is now necessary to determine the amount of reality that is attributable to it. Such is the purport of the Propositions included under the present Section. It will assist the reader, if the discussion is introduced by a few prefatory observations sufficient to indicate the course of this inquiry. It is undoubted that Primordial Matter cannot naturally exist, apart from the actuation of some substantial form. It co-exists; but it cannot exist. Consequently, it is easier to determine the amount of reality that attaches to it, when it is considered as forming an actual part, or constituent, of the substantial composite,- that is to say, as actually informed,than as reduced by metaphysical analysis to a state of isolation. is for this reason that our present investigation commences with Primordial Matter considered as existing, in the only way in which naturally it can exist, in complete corporal substance. By the aid of conclusions thence obtained, it will be easier afterwards to consider it as it is in itself.

It

PROPOSITION CXLII.

It is certain that the Primordial Material Cause of bodily substance, actually informed, that is to say, as existing under the actuation of its form in a complete substance, has a certain real and substantial entity really distinct from the entity of its substantial form.

To any one who examines the enunciation of this Proposition it will be apparent, that there are three Members included under it; viz. that Primordial Matter in the complete bodily substance has a real entity; secondly, that this real entity is substantial; lastly, that this substantial entity of Matter is really, and not conceptually only, distinct from the entity of its form. To take each of these Members separately :

:

I. PRIMARY MATTER IN COMPLETE BODILY SUBSTANCE HAS A

REAL ENTITY.

If the Primordial Material Cause had no reality, it would be nothing. But nothing cannot be a real Subject of transformations, generations, or generally of any sort of real change. Therefore, there could be no generations and corruptions; because there would be no common Subject. As consequence, all so-called substantial

mutations of bodily substance would be reduced to a series of alternate creations and annihilations. Moreover, the substantial form. of all material substances, with one exception, is educed from the potentiality of Matter. But, if the said potentiality were a potentiality of nothing, it would be no potentiality. Whence, in such case, the forms? They could not be evolved, or communicated, by secondary efficient causation; wherefore, one and all would be created, and all ancestral or other active generation would be not only superfluous but impossible. Finally, and this is a palmary argument, the common sense of mankind in every age has instinctively recognized the real entity of Matter in material substances.

II THE REAL ENTITY OF THE PRIMORDIAL MATERIAL CAUSE IS SUBSTANTIAL,—that is to say, not accidental.

Primordial Matter enters essentially into the constitution of the complete substantial composite. But that which is the essential constituent of a substance, must itself be a substance, however partial, incomplete, and rudimentary; otherwise, the essence of a substance might be in part composed of that which is not substance,a contradiction in terms. Again: In complete composite substance, there is something real added to the entity of the form. But that something cannot be an accident; for it is an integral part of substance, qua substance. Besides, accident presupposes substance already fully constituted as its necessary Subject. Lastly; Accident essentially postulates, as its correlative, a possible Subject of inhesion. But it is metaphysically impossible that Primordial Matter should have any Subject of inhesion; because itself is the first Subject, and consequently can be subjected to no other.

III. THE SUBSTANTIAL ENTITY OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER IS REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE ENTITY OF ITS FORM.

As we have seen, Primordial Matter is indifferently receptive of any whatsoever bodily form; neither has it, in itself, even an initial disposition for the reception of one form more than of another. Consequently, it is an entity really and physically separable from any of the particular, determinate forms by which it is hic et nunc actuated; though it cannot exist in a state of separation from all form in general. But this would be impossible, unless there were a real distinction between the Matter and its