iii. The Doctors of the School never taught that being is the first act, and the specific nature, or principle of operation, the second act; but that the constitution of an entity outside its causes in its own specific and individualized nature is the first act, while its actual natural operation is the second. If the theory in question were true; this last would be the third act, not the second. It is further to be noted, that the author of this objection identifies act with Form; but, while it is true that every Form is an act, it is not true that every act is a Form, save in a very analogical sense. See Proposition clxxiv.

iv. Further: To be necessarily presupposes Being, or at least connotes the latter. But Being is essence. That same essence, conceived as the principiant of natural operation, is the specific nature. There is no possible foundation, therefore, for any distinction between the two.

v. This novel introduction of what is called a natural Form is probably a necessity for the particular dynamic theory which it is intended to render conceptually complete; but, forasmuch as the said theory exhibits that which is accidental to the primordial Subject as the sole constitutive of the specific nature of material substance, we may safely be spared any further inquiry into its demerits.

V. Against the last argument adduced in favour of the present Proposition it has been objected as follows: From the Antecedent, that the constitution, integration or completion, of bodily substance is an absolute necessity, in the hypothesis that the actual order of nature was intended and willed; the conclusion has been drawn, that the existence of material Forms is, under the same hypothesis, an absolute necessity. But the conclusion does not appear to be warranted by the premisses. For, in the first place, the whole force of the argument depends upon the supposition that there is such a thing as primordial matter, which most adversaries of the Peripatetic philosophy would be disposed to call in question. Then again, even assuming the existence of a primordial matter, the supposed fact would not render the existence of substantial Forms an absolute necessity; for why should not this primordial matter become actuated by a definite collection of accidental Forms?

ANSWER. As to the first part of the objection it must be observed, that proofs of the existence of a primordial matter have been already

given in the preceding Chapter; and it would be impossible to make progress in any science, if no account is to be made of truths already demonstrated.

The second part of the objection, though implicitly treated elsewhere, merits further consideration. It must be said, then, that no accident, or collection of accidents could satisfy the final cause of a substantial Form,-that is to say, the constitution, integration, completion, of bodily substance. The Antecedent is proved in various ways. The constitution, etc. of bodily substance, as such, means nothing more or less than the complete constitution of the substantial essence, or nature. But no essence can be completed, so as to become truly and of itself one, by a potentiality and act which belong to distinct and opposed categories. A fortiori, no essence which is absolute,of itself, in its intrinsic constitution,-in its own right,-can be essentially constituted in itself by any accidental addition. Again, to put the same argument under a somewhat new form:-Every potentiality is only fulfilled by an act correlative with itself and with its own specific nature. But primordial matter is a substantial potentiality. Therefore, it can never be fulfilled by any accidental Form or collection of accidental Forms; for no mere collection can overleap the common essential nature of its several constituents. Lastly: If this accidental Form or compost of accidental Forms, which is supposed to complete material substance, be really (as it must be) accidental, it occurs to inquire: What is the Subject of this accident, or congeries of accidents? It cannot be an accident to the supposed integral composite constituted by itself and primordial matter; because this would make the accident an accident to itself, since itself enters intrinsecally and primarily into the constitution of the composite, as being according to the hypothesis the constitutive act of such composite. Can it, then, be considered as an accident to primordial matter? But this will not square with the hypothesis, that it essentially enters into the constitution and completion of material substance. It may be urged, perhaps, that it is said to be accidental, because primordial matter can exist with or without it. Here, however, there is a noticeable ambiguity. Either the assertion may mean that primordial matter can exist without this particular accidental Form, or it may mean that primordial matter can exist apart from any accidental Form whatsoever. If the former meaning is intended, the fact would not secure the accidental nature of the Form; since primordial matter can

exist without this or that particular substantial Form. If we are to understand the proposition in the latter sense, it must be denied; since, in the hypothesis that bodily substances are constituted by accidental Forms as acts of primordial matter, it is impossible de potentia absoluta that primordial matter should exist save under the actuation of one or other of such Forms. It may again be urged, that the said Form is said to be accidental because of its dependence on matter. But the same reason would go to prove that primordial matter itself is accidental; since the dependence of the latter on its fellow constituent is, if anything, more absolute than that of the actuating Form. Moreover, for the same reason, the parts or members of a body would claim the name of accidents; since there can be no doubt that they exhibit a mutual and necessary dependence. There is, then, one kind of dependence, and there is another kind of dependence; and there is nothing, therefore, repugnant in an incomplete substance depending on another as Subject within the limits of its own Category. Finally: Such an accidental information would satisfy the requirements neither of the final cause of the substantial Form nor of its own :--not of the final cause of the substantial Form, because (as has been already urged) from such information there could never result one substantial nature; not of its own final cause, for this is the accidental perfecting which is completorial of the already constituted substance.

Wherefore, as Suarez justly observes, 'the philosophical doctrine touching substantial Form is most certain.'

ARTICLE III.

The Eduction of bodily substantial Forms out of the potentiality of matter.

There is no part of the Scholastic doctrine touching the constitution of bodies, which has been generally considered more obscure than the question now proposed for discussion. Some not over thoughtful, some impatient, very many prejudiced, inquisitors have not scrupled to pronounce the words that head this Article to be a sounding phrase without meaning; whereas in reality, of all the conclusions connected with the essential constitution of bodies they virtually contain conclusions the most momentous and most pregnant with principles directive of physical research. It should be added, that nowhere perhaps is the harmony between metaphysics

and modern physical discoveries more satisfactorily established, than in the doctrine to the exposition of which this Section of the present Work is devoted. It will be the object, therefore, of the writer to evolve, in a series of Propositions, what Aristotle and the Doctors of the School mean, when they affirm that material substantial Forms are educed, or evolved, out of the potentiality of matter. At the end of the Article the results of the investigation will be set before the reader in the form of a summary.

Previously, however, to entering upon the proposed inquiry, it is necessary to premise that the human soul, though a substantial bodily Form, is excluded from the discussion. This exclusion is due to its singular nature, by which it is essentially distinguished from all other substantial Forms of bodies. Psychology teaches by demonstrative proof, that the human soul alone of all such Forms possesses intellect and will properly so called, by reason of which faculties it lays claim to a place, albeit the lowest, among spiritual entities. We are likewise taught by the same science no less than by the general verdict of mankind in every age, that the human soul has a subsistence of its own and, in consequence, survives its separation from the body at the time of death. In these respects it is exceptionally distinguished from all other corporeal Forms. In order, then, to obviate the necessity of a repetition of the same conditional clause in the Enunciation of each Proposition, let it be understood once for all, that the present investigation embraces all substantial Forms of either inanimate or animate bodies with the single exception of the human soul. Every Proposition in the present Article must be considered as virtually subject to this modification.

PROPOSITION CLXXVII.

Since the substantial Forms of bodies are acts of primordial matter and have no independent existence; it is metaphysically impossible that they should become the single term of either creative or productive action.

PROLEGOMENON I.

It has been shown in the hundred and seventy-fourth Proposition, that every Form is an act. But there is an essential difference in Forms. Some are Forms that are acts, so to say, to themselves, and subsist exclusively in their own right. Others there are, which are

acts of another and naturally subsist, together with a compartner, in the composite; yet are also substantial acts in themselves, and in consequence capable of a separate subsistence. Others, finally, are exclusively acts of the composite, having no possible subsistence save in the composite. Under the first class are included all purely spiritual substances. To the last class belong all substantial Forms of bodies, with the solitary exception of the human soul which constitutes the second class. The present Proposition concerns itself only with the last class.

PROLEGOMENON II.

By the phrase in the Enunciation,-that bodily substantial Forms cannot possibly become the single term of either creative or productive action,-is meant, that neither the Creative Action of the First Efficient Cause nor the productive power of secondary causes can terminate in the separate creation or separate production of any one of these Forms,-that is to say, in its creation or production otherwise than through the medium of, and in conjunction with, matter. THE PROPOSITION IS THUS PROVED.

That which involves a contradiction in terms is a metaphysical impossibility. But that substantial Forms should become the single term of either creative or productive action, involves a contradiction in terms. Therefore, etc. The Major is evident: the Minor is thus proved. That what is exclusively an act of matter should be not an act of matter, is a contradiction in terms. But that a bodily substantial Form should be the single term of either creative or productive action, is equivalent to its being an act of matter and not an act of matter. Therefore, etc. The Minor is thus declared. It belongs to the essential nature of a substantial bodily Form such as we are now considering, that it should be exclusively an act of matter, because it has no subsistence of its own; while, according to the hypothesis here combated, it could not be the act of matter, since it would be created or produced (as the case might be) without the intermediary of matter and as an independent entity.

The above argument needs explanation and illustration. To begin with the latter:-The earth is an oblate spheroid, as we are told,—in other words, a sphere flattened at the poles; since its polar diameter is shorter than its equatorial by some twenty-four miles. This shape, or figure of our globe,-like other figures of