the two hundred and third, and following Theses under the same Section, where this question recurs and is discussed according to its full bearings.

DECLARATION OF THE THESIS.

That cannot with any show of reason be classed among the mere conditions however necessary of any causality, which is essentially included in the nature of the latter. But the existence of the cause

is essentially included in the nature of material, as of every other kind of, causality. Therefore, etc. The Major is evident. The Minor is thus proved. A thing must be in order to receive. But the material cause is a receptivity purely and simply such. Therefore, the existence of the material cause is essentially included in the nature of its causality. Again: The existence of Matter, owing to the exceptional nature of its entity, cannot in strictness of language be required either as a necessary condition or essential element of its causality. The reason is, that Matter has no independent existence. It would, therefore, be more correct to say, that the partial existence or co-existence of Matter was an essential element in the nature of its causality. It is an essential element; because the information of Matter by the form essentially includes the existence of the former, so that its existence and causality are de potentia absoluta inseparable.

PROPOSITION CLIII.

For similar reasons, indistance from the substantial form is not merely a necessary condition of the actual influx of the Material Cause; since it is essential to such influx.

DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION.

A mere condition, however necessary, is, metaphysically at least, separable from that which it conditions; since it is not essentially connected with the latter. But indistance from its form is an essential property of material causality and, consequently, of the Material Cause. The reason is, that Matter is a pure potentiality and the substantial form is its own act. But it is metaphysically impossible that a potentiality of any kind should be distant from its own act. Take the instance of an active potentiality. Who would not smile to be told that it was a necessary condition of the intellectual faculty in eliciting a thought, that the faculty should

be indistant from the thought; or that, if the sensitive faculty of touch is actually to feel the winter's cold, it must be indistant from its feeling? Yet active potentialities, (such as these are), have more of entity than a purely passive potentiality which cannot exist unless actuated by some form. Moreover, since the form essentially depends both in fieri and in facto esse on the Matter, and the existence of the Matter from first to last is essentially dependent on the form; it is a contradiction in terms to affirm the possibility of the distance of the Matter from its form.

Let it not be supposed that the discussion contained in this and the preceding Thesis is a mere dispute about words. If such had been the case, it would have found no room for itself here. On the contrary, it is connected most intimately with a grave point of difference between the teaching of Suarez and of the Scotist School on the one hand, and of St. Thomas on the other. It is difficult to explain with clearness the Scholastic doctrine touching the nature of Primordial Matter and its substantial forms, which together constitute all material substance; and that which appears at first. sight to involve a difference of little or no moment, may become very far reaching and important in its issues.

It only remains to add, that there are peculiarities in the union of the human soul with its body, which modify somewhat the relation of these two causes; but the consideration of this point is reserved for the following Chapter.

PROPOSITION CLIV.

Though it is more probable that quantity is naturally inseparable from Matter, and although the quantification of Matter is a necessary condition of generation in order that the agent may be enabled to communicate the generating motion; nevertheless, quantity is not absolutely and formally necessary to the causality of Matter.

The present Proposition necessarily anticipates in some measure that which, later on, will form a distinct subject of discussion. For this reason, the first and second Members will not be established by proof; but, assumed as Lemmata, will be considered only in their relation to the main purport of the Thesis. Under these circumstances it will be easier for the reader, if we confine ourselves to

a general declaration and explanation of the Enunciation; more especially as the proof of the third Member, which is the only one that directly concerns us now, will of necessity be included in the exposition. Wherefore,

I. The intent of the present Proposition is to show, that quantitative information is not a necessary condition of the causality of Primordial Matter. But a difficulty confronts us in limine. Quantity is so connatural with Matter, that it is physically inseparable from it. Now, though Matter is also inseparable from its form, because its actuation by the form is necessary to its existence; nevertheless, there is a great difference between the two cases. For the form is necessary to Matter as completive of its substantiality,— that is to say, in its own substantial nature. The conjoint causality of the form is essential to the constitution of the composite. But quantity seems to be congenital with Matter for its own sake; and whether its inhesion precedes in priority of order or accompanies the information of Matter, (about which the Doctors of the School differ), it belongs to Matter, and only affects the form, (wherein it does affect the form), by concomitance. This might perhaps lead one to conclude, that quantitative information is a necessary condition of the causality of Matter. But such a conclusion would be erroneous. For quantity is in Matter and is naturally inseparable from it, because, as Suarez remarks, Matter is an entity of such a nature as to postulate this property; so that quantity is a property consequent on the Material Cause, rather than a necessary antecedent condition of its causality.' Consequently, if by a miracle,-to borrow from the same author,-Matter should be preserved without quantity, it would still be able, for its part, to fulfil its office in regard of its form and the composite.

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II. But there remains a yet greater difficulty. For, in the instance of all generated bodies, (and the term, generated, is here employed in its most extended signification), not only is the Matter de facto quantified; but its quantification is necessary to the eduction of the new form and the generation of the composite. True; but this necessity does not arise from any causal indigence on the part of the Material Cause. It is due rather to the indigence of the agent, or efficient cause, which requires extension in the subject of its action, in order that it may be able to communicate the generative motion. Further: The agent requires such extension; because, by reason of its own quantitative information, all its

material forces are subject to the same property. Since, therefore, its own action is accommodated to that property, it connaturally exacts a like accommodation on the part of its Subject and transcendental correlative,-that is to say, in the Matter as receiving motion from it. In a word, the motor is quantified; therefore, the moved must be quantified also.

III. Quantity, then, is not absolutely and formally necessary to the causality of Primordial Matter; that is to say, it is not necessary in such sense that Primordial Matter essentially requires to be informed by quantity, in order that, in any case whatsoever, it may be proximately capable of receiving or sustaining any form.

THIS THIRD MEMBER of the Proposition is proved, first of all, from the nature of Primordial Matter. For the whole entity of the Material Cause, (to repeat what has been so often said before), consists in its receptivity. If, therefore, it were not proximately and immediately receptive, it would proximately and immediately be nothing. If it is proximately and immediately receptive, it is proximately and immediately causative. Against this argument it might possibly be urged, that a potentiality may be proximately and immediately reducible to act; and yet be subject to a necessary previous condition. In reply: It must be admitted, that the above objection holds good in all those cases wherein the condition is extrinsic to the entity of the potentiality; but not when the condition is an intrinsic addition to it. For, if it needs such entitative addition, it cannot be of itself proximately potential. Secondly, it is proved from the nature of quantity. For quantity is an accident. It therefore, in order of nature, presupposes a complete substantial Subject. Accordingly, information by quantity, or quantitative information, is in order of nature consequent upon the integral constitution of the composite; just as, in the same order Matter and its causality are prior to the constitution of the composite. How, then, could quantitative information be a necessary condition of that causality? Lastly, it seems incongruous, that an accidental addition should be a necessary condition of an exclusively substantial causality.

NOTE.

It is of importance that the reader's attention should be again directed to the adverbs, formally and absolutely necessary,' as given in the third Member of this Thesis. For, in the evolution of generated substances, it would seem as though not only quantity

but certain qualitative dispositions also were necessary conditions of the eduction of this or that substantial form in particular;-the former in the way already explained, the latter as conspiring causes towards the production of this or that composite. Neither is formally and absolutely necessary to the causality of Primordial Matter.

§ 3.

What is causality of Matter?

The word causality may be understood in two different ways; first, as representative of potential, secondly, as representative of actual influx of a cause. About the former, in the instance of Primordial Matter, there can be no question; for the potential causality of Primordial Matter is, plainly enough, its own entity. But a controversy existed in the Schools touching its actual causality. Some maintained that it is nothing but the entity itself of the Material Cause. Others pronounced it to be a predicamental relation; others, again, the effect of the Material Cause; others, finally, that it is a real mode really distinct from Matter. The first and third opinions may be forthwith eliminated from the discussion; because in all causes the actual causality is something mediate between the entity of the cause and the effect. In like manner, the second opinion must be rejected. For causality is the foundation of relation which, consequently, presupposes the former. How, then, can the one be identified with the other? There only remains the fourth. But, first of all, it is not universally admissible; and secondly, in the particular causality to which it truly applies it needs explanation.

It will conduce towards a solution of this problem to recall to mind a remark already made; viz. that the composite, or adequate effect of material causality may be considered in two ways. For we may regard the composite either in course of production or in its completed and enduring constitution. Consequently, the actual causality of the Material Cause may be considered in reference to the producing of the complete substance (in fieri), as well as in reference to its perfected production (in facto esse). The answer to the proposed question will depend on the point of view from which the causality of Primordial Matter is regarded. Wherefore,