St. Thomas, then, teaches in this passage, that accidents in the abstract are mere concepts of the intellect which considers as separate and sui juris entities that only exist in composition with others. Under this abstract and purely conceptual form they have been treated as though they were subsistences, and have been divided into genera and species. Now, though in no case are genera and species, as such, realities; yet they are founded in reality. For composite subsistences, or complete substances, supply a basis for genus in their Material Part, which is common and indifferent; for difference in their formal part, which is specific and discrete. But accidents cannot show as much reality as this to account for their division into genera and species; because in themselves they are next to nothing. Consequently, though, as modes of their Subject affecting it differently each from the other, they in the concrete afford something like a basis for generic distinction,-since, for instance, quantity is a mode of measure, quality of disposition; nevertheless, their specific distinctions must be sought for, not in themselves but in their principiants or causes. Thus, if you would discover the basis of the specific distinction between continuous and discrete quantity, you must seek it in the quantified entities themselves as the principiants of quantity. For, if it is the nature of a Subject to be successive, as in a series of alternate corruptions and generations, or of words in a sentence, or of notes in music, or of moments in time; its measure must be specifically different from that of a permanent entity, like the sun or a man or a mountain. Wherefore, accidents in the abstract cannot, properly speaking, be specifically divided; forasmuch as, so considered, they are conceptually separated from their Subject. If the attempt is to be made, the Subject must be brought back in order to supply the place of a difference. Thus, snubbiness is a curvature of the nose; Discrete quantity is the quantity of successive entities; continuous, of permanent entities: the genitive or oblique case in the second place of the phrase supplying the differentia. Hence, accidents in the abstract do not admit a Material Cause, because they are not intrinsically composed of Matter and form; while in the concrete they require one.

cum definiuntur accidentia in abstracto, subjectum ponitur in eorum definitione oblique et secundo loco; et hoc est proprium differentiae; ut cum dicitur, simitas est curvitas nasi, per quod differt simitas a curvitate quae est in ligno.' Opusc. XLII, (aliter XXXIX), de Natura Generis, co 19.

III. The third objection is directed against the second member of the Proposition; and is as follows. It is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas, that accident in the concrete should postulate a Material Cause with which to enter intrinsically into composition. For the Angelic Doctor asserts, that the Subject is not included in the representation of the word that stands for accident in the concrete, as the Commentator says; though Avicenna was of the contrary opinion.' But, if the accident does not enter into the representation of accident in the concrete, accident does not postulate a Material Cause; neither can it enter intrinsically into composition with the same.

ANSWER. There are two ways in which this passage of the Angelic Doctor may be explained; each one of which leaves the truth of the Proposition unassailed. St. Thomas, then, agrees with Averrhöes in maintaining, that a word signifying accident concretivè does not include in its signification the Subject of the accident. Now, i. He may mean by the Latin word concretivè, substantially,— that is, under the form of a noun; which would be tantamount to accident in the abstract. Such an interpretation is fully justified by the context; for the particular word that excites the discussion is gift, which is certainly under a substantive form. But, ii. If the Latin adverb means, in the concrete, the ensuing is the only possible and most natural explanation. A word which expresses an accident in the concrete,-to take an instance, white,-does not determine its Subject; though it connotes some subject or other indefinitely. It must be a white something; but it may be a white anything. Anyhow, that it is a mere question about the meaning of words is expressly stated by the Angelic Doctor who in the same place maintains that the Subject is included in the concept, while he speaks hesitatingly about the verbal meaning 2. Nor could it for one moment be supposed that he would here contradict that which in other places, as we have seen, he has so clearly asserted.

IV. Again: Against the second Member of the present Thesis,

1 'Subjectum non includitur in significatione nominis significantis accidens concretive, ut dicit Commentator (5 Metaph. text. 14), quamvis Avicenna (6 Natural. part 1, cap. 2.) contrarium senserit.' I d. xviii, a. 2, 3m.

2 Hoc nomen donum vel datum, praeter relationem ex qua dicitur donum vel datum, dat intelligere rem quamdam quae datur; quamvis forte non sicut partem significationis nominis, quia subjectum,' &c., as in the preceding note.

the following objection has been urged. A composition by accident does not postulate a Material Cause. But accidental composition is composition by accident. The Major is confirmed by an example. A heap of stones does not require a real material cause in order to be a heap; nor do the bricks, mortar, rafters, etc. that constitute a house require a material cause, in order to constitute that house.

ANSWER. Let the Major pass. The Minor is denied. There is the most observable difference between a composition of substances by accident, for instance, an aggregation of stones by the wayside,— and the composition of an accident with its Subject. The one is fortuitous; the other, intended by nature. Again: The one is extrinsic; the other, intrinsic. Once more: The former is either conceptual or artistic; the other is natural. It is an amphibology to call both indifferently an accidental composition. Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that, even in the case of composition by accident, there is need (speaking analogically) of a Material Cause. For, in the heap of stones, there is a certain order and proximity of position which serves in the mind for a form; but then, the stones themselves assume the character of a Material Cause. So, in the instance of a house: The collocation of materials, the subordination of parts, the mutual adaptation, &c. for the purposes of habitation, constitute the artistic form; but the materials themselves, as receptive of the design, are the Material Cause. In fact, these combinations by accident offer a much greater difficulty as touching the form than as regards the Matter; for the former is conceptual, while the latter is real.

PROPOSITION CLIX.

Accident, by virtue of its own entity considered apart and in the abstract, postulates a Material Cause, in order that it may be sustained in its being. Such Material Cause is equally requisite for the producing, as for the perfected production of accident; though it is extrinsic to the entity of accident itself.

The present Proposition is so manifestly a Corollary from the two previous Propositions, as to stand in need of only a brief declaration. For it has been proved in the hundred and fifty-seventh Thesis that accident, by reason of its attenuated entity, stands in

need of a Material Cause. But in the hundred and fifty-eighth Thesis it has been shown, that accident in the abstract does not admit of a Material Cause as intrinsic in its own nature. Therefore, it must require a Material Cause as extrinsic Subject both of its production and of its maintenance, according to the exigency of its nature; for there is no other conceivable function of a Material Cause. Furthermore: Accident requires this support, not merely for the sake of union with its Subject, (for thus much even the human soul exacts); but in order that it may be produced, and that it may be maintained in being. Both of these reasons are given by the Angelic Doctor. Touching the accidental union, he makes this observation: Because all accidents are certain forms superadded to substance and caused by the principiants of substance, it is necessary that their entity should be superadded to the entity of substance, and dependent upon it.' So, somewhat more generally he remarks: 'Whatever the signification given to it, accident has a dependence on the Subject in accordance with its nature. Therefore, whether accident be considered in the concrete or the abstract, it includes in its nature a dependence on a Material Cause. Referring in another place more particularly to the entity itself of accident as postulatory of such a cause, he makes the following observation: Because to be is the act of Being, but the verb, to be in, expresses the inherence of accident; therefore, to inhere in a perfect (or complete) entity is the essence of accident, which is necessarily extraneous to the nature of that entity. For the expression, to inhere, does not mean that the essence of accident is in the essence itself of substance; since essence is that which most formally belongs to every thing 3.' Therefore, it is of the essence of accident to postulate a Material Cause on which it may depend. Once more: 'It is the nature of

1 'Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam substantiae superadditae et a principiis substantiae causatae, oportet quod eorum esse sit superadditum supra esse substantiae et ab ipso dependens.' Cg. L. IV, co 14, v. fi.

2 Quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet dependentiam a subjecto secundum suam rationem.' 1-2a0 liii, 2, 3m.

3.Quia esse est actus entis, hoc autem verbum "inesse" est designans inhaerentiam accidentis; ideo inesse rei perfectae est esse accidentis, quod extraneum a rei natura esse necesse est. Non enim significatur per hoc inesse, quod accidentis esse sit in ipso esse substantiae, cum esse sit formalissimum omni rei.' Opusc. XLI, (aliter XXXVIII), De Natura Accidentis, co. 1, init. The meaning of this passage is plain enough; but it is impossible to express its antithetical force in English.

accident to inhere in the entity itself1;'-that is to say, immediately. Finally: It is evident from all which has gone before, that accident stands in need of a Material Cause for its producing as well as its perfected and permanent production in the accidental composite; for its essential dependence is the same in both cases. In this respect it is similar to the substantial form of bodies; for it is evolved from the potentiality of the substance, as the latter is evolved out of the potentiality of Matter.

§ 2.

WHAT IS THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS, AND WHAT THE NATURE OF ITS CAUSALITY?

PROPOSITION CLX.

Substance is the primary and fundamental Material Cause of accident.

This Proposition is nothing more than a Corollary from the doctrine established in the preceding Section. For, if accident in general has essentially an entity so attentuated that naturally it can only co-exist with another on which it depends for its being and continuance; it is plain that no accident can be the primary and fundamental Material Cause of accident, for the former would stand in need of such a cause itself. Therefore, it must be substance; since substance and accident divide all real Being between them.

PROPOSITION CLXI.

Any integrating part of corporal substance can separately be the Material Cause of accident.

Owing to the nature of its subject-matter, the present Proposition virtually contains two Members. For an integrating part of any body may be either heterogeneous or homogeneous relatively to other parts of the same body. Thus, for instance, in the body of an animal, the bones, blood, heart, hair, are heterogeneous parts respectively; forasmuch as they are each dissimilar from the other. But one hair is homogeneous with another, one piece of skin or of bone

4

1 Natura accidentis est inesse, sive inhaerere ipsi rei.' Ibidem.