by the above preliminary distinction, it has not yet disappeared. The reason assigned for rejecting the opinion of Suarez was generally, that no accident can become a necessary condition of the constitution of its own Subject. Then, apart from the question of a supposed contradiction between the two Theses, how is it possible that any accidents of a given substance can ever be conditions of its primordial constitution? Wherefore,

i. To clear the way:-There is no question of priority of time, at least necessarily, in the mutual relation of substance and accident. This is the starting-point; for it is quite clear that the problem turns upon a priority of some sort that substance claims over accident. It has been already pointed out in the hundred and eightyfourth Proposition, that the respective quantity and qualities of each primordial element were concreated with the element itself in accordance with the accidental nature of each. In natural generation the quantity and qualitative properties are, after a manner, generated synchronously with the generation of the new substance. There is this vital difference, however, in this respect among others between the creation of the elements and natural generation, viz. that these accidents in creation do not virtually pre-exist; whereas in natural generation they do virtually pre-exist in the corrupted substance, while receiving their existence from the new Form.

ii. It is quite plain that the priority, which lies at the foundation of the present difficulty, is not a mere priority of order; because mere priority of order does not connote dependence, whereas accident includes an essential dependence upon substance.

iii. There is a certain priority of nature which substance essentially vindicates to itself over accident; and it remains to be seen whether this priority is of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of quantity and quality becoming conditions of the causality of the substantial Form. Here is the root of the difficulty. On the one hand, it is certain that every accident presupposes its Subject as constituted according to its specific nature and, consequently, quantity and quality presuppose their Subject thus constituted; on the other hand, matter must be portioned, proportioned, and disposed by quantity and quality for the evolution of such or such a particular Form. It is important, then, to bear in mind, first of all, that quantity is (so to say) a generic and undifferential accident. In this respect, as in others, it bears a very striking resemblance to primordial matter; so much so, indeed, that it may be fairly called

a sort of primordial matter for the rest of the accidents. Similarly, there are certain generic qualities, as it were, which virtually belong to all bodies, such as figure, weight, colour, etc. These are, therefore, invariable accompaniments of quantity. Quantity, then, is an essential property of all bodies, existing indifferently in one as in another. It is true that its limits vary; but limit, figure, etc., are modifications of quantity, that find their place in the Category of Quality. It follows, as St. Thomas teaches, that quantity depends upon that primary and fundamental Form which is virtually contained in all material substantial Forms,-to wit, the body-Form; and this Form may consequently be called generic, since all actual Forms are, as it were, its specific determinations. Wherefore, looking at the question metaphysically, quantity is at once the accident of the body-Form,—or rather, of body as the primordial composite substance virtually contained, as a sort of genus, in the elements themselves and in all subsequent compound substances, and the necessary condition of the causality of all other substantial Forms. But, since quantity requires actuation by qualitative Forms, as primordial matter by substantial Forms; it follows that certain generic or indeterminate qualities should in like manner be accidents of the body-Form and conditions of the causality of all other actual substantial Forms. And now to descend to particulars:-It is very much to be doubted whether the primordial elements, according to the exigency of their nature, required for their creation any dispositions in the matter beyond its quantitative apportionment concreated with each element; for the quantity would in each case be informed by those primary properties of each element, that accompanied its creation,-so many actual determinations of the generic qualities which follow the body-Form. The dispositions necessary for the evolution of the Forms of compound bodies are to be found partly in such as are introduced in the matter by an external agency,—such, for instance, as that of the electric spark,-partly by attraction and affinity and other accidents existing in the component elements. In the natural generation of living entities, certain qualitative accidents, (for the quantity in the matter has been already determined in the corrupted substance), dispose the matter either for the eduction or introduction of the new Form, as the case may be, and consequently for the constitution of the new composite. Wherefore, all the accidents in the corrupted substance that are homogeneous with the new Form remain essentially (or as

regards their essence) in the newly generated substance; no longer, however, as dispositions but as proper accidents, since they receive a new actuation and existence from the new Form. The newly generated Form leads captive the subjacent matter and, together with it, the accidents that it finds there. Those that are heterogeneous it exiles, while the dispository and other friendly accidents it accepts as its own subjects, but gives to them a new entitative existence under its own sway. It is in such wise that quantity and certain qualities may be really and truly conditions necessary to the causality of the substantial Form, and yet as accidents retain the true nature of their dependence upon substance.

§ 3.

The nature of the causality of the substantial Form.

PROPOSITION CC.

There is a metaphysical distinction between the entity and the causality of the substantial Form.

PROLEGOMENON.

In the Enunciation of the Thesis it is said that there is a metaphysical distinction, in order at once to claim for the conceived distinction a certain foundation of reality and at the same time to exclude anything like a physical distinction. The Thesis, therefore, virtually contains two Members,―viz. that there is a metaphysical, and that there is not a physical, distinction existing between the bodily Form and its causality.

By a physical distinction is to be understood (as we have seen before) a real distinction, such that there is a natural possibility of separating one from the other, so that one at least of the two is capable of existing without the other. Metaphysical distinction, on the other hand, is conceptual yet based on a reality, or real yet in such wise that neither is physically capable of existing without the other. The reader will do well to consult the Article on Distinctions, Book iii, ch. ii.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER asserts that there is a metaphysical distinction between the substantial bodily Form and its causality. First of all it is plain that, if (as will be proved in the second Member)

there is no physical distinction between the two, the distinction must be conceptual, since there is no middle term; always supposing that there is a distinction of some sort, about which in the present instance there cannot be a doubt. The only remaining question, therefore, is, whether this conceptual distinction is rationis ratiocinantis or rationis ratiocinatae; in other words, whether the distinction is exclusively a creation of the mind, or whether a real foundation for the concept is discoverable. The Thesis maintains that this latter is the case; and the assertion is thus proved. A distinction which is due to the perfection of the object distinguished, by virtue of which it is equivalent to two realities really distinct in other entities, is a metaphysical distinction. But such is the distinction between the bodily Form and its causality. Therefore, etc. The Major is evident; for it is a definition. The Minor is thus declared. In other finite entities there is a real distinction between the principiant of action, or of causality, and the causality itself; so that the principiant,-at the least de potentia absoluta,—can exist, and does often exist, without its causal action. In the substantial Form these two are one by reason of the perfection of its entity. Again: If considered in the light of an imperfection, (and that it admits of being so considered, will be explained under the second Member); such imperfection is the foundation of another species of metaphysical distinction, about which, as about the former, the Article referred to in the Prolegomenon gives a detailed explanation. Again: In the human soul, which is a substantial bodily Form, the two are seen to be actually separated; since the soul exists after death and, nevertheless, ceases to inform the body.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Thesis declares that there is no physical distinction between the bodily Form and its causality. A distinction between two entities, neither of which can be separated from the other either in the order of nature or de potentia absoluta, is not a real distinction. But the substantial bodily Form neither in order of nature nor de potentia absoluta can be separated from its causality or the causality from the Form. Therefore, there is no real distinction between them. The Major is indisputable. The Minor has been sufficiently established in former Propositions. For it has been shown that these bodily Forms, (with the solitary exception signalized at the beginning of the Article), depend upon the matter for their eduction and support; so that the commencement and continuance of their existence depend upon their actually

informing the matter. Consequently, it is impossible to separate the Form from its causality; for the same moment that it ceases to be causal, it ceases to be. Its causality is what may be analogically called the material part of its essence, the specific determination of its causality supplying (as it were) the place of a Form. This virtual identity of the Form with its causality owes its origin to the imperfection of its substantial entity; as the above declaration of the Minor must have made sufficiently apparent. It is in this sense that the distinction in question may be said to be founded on the imperfection of the Form. Hence, compared with the human soul, or even, after a manner, with accidental Forms, the substantial bodily Form is conceptually distinguished from its causality rather according to this second species of metaphysical distinction. On the other hand, forasmuch as it is identified with its own essential operation or causal action, it is a more simple act than are principiants that are separable from such action; and, considered in this light, the foundation for the distinction between it and its causality is a perfection indicative of a more absolute unity.

DIFFICULTY.

Against the proof of the second Member it is objected as follows. It would appear that de potentia absoluta,—that is to say, by the Omnipotence of God,—the substantial Form could be preserved in being without its actual causality,-in other words, without its informing matter. Therefore, there is a real distinction between the two. The Antecedent is proved by two arguments. First of all, in the human soul there is an actual separation. But, so far as the information of the matter is concerned, the human soul stands on a par with all other bodily Forms. Consequently, these latter are separable de potentia absoluta. Secondly, quantity can be preserved in being, apart from matter de potentia absoluta, as all the Doctors of the School allow. Therefore, à fortiori the substantial Form. Such is the argument of Suarez, who maintains that there is a real distinction between the bodily Form and its causality. Fonseca goes so far as to say that 'no Catholic philosopher doubts but that all Forms without exception can be preserved by the Power of God without a Subject 1.'

1. 'Neque ullus Catholicus Philosophus ambigit, quin formae absolute omnes divina potestate sine subjecto cohaerere in rerum natura possint.' In Metaph. Arist. L. V, Cap. 2, Q. 4, § I., v. ƒ.