legal right, but it is not likely that the courts would draw so fine a distinction between this case and that of an owner protecting his property, and therefore the act of shooting at a trespassing aviator, or even merely of pointing a gun which the owner knew to be loaded, would be the commission of a criminal offence, and of an act of unnecessary violence. (b) If the result of the shooting were fatal, the owner would be guilty of manslaughter, even if it is assumed in his favour that no offence under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, has been committed. It is a principle familiar to all that every criminal offence involves the mental condition of a "vicious will" or "intention," and that there must be some form of mens rea, i.e., the wrongdoer must (1) be able to "help doing" what he does, (2), know that he is doing a criminal act, and (3), every sane adult is presumed to foresee and to intend the natural consequence of his conduct. Assuming that the owner has the right to eject trespassers, and that he has used the only force which can under the circumstances be used by him, it would be idle for the owner to argue that he did not know that a fatal accident might result, or that it is impossible to foresee such a contingency arising, or that, taking everything into consideration, such as the care with which he had fired at the aeroplane, and that he had warned the aviator of his intention to shoot, he had not in law intended the natural consequences of his act. But the opinion has been expressed by Denman, J., in R. v. Prince, L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154, that criminal liability may exist even where there is an intention to do some act which is wrong, even although it does not amount to a crime; whilst Bramwell, B., giving judgment in the same case, actually went so far as to say that the intention to commit an act only morally wrong was sufficient mens rea. However much this latter view may be questioned, it is clear that criminal liability exists where there is an intention to commit a crime, even although it is not the particular crime in fact committed, or where there is an intention to do a tortious or wrongful act which yet falls short of a crime. To shoot with fatal result at a trespassing aviator, without warning and without taking precaution, would be manslaughter (assuming always that 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, does not apply), because the owner intended to commit and did in fact commit an act which was wrong. Neither would the taking of precautions, as suggested above, absolve the owner from liability since every sane adult is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his conduct, and is assumed by law to have the power of foreseeing these consequences. From whatever point the question is approached, it seems clear that the owner would not be able to enforce his right of ejectment, but would be obliged to rest content with his right of action for damages or for a declaration, or for an injunction to restrain further acts of trespass. In view of the present stage of development arrived at by the science of aviation, the writer ventures to suggest that the landowner has at his command all the remedies he requires, and to express the hope that no landlord will be tempted, should he read this article, to institute proceedings for trespass against an aviator merely for flying over the owner's land.-Law Magazine. VERBUM SAP.-On the door of the old Court-room of the Court of Appeal at Osgoode Hall is affixed the notice: "Dangerous, keep out." NE SUTOR ULTRA CREPIDAM:-Motion before Court of Appeal for stated case by way of appeal from the conviction of a cobbler, aged 73, for non-support of his second wife aged 63. Mr. Justice Magee: "She was probably his last, and he did not stick to her." REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES. (Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.) ADMIRALTY-BILL OF LADING INCORPORATION INTO BILL OF LADING OF CONDITIONS OF CHARTER-PARTY-ARBITRATION CLAUSE -STAYING ACTION. The Portsmouth (1910) P. 293. In this case goods were shipped under a bill of lading which provided for payment of freight and other conditions as per charter-party." The charter-party provided inter alia for the payment of demurrage, and also contained an arbitration clause in the event of any dispute. The shipowners commenced an action for demurrage against the holder for value of the bill of lading, and an application was then made by the defendant to stay the action, on the ground that the matter in dispute must be referred to arbitration. The County Court judge granted the application and the Divisional Court (Evans, P.P.D., and Deane, J.) affirmed his decision holding that the terms of the charter-party were by reference incorporated into the bill of lading. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-NOTICE OF ACCIDENT REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO CAUSE OF DEATH-PREJUDICE TO EMPLOYER-WORK- Eke v. Hart-Dyke (1910) 2 K.B. 677 was an action under the Employers' Liability Act, 1906, which contains similar provisions to those in R.S.O. c. 160, s. 13, as to giving of notice. The deceased workman had died in October and no notice of the accident was given until December. The excuse for not giving the notice was the uncertainty of the real cause of the deceased workman's death, and this was held to be a "reasonable cause" for not giving the notice within the statutory period. COMPANY-WINDING-UP-OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND LIQUIDATORFRAUD-EXAMINATION OF PERSON CHARGED LIQUIDATOR UNSUCCESSFULLY OPPOSING APPLICATION FOR EXCULPATION— JURISDICTION TO ORDER LIQUIDATOR TO PAY COSTS PERSONALLY. In re Tweddle & Co. (1910) 2 K.B. 697. This is the decision of the Court of Appeal (Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ.), varying the judgment of the Divisional Court (1910) 2 K.B. 67 (noted ante, p. 537). As was remarked in that note, while agreeing with the Divisional Court that in respect of the liquidator's report and the consequent examination of the parties charged therein with fraud, the liquidator was merely discharging his official duty and as to those proceedings there was no jurisdiction to order him to pay costs personally, yet the Court of Appeal considered his unsuccessful opposition to the motion of the party charged for an exculpatory order stood on a different footing, and having made himself an active party to litigation he incurred a personal liability to pay costs if he failed, and the order of the Divisional Court was varied by directing him to pay those costs. JUSTICES-PRACTICE-HEARING OF INFORMATION-ABSENCE OF INFORMANT-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES BY POLICE OFFICER. In May v. Beeley (1910) 2 K.B. 722 an information was preferred by Beeley, superintendent of police, against the appellant May, charging him with driving a motor at an excessive speed on the highway. On the hearing the informant was not present nor represented by counsel or solicitor, but witnesses were produced and examined in support of the information by a police sergeant who was also one of the witnesses in the case. The appellant's solicitor called the attention of the justices to the fact of the sergeant taking the conduct of the case, and they offered to adjourn, but the solicitor for the appellant declined an adjournment and the appellant was convicted, no objection being made to the hearing of the information in the informant's absence. On appeal from the conviction the Divisional Court. (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Bucknill, and Bray, JJ.) held that though there was some conflict as to what actually took place before the justices in regard to the offer to adjourn, the court was bound to accept the statement of the justices, and the appellant having waived the adjournment offered could not now contend that the mere fact that the police officer had improperly acted as advocate in the absence of the informant, invalidated the conviction. Correspondence GORDON V. HORNE AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL. To the Editor, CANADA LAW JOURNAL: DEAR SIR, I have read with interest Mr. Deacon's letter in your last issue as well as your editorial comments upon the case of Gordon v. Horne. May I be permitted to add my item to the discussion. I have read the evidence set out in the judgment of Clements, J., in 13 B.C. 140-141. It seems to me incomprehensible how any court composed of reasonable men could have come to any other conclusion than what was arrived at by the Supreme Court of British Columbia, and by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It was not a question of conflict of evidence but one as to the evidence of the defendant himself. I cannot see how the Privy Council, the court of last resort, could have come to any other conclusion. Yours, etc., Toronto, Nov. 22. K. C. ADMIRALTY LAW AND COMMON LAW. To the Editor, CANADA LAW JOURNAL, TORONTO: DEAR SIR,-In your issue of November 1st, at page 654, you cite The Drumlanrig (1910), p. 249, to shew "the difference between admiralty law and common law on the question of liability for negligence." May I suggest with all deference that your comments on this case do not define this difference in accordance with the cases? You contrast the common law rule of Thoroughgood v. Bryan with the admiralty rule adopted in The Drumlanrig, and point that while the common law rule prevents a passenger injured in one of two colliding vehicles, equally in fault, from recovering damages from the driver or owner of the other vehicle, the cargo owner, on the other hand, under similar circumstances can recover half his damage from the owner of the other boat. You suggest that the cargo owner has a better remedy than the passenger. Is it not so that Thoroughgood v. Bryan was decisively overruled by the House of Lords in The Bernina, 13 A.C. 1, and that the doctrine that the passenger is always identified with his vehicle was emphatically condemned? And was not the main point in the Drumlanrig |