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DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION.

Matter is essentially a mere passive potentiality, (as has been shown in the previous Chapter), having a natural disposition towards its act as (to say the least) completive of its perfection in its own Category; since without the Form it is an incomplete entity, -nay, the most incomplete of entities,-next to nothing. Therefore, by virtue of its nature it depends upon the Form. But it naturally depends upon the Form for its existence. For (i) a mere passive potentiality in the order of nature requires actuation as a condition of its existence. Why? Because it is a mere receptivity. But a mere receptivity is not in act, till it receives. Neither is it, -physically, at all events,-an act; for an act, as act, excludes potentiality. Furthermore: Because it is not an act, it is in potentiality to existence; because nothing that is not an act, or actual, can exist. If, then, it is in potentiality to existence; it cannot exist till it is actuated by the Form. Therefore, it depends upon the latter for its existence. (ii) If matter could exist without actuation by the Form, it would be wholly useless; and 'nature makes nothing in vain.' It is frivolous to urge that it would not be useless, because it would retain its essential tendency towards some Form as condition of its actuation. For how could such tendency make matter practically useful, so long as it was forcibly hindered from arriving at its term? (iii) It is not reasonable to suppose that matter should be less dependent on the substantial Form than on accidental Forms. Yet matter cannot naturally exist without the latter, more particularly without quantity. Therefore, it connaturally postulates actuation by the substantial Form in order that it may exist, the more so, that the accidents are consequent upon the Form. (iv) That which always occurs in the same way among the things of nature may be safely said to be naturally necessary. But the information of matter by some substantial Form always occurs in the same way. Therefore, etc. The Minor is proved by experience; for there is no known exception to the rule. But, if it is naturally necessary to the existence of matter that it should be actuated by some substantial Form, matter depends upon such Form, in the ordering of nature, for its existence. (v) This last argument is confirmed by the universal law of alternate corruptions and generations. In no single instance does a corruption terminate, so to speak, in itself; but it invariably makes way for

a new generation. Hence, matter from the first moment of creation has been always under the actuation of some substantial Form. But this is no feeble sign of a natural necessity.

DIFFICULTY.

Primordial matter has a partial subsistence of its own. Therefore, it is not dependent on the Form for its existence.

ANSWER. It is true that matter has a partial subsistence in the composite, that is to say, as actuated by the Form;-but, apart from the composite, it has neither partial subsistence nor existence nor entity. Besides, as Suarez acutely remarks, subsistence,—that is, the existence of a thing in itself without inherence in another,excludes dependence on a Subject, but not dependence on an act, or Form.

PROPOSITION CCIV.

Such natural dependence of the matter on the Form is not a mere necessary condition, but is truly causal.

THE THESIS IS PROVED by the following arguments:

But

I. The first argument is an argumentum ad hominem;-of no little weight, be it observed, in the present controversy, which is a purely Scholastic one; though its issues are much more general and of the gravest importance. The purport is, to show that those Scholastic philosophers who maintain the opposite opinion are in contradiction with themselves; since they hold and teach the doctrine of formal causality, yet at the same time virtually deny its existence. The argument is as follows: If this natural dependence of matter on the substantial Form were a mere necessary condition and not causal, the Form must be expunged from the catalogue of causes. this would practically amount to the subversion of the Peripatetic, or Scholastic, Philosophy. The Major is thus proved. The natural dependence of the matter on its Form for its existence is confessedly the dependence of matter as a passive potentiality on its act. Consequently, if this dependence is not causal, the actuation of matter by the Form (which is this same dependence in act) will not be causal. Therefore, the Form will not be formal cause of the matter. But neither of the composite; for the composite is really nothing more or less than the matter actuated by the Form. If this be true of the substantial Form; à fortiori must it be true of

accidental Forms. Now, substance and accident are a real dichotomic division; within one or other of the members of which every entity is included. Therefore, in the hypothesis that this dependence of matter on Form is a mere necessary condition, there would be no such thing as a formal cause. Against the above argument it may be urged, that the dependence of matter for its existence on the Form and its dependence on the Form for its completeness and substantial perfection are not one and the same thing; and that consequently the latter may be causal, while the former is a mere necessary condition. The answer is plain. The dependence in both cases is really the same, though considered from two different points of view. The matter naturally depends upon the Form for its existence, because it depends upon the same for its actuation ; and by its actuation it receives its completeness and substantial perfection. Wherefore, if the former is not causal; so neither can the latter be.

II. The substantial Form, as all are agreed, has a causal dependence on the matter. Therefore, à fortiori the matter causally depends on the Form; because the Form is out of all comparison the more noble. Consequently, it is only fitting that, of the two, its dependence should be the less stringent. Neither is it a valid objection against this second argument, that the Form depends upon the matter as upon its Subject; and that this can under no possible hypothesis be predicated of the Form: Therefore, it is necessary to admit that the dependence of the Form on matter is more stringent than that of matter on the Form. For there are more ways of dependence than one; and it cannot be admitted that the particular dependence on another as on a Subject is the most absolute. There is the dependence on another for entitative actuation, by which the existence and actual entity of the actuated depends on the actuating; and this is more absolute than the dependence of one entity on another as its Subject. For dependence is measured by indigence. Now, (as we have been already taught by the Angelic Doctor), if we consider the question metaphysically, the matter receives a notable perfection in its limitation by the Form; while the Form suffers loss in its limitation by matter, because the fecundity of its extension is diminished by its individuation.

III. The dependence of the matter for its existence upon the Form is shown to be causal from the essential nature of this dependence. For a pure passive potentiality essentially postulates its

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actuation and its existence as identified with its actuation.

matter is only actuated by its substantial Form.

DIFFICULTIES.

But

A. The first class of objections embraces those arguments which are adduced in proof that the said dependence is only a necessary condition.

I. This mode of dependence is possible; for it exists as a fact. The Antecedent is proved from the accidental dispositions of the matter in the process of generation. For the eduction of the substantial Form, the concomitant information of matter, and constitution of the composite, depend upon these conditions. But the dependence is not causal. Again: It is certain that the information of the matter and constitution of the composite depend upon the apportionment of matter by quantity. But here again the dependence is not causal. In both cases the dependence is but a necessary condition. Therefore, à fortiori matter can depend upon its substantial Form as a mere necessary condition.

ANSWER. So far is the above conclusion from being à fortiori, that it is not even à pari. There is no parity even between the instances adduced and the case of the substantial Form. In the first place, the said accidents are not the proper act of matter; whereas the latter is. Further: These accidents presuppose the existence and, therefore, the information of matter; and are accidental acts of the composite. Secondly, they are in a different Category from that of matter, the Form, and composite. Consequently, they cannot possibly exercise a causal influx into the existence of any one of the three. In their case, therefore, the dependence cannot be causal. But the substantial Form is the act of matter and, together with this latter, is by reduction under the same Category of substance. Lastly, considered as necessary conditions, they are included by St. Thomas under the material cause; while, considered as actually existing in the composite, they are concomitants of the Form.

II. The aforesaid mode of explaining the dependence of the matter on the Form is sufficient to account fully for all that has been predicated of this dependence; and the arguments hitherto offered in support of the contrary opinion go no further than

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prove that matter depends on the Form as a necessary condition of its existence.

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ANSWER. This assertion, unaccompanied by any proof, must be met with an unequivocal denial. The Angelic Doctor has predicated of matter that it is next to nothing,-that it cannot alone become the term of a Creative Act, and is consequently concreated with the Form,-that it cannot exist of itself, but receives existence from the Form,-that there is a mutual causality between matter and Form,-that 'It comes to pass in causes, that the same entity is cause and caused in a different order of causality. It is the same with the relation existing between matter and Form. For, in the category of material cause, the matter is cause of the Form, in that it sustains the latter; while the Form is cause in the category of formal cause, because it causes matter to be in act1. Are these ample declarations, particularly in their collective strength, satisfied by the opinion, that the existence of the matter depends upon the Form only as a necessary condition? Again: Among the arguments adduced in support of the present Proposition, (let one example suffice), it has been urged that the Form exercises a real influx into the existence of the matter in consequence of the essential dependence of the latter, as a pure passive potentiality, on the former, as its substantive act. Can such an argument be satisfied by the dependence of the matter on the Form as on a mere condition?

III. The mode of explanation maintained by Suarez is easy and clear; for it enables us plainly to understand how the matter depends on the Form, the Form on the matter. The dependence of the Form on the matter is causal and à priori; while the dependence of matter on the Form is a mere concomitant condition and à posteriori.

ANSWER. Easy explanations of abstruse metaphysical problems have a name of evil omen. They are for the most part like the short cuts of inexperienced travellers, which end in leading those who venture them far away out of the right road. So is it in the present

'In causis autem contingit quod idem est causa et causatum, secundum diversum genus causae. . . . Et similiter de habitudine quae est inter materiam et formam : quia secundum genus causae materialis materia est causa formae quasi sustentans ipsam, et forma est causa materiae quasi faciens eam esse actu secundum genus causae formalis.' 4 d. xvii, Q. 1, a. 4, q. 1, c. Videsis Verit. Q. xxvii, a. 7, c. ૨ ૧ 2

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