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explained; though the solution of them will be simplified, for men who think, by that which has gone before. The common sort judge, and, so far as their judgment is purely positive, judge rightly, in accordance with the natural phenomena that meet the senses. They do not concern themselves with an occult antecedent process (in fieri); but with the constituted fact (in facto esse). By their common sense they recognize in the animate things of nature a body on the one hand, and a ruling, operating, life on the other. They separate the two; and phenomena justify the phenomenal distinction they make. But the essential link between the two, it is not theirs to see. It is object of science, not of common The senses cannot near it; it reveals itself only to the practised understanding.

sense.

III. Lastly, and this would seem to have been the principal argument that moved Scotus to adopt the opinion in question,— the co-existence of the body-Form with the soul of living bodies is deducible from the phenomena of death. When a thing dies, the animating Form leaves the body; and there is no other substantial Form that immediately takes its place. During this interregnum the matter cannot be existing without any Form at all. Therefore, the body-Form must have actually co-existed with the specific animating Form; and is seen to remain after the death of the once living entity. That no other new substantial Form then intervenes, is thus proved. If such intervention took place, the body would be specifically at once and individually different; whereas to all appearance it remains for some time specifically and individually the same.

ANSWER. It is undoubtedly true, that the matter which constitutes the body of a living creature cannot remain formless after death; but it is equally certain that the arrangement imagined by Scotus is naturally impossible. For, (not to repeat the arguments which go to prove that two substantial Forms cannot simultaneously inform the same portion of matter, as also the demonstration that the body-Form cannot exist unless specifically determined), according to the Scotist hypothesis there would be corruption without a corresponding generation. Neither does the reply avail, that generation is the necessary concomitant of a total corruption; whereas in the present instance it is only a partial corruption. For, in the first place, these partial substantial cor

ruptions are simply a new invention to meet the difficulty. They are not known in any other case; nor were they heard of before. Secondly, if we are to admit of partial corruptions, we must necessarily admit partial generations; which leaves the difficulty where it was. Lastly, the body would not remain the same, in the hypothesis of Scotus; because the informed matter would be generically body; whereas it was previously the specific body of a geranium,—say,—or of an ox. Yet the assumed identity of the body is the main stay of the theory. If it should be urged in reply, that the body remains generically the same; the answer is obvious. The bodies of a geranium and of an ox are generically the same; so that after death there is nothing to hinder the remains from becoming one body. There is another strong argument that tells against the theory of Scotus. On his hypothesis, there would be a partial substantial corruption; nevertheless, there would still remain a complete material substance composed of matter and a material Form.

Consequently, in unison with the common teaching of the School it must be said that, as soon as the living substance is corrupted and the soul recedes, the corpse-Form succeeds. Wherefore, it is no longer in reality either specifically or individually the same body; though it may analogically be considered as such by the title of former possession. As for the apparent identity between the two, the question has already been discussed; it may, however, be added, that there are commonly supposed to be specific and individual differences in corpses to correspond with those of living bodies. This would account for identity of structure, organism, individual marks, and the like.

It remains to show that the answer here given is in harmony with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. In one place St. Thomas says, 'The dead body of a saint,' (the nature of the question discussed alone suggested the limitation, since the argument applies equally to all living things), 'is not numerically the same as it was at the first while living, on account of the diversity of the Form'' Again: The dead body of every other man,' except Christ, is not the same absolutely, but only to a certain extent; because it is the same as regards the matter, but not the same as

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'Corpus mortuum alicujus sancti non est idem numero quod primo fuit, dum viveret, propter diversitatem formae.' 30 xxv, 6, 3m.

regards the Form 1' So, once more, while engaged in a discussion of the question, Whether the Body of Christ on the Cross and in the Sepulchre was numerically One, he objects to his own conclusion that it was One, as follows: All things whatsoever that differ in species, differ numerically. But the Body of Christ hanging on the Cross and' that Body lying in the Sepulchre differ specifically. Therefore, etc. 3' The solution of St. Thomas will not be given, because it belongs to Supernatural Theology. It is enough to know that in his answer he clearly admits the existence of a specific difference in the mere order of nature, between a body dead and that same body alive. But, according to the hypothesis of Scotus, there could be no specific difference between a body alive and dead, but only a generic identity; since, in order to constitute a specific difference, the mutual opposition of two specific Forms is required. Animal and horse do not differ specifically. The Formula of St. Thomas would be, M+F specifically differs from M+F; the formula of Scotus, M+C+F and M+C—F=M+C; (M representing the matter, C corporeity or the body-Form, F the specific Form of the living substance, F the corpse-Form of the dead substance).

answer. cause.

IV. An objection is urged against the above explanation, or The introduction of a new Form postulates an efficient But, in many instances of death, there is no agent to which the eduction of the corpse-Form can be attributed. Therefore, etc. ANSWER. The same agencies which indispose the matter for retaining the vital Form concur towards the retrogade eduction of the corpse-Form.

PROPOSITION CCX.

It is neither necessary nor possible that lower Forms of life should actually co-exist with a higher Form of life in the same composite.

DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION.

Certain Doctors of the School have maintained, that in man there are three souls really distinct,-a vegetative, animal, and

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1 Corpus mortuum cujuscumque alterius hominis non est idem simpliciter, sed secundum quid: quia est idem secundum materiam, non autem idem secundum formam.' 3ae 1, im.

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'Quaecumque differunt specie, differunt numero. Sed corpus Christi appensum in cruce et jacens in sepulchro, differt specie eo modo quo mortuum et vivum differunt specie. Ergo non est unum et idem numero.' Quol. L. IV, a. 8, 1m arg.

rational, soul. To be consequent, these authors would be compelled to admit, that similarly in irrational animals there are two actually distinct Forms,-the vegetative, and their own sensitive soul. The arguments already offered in previous Theses sufficiently establish the truth of the above enunciation, and afford a satisfactory answer to the reasons given for the contrary opinion. One more argument, however,—or rather a preceding argument under a new form,--may be added, in order to expose the absurdity of the theory in question. If, for instance, a vegetative soul and a sensitive soul could actually co-exist with the rational soul in a man, the two former must of necessity be determined to some definite species; for no genus, as such, can exist in the world of nature. Consequently,--to put it in the concrete,-Charles (we will say) has his own individual reasonable soul and, besides this, the vegetative Form of a dandelion as well as the soul of a hippopotamus. The practical incongruity of such a combination is sufficiently apparent; unless we suppose that these two latter Forms remain quiescent. But their remaining quiescent would suppose a Form deprived by nature of its natural operation; which is preposterous.

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The constant teaching of the Angelic Doctor confirms, were confirmation needed, the truth of the present Proposition. Thus, in an Opusculum which is devoted exclusively to the discussion of this question, he expresses his judgment as follows: A Form that is virtually more perfect contains within it the less perfect Form. Therefore, the more perfect Form supposed, it is superfluous to suppose the less perfect. Since, then, there is nothing superfluous in nature; nature does not suffer that in the same composite there should be two Forms, one of which is more perfect than the other'.' He then proceeds to heap up arguments in disproof of the theory that is here impugned; for which the reader is referred to the Opusculum. In the following passage, taken from another of his Works, the Angelic Doctor pursues the same idea. We must understand,' he writes, that substantial Forms have a similar relation, one with another, to that which subsists between numerals, as it is said in the eighth Book of the Metaphysics; or, again, like to that subsisting between geometrical figures, as the Philosopher

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Posita ergo

Forma ergo perfectior virtute continet formam imperfectiorem. forma perfectiori, superfluit ponere imperfectiorem. Cum ergo in natura nihil sit superfluum, non permittit natura quod in eodem composito sint duae formae, quarum una sit perfectior alia.' Opusc. XLV (aliter XLII), init.

remarks touching the parts of the soul in the second Book of his De Anima. For a greater number, or a more complex geometrical figure, always contains virtually within itself the less; just as fire contains four, and a pentagon contains a quadrilateral. In like manner, a more perfect Form virtually contains within itself the less perfect; as is more particularly evident in animals. For the rational soul has the virtue of conferring on the human body all that the sensitive soul confers on brutes; and similarly the sensitive soul in animals causes all that the nutritive soul causes in plants, and more besides. Wherefore, in man a sensitive soul in addition to an intellectual soul would be useless; because the intellectual soul virtually contains the sensitive soul, and more besides; just as the enumeration of the' number four would be a useless addition, if we have arrived at the number fire. The same holds good of all substantial Forms, till you arrive at primordial matter. . . Accordingly, it is plain that, when the perfect Form comes, the imperfect Form is removed; just as the figure of a quadrilateral is removed, as soon as that of a pentagon supervenes '.'

§ 3.

The possibility of a multiplication in the same body of substantial Forms, the rest of which are dispositions for the principal Form.

The discussions upon which we are now about to enter are of more than ordinary interest, if considered in the light of recent physical investigations. There is a relative importance, therefore, attaching to them, which it would ill become the author of this Work to ignore; seeing that one of his main objects, more particularly in the present Book, has been to show that the Scholastic Philosophy squares in a remarkable manner with the discoveries in

1 Sciendum est quod formae substantiales se habent ad invicem sicut numeri, ut dicitur in 8 Metaph; vel etiam sicut figurae, ut de partibus animae dicit Philosophus in 2 de Anima. Semper enim major numerus vel figura virtute continet in se minorem, sicut quinarius quaternarium et pentagonus tetragonum; et similiter perfectior forma virtute continet in se imperfectiorem, ut maxime in animalibus patet. Anima enim intellectiva habet virtutem ut conferat corpori humano quidquid confert sensitiva in brutis; et similiter sensitiva facit in animalibus quidquid nutritiva in plantis, et adhuc amplius. Frustra ergo esset in homine alia anima sensitiva praeter intellectivam, ex quo anima intellectiva virtute continet sensitivam, et adhuc amplius; sicut frustra adderetur quaternarius, posito quinario. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus formis substantialibus usque ad materiam primam... Manifestum est autem quod semper, adveniente forma perfecta, tollitur forma imperfecta; sicut etiam, adveniente figura pentagoni, tollitur quadrati.' Quol. L. I, a. 6, c.

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