an imperfect Form it is in potentiality to a perfect Form; so is it conversely 1,'-that is to say, under a perfect Form, even though it virtually contain the imperfect, the matter is nevertheless in potentiality to the imperfect Form. This fully explains the possibility and reason of retrograde generation,-in other words, of the change from a superior to an inferior substance. Accordingly, the same Doctor tells us in another place: 'Although Forms' (substantial) 'and accidents do not possess matter as a part of themselves, of which they consist;'-that is to say, though they include no material cause in their entity; nevertheless, they have matter in which they exist and act, and out of whose potentiality they are educed. Hence, even when they cease to exist, they are not entirely annihilated but remain in the potentiality of matter as before 2.' These passages will help to explain the precise meaning of the expression, that the displaced Form of the corrupted substance recedes into the potentiality of the matter. No Form strictly speaking can be corrupted. It is the composite that is corrupted; and corruption is metonymically predicated of the Form. By the corruption of the substantial composite the Form ceases to be in act. But it is not annihilated, just as it was not created or made. It recedes, then, into the potentiality of matter ;-in other words, it is no longer actual, but virtually exists in the matter after such sort that, should the requisite dispositions recur, it can again be educed out of the matter. Thus, for instance, the substantial Forms of oxygen and hydrogen do not exist actually in the water, but they exist virtually; so that by means of the electric spark disposing the matter, they can be again evolved.

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COROLLARY IV.

Since the human soul is a subsisting entity, it may become the

'Oportet ergo quod materia secundum se considerata sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis. Per unam autem formam non fit in actu nisi quantum ad illam formam. Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias; quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum. Unde, sicut quando est sub forma imperfecta, est in potentia ad formam perfectam, ita e converso.' Iae lxvi, a, c.

2 Formae et accidentia, etsi non habeant materiam partem sui ex qua sint, habent tamen materiam in qua sunt et de cujus potentia educuntur: unde et cum esse desinunt, non omnino annihilantur, sed remanent in potentia materiae, sicut prius,' Poa Q. v, a. 4, 9m.

term of a productive action; but, because it is a spiritual entity, it cannot be either educed out of matter or strictly speaking produced, i.e. made, but must be created. That the human soul is spiritual and subsistent, is assumed as a Lemma from psychology.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The doctrine developed in the last two Propositions contravenes the universal teaching of the Schoolmen, and of St. Thomas in particular, touching the nobility of the substantial Form; since it assigns the latter a position inferior to that of primordial matter. The Antecedent is thus proved. On the point of existence the two are equal; since neither can exist save in conjunction with the other. In a similar manner both are dependent; but the dependence of the Form on matter seems to be much. more absolute than that of matter on Form. For the Form depends on matter by virtue of presupposition. Its own imperfect entity presupposes the matter as its Subject in order that it may, so to say, begin to be. It is evolved out of the matter. But the entity of the matter is only dependent on the Form for its substantial completion. Lastly: A priority of nature has been claimed for matter over the Form, which evidently supposes the inferiority of the latter to the former.

ANSWER. The Antecedent is denied; seeing that the doctrine of these Propositions has been established, as may be seen, on the authority of St. Thomas. Now, for the two proofs of the Antecedent:-It is true, that on the point of their partial existence there is in each an equal necessity for conjunction with the other. It is, moreover, true that each is causally dependent on the other; and it must also be allowed that, in order of genesis, the dependence of the Form on matter is more absolute than the dependence of matter on the Form. But these premisses do not warrant the conclusion. For, in determining the relative superiority or inferiority of the one to the other, we must not regard only or primarily their relative position in order of genesis, but their respective grades in the composite substance. Now, considered in their relation to the composite, the Form is all but incomparably nobler than the matter; since it primarily constitutes the composite, determines its specific nature and specific place in the chain of being, is the source of its natural operations, and moulds matter to its will; whereas the function of

matter is to sustain and (so to say) individualize the Form. As to the second proof:-The conclusion would be valid, if there were no other and nobler priority of nature than that which has been vindicated for matter. But, as the Angelic Doctor remarks, 'It does not belong to the Form to precede the matter in time, but only in dignity1.' 'Form, as received in matter, is posterior to matter in order of genesis, though it is naturally prior 2.'

II. It has been more than once stated, in the exposition of the preceding Propositions, that the existence of these substantial bodily Forms apart from matter is an impossibility. But such an assertion contradicts the teaching of St. Thomas, who is constant in asserting that, while matter cannot exist without a Form, Form can exist without matter. Thus, in one place he says, that "There is nothing to prevent some Form subsisting without matter, though matter cannot exist without Form 3;' and again: Though matter cannot exist without Form, nevertheless Form can exist without matter; for matter has being by the Form, and not vice versa. In this latter passage he cannot be alluding to spiritual and separated Forms; because these do not give being to matter. Therefore, he seems clearly to maintain that bodily substantial Forms can exist apart from matter.

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ANSWER. St. Thomas, in both the above passages as well as in others similar to these, is treating of Form in the full latitude of its signification, as inclusive of separate and spiritual Forms no less than of those which are material and non-subsistent; but, as we shall see, the main discussion turns on spiritual Forms. Further: It is very necessary to fix attention on the fact, that the point debated is this: Whether matter enters into the constitution of spiritual Forms or substances themselves,-to put it otherwise, whether there can be a finite spiritual substance which is not material. The former of the two passages is taken from an Article in which the question is dis

1. Formae autem non est ut tempore materiam praecedat, sed dignitate tantum.' 3 d. ii, Q. 2, a. 3. q. 3, 2m.

2. Forma, secundum quod est recepta in materia, est posterior via generationis quam materia, licet sit prior natura.' I-20 XX, I, 3m.

3 Nihil prohibet aliquam formam sine materia subsistere; licet materia sine forma esse non possit.' Spiritu. a. 1, 6m.

'Licet enim materia non possit esse sine forma, tamen forma potest esse sine materia; quia materia habet esse per formam, et non e converso.' Spiritu. a. 5, 10m.

cussed, Whether a spiritual substance is composed of matter and Form. St. Thomas answers in the negative; but proposes the following among other difficulties to his conclusion. The human soul, he urges, subsists in itself; à fortiori, an Angel. But it would not seem that a substance subsisting in itself could be a Form only. Therefore, a spiritual substance is not a Form only, but is composed of matter and Form. To this objection St. Thomas replies: 'Although the soul subsists of itself, nevertheless, it does not follow that it is composed of matter and Form; because independent subsistence can appertain to a Form apart from matter.' Then follow the words, quoted in the difficulty: For, since matter receives being from the Form, and not vice versa, there is nothing to prevent some Form subsisting without matter, though matter cannot exist without Form.' The answer of the Angelic Doctor may be paraphrased thus: The independent subsistence of a Form does not postulate that it should be conjoined with matter. For though matter, in virtue of its essential nature as a pure potentiality, absolutely in every possible case requires conjunction with some Form, in order that by its actuation it may exist; Form, as Form, does not require matter in order that it may exist, because it is itself act. A Form, therefore, is capable of existence apart from matter; and, if in any given case incapable, this is not, so because it is a Form, but because it is a Form of such an imperfect nature as to be only capable of subsistence in conjunction with matter. Consequently, a spiritual substance, though subsistent in its own right, is not composed of matter and Form; but is a Form only. The second passage quoted in the difficulty is, if possible, plainer still. St. Thomas is engaged in discussing the problem, Whether there is any created spiritual substance that is not united to a body; and, of course, he answers in the affirmative. But he opposes to his conclusion the following difficulty: Created spiritual substances are not matter only; neither are they composed of matter and Form. Therefore, they are Forms. But it is of the nature of a Form to be the act of the matter to which it is united. It would seem, therefore, that spiritual substances are united to a body. St. Thomas replies Substances, which are separate from bodies, are Forms only; nevertheless, they are not the acts of any sort of matter. For, though matter cannot exist without Form, Form can exist without matter; since matter has being by the Form, and not vice versa.' It is plain, then, that in neither of the two passages is

:

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he pronouncing directly or indirectly on those non-subsistent bodily Forms that are the object of the present inquiry, and of which St. Thomas declares, in a passage already quoted, that 'their being is in their union with matter 1'

PROPOSITION CLXXXII.

The eduction of the substantial bodily Form from the potentiality of matter is due to the action of some efficient cause.

The present Proposition has been inserted here, in order to complete the explanation of what is meant by the eduction of the Form out of the potentiality of matter: but the full discussion of the question touching the efficient cause and its causality is reserved for the next Chapter. It will suffice, therefore, for the time being to set before the reader briefly the teaching of the Angelic Doctor touching this point. Matter,' writes St. Thomas, 'considered as denuded of all Form, is indifferent to all Forms; but is determined to special Forms by the virtue of the efficient cause 2.' But how is the matter thus determined? By the dispositions implanted in it by the agent. How is it disposed? By a two-fold preparation; one relatively to the efficient cause, the other relatively to the Form about to be evolved. The former is, therefore, ancillary to the latter, and embraces the due disposition of the matter for receiving the action of the efficient cause. In illustration it may, perhaps, be permitted to quote again a passage from the Angelic Doctor, already given under the second Member of the hundred and eightieth Proposition. The preparation which is required in matter in order that it may receive a Form includes two things; viz. that it should be in due proportion to the Form, and to the agent' (efficient cause) 'whose it is to introduce the Form; because nothing evolves itself from potentiality into act. Now, the proportion due for receiving the action of the agent resolves itself into a due approximation to the agent 3.' The approximation of which St. Thomas here speaks is a local proximity. The due proportion

1 Poa Q. iii, a. 11, 11m.

2 Materia, prout nuda consideratur, se habet indifferenter ad omnes formas, sed determinatur ad speciales formas per virtutem moventis, ut traditur in 2 de Generatione.' Spiritu. a. 3, 20m.

3 4 d. xvii, Q. I, a. 2, q. 2, c.